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Digital archives of early modern printed materials—on Early English Books 
Online, Eighteenth-Century Collections Online, Google Books, and Project Gutenberg, 
among others—are rife with scanning errors, incomplete metadata, typos, and other odd, 
frustrating artifacts of mediation. Each technological change in writing brings its own 
version of problems in preserving and mediating our print history—problems which may, 
paradoxically, proliferate errors as they seek to correct prior mistakes. “The Progress of 
Error” traces a history of these fractious, recursive, debates about error correction and 
mediation in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when editors, printers, 
and critics squabbled over the best means of preserving classical texts, Shakespeare, 
Milton, and early English ballads. I argue that the literary past is literally made of 
mistakes and attempts to correct them which go out of control; these errant corrections 
are not to be fixed in future editions but rather are constitutive of Enlightenment concepts 
of mediation, criticism, sensory perception, historicity, and agency.  
Editor and satirist Alexander Pope played both sides of the error correction and 
creation game, translating and editing texts at the same time as he reveled in satire’s 
distorting lens and its potential for correcting others’ moral and intellectual failings. 
Classical editor Richard Bentley, a target of Pope’s scourge in the first edition of the 
Dunciad, practiced extraordinary editorial hubris in insisting that he could conjecturally 
correct not just typos in Milton’s epic poem Paradise Lost, but entire lines that he felt 
were blots on the poem’s design and style. Lewis Theobald followed Bentley’s 
 
intellectually provocative but over-reaching, bombastic style when he turned his scrutiny 
onto Pope’s editorial methods: his Shakespeare Restor’d was a method composed of 
broken lines and phrases as he animadverted on his rival’s work. Less sharp-tongued but 
even more ambitious, Thomas Percy undertook a gigantic editorial vision of composing a 
world history of poetry in his Reliques of Ancient English Poetry and related editorial 
projects, many of which were left unfinished: a hodgepodge of misprisioned scale and 
poetic scope. Correction’s effects thus extended beyond fixing a particular error in a 
poem or play; the protocols engendered new technologies of social behavior in print and 
new forms of mediating agency. 
I am fascinated by those printer’s errors and scanning glitches, those moments 
when mediation goes awry. Following Marshall McLuhan, media historians Jay David 
Bolter and Richard Grusin have used the term “remediation” to consider how digital 
technology refashions media across forms and genres. With McLuhan’s background in 
early modern literary criticism in mind, I adapt the term for the study of print technology. 
I fold in related meanings of remediation—to remedy a mistake, to intervene in a 
situation, to renovate a landscape—to describe an emergence of literary effects generated 
by the iterative interventions of textual error correction. I pay attention to editors’ critical 
vocabularies of mediating conjectures, surveying prospects, and sifting through reams of 
information. The same debates about errors in perception and transmission of knowledge 
which engaged Enlightenment philosophers such as Francis Bacon, George Berkeley and 
John Locke took place on the margins of pages as editors debated how to use these new 
tools of mediation. My dissertation historicizes and breaks down these protocols and 
interactions into their smallest radical units—errors—with the goal of theorizing how 
 
these procedures have come to constitute both objects of study and critical practices in 
the field of literary study. It is a meta-reflective experiment in mediating among fields of 
book history, media theory, experimental poetics and digital art, and disciplinary histories 
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With Directions to the Binder 
 
Candid Reader: My not Revising the Sheets, by Reason of my Distance from the 
Press, and (almost) constant Illness, has occasion’d some Literal escapes, and some few 
ERRORS, Injurious to the Sense, (and indeed, in a History of Errors; it wou’d be strange, 
shou’d the Printer not make some too), however, the Reader is desir’d to pardon 
FAULTS of less Moment, and to correct these which follow— 
But if I inlarge, I shall make an Errata in my very Errata… 
And so, Reader, fall to and wellcome; for as to rest of my ERRORS, I leave ’em to 
thy Eye, to discover, and to thy Candour to pardon; or if my whole BOOK must pass for 
ONE GREAT ERROR, (without Smile or Excuse), I must say thou haft no Stomach to a 
New Life—And so Farewel— 
 
--John Dunton, The Life and Errors of John Dunton (London, 1705) 
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Introduction: The Progress of ‘The Progress of Error’ 
 
SING, Muse (if such a theme, so dark, so long,  
May find a Muse to grace it with a song),  
By what unseen and unsuspected arts  
The serpent Error twines round human hearts;  
Tell where she lurks, beneath what flowery shades,  
That not a glimpse of genuine light pervades,  
The poisonous, black, insinuating worm  
Successfully conceals her loathsome form.  
Take, if ye can, ye careless and supine!  
Counsel and caution from a voice like mine; 
Truths, that the theorist could never reach,  
And observation taught me, I would teach. 
--William Cowper, “The Progress of Error” (1782)1  
 
“Intermittently over the last year, I’ve found myself fumbling around an idea about 
critical temporalities. That is: ideas keep moving, keep developing, even after you’ve 
locked them down in print or pixels. You continue developing your own ideas, one 
hopes, but the others who encounter your ideas also develop them as well, often in very 
new directions. And given how much critical development takes place in the negative 
(demonstrating the fundamental incorrectness of previously held ideas, as opposed to 
building beside or on top of those ideas), the conclusion I keep being drawn back to is 
that everything that we are today arguing will someday be wrong.” 
--Kathleen Fitzpatrick, “Being Wrong” (2013)2 
 
 
Remediation and Remediation 
 
The title of this dissertation comes from William Cowper’s “The Progress of 
Error,” a mock-epic about moral remediation, the acknowledgement and reparation of 
one’s sins. “The theorist could never reach” such moral remediation because devotion is 
ongoing, dependent on repetition for its powers of correction. It is a practice, not an idea 
or an abstraction that one can play with. Cowper’s first line is also a re-mediation of an 
epic convention of beginning in media res, in the middle of the action, and invoking the 
                                                
1 William Cowper, “The Progress of Error,” in The Task and Selected Writings, ed. James Sambrook (New 
York: Longman, 1984), 251. 




Muse for assistance in mediating a poetic scene in the epic tradition. He pauses in the 
middle of the trope with a parenthetical note about his doubt that a Muse could assist: a 
signal that he is really working in the mock-epic, an adaptation of the epic form through 
the distorting lens of satire. Only a theorist could reach that terminology. Cowper’s poem 
traces an alternative, errant path through the eighteenth century as a century obsessed 
with conjectural histories about the progress of knowledge—although that term had 
satirical distortions embedded in it, as Matthew Prior pointed out in his 1718 poem Alma: 
or the Progress of the Mind: “Are we in life through one great error led?”3 
In appropriating “The Progress of Error” from Cowper I am working with a play 
on words: there is remediation in the sense of remedy of one’s errors, and there is the 
process of re-mediating a form into a different media or genre. I take the term from Jay 
David Bolter and Richard Grusin, who coined the term to theorize the refashioning of 
older media into new media, especially virtual reality media. In Remediation: 
Understanding New Media, Bolter and Grusin propose what they call a double logic of 
remediation: that the process is always constituted by a tension between the strategy of 
transparent immediacy (making the medium invisible, suggesting an unmediated 
experience of pure content) and the strategy of hypermediacy (emphasizing the medium, 
celebrating or even exaggerating its presence).4 Bolter, for his part, is remediating his 
previous work Writing Space: The Computer, Hypertext, and the History of Writing, first 
published in 1991, then republished in 2001 with considerable revisions.5 Both editions 
                                                
3 Matthew Prior, Alma: or the Progress of Mind in The Poetical Works of Matthew Prior (London: printed 
for W. Strahan, 1756), 233. 
4 Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New Media. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2000), 8-9. 
5 Jay David Bolter, Writing Space: The Computer, Hypertext, and the History of Writing (New York: 
Routledge, 1991/2001). Explaining some of the changes he made, he notes: “I have also shortened this 
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of that book contain wide-ranging reflections on interface and writing technology, with 
considerable debt to post-structuralist theories of erasure and écriture. Bolter had 
experimented with rendering the book in new media through Storyspace, a 1990s 
experimental interface in hypertext-enabled storytelling used by theorists, novelists, 
poets, and other writers interested in playing with mediation.6 Both the overreliance on 
Derridean wordplay and the Storyspace interface seem dated now—the hypertext version 
is not accessible to readers or users, sitting unusable on a server as an artifact of a bygone 
era. As a conjectural history of the progress of electronic writing, Writing Space had 
come to reflect the obsolescence of the form and theories it had once pioneered. Yet these 
critical mediations were not useless for Bolter; they enabled him to write Remediation as 
a kind of recursive remaking of previous ideas about media technology.  
Bolter and Grusin fill their book with examples from visual and new media—the 
perspectival tricks in seventeenth-century Dutch still-life paintings by Vermeer, or the 
immersive interface of a first-person-shooter video game. These plays with visual 
perspective have it both ways: they toy with the viewer’s sense that he is immersed in the 
image, but they contain small glitches to remind him that that immersion is an illusion. 
Those moments of realizing of one’s mediated state are frustrating, pleasurable—and 
theorizable into narratives of progress (virtual reality and special effects are getting more 
and more technologically adept!) or decline (we’re losing a sense of the real!). As 
                                                                                                                                            
second edition by eliminating many prophetic claims that did not come true or were simply made irrelevant 
by the development of hypertext in directions I had no foreseen” (2001 edition, xii). 
6 Two of the most famous Storyspace experiments are Michael Joyce’s Afternoon (1987, published by 
Eastgate systems in 1990) and Shelley Jackson’s Patchwork Girl (1995), a remediation of Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein and L. Frank Baum’s Patchwork Girl which plays with digital images of woodcuts so as to 
highlight the many kinds of inscription technology at play in the story and interface. Yet, like Writing 
Space, Patchwork Girl cannot be accessed by readers/users because it requires such an old operating 
system. Just there is something ironic about an inaccessible, immaterial writing space, there is something 
deliciously Frankenstein’s monster-like in its half-material, half-immaterial existence. 
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Writing Space points toward its own obsolescence, Remediation, too, invites a kind of 
reader participation in remaking the book in new contexts—a fitting flexibility for a 
critical work about mediation. 
I work with textual, visual, and digital materials to test out the usefulness—and 
possible promiscuity—of the term in eighteenth-century texts. I extend Bolter and 
Grusin’s criticism by arguing that the double logic of remediation is most apparent—and 
most epistemologically generative—when we notice errors and try to correct them, only 
to generate more. I try out the term in eighteenth-century genres of dream visions, 
conjectural criticism, satires of learning, theories of mind and language, and conjectural 
history: genres, I argue, which practice both kinds of remediation (remedy and 
adaptation) in exploring that paradox of producing error out of reiterated attempts at 
correction. 
The eighteenth-century editors and authors under study in this project are 
consumed by remedy and re-mediation alike: they are gleeful to point out others’ 
mistakes, defensive about their own, imaginative in their animadversions and attacking 
language. Editor and satirist Alexander Pope played both sides of the error correction and 
creation game as he translated and edited texts at the same time that he reveled in satire’s 
distorting lens which served to correct others’ moral and intellectual failings. Classical 
editor Richard Bentley, a target of Pope’s scourge in the first edition of the Dunciad, 
practiced extraordinary editorial hubris in insisting that he could correct not just typos in 
Milton’s epic poem Paradise Lost, but entire lines that he felt were blots on the poem’s 
design and style. Lewis Theobald followed Bentley’s intellectually provocative but over-
reaching, bombastic style when he turned his scrutiny onto Pope’s editorial methods: his 
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Shakespeare Restor’d was a method composed of broken lines and phrases as he 
animadverted on his rival’s work. Less sharp-tongued but even more ambitious, Thomas 
Percy undertook a gigantic editorial vision of composing a world history of poetry in his 
Reliques of Ancient English Poetry and related editorial projects, many of which were left 
unfinished: a hodgepodge of misprisioned scale and poetic scope.  
In my work, that twinned error correction-proliferation is a method as much as it 
is a subject. I come at the subject from my time working as a college newspaper editor 
who, overwhelmed by the nightly grind of correcting the next day’s pages, began to 
doubt her ability to remedy a typo without introducing more of them. During that time, 
paste-ups became a remnant of the past as digital editing systems became standard in 
newsrooms. At first I was sure I could blame my proliferating errors on the problematic 
shifts in agency created by the digital interface. As the nights grew longer, I became 
fascinated by the interactions of multiple forms of mediators (writers, copy-editors, 
various tiers of section editors in the institution, interfaces, anonymous tech support, 
printers, the various ghosts in the machine who seemed to delay the getting the paper in 
on time three of five days a week) who were sometimes in conflict in unpredictable ways. 
I was already immersed in eighteenth-century studies as an undergraduate, so I reflected 
on my own situation as it related to Samuel Johnson, who engaged with all these critical 
debates about the production of knowledge through inevitable error in his own 
journalism, dictionary-making, and editorial work. My practice led me to theorize: errors 
are most noticeable at moments of technological and institutional changes in mediation.  
From journalism to the academy, errors loom large. In Error and the Academic 
Self, Seth Lerer describes that terror of realizing one’s reverse corrections: “I do not think 
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I have ever published anything that did not have an error in it. Typos have crept in and 
escaped proofreading. Miscitation and mistranslations have refused correction. Facts and 
judgments have, at times, seemed almost willfully in opposition to empirical evidence or 
received opinion.”7 Errors take on lives, wills, and agencies of their own in Lerer’s 
evocative, pained phrasing; that agency combines and is amplified by the social behavior 
of other members of the academy whose professional identity is constructed through 
noticing and correcting the errors of others: “Referees for publishers, and after them, 
book reviewers often begin well and well-meaningly,” Lerer continues. “But praise soon 
shatters into pedantry, and reports and reviews will often end with catalogs of broken 
lines and phrase: errata uncaught by editor or author, blots on the reputation of the 
scholar’s knowledge or critical acumen.” Lerer concludes this description of an error-
determined life with a flourish: “It’s as if I’ve led an erroneous life, as if what should be 
toted up on the pages of the book of judgment… are not achievements but mistakes. We 
live, in the academy, by blunder.” 
Kathleen Fitzpatrick takes the possibility of being wrong as an opportunity to 
reflect on what it means to produce academic work in disciplines that change over time. 
Fitzpatrick, who currently serves as Director of Scholarly Communication at the Modern 
Language Association, comes at the subject of wrongness and writing from her own 
experience of seeing institutions for scholarly publishing in decline for multiple reasons. 
Her first book, The Anxiety of Obsolescence, went through multiple publishers before 
being published digitally through Vanderbilt University Press on an interactive interface 
called CommentPress, which allowed public commenting on paragraphs of her work 
                                                
7 Seth Lerer, Error and the Academic Self: The Scholarly Imagination, Medieval to Modern (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002), 1. 
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which she then incorporated into the print monograph.8 She could be wrong—or unsure, 
or experimental, or disputative—on a scholarly platform, and that record became as 
important as the ideal of producing brilliant readings, devastating critiques, unassailable 
knowledge. Fitzpatrick writes: “The use of this critical humility, in which we 
acknowledge the mere possibility that we might not always be right, is in no small part 
the space it creates for genuinely listening to the ideas that others present, really 
considering their possibilities even when they contradict our own thoughts on the 
matter.”9 Both practically and optimistically, Fitzpatrick took a major roadblock in her 
scholarly work and turned it into the subject of her future work about scholarly 
publishing. In a blog post—a medium that’s both material and immaterial, erasable but 
also shareable, she extends that work into epistemology as she poses questions about 
what kinds of critical forms of errancy might be important in the future. In this way, she 
joins Bolter and Grusin in figuring obsolescence and contingency—the most frustrating 
or terrifying things about contemporary scholarly work—as something worth studying as 
a media event with historical precedents.10 
I can reach back even further to argue for the value of studying provisionality, 
contingency, and error as crucial scholarly values in the history of media studies. In The 
                                                
8 Kathleen Fitzpatrick, The Anxiety of Obsolescence: The American Novel in the Age of Television 
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996). She reflected on the experience in her next book, Planned 
Obsolescence: Publishing, Technology, and the Future of the Academy (New York: New York University 
Press, 2011). 
9 Ibid. 
10 Warning against too much optimism about digital scholarship as a means of transforming scholarly 
editing, Gary Taylor and Peter Robinson have written essays about the contingencies of textual editing and 
preparing digital scholarly editions of work at a moment when funding, format, and professional status are 
in flux. Those essays are now fifteen years old, and many of their concerns have only been exacerbated. 
See Gary Taylor, “c:\wp\file.txt 05:41 10-07-98” in The Renaissance Text: Theory, Editing, Textuality, ed. 
Andrew Murphy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 44-54 and Peter Robinson, “Ma(r)king 
the Electronic Text: How, Why, and for Whom?” in Ma(r)king the Text: The Presentation of Meaning on 




Printing Press as an Agent of Change, Elizabeth Eisenstein used an epigram from the 
eighteenth-century printer Joseph Ames as he tried to compile his own account of the 
progress of printing: “I do ingenuously confess that in attempting this history of Printing I 
Have undertaken a task much too great for my abilities the extent of which I did not 
perceive at first.”11 Ames’ warning has echoed recursively through each of Eisenstein’s 
book’s revisions, critiques, and reevaluations since its publication in 1979: not as an 
apology for mistakes, but as a frank admission of the contingencies involved in printing, 
disciplinary trends and crtiques, institutional changes, and, more generally, the progress 
of knowledge. Eisenstein’s book had a long gestation, drafting, and revision process, 
which traces back to 1963, when she wanted to correct the doom-saying exaggerations of 
the president of the American Historical Association who warned about the loss of 
historical awareness in an age of media saturation. She contrarily noted that the glut of 
historical publications threatened to make the discipline incoherent and fractious; then 
she read McLuhan’s The Gutenberg Galaxy, which “seemed to take mischievous pleasure 
in the loss of familiar historical perspectives.”12 Though she felt that The Gutenberg 
Galaxy “seemed to testify to the special problems posed by print culture rather than those 
                                                
11 Elizabeth Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980), ix. She is quoting Joseph Ames, preface to Typographical Antiquities or the History of 
Printing in England, Scotland, and Ireland, ed Thomas Dibdin (London, 1810, reprinted from 1749), I:12. 
In its paperback edition published in 1980, the book was condensed from two volumes to one. The text of 
the introduction is adapted slightly in the second edition, which has been retitled The Printing Revolution in 
Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). For an assessment of the 
celebrations and critiques of Eisenstein’s work, see Agent of Change: Print Culture Studies after Elizabeth 
L. Eisenstein, eds. Sabrina Alcorn Baron, Eric N. Lindquist, and Eleanor F. Shevlin (Amherst: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 2007). 
12 Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change, x. Later she notes the way that McLuhan’s 
arguments seemed to go through a period of obsolescence before they were reanimated by media theorists: 
“Although Marshall McLuhan’s work stimulated my historical curiosity, among many of my colleagues it 
has been counter-productive, discouraging further investigation of print culture or its effects. Concern with 
the topic at present is likely to be regarded with suspicion, to be labelled “McLuhanite” and dismissed out 
of hand. I hope my book with help to overcome this prejudice and show that the topic is not incompatible 
with respect for the historian’s craft” (xvii). 
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produced by newer media,” that book nonetheless inspired her because it “provided 
additional evidence of how overload could lead to incoherence.” She published the first 
versions of her work as literature reviews of gaps in scholarship and “Some Conjectures 
about the Impact of Printing on Western Society and Thought: A Preliminary Report.”13 
The publication of The Printing Press as an Agent of Change in 1979 brought significant 
attention; as I discuss in the third and fourth chapters, many historians disagreed with the 
scope of her argument, her use of “agent” and “agency” as a slippery slope toward 
technodeterminsim, and her use of mostly secondary sources. To those concerns, she 
noted that the work was an assessment of the current historiography—a provocation to do 
different kinds of work.  
Reflecting on the influence of her work thirty years later, she explains the value of 
conjecture and provisionality: “Especially when I was writing about the preservative 
powers of print (a theme assigned special importance and hence repeatedly sounded in 
the book), I could not help wondering about the wisdom of presenting views that were 
still in flux in so permanent a form”—a nod to recursion and self-reflection. This is not 
an excuse or an admission of error; rather, it is a reasonable assessment of how the 
progress of knowledge actually works through debate, refinement, revision, and even 
consolidation of what had seemed iconoclastic. She continues: “The reader should keep 
in mind the tentative, provisional character of what follows. This book should be read as 
an extended essay and not as a definitive text.”14 I read Eisenstein for her interest in 
reassessing her own work and considering its changes; in this dissertation’s foray into a 
                                                
13 Eisenstein, “Some Conjectures about the Impact of Printing on Western Society and Thought” Journal of 
Modern History 40 (1968), 1-56. 
14 Eisenstein, The Printing Revolution in Modern Europe, xvi. 
 
 11 
fields invested in studying variations in the objects they study, I want to stress the value 
of the provisional and the contingent over the definitive in my own methodology. 
The historian Anthony Grafton wrote one such critical review of Eisenstein’s 
work, for his own long scholarly history has trained him in dealing with archives, 
documents, and particular histories over sweeping arguments.15 In Defenders of the Text, 
he traces his own scholarly career across Europe as he completed his dissertation and 
worked with various archives with distinct protocols, histories, and approaches to 
humanist study. These distinctions are the bread and butter of a textual historian of 
humanism: “The scholar reasoning about a difficult text works within a set of context. 
Personal needs and circumstances, professional customs and institutions, long-standing 
intellectual and technical traditions, and recent polemics all shape his method and help to 
dictate his conclusions.” It is striking that both Eisenstein and Grafton can make gestures 
to contingency and yet operate at different ends of argument about the protocols of 
historical research and argument. Grafton uses contingency as an argument for 
particularity, as he uses his own career of gaining expertise to reflect on the disciplinary 
knowledge that classicist editor Richard Bentley amassed in his own career of close 
textual scrutiny at the end of the seventeenth century: “He is the prisoner of his own 
tastes and obsessions, interests, and insensitivities. His deceptively modern-sounding 
arguments often address now-forgotten and unlikely issues or follow from now-obscure 
and alien premises.”16 Grafton would surely disagree with my own reading of Bentley’s 
career in the second chapter of this dissertation, arguing that it has been distorted by my 
                                                
15 Anthony Grafton, “The Importance of Being Printed,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History XI:2 (1980), 
265-286. 
16 Anthony Grafton, Defenders of the Text: Traditions of Scholarship in the Age of Science 1450-1800 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 12. He assesses Bentley’s career from 12-21. 
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own modern-sounding investments and thought experiments. But what if one could study 
the effects of these distortions and alien premises by engaging in them—somewhere 
between Grafton’s immersion in the past and the Eisenstein’s worry about the glut of 
discrete historiographies which may correct errors of fact, but not errors of interpretation 
or theoretical argument? 
 
Reading through Distortion 
 
The best illustration of my claim that error correction is proliferative is a scan of 
the facing errata and first page of Stephen Lobb’s 1697 treatise, The Growth of Error17 
(see fig. 1). I discovered this image, this book by accident: I had searched for earlier 
articulations of “the progress of knowledge” on the Early English Books Online database 
and found this religious text, affixed with an errata sheet that shows the material 
manifestations of printers’ mistakes even as one’s immaterial errors are supposed to be 
corrected through reading. At multiple points in the dissertation, I argue that this kind of 
serendipitous errancy in the realm of digital remediation of seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century texts may be a site for different kinds of scholarship and knowledge production. I 
devote less space to interpreting these errors or correcting them than I do to theorizing 
their spread in more zoomed-out terms. Editorial historian Marcus Walsh argues that 
focusing on the editors’ own particular misunderstandings, misjudgments, and other 
errors in methodology ignores their larger contributions to the larger discipline, for “most 
of their more consequential theoretical statements, and by far the greater number of their 
                                                
17 Stephen Lobb, The growth of error being an exercitation concerning the rise and progress of 
Arminianism and more especially Socinianism, both abroad and now of late, in England / by a lover of 
truth and peace. (London: printed for John Salisbury, 1697). 
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practical textual decisions, involved issues of interpretative judgement rather than of 
textual description, collation or genealogy.” To focus on the gaps in their knowledge of 
textual transmission is “likely to reveal areas of weakness rather than of strength, or 
rather to show them in the early stages of what might credibly be though an evolutionary 
science.”18 Where Walsh gives a historical, progressive account of the development of 
scholarly apparatus and its functions for enabling interpretative interventions, I juxtapose 
these interventions with other genres like the dream vision, reinstaurations of learning, 
empiricist essay, conjectural history, Menippean satire, and the georgic. These 
juxtapositions serve as thought experiments about the more speculative mediating 
qualities of textual criticism, a discipline that, after it threw off the claims to being a 
science in the nineteenth-century, has stressed its systematic protocols, consolidation, and 
institutional bona fides as a historicist practice that does rarely indulges in speculation.  
The genre of critique has propelled the progress of knowledge about textual 
transmission; Jerome McGann has even played with remediating a canonical text in the 
discipline, W.W. Greg’s “The Rationale of the Copy-Text” as “The Rationale of the 
Hyper-text” (fittingly, that remediated essay appears in multiple print and digital 
versions, as McGann has taken that rationale to heart).19 Others have framed their 
critiques as motivational calls for crisis and intervention, which yielded Randall 
McLeod’s extraordinary “FIAT fLUX,” an illustrated-yet-iconoclastic polemic about the 
failures of twentieth-century textual criticism to interpret, understand, or even notice 
                                                
18 Marcus Walsh, Shakespeare, Milton, and Eighteenth-Century Literary Editing: The Beginnings of 
Interpretative Scholarship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 18-19. 
19 Jerome McGann, A Critique of Modern Textual Criticism. (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia 
Press, reprint 1983/1992), and “The Rationale of the Hypertext” in Radiant Textuality: Literature after the 
World Wide Web (Cambridge: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 53-74. The essay appeared in TEXT 9 (1996) 
11-32 and was revised by McGann for his professional web site 
http://jerfferson.village.virgiinia.edu/rossetti/rossetti.html.  See also: W.W. Greg, “The Rationale of the 
Copy-Text,” Studies in Bibliography 3 (1950-51), 19-36.   
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consequential variants in image and design. Writing as Random Cloud as part of his 
unconventional critique, he issued a scathing indictment of previous editors who claimed 
systematic, sustained attention to detail: “This period, though it includes the rise of 
systematic literary study of English letters in the university, also exhibits the greatest 
diversity, and hence the greatest error, of editorial renderings that are attempting to be 
authoritative….”20 Even McLeod’s detractors have found the essay to be important to the 
discipline; its iconoclasm has become part of the textual criticism canon as scholars have 
incorporated his interests in design into their protocols of attention. For my part, writing 
twenty years after the publication of “FIAT fLUX,” I study it as an experiment in dual 
forms of remediation: of refashioning image and textual media, and of remedying a 
discipline’s protocols, goals, and illusions. 
The term “remediation” is especially felicitous for recontextualizing Lerer’s, 
Fitzpatrick’s, McLeod’s, and, indeed, my own preoccupation with error, for the coinage 
remediation only appears to be same word as the more traditional uses of the word in 
relation to remedy and correction. Mediation and remedy do not have the same root and 
are only resemble each other in having the same spelling.21 The link between remediation 
and re-mediation is an error generated (but not really theorized) by Bolter and Grusin. I 
argue that there is productive play between the two words that is created by the 
misprision: there is a recursive power to the work of having to go back and re-read the 
neologism. But re-reading is not limited to distinguishing between the two as just one 
                                                
20 Randall McLeod/Random Cloud, “FIAT fLUX,” Crisis in Editing: Texts of the English Renaissance. 
Papers given at the 24th Annual Conference on Editorial Problems, University of Toronto 4-5 November, 
1988. New York: AMS Press, 1994, 61-172, 148.  
21 For an etymological history of the term “mediation” in the Enlightenment, see John Guillory, 
“Enlightening Mediation.” This Is Enlightenment, Clifford Siskin and William Warner, eds. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010), 37-66.  
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meaning or the other; rather, it revels in the slipperiness of the conflation between 
refashioning and committing an error. Kevis Goodman shares my interest in this 
slipperiness in an eighteenth-century context, as she studies the ways that the georgic 
genre plays with “an implicit conjunction between remedy and mediation.”22 As I shall 
discuss in the fourth chapter, the eighteenth-century georgic figures poetic labor as an 
ongoing process of remediation of the world through translation and criticism; in this 
contemporary context of error-prone, reflective scholarly media, it may point the way to 
considering Fitzpatrick’s imagined future of scholarly labor as errancy. Thinking of 
scholarly work as creative remediation allows for experimentation, testing, and 
assessment of historical change that is not successive but recursive, in its dilation on how 
past errors pose possibilities for recombination and re-mediation. 
In Remediation, Bolter and Grusin use the coinage as a kind of keyword 
experiment in the tradition of Marshall McLuhan.23 McLuhan described his work in The 
Gutenberg Galaxy as being a kind of “mosaic approach” in which quotations, data, and 
reflections are juxtaposed with one another in order to generate new directions of 
thought: “the alternative procedure would be to offer a series of views of fixed 
relationships in pictorial space. Thus the galaxy or constellation of events upon which the 
present study concentrates is itself a mosaic of perpetually interacting forms that have 
undergone kaleidoscopic transformation.”24 Neil Rhodes traces McLuhan’s one tile of 
McLuhan’s interest in the mosaic form to his graduate work at Cambridge, where he read 
                                                
22 Kevis Goodman, Georgic Modernity and British Romanticism: Poetry and the Mediation of History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 23, 152n.  
23 They have reformulated and repurposed their work in a number of places, and they treat these 
republications and refashionings as critically productive. See for example, “Remediation,” Configurations 
4:3 (1996), 311-358 and “‘Remediating McLuhan,” The Legacy of McLuhan, eds. Lance Strate and Edward 
Wachtel (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, Inc., 2005), 323-343. 
24 Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), [i]. 
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F.R. Leavis and Denys Thompson’s Culture and Environment: The Training of Critical 
Awareness, which arranged images from advertising in a tessellated form to play with 
distinctions of high culture and low culture reading.25 McLuhan could juxtapose that 
critical awareness with his one of his dissertation’s subjects, Thomas Nashe, who also 
played with form, mediation, and high/low distinctions in his early modern poetry. “What 
Nashe called ‘gallimaufry’ (motley, medley), McLuhan called ‘mosaic,’” writes Rhodes. 
Furthermore, “the experimental quality of Nashe's style, with its mixture of neologism, 
acoustic effect, and a sliding between high and low elements, has prompted comparisons 
with much later writers, notably Joyce. These comparisons may be specious or 
misleading, but the point here is that they show that Nashe may give the appearance of 
modernity to the modern reader.” With that genealogy we can see McLuhan start to use 
the mosaic approach for diachronic investigations that juxtapose formal qualities across 
time and space.26 To add another mosaic tile to this textured intellectual background, 
Nashe’s and Joyce’s visual-verbal wordplay designs appealed to McLuhan’s later interest 
in concrete poetry forms that were flourishing around him in the 1960s.27 For McLuhan, 
                                                
25 Neil Rhodes, “On Speech, Print, and New Media: Thomas Nashe and Marshall McLuhan” Oral 
Tradition 24:2 (2009). Speaking of contingencies that limit access and research: “Since Cambridge 
University Library will not lend out the thesis in any form, and also imposes a strict embargo on quotation 
from it, this work has understandably not featured much in discussions of McLuhan and his subsequent 
intellectual development.” 
26 In her afterword to The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe, Eisenstein reassess her book’s 
project and describes at one point how McLuhan’s work led her to become “concerned with the diachronic 
as well as with the synchronic aspects” of print technology” (318). 
27 See Richard Cavell, McLuhan in Space: A Cultural Geography (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2002), 136-169. To give just one example of Cavell’s extraordinary mosaic of research: “The Brazilian 
concretists “cite Joyce’s term ‘verbivocovisual,’ though without citing Joyce…. McLuhan had used the 
term verbivocovisual in the October 1957 issue of Explorations as the title of one of the items in which he 
identifies the ‘staccato stutter of the typewriter’ as ‘really close to the stutter that is oral speech.’ Verbi-
Voco-Visual Explorations (1967) became the title of Explorations 8 when it was published separately by 
Something Else press, which was closely tied, through its publisher, Dick Higgins, to the concretist 
movement. Indeed, Emmett Williams’s landmark Anthology of Concrete Poetry, published in the same year 
by Higgins’s press, listed McLuhan’s book on its dust-jacket, describing it there as an ‘early fusillade 
(1957)…trained comprehensively and comprehensibly on the word: taps for the written culture, a victory 
salvo for the oral revolution’” (143). Cavell’s book is a brilliant historical account of McLuhan’s 
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these creative, multimedia juxtapositions across time and space are generative because 
they are not fixed: they insist on reimagining a poetic, critical medium for new kinds of 
sensory perception.28 In this space, juxtapositional errors may be promiscuous, social, 
and transformative.  
I situate McLuhan’s work in studying how media are forms of sensory theory in 
relation to eighteenth-century discussions of mind, perception, and language. Notably, 
those theories—from John Locke to Bishop Berkeley—are more concerned with 
identifying the sources of error than they are with articulating the positive formations of 
these claims. As with Lobb’s already erroneous edition of The Growth of Error, the 
digital remediation of Berkeley’s work and its errata sheets also poses some moments of 
reflection on irony and design (see fig. 2). In the chapters that follow, I examine Pope, 
Bentley, Theobald, Percy, and other authors and editors as though they were in an Oliver 
Sacks study of neurological errors and disorders,29 as they generate work and visions of 
the world through distorted sensory perceptions of sight, sound, and even touch. When 
errors proliferate—when they concatenate into satires and/or new visions of the world—
they produce more than just shame and humiliation. They produce epistemological 
wonder.  
                                                                                                                                            
intellectual history and influence, but it also takes seriously McLuhan’s interest in non-linear approaches to 
media theory across time and space. 
28 There are many other tiles to McLuhan’s intellectual history, but because I am going to return to the form 
of concrete poetry as an unconventional probe for thinking about the history of media transmission across 
space and time, I want to add Mary Ellen Solt’s own salvo for her 1969 anthology Concrete Poetry: A 
World View. Solt argues that the form allows for “…the concrete poet is concerned with establishing his 
linguistic material in a new relationship to space (the page or its equivalent) and/or to time (abandoning the 
old linear measure).” See Solt, Concrete Poetry: A World View (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1969), 7. I will puzzle over this claim to engage with a media object that operates outside of linear 
dimensions of time and space as I discuss the ways that editors historicize and artifactualize textual and 
image objects, how they frame their mediations over format, time, and space. Even thus far in the 
introduction, we can see how Walsh, McGann, McLeod, Eisenstein, and Grafton might have very different 
thoughts on their objects’ position in time and the space of the page. 
29 Oliver Sacks, The Mind’s Eye. (New York: Random House, 2010). 
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In this way, I depart from a strict historicist approach to studying the material 
cultures of error, as that way has already been paved by bibliographers and historians of 
material culture like Walsh, Jerome McGann, Anthony Grafton, David McKitterick, Ann 
Blair, Peter Stallybrass, Margreta de Grazia, and above all D.F. McKenzie, who coined 
the useful phrase, “the sociology of texts.” All of these writers have engaged, often 
critically, with Eisenstein’s work—yet even in their criticism they treat her as a crucial 
interlocutor. For example, McKitterick has studied thousands of errata sheets and 
correctors’ notes, leading him to prioritize this kind of scholarly attention to distinct 
materialities: “Texts are not fixed. They are always mobile—at the time of writing, the 
time of production, the time of publication, and over the course of time, quite apart form 
in the hands of different readers.” He frames his argument as a commonplace, an idea 
that’s reasonable in its practicality: “This is well known to historians of reader response, 
to social scientists and to literary and art critics alike. But it is not always fully 
understood from a bibliographical point of view; and without a clear understanding of 
bibliographical issues there are dangers in constructing historical, literary or critical 
theory.”30 I welcome that danger here, and I interrogate some of the reasons why material 
historians might harp on that attention to detail, in favor of spinning outward toward 
speculation—and maybe even toward the ahistorical yet generative errors of 
anachronism, conflation, and counterfactual history.  
In advocating a strategy of reading the eighteenth-century obsession with 
correcting and proliferating mistakes of apprehension, perception, and communication, 
Zachary Sng recommends a practice of oscillating between two meanings of error:  
                                                
30 David McKitterick, Print, Manuscript, and the Search for Order, 1450-1830. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, 97. 
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To read the rhetoric of error in a set of texts therefore means two kinds of 
reading at once. The first is a reconstruction of the rhetorical strategies 
that such texts employ to produce the category of ‘error’ and to allow for 
its containment or conversion into gain. The second is an examination of 
how error itself produces a vertigo-inducing suspension of the strategies 
revealed by the first reading.31 
 
Sng looks to semiotic theory to perform this oscillation, but I appropriate this strategy in 
the realm of mediation, where McLuhan’s mosaic approach enables reading both ways at 
once: “To conduct both of these readings simultaneously involves a close consideration 
of the thematics of these texts as well as their theoretical registers, but the goal is not 
thereby to arrive at the knowledge of one’s superiority over the other, or even a consistent 
opposition between the two.” Sng’s work on error retraces post-structuralist theories of 
polyvalence and incommensurable meaning, sometimes so much so that it feels like a 
rehearsal of close readings rather than a series of new insights. Yet this idea of letting 
multiple readings exist together is a good way of thinking about the oscillating 
relationships among the 1991 and 2001 editions of Writing Space and Remediation, 
among competing eighteenth-century editions of Shakespeare, even among this 
dissertation and the forms it may take in the future. They are conjectural histories of 
media that both trace a trajectory of texts and readings; crucially, they also point to their 
planned obsolescence by exposing and dilating on their own errors of version, 
reconsideration, and thought experiments that have outlived their usefulness.  
Anticipating this possible charge of obsolescence, McLuhan extended his 
terminology to include the technology of the probe that provokes new kinds of 
connections (even if they occur by means of generating error). Elena Lamberti describes 
their functionality as stemming from their incomplete theorization:  
                                                
31 Zachary Sng, The Rhetoric of Error from Locke to Kleist (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
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A probe or gloss is a dynamic rhetorical device envisaged as a textual 
addition that creates a series of related patterns of knowledge inside and 
outside the text itself. If reader reads through the probe—that is, if they 
see it as a window opening on a broader textual and contextual 
landscape—they read in depth, investigating and discussing possible 
meanings, links, and further implications.32  
 
She situates the device in the tradition of Francis Bacon’s aphorisms from The 
Advancement of Learning: “The probe is used to convey a broken knowledge.” Seen in 
terms of Bacon and McLuhan, what Lerer describes frustratedly as “broken lines” of 
listed errors at the ends of academic reviews may also be an opportunity for refashioning 
of knowledge. 
This approach to indulging in the contingencies and accidents of knowledge 
production requires making allowances: tolerating imprecision, over-proliferation, 
promiscuity, and as forms of broken knowledge that may generate new ideas if they are 
remediated recursively (and not just rehearsed). As a probe, the term “remediation” has a 
kind of numinous power in being defined and redefined by its context and proliferating 
uses. In the preface to Remediation, Bolter and Grusin describe its coinage in what appear 
to be deliberately vague terms:  
It was in May 1996, in a meeting in his office with Sandra Beaudin that 
RG was reported to have coined the term remediation as a way to 
complicate the notion of “repurposing” that Beaudin was working with for 
her class project. But, as most origin stories go, it was not until well after 
the fact, when Beaudin reported the coinage to JB, who later reminded RG 
that he had coined the term, that the concept of “remediation” could be 
said to have emerged. Indeed, although the term remediation was coined 
in RG's office, neither of us really knew what it meant until we had 
worked out together the double logic of immediacy and hypermediacy.33 
 
                                                
32 Elena Lamberti, McLuhan’s Mosaic: Probing the Literary Origins of Media Studies (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2012), 43. 
33 Bolter and Grusin, viii. 
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In a review of Remediation, Matthew Kirschenbaum detects a slippage in Bolter and 
Grusin’s coinage: a problem of claiming agency in narrating this scene: 
This is writing that itself bears the mark of multiple mediations, from the 
willfully passive construction of its syntax … to the flutter of the keyword 
remediation from an italicized presentation to scare quotes and back again. 
I dwell on such details not to be clever, but rather because those visible 
stress-marks, and the placement of this vignette in the volume's preface 
(where it is labeled, tongue-in-cheek, as an “origin story”) both underscore 
the extent to which language itself is about to be recycled and repurposed 
in the project that follows.34  
 
I want to mediate between the theorists Bolter and Grusin and their critic Kirschenbaum 
to propose a creative alternative: that we sit with the problem of agency that 
Kirschenbaum notices not as (only) as a charge about unclear writing, but as an 
opportunity to theorize the productive errors of describing collaborative agency. What is 
unclear in the syntax may be a critical slippage, but it may also be an error that reveals an 
epistemological problem of co-writing in the single-author-centric genre of an origin 
story, indeed a story of critical-poetic inspiration. I shall assess those moments when I 
discuss the challenges of rendering competition and collaboration in Shakespeare editing 
as something more than just a series of social disputes, and rather as evidence of iterative 
correction by many hands as an engine for alternative forms of agency. I can say that 
Kirschenbaum’s noticing an error produced an epistemological revelation for me—a 
creative dance of correction and extension of the probe.   
Kirschenbaum continues his critique of Bolter and Grusin’s super-flexible use of 
the term “remediation” in its already-useful contexts: 
For remediation is not in fact a neologism or a new coinage but rather a 
paleonym, a word already in use that is recast in wider or different terms: 
remediation is a word commonly encountered in business, educational, 
                                                




and environmental contexts to denote remedy or reform. Bolter and Grusin 
do acknowledge this later in the book by discussing remediation's usage 
by educators (59), but “remediation” (the word's) status as a paleonym 
itself becomes questionable when we realize that Bolter and Grusin clearly 
expect Remediation (the book) to perform exactly this kind of reformative 
work—most broadly as a corrective to the prevailing notion of the “new” 
in new media.35 
 
Here is a different kind of origin story about the proliferating—indeed, purposefully, 
argumentatively remediating and generative—meanings of the term: Because Bolter and 
Grusin gesture at the other meanings of remediation in professional contexts of education 
and environmental cleanup, I had labored under the false impression that the words 
remediation (as remedy) and re-mediation (as refashioning of media) did have the same 
root. I was corrected, gently, in a job interview in which I was describing my work. I was 
stunned and embarrassed, briefly, but then I remarked that I was performing a similar 
kind of critical error to Richard Bentley, who notoriously claimed to be editing erroneous 
homonyms in Paradise Lost. It was a save—a flippant correction—but it later generated 
an insight about Bentley’s willfully erroneous practices. I not only fixed an error, but I 
used that act of correction to concatenate into a larger theory, choosing not to erase its 
existence but to highlight it in this introduction as the explanation of my method.  
 As I was being corrected about conflating the roots of “mediation,” the 
interviewer also pointed out that my writing has a recursive quality to it. He meant it in a 
complimentary way—it was a risk in scholarly writing, but he believed it had paid off in 
what I had submitted. My writing has always been described as recursive, whether in 
complimentary or critical terms, because I’m invested in juggling and jumbling many 
different sources together to probe what happens. The most inspiring comment I heard in 
graduate school was that we, as students who had already succeeded in undergraduate 




English departments, already knew how to close-read texts—so that meant that we could 
learn how to do something else. That “something else” wasn’t articulated—we were 
meant to find it ourselves. It wasn’t even meant to be found or recovered from something 
“out there”: it was to be practiced, corrected, reflected on, taught, and shared as a 
recursive process of learning and doing scholarship. For many reasons, I found that 
exhortation more enabling in the classroom, where I could present the same challenge to 
students in my classes and share their befuddlement, excitement, push-back, and 
experimentation. This project is a record of trying to do that in my own scholarly writing, 
performed with many moments of doubt, attenuated attention, pedagogical experiments, 
and revelations along the way.  
 At many points, it has felt both like a secular “Progress of Error” and like 
Cowper’s monumental work of meditation on objects and media, The Task. Cowper’s 
Task appeals to my belief in mediation as a recursive exercise. His description of reading 
the newspaper reminds me of my past in journalism—and, crucially, it is also a figure of 
the complex printed mediations in the dream vision poetry, editorial variorums, and 
miscellanies that I am analyzing.  
What is it but a map of busy life, 
Its fluctuations and its vast concerns? 
Here runs the mountainous and craggy ridge 
That tempts ambition.  
… 
Here rills of oily eloquence, in soft 
Meanders, lubricate the course they take; 
… 
The dearth of information and good sense 
That it foretells us, always comes to pass. 
Cataracts of declamation thunder here, 
There forests of no meaning spread the page 
In which all comprehension wanders lost; 
While fields of pleasantry amuse us there, 
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With merry descants on a nation's woes. 
The rest appears a wilderness of strange 
But gay confusion.36 
 
At an obvious level, this is a description of a printed page for social interactions, with 
retired, isolated Cowper observing the din and debate from afar. Cowper sees the printed 
newspaper page as a kind of mosaic in McLuhan’s terms, a series of juxtaposed 
discourses. The alliterative “rills of oily eloquence” enacts the very sliminess it 
describes—it is the very paradox or error that poetic language has always been good at 
rendering. “Forests of no meaning spread the page” is a picture of the very scenes of 
information overload that have been the subjects of decline narratives for centuries. 
Cowper’s poem also participates in the georgic mode that Goodman has traced in her 
history of georgic media; I use it here as a kind of touchstone of my self-administered 
tasks of recursively returning to my own past experiences in media to reflect on what the 
future might hold for my own scholarly labor. 
 
Remediation as Critical Making 
 
Because I have spent more time thinking about remediation in the classroom, I 
have tested it out in many contexts other than the eighteenth century—especially in new 
media theory and anonymous Internet art and poetry collectives that delight in errors 
made by anonymous agents. I draw from critical approaches that are promiscuous, self-
indulgent, and experimental for juxtapositions that are unexpected and even ahistorical. 
In this way, I am actually quite distant from Cloud’s call for scrutiny as a means of 
conferring authority: 
                                                
36 William Cowper, The Task, ed. Sambrook, 139-40. 
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Our conclusions must be partial; inevitably we are consigned to some kind 
of error….Taken as a whole, the body of editorial modification and 
commodification can constitute a map of misreadings, not only those of 
our naive selves, but also those of our culture at large. I think it takes 
exacting textual criticism of authoritative documents to force editing to 
disclose such a map, for without an external discipline those who wander 
in editing will simply become what they behold.37 
 
I may even fall into the errancy of wandering without external discipline because I am 
drawing so promiscuously as a kind of sustained thought experiment in recursion as 
mediated reflection. I am willing to be wrong.  
My approach in the dissertation is synecdochal—I am less interested in assessing 
the meaningfulness of the particular content of corrections or presenting a material 
history of their presence on so many pages. I close-read some texts but not others, and I 
am most interested in texts that are easy to close-read for literary meaning but then take it 
on too well, generating “artifacts of procedure” that evince the arbitrariness of any 
method to reveal knowledge. I am inspired by Johanna Drucker’s work in critical 
bibliography for the ways that she engages with many of the terms, methods, and goals of 
textual and digital scholarship, only to turn back and reflect on what assumptions she has 
been laboring under.38 Like Bolter and Fitzpatrick, she makes visible the ways that 
disciplinary obsolescence is related to technological change, as when she introduces her 
work on experimental typography: “The research for this book was begun in an era in 
which semiotics was considered a useful interpretive tool, but the writing is concluded at 
                                                
37 Cloud, “FIAT fLUX,” 148, 150. 
38 See Johanna Drucker, “Intimations of Immateriality: Graphical Form, Textual Sense, and the Electronic 
Environment.” Reimagining Textuality: Textual Studies in the Late Age of Print, ed. Elizabeth Bermann 
Loizeaux and Neil Fraistat (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 2002). 152-177 and “Digital Ontologies: 
The Ideality of Form in/and Code Storage—or—Can Graphesis Challenge Mathesis?” Leonardo 34:1 
(2001). 141-45. When Laura Mandell was working on an essay about digital humanities scholarship, she 
wrote to Drucker to ask a question about her work. Drucker sent back not just an answer to the question but 
a full revision of the essay—she seems to be committed to treating her work recursively. See Laura 
Mandell, ““What’s the Matter? What Literary History Neither  Hears Nor Sees” New Literary History 38.4 
(2007) 755-776, 775. 
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a moment in which semiotics has become the object of historical and historiographical 
inquiry.”39 Her writing can be dense with critical terms of her own making and which she 
has adapted from others; her sentences often flip back on themselves as she recursively 
reflects on how she’s producing knowledge through the technology of critical writing. 
For example, here is her explanation of her argument in “Intimations of Immateriality,” 
an allusion to Wordsworth’s “Intimations of Immortality” as well as a critical 
remediation of what Drucker worries is a too-settled distinction between materiality and 
immateriality in media studies, wherein the materiality of code is ignored when it is 
idealized into “just” digital form: 
Configured meaning is an aesthetic, structural, and substantive part of 
linguistic form. Consideration of configured meaning (in which 
configuration is taken to be part of textual information) allows us to revive 
the philosophical inquiry into the relation between sense and form. This 
can be explored initially in the interrogation of the identity of the letter, 
and then at the level of text, document, and archive. The exploration 
always asks how the visual forms of language inform the production of 
meaning in the electronic environment, and, in turn, how the immaterial 
text of the electronic domain offers the fundamentals of ‘ideality’ of sense 
in relation to visual, graphical form through an examination of configured 
meaning at the level of the text.40 
 
Each sentences builds complexity on the previous one, mostly by explaining how those 
previous sentences are constrained by prior ontologies and epistemologies. It feels nearly 
Cowperian in its circumlocution around a particular subject which is both material (a 
sofa, a newspaper for Cowper; a letter, an archive for Drucker) and immaterial (faith, 
ontology). The unclear antecedent in the sentence that begins “this can be explored 
                                                
39 Drucker, The Visible Word: Experimental Typography and Modern Art 1909-1923 (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), 1. She ends the introduction with a similar barb: “My own project has 
become historicized as well as historical, and that suggests to me that this is an appropriate moment to draw 
it to an end” (8). The monograph itself is a finite form, but she continues to reflect on the historicity of 
scholarly discourse and interventions in her later work. 
40 Drucker, “Intimations of Immaterality,” 155. 
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initially” is telling, I think, not of a usage infelicity but rather of the hugeness of 
Drucker’s project and the ways that her critical writing demands recursive reading and 
reformulating. Indeed, the best way I can work with her ideas is to make them, so I can 
have something concrete and material to read as I am exploring the ontologies she is 
unmaking. 
This project has a thesis that can be terrifying or exhilarating: every attempt to 
correct an error ends up proliferating errors. We could reconceive of Lerer’s “academic 
life … as blunder” as being like living in a poorly rendered virtual reality: in which all 
perspective was off in some ways, where typos, miscitations, mistranslations, 
misjudgments, and broken views manifested themselves as perspectival errors created by 
sloppy or perverse coders. A typo would look like an errant pixel, perhaps, or a 
mistranslation from Latin to English would be a glitch in the code as it has been 
translated from one medium to another. As Norman Klein puts it in his provocatively 
ahistorical study of special effects, any study of perception and its wonders demands a 
recursive method of description and analysis and a play with historicity: “This book is 
designed as a computer 450 years old: the chapters, index, notes. This ‘Baroque’ structure 
helps me explain how ‘software’ since 1550 has serviced special effects.” He finds his 
method in the Baroque period and then adapts it to a critical survey, knowing that such a 
survey produces artifacts of perspective and sensory disorientation that he will highlight 
as generators for his inquiry:  “When a text in a book generates special effects, what does 
that look like? … For the tone of the writing to be sensory and atmospheric, in the sense 
of special effects, I need to mix in the fictive and novelistic. The tactile and auditory in 
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effects belong in writing.”41 Lori Emerson makes a similar kind of argument that we must 
account for how our immersive experiences with print and digital media enable recursive 
thought: “It’s not just that we irremediably see the book through the lens of the digital but 
that the technology of the book finds its way into the digital—the book, reconfigured in 
our minds and in actual fact by the digital.”42 
For that reason, I experiment in this dissertation with digital remediations that 
introduce errors into texts, images, and sounds as a way of theorizing remediation 
through error-prone practice. I am working in a contemporary art movements called “the 
New Aesthetic” and “the glitch aesthetic,” which revel in glitchy reality, in which one 
notices pixelations, distortions, and failures to render as moments to reflect on mediation. 
The vaguely named “New Aesthetic,” which began as a provocation by media futurist 
James Bridle to collect examples of visual glitches that introduced epistemological 
problems into their networks, bears some resemblance to the aesthetic debates from the 
beginning of the eighteenth century and then extended toward theorizing the sublime. 
Eighteenth-century aesthetic debates remediated images into concepts and engendered 
new forms of writing to share these theories. The New Aesthetic and glitch aesthetics are 
also committed to critical writings that both describe and theorize these new ways of 
seeing but also maintain the errors and glitches as non-assimilable objects as “an attempt 
to ‘write’ critically about the network in the vernacular of the network itself.”43 And yet 
that writing produces charges of misprision—in much the same way that the more Lerer 
                                                
41 Norman M. Klein, The Vatican to Vegas: A History of Special Effects (New York: The New Press, 2004), 
16-17. 
42 Lori Emerson, Reading Writing Interfaces: From the Digital to the Bookbound (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2014), 135. 




worried about mistranslations of his Latin texts, the more they seemed to appear crucial 
to his work. Bridle argues: “it is as much work as criticism: it does not conform to the 
formal shapes—manifesto, essay, book—expected by critics and academics. As a result, 
it remains largely illegible to them … I think the deeper and more interesting aspect of 
this misreading of the New Aesthetic is that it directly mirrors what it is describing: the 
illegibility of technology itself to a non-technical audience.”  
In his essay “glitches are us,” Alex Reid points out that astronaut John Glenn’s 
coinage of the term “glitch” was originally associated with a surge in intensity, and thus a 
glitch is a moment when we realize that our perception of the world is always already 
mediated by technologies of vision: “Whatever agency we attribute to our subjective 
experience exists inasmuch as the subjective relations with both the external world and 
our internal processes are glitchy and leave some uncertain space.”44 That moment is not 
the time to pick up the scourge but rather an opportunity to re-see the world and one’s 
relation to it. Reid sees these glitches not as errors to be corrected but rather as errors to 
be pressed on for epistemological inquiry: “glitches … introduce thought and agency 
(and rhetoric) but also allow us to understand composing as natural, technological, 
discursive, and social all at once.” The error-prone world is generative of new ways of 
knowing. Error is a challenge to ontology because correcting it is supposed to make the 
error disappear. If it is not detected, is it an error? If it is not corrected, is it an error? If it 
is corrected, what does it become? 
                                                





Chapter 1: The Circular Ruins of Alexander Pope: Theorizing the Poetics of 
Remediation 
“I herde a gret noyse withalle 
In a corner of the halle, 
Ther men of love-tydynges toddle, 
And I gan thiderward beholde; 
For I saugh renynge every wight 
As faste as that they hadden might, 
And everych cried, ‘what thing is that?’  
And somme sayde, ‘I not never what.’ 
And whan they were all on an hepe, 
Tho behynde begunne up lepe, 
And clamben up on other faste, 
And up the nose and yën kaste, 
And trodden fast on others heles, 
And stampe, as men doon aftir eles. 
Atte laste y saugh a man, 
Which that y [nevene] nat ne kan; 
But he semed for to be 
A man of gret auctorite…” 
--Geoffrey Chaucer, The Hous of Fame, (c.1379)45 
 
“At first, his dreams were chaotic; a little later they became dialectical. The foreigner 
dreamed he was in the center of a circular amphitheater, which was somehow the ruined 
temple; clouds of taciturn students completely filled the terraces of seats. The faces of 
those farthest away hung at many centuries’ distance and at a cosmic height, yet they 
were absolutely clear. … He understood that the task of modeling the incoherent and 
dizzying stuff that dreams are made of is the most difficult work a man can undertake, 
even if he fathom all the enigmas of the higher and lower spheres—much more difficult 
than weaving a rope of sand or minting coins of the faceless wind. He understood that 
initial failure was inevitable. He swore to put behind him the vast hallucination that at 
first had drawn him off track, and he sought another way to approach his task.” 
--Jorge Luis Borges, “The Circular Ruins” (1940, tr. 1946)46 
 
 
Introduction: Modeling the Incoherent and Dizzying Stuff of Dreams 
 
 
                                                
45 Geoffrey Chaucer, The House of Fame, The Riverside Chaucer, third edition, general editor Larry 
Benson (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1987), ll. 2141-2158, 373. 
46 Jorge Luis Borges, “The Circular Ruins” (1944) Collected Fictions, trans. Andrew Hurley (New York: 
Penguin, 1998), 97. 
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 The last line of Geoffrey Chaucer’s Hous of Fame leaves the poem famously 
unfinished: whom does the speaker, a not-quite author figure called Geffrey, encounter? 
What is his great authority?47 What are his interactions with the allegorical figure of 
Fama, the goddess who presides over the dream vision? In the classical tradition Chaucer 
is referencing and refashioning, Fama is an arbiter of all utterances and how they will 
circulate in the world—as preserved literary forms, eternal truths, ephemeral snippets, 
misquotations, apocrypha, or things in between. Her choices are arbitrary and capricious, 
her supplicants’ fortunes contingent and precarious. At this unfinished ending, the 
visitors to the House of Fame clamber to seek a final answer to their queries as to their 
literary statuses, but they cannot determine the outcome. They are left with an unresolved 
“hepe” of “tydynges,” or scraps of rumor and miscellaneous information—it is difficult 
to distinguish signal from noise. In this way, the poem theorizes itself as a self-same 
member of the aporetic, staticky stuff that circulates in the House of Fame.  
In this chapter, I read the poem as an account of remediation, the refashioning of 
disparate media into new forms, as it dramatizes the ways in which “media are 
continually commenting on, reproducing, and replacing each other.”48 The poem is also a 
remediation itself, as it is constituted of translations of older texts and extended allusions 
                                                
47 One can read the poem historically as situated in Chaucer’s time at court, and read The House of Fame 
and the Parliament of Fowls as political allegories to the marriage of King Richard II to Anne of Bohemia, 
among other political intrigues he observed. As an allegory, it is situated generically to draw on traditions 
form the Roman de la Rose, Dante’s Divine Comedy, Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Virgil’s Aeneid, among many 
others. The poem itself already casts some doubt onto the idea of a single interpretation of a dream—say, as 
an allegory that stands for one particular situation—and leaves them as multifarious and open-ended. See 
Steven F. Kruger, Dreaming in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) and 
Michael St. John, Chaucer’s Dream Visions: Courtliness and Individual Identity (London: Ashgate, 2000). 
48 Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New Media. (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2000), 55. 
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that ekphrastically reframe older media in the text.49 Chaucer’s dream vision is “an 
allegory on the processes of reading and writing, … raising questions concerning 
inspiration and transmission, as well as interpretation and authority, that destabilize 
tradition instead of reaffirming it”50—a remediation about the process of remediation. It 
is a virtuosic infinite regression that figures a recursive churn of literary productions 
which is never resolved and cycles forward without an apparent direction or resolution. 
Jorge Luis Borges builds such a metafictional rubric in “The Circular Ruins,” in which 
the dream vision of a ruined temple generates a creative space for imagining new literary 
productions elsewhere in the collection of Ficciones—at the end of the story, the dreamer 
realizes he was but a figure in another man’s dream, a point on a line of infinite 
regression. Like “The Library of Babel” and “The Garden of Forking Paths” (also 
collected in Ficciones), “The Circular Ruins” figures an alternate imaginative spatial 
configuration of literary texts that comment on their own textuality in a mirror hall of 
epistemology: a dream vision of recursive writing. So what happens when the dream 
vision of Fama undergoes another iteration of translation in eighteenth-century print 
media, in which those scraps are all the more abundant and multifarious? 
 Alexander Pope’s Temple of Fame, published in 1715, is not as obviously strange 
or unstable as Chaucer’s dream vision. Pope works with the third section of Hous of 
Fame, though he draws material about theories of distorted aurality from the second book 
without explicitly citing his Chaucerian source. He contracts the meaning of Fama from 
                                                
49 As when the speaker, Geffrey, sees panels that retell stories from the Aeneid, and he worries that he is not 
up to the task of describing their beauty. 
50 Deanne Williams, “The Dream Visions,” The Yale Companion to Chaucer, ed. Seth Lerer (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2007), 149. 
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that of generalized rumor to a reference to one’s literary reputation or Fame,51 an 
interpretation he solidifies when he adds a moral—“Then teach me, heaven! to scorn the 
guilty bays, / Drive from my breast that wretched lust of praise”52—to what had been 
unfinished and open-ended. In the Advertisement, he claims he has completely 
refashioned the source material, yet in so doing he indicates his work’s status as a 
remediation. He has taken “the hint of the following piece” from Chaucer: “The design is 
in a manner entirely altered, the description and most of the particular thoughts my own” 
yet “wherever any hint is taken from him, the passage itself is set down in the marginal 
notes.”53 Pope’s composition is immediate—“most of the particular thoughts my own”—
but it is also mediated through footnotes that explain the translations from the earlier 
author’s work and its conventions of the dream vision genre.54 The Temple of Fame is a 
poem about the double logic of remediation in a printed translation: Pope situates his 
literary reputation by immersing his speaker in the dream vision—which reflects the 
immersive experience of dreaming itself—and hyper-mediating that experience in his 
acknowledgement of genre and the interface of textual media. 
 Error does not appear in Pope’s translation, though she is an allegorical figure 
who attends Fama as another interfering mediator in other dream visions of print culture 
from the period.55 In Dryden’s translation of Book Twelve of Ovid’s Metamorphoses 
                                                
51 For an account of how the word changed meaning from the medieval period to the eighteenth century, 
see A.C. Cawley, “Chaucer, Pope, and Fame,” Review of English Literature 3 (1962), 9-19. 
52 Alexander Pope, The Temple of Fame, The Poetical Works of Alexander Pope, ed. Herbert Davis 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1966), ll. 521-22, 132-46. 
53 Pope, “Advertisement to The Temple of Fame,” 132. 
54 The heavy epigraphs to this chapter are another frame on this phenomenon. 
55 Most famously she appears in Edmund Spenser’s Faerie-Queene as half-serpent, half-woman, spewing 
papers and junk:  
“Her vomit full of bookes and papers was, 
 With loathly frogs and toades, which eyes did lacke, 
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(published in Fables, Ancient and Modern in 1700), she lurks on the margins of the scene 
with the other destabilizing figures: 
Error sits brooding there; with added train  
Of vain credulity and joys as vain 
Suspicion, with sedition joined, are near;  
And rumours raised, and murmurs mixed, and panic fear. 
Fame sits aloft, and sees the subject ground,  
And seas about, and skies above inquiring all around.56 
 
Robert Lloyd, always attuned to his own minor status as a professional poet, wrote a 
dream vision of “The Temple of Favour” (published posthumously in 1774), in which he 
figures literary reputation and lasting fame as a series of repetitive ministrations to Fame. 
John Dryden, Samuel Otway, and John Gay must continually re-scale the mountain to the 
Temple “built by dame Error’s hasty hands” to varying degrees of success and “repeat 
their lives, their work, their fame” to maintain their place in the canon.57 The situation is 
always precarious: 
Lethargic Error for a while 
Deceives him with her specious smile, 
And flatt’ring dreams delusive shed 
Gay gilded visions round his head. 
 
When, swift as thought, the goddess lewd 
Shifts the light gale; and tempests rude, 
Such as the northern skies deform, 
When fell Destruction guides the storm, 
Transport him to some dreary isle 
Where Favour never deign'd to smile. 
Where waking, helpless, all alone, 
Midst craggy steeps and rocks unknown; 
Sad scenes of woe his pride confound, 
And Desolation stalks around. (ll. 140-54) 
                                                                                                                                            
 And creeping sought way in the weedy gras: 
Her filthy parbreake all the place defiled has.” (Book I, Canto I, ll.) 
56 John Dryden, The Twelfth Book of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, from Fables Ancient and Modern, ll. 83-88. 
The Works of John Dryden, eds. Edward Niles Hooker, H.T. Swedenberg, Vinton A. Dearing (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1956-2000), 4:409. 
57 Robert Lloyd, “The Temple of Favour,” The Poetical Works of Robert Lloyd, ed. William Kenrick 




Lloyd situates Error specifically in a print marketplace of Fame that has been made by 
Pope and his battles with adversaries to attain fame and authority; he opts out of the race 
that Pope has chronicled—indeed, exacerbated—in the Dunciad: “I jostle no poetic 
name;  / I envy none their proper fame; … Nor would, to gain a Monarch’s Favour,  / Let 
Dulness or her sons enslave her” (ll. 180-92). Error’s powers of distortion are like Fame’s 
in that they are arbitrary; her mistake-ridden texts may be ridiculed, but more likely they 
are forgotten and lost. 
 In the eighteenth century, what was already a self-aware, self-reflexive genre 
becomes even more so—it becomes recursive—as new hyper-mediations in printed text 
reorient the dream vision toward dreaming specifically in print, with poetic plays on fears 
of errors and arbitrary preservation.58 Joseph Addison warns of a glut—“Had I printed 
every one that came to my Hands, my Book of Speculations would have been little else 
but a Book of Visions”—in the very headnote to another dream vision in the Spectator.59 
Pope remediates his Temple of Fame into the Dunciad, in which the Queen of Dulness 
replaces Fama as a mediator of authors’ printed productions, and the Temple’s 
chatterings, boasts, and rumors become hyper-mediated in pedantic, discursive footnotes. 
In this chapter, I am less interested in close-reading elements of Pope’s poetry and 
pointing to a chain of their allusions and references and more interested in abstracting the 
poetic language to see how remediation is figured and practiced as a strategy of 
theorizing media history in the dream visions. As an allegory, the poem already proceeds 
                                                
58 For a later version of this dream-vision phenomenon, see Andrew Piper, Dreaming in Books: The Making 
of the Bibliographic Imagination in the Romantic Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
59 “To prevent this Inundation of Dreams, which daily flows in upon me, I shall apply to all Dreamers of 
Dreams, the Advice which Epictetus has couched, after his manner, in a very simple and concise Precept. 
Never tell thy Dreams, says that Philosopher, for tho’ thou thy self may’st take a Pleasure in telling thy 




in abstractions, so these are my primes of analysis.60 Georg Stanitzek theorizes that the 
dream vision genre is a model for theorizing media communication: “Communications by 
Fama are associated with certain dissimulations; this medium distorts every message 
because reception is only possible at the cost of simultaneous production. No message, no 
information, no understanding remains unaffected ‘as such’; they all enter into 
continuous spin.”61 Under such a model of Fama, there is a kind of Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle of interpretation: one cannot observe a media interaction without 
somehow affecting it, without re-mediating it somehow. Stanitzek continues, “This is true 
not only for the wording of each individual message and the meaning of single pieces of 
information, it also holds for the criteria of selection, assumptions about relevance, and 
understanding that are constantly shifting.” There is noise in the communication 
channels, noise which may be the distortions of errors, but it may also be the 
communication itself—the distinction is impossible to parse in the media space of the 
Temple. Instead of dissecting the individual channels of voices, I must read the poems in 
such a way that I can retain their inchoate quality that is refracted and redoubled through 
their mediations. The dream vision’s special generic qualities of distortion derive from 
how the representations of media act in concert, as registered at the most obvious level by 
the frequent accounts of sensory overload, uncountable crowds, and multiplying media.  
                                                
60 For a book-length study of the correspondences between The Temple of Fame and The Dunciad, see John 
Sitter, The Poetry of Pope’s Dunciad (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), especially 66-
117. For example: “Pope at this point was following in the path of numerous other Augustan poets who had 
described the ‘temple’ of numerous other abstractions. As allegorical visions the ‘temple’ poem and the 
progress piece have many common tendencies, and one sees their successful—perhaps inevitable—fusion 
in the Dunciad. … Like The Temple of Fame, the Dunciad is rooted more deeply in abstraction than in fact, 
or, perhaps more accurately, the ‘facts’ are collectively subjected to an abstraction. Although it is true that 
much of the poetry is concerned with turning facts into something more significant, The Temple of Fame 
and the Dunciad occupy that particular province in which a poet seeks to organize certain historical facts by 
means of a single allegorical principle.” (67-68). 
61 Georg Stanitzek, “Fama / Chain of Muses: Two Classical Problems of Literary Studies with ‘the 
Media,’” trans. Peter Krapp, South Atlantic Quarterly 101:3 (2002), 609-623, 612. 
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The dream vision is a literary strategy for configuring literary history as an 
emergent phenomenon, wherein the individual fortunes of an author or a text are subject 
to self-organizing forces that are not predictable from a single example. Clifford Siskin 
argues for emergence as a means for explaining how the increase of publications and the 
new social behaviors to sift these changes mark not just more stuff, but fundamentally 
different organizing qualities to literary productions in the middle and late eighteenth 
century. He takes the phrase “more is different” from complexity theory: “When the 
production of print accelerates in the eighteenth century—in kind and in quantity—the 
inclusive body of writing that was then called literature begins to exhibit emergent 
behaviours that we now experience under the rubric of Literature.”62 Remediation is the 
engine of emergence as texts are refashioned into the new forms and social behaviors that 
Siskin enumerates. The dream vision poem is an eighteenth-century genre that theorizes 
remediation as it is occurring and thus produces more writing about the media maelstrom. 
In what follows, I shall use Pope’s Temple of Fame and Dunciad as tools to test some 
theories and queries about remediation.  
How does the description of remediation as refashioning—reframing—older 
media serve to discuss complex systems? The Fama model does not proceed in an orderly 
                                                
62 Clifford Siskin, “‘More is Different’: Literary Change in the Mid- and Late Eighteenth Century,” The 
New Cambridge History of English Literature, 1660-1780, ed. John Richetti (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 795-823. Siskin continues to detail these behaviors in a chart and 
explanation.”…The expansion of print in general lead to the formation of a mass market and the emergent 
behaviour of ‘culture,’ including commodification into ‘high’ and ‘low’ form. Increases in specific kinds of 
writing, such as the rise in anthologies, the popularity of collected editions and the spread of literary 
periodicals, lead to other emergent phenomena—in these three cases, the notion of a ‘national tradition’; 
the apotheosis of key genres and the professional and academic enterprise of ‘criticism.’ A commodified 
culture in the form of a national tradition highlighted by rising genres and valorised by the institutions of 
criticism gave us Literature” (821-822). The phrase “more is different” comes from P.W. Anderson, “More 
is Different,” Science 177: 1694 (1972), 393-396. For popular, non-specialist accounts of emergence 
theory, Siskin cites Kevin Kelly, Out of Control: The Rise of Neo-Biological Civilization (Reading, MA: 
Addison Wesley, 1994), Steven Johnson, Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and 
Software (London: Penguin, 2002) and John H. Holland, Emergence: From Chaos to Order (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), among others. 
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fashion through stages of mediation or frames of perception—the turbulence is the key—
and so with Pope’s metaphors I propose some alternative vocabulary of emergence, 
mosaics, and pageants for working between frames and the Fama chaos. 
As it has been theorized by Bolter and Grusin, the critical term “remediation” 
relies heavily on visual media to explain and develop the term and its utility—what 
happens when we consider the work of genre in remediation, rather than in the visual 
frames of media? How does one genre remediate another? Why do the genres of 
speculative world-building such as the dream vision, science fiction novels and films, 
virtual reality games and interfaces, and Borgesian philosophical tales serve theorists like 
McLuhan and Bolter and Grusin—and, in earlier historical genres, poets like Pope—so 
well for rendering a space to work out the emergent properties of remediation? 
Does the term “remediation” refer to a process or to a state? Thus far, I have been 
shifting back and forth between the two usages in order to make the case for a recursive 
relationship between process and state: one reinforces the other. What does one get out of 
this critical indistinction, given the model of Fama that depends on oscillation as a source 
of its power? How does the poem render the destabilizing sensory experience of dealing 
with oscillation, in aural, visual, and spatial perception? 
Given the Fama model’s eccentric, unpredictable play with juxtaposing media 
from different time periods, how can we use the model to discuss contemporary versions 
of the dream genre? How does the Fama model promote alternative forms of new media 
scholarship that take up the challenge of rendering multiple channels of media at once? 
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Finally, what does it mean to notice the ways in which scholarly reframing of 
critical terms and concepts is itself a practice of remediation? What other kinds of critical 
protocols are enabled by playing with these recursive properties of literary criticism? 
 
‘Wild Order’ Is an Emergent Behavior 
  
As I have traced it so far, the model of remediation that The Temple of Fame 
exemplifies is one of authorial frames on top of frames on top of frames: Pope translates 
and annotates Chaucer, who in turn refashions Ovid and Virgil, among others. Yet the 
poem itself is not about orderly stages or processions of media at the Temple; it is instead 
a series of encounters with teeming chaos, in which crowds of people are vying with 
allegorical figures for an abstraction, Fame. I have used the frame is a kind of organizing 
structure to contain these multitudes—an imposition of an author function, in 
Foucauldian terms, to spatialize the field of literary productions under survey.63 But that 
spatizalization is already problematic at the beginning of the poem, when the speaker 
cannot situate himself—“I stood, methought, betwixt earth, seas, and skies”—and is 
further bewildered by “a wild promiscuous sound / Like broken thunders that at distance 
roar  / or billows murmuring on the hollow shore.”64 Sensory perceptions of space are 
fundamentally uncertain and irresolvable into a composed scene as the confusion 
                                                
63 Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?” Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and 
Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, trans. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1977), 113-138. For example: “the name of an author remains at the contours of texts—separating one from 
the other, defining their form, and characterizing their mode of existence. It points to the existence of 
certain groups of discourse and refers to the status of this discourse within a society and culture. The 
author’s name is not a function of a man’s civil status, nor is it fictional; it is situated in the breach among 
the discontinuities, which gives rise to new groups of discourse and their singular mode of existence” 
(123). 
64 The Temple of Fame, ll. 11, 22-24. All future references to the poem will be parenthetical. 
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progresses. It should be noted, too, that Chaucer’s “Geffrey” is not the speaker in Pope’s 
poem and thus some of the authorial play is lost in the translation; the focus instead is on 
the complexity of the fray rather than on an individual experience, a kind of zoomed-out 
fractal perspective of the authorial self-consciousness from Chaucer’s Hous.65 
To return to a thought experiment from the introduction, how would one render 
this scene in visual media, and what might that remediation reflect back onto the poem’s 
Fama theory of media communications? Here I am most directly inspired by Alan 
Galey’s essays about Shakespeare editing and the history of information, in which he 
plays with the forms of anachronism and decontextualized readings of Shakespeare’s 
plays to situate them in a contemporary space of reflection about media.  Galey begins 
“Networks of Deep Information” with a provocatively anachronistic reading of Milton’s 
“Epitaph on the admirable Dramaticke Poet VV. Shakespeare” (published as the epigraph 
to a 1632 edition of the plays) as a poem about computing: “Milton also evokes a form of 
textual transmission familiar to anyone who uses a personal computer, that of making 
exact copies in an instant and on practically any scale. As anyone who has suffered major 
data loss can attest, modern computing forces upon us an equivalence between copying 
and preservation.”66 For Galey, this anachronistic reading inspires a critical reflection on 
                                                
65 At the end of “What is an Author?” Foucault asks four questions for respatializing the field of study: 
“What are the modes of existence of this discourse? Where does it come from; how is it circulated, who 
controls it? What placements are determined for possible subjects? Who can fulfill these diverse functions 
of the subject? What matter who’s speaking?” (138). The Temple of Fame dramatizes these four questions 
as a pageant of competing modes of discourse which come from near and far; in the action of the poem, 
these discursive fragments are circulated, set against one another, recombined, and judged by an arbitrary 
figure, Fame.  
66 Alan Galey, “Networks of Deep Information: Shakespeare and the History of Information.” Shakespeare 
Quarterly. 61.3 (2010). 289-312, 290. See also: Galey, “Signal to Noise: Designing a Digital Edition of The 
Taming of a Shrew.” College Literature 36.1 (2009). 40-66. The anachronistic close-reading is a virtuosic 
go-to move for Galey. For an essay about making a digital edition of an early version of The Taming of a 
Shrew (note the article difference), he close-reads the Chorus’s speech from the Prologue of Henry V, a 
kind of warning about over-reaching one’s territory. Galey paints a double scene of the stage and the digital 
edition: “Most of us, sadly, do not have a muse of fire that would ascend the brightest heaven of invention, 
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digital Shakespeare studies: it is not so much that Milton was prescient about computers; 
rather, the anachronistic close-reading creates a valuable artifact of reflection about limit 
cases. Galey continues:  
His texts have come to stand as both ideal and limit case for the concept of 
information which, in its modern guise, emerged from a late twentieth-
century cultural formation that still dominates much current thinking about 
computing. Idealized as easily encoded, unproblematically transmissible 
data, Shakespeare’s texts supposedly flow naturally into new digital forms 
of analysis, so that Shakespearean compatibility with digital media has 
become a truism.67 
 
Galey then pivots from his generative anachronism to a historicist study of how 
Shakespeare bibliography is intertwined with twentieth-century information theory, and 
how that double history might make us think about our complicated investments in digital 
humanities scholarship. I see the many iterations of The Temple of Fame as another poem 
one can read anachronistically to understand the history of media and its emergent 
behaviors.  
There is a precedent for invoking such a multimedia thought experiment to 
discuss The Temple of Fame, as the editor of the Twickenham edition of Pope’s collected 
works, Geoffrey Tillotson, has compared the two poems in terms of other media: “For 
Chaucer’s cinematographic speed and lightness there is Pope’s Handelian tempo and 
harmony, for Chaucer’s narrative, Pope’s scene.”68 Or we may consider the mise en 
abyme technique from visual art, cinema, video games, and virtual reality of showing 
                                                                                                                                            
a kingdom for a stage, and princes to act; the screen obviously cannot hold the vasty fields of France, nor 
can we expect pixels to cram within this electronic O the very casques that did affright the air at Agincourt. 
It is not the brightest heaven of invention, but a more practical kind that must happen right there in the 
playhouse if the venture is to succeed. As the Chorus proposes this distinction, it becomes apparent that his 
apology for the inadequacies of the stage is really not an apology at all. This is the Shakespearean version 
of the defense Microsoft has been known to make of its operating systems and Web browsers: the bugs are 
not really bugs, but features” (41). 
67 Ibid. 
68 Geoffrey Tillotson, notes to the Twickenham Pope, cited in Sitter, 69. 
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miniaturized pictures within pictures, stories within stories, frames within frames in order 
to represent infinite replication in the dreamscape—the term literally means “to be placed 
into the abyss.” The dream vision necessitates a multimedia experience to account for its 
play with perspective, sensory confusion, and techniques of inscription. Lev Manovich 
describes such a state of confusion in multimedia environments: “Often, the two goals of 
information access and psychological engagement compete within the same new media 
object.”69 For the comparative practices of this chapter, we can say that Temple poems 
render this competition with media that are new, such as the newly proliferative and self-
organizing print media of the early eighteenth century, and not just the new media objects 
under his purview in The Language of New Media. Manovich’s goal in that book is to 
define some characteristics unique to new media objects while also drawing historical 
connections to the language of early cinema, which developed so robustly as to make a 
full discipline of techniques, theories, and technologies. That robustness, even glut, 
creates opportunities for conflation and distinction alike in Manovich’s survey, creating a 
kind of Temple of Fame for media technologies of past and present: “Along with surface 
versus depth, the opposition between information and ‘immersion’ can be thought of as a 
particular expression of the more general opposition characteristics of new media—
between action and representation. And just as is the case with surface and depth 
opposition, the results of this competition are often awkward and uneasy.” In this 
                                                
69 Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Press, 2001), 216, italics original. Manovich begins the book with a personal narrative of his errant path 
toward new media studies and a kind of dream vision about what he wishes he could study in early cinema 
culture: “I wish that someone in 1895, 1897, or at least 1903, had realized the fundamental significance of 
the emergence of the new medium of cinema and produced a comprehensive record: interviews with 
audiences; a systematic account of narrative strategies, scenography, and camera positions as they 
developed year by year; an analysis of the connections between the emerging language of cinema and 
different forms of popular entertainment that coexisted with it. Unfortunately, such records do not exist. 
Instead, we are left with newspaper reports, diaries of cinema’s inventors, programs of film showings, and 
other bits and pieces—a set of random and unevenly distributed historical samples” (Manovich, 6). 
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jumbled dreamscape, the anachronistic confusion of media technologies across time 
periods may not always be an error; it may also serve to provoke emergent behavior. 
The Temple is located in a liminal space, and the speaker is able to both zoom in 
on small details of the scene and zoom out to assess the larger prospect, to dizzying 
effect:  
A train of phantoms in wild order rose, 
And, join’d, this intellectual sense compose. 
In Air self-balanc’d hung the Globe below, 
Where Mountains rise, and circling Oceans flow. 
Here naked Rocks, and empty Wastes were seen, 
There Tow’ring Cities, and Forests green, 
Here sailing Ships delight the wand’ring Eyes, 
There Trees, and intermingled Temples rise. 
Now a clear sun the shining scene displays, 
The transient landscape now in clouds decays. (ll. 8-20) 
 
Pope’s indefatigable antagonist John Dennis, who seized on every small detail of his 
rival’s poetry as material for critique, cannot abide this perspectival play: “If the whole 
Creation was open to his Eyes, he must be vastly high. Let it appear then by what 
follows, what a Master he is of Perspective. …”70 Dennis’s critique evinces the double 
logic of remediation: he claims he is taken out of the immersive experience of the poem 
because he notices the errors of Pope’s hyper-mediated perspective that attempt to 
compose tiny details and panoramic scope at the same time. 
Let us appropriate Dennis’s critique into a new context of the multimedia thought 
experiment: this rapidly expanding and contracting perspective may be familiar to those 
who play interactive interface video games. Steven Johnson calls this perspective “the 
long zoom” and names it as the defining “way of seeing” of the 21st century. The long 
                                                
70 John Dennis, “Remarks upon Mr. Pope's translation of Homer. With two letters concerning Windsor 
Forest, and the Temple of Fame.” The Critical Works of John Dennis, ed. Edward Niles Hooker 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1939-43), II: 139. 
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zoom is self-aware of its work in scaling up and down to mediate the emergent behavior 
we can now conceptualize through technologies that mediate the very small and the very 
large to our understanding. The long zoom is attuned to infinite regressions, “the fractal 
geometry of chaos theory in which each new scale reveals endless complexity. And this 
is not just a way of seeing but also a way of thinking: moving conceptually from the scale 
of DNA to the scale of personality all the way up to social movements and politics — and 
back again.”71 Johnson is writing a piece about the video game designer Will Wright, 
whose Spore was, in 2006, a way of making emergence theory fun: the game is a series 
of stages of procedural, iterative world-building stages in which tweaking individual 
details aggregates into larger social and environmental adaptations and behaviors.  
Pope had rendered such aggregating social behavior of insects in his translation of 
the Iliad:  
As from some rocky Cleft the Shepherd sees, 
Clust’ring in Heaps on Heaps, the driving Bees.  
Rolling and black’ning, Swarms succeeding Swarms 
With deeper Murmurs, and more hoarse Alarms 
Dusky they spread, a close embodied Crowd,  
And o’er the Vale descends the living Cloud.72  
 
As Dennis fulminates about the erroneous, indistinct language for describing a swarm of 
bees, he manages to detail everything that’s fascinating about Pope’s emergence theory 
avant la lettre:  
                                                
71 Steven Johnson, “The Long Zoom,” The New York Times Magazine, October 8, 2006. The programmers 
are especially interested in moments where the game seems to encounter an error and the program must 
“learn” new behaviors: “They know that a certain percentage of their users will be building creatures 
deliberately designed to foil the procedural animation system. Those creatures won’t likely be ‘fit’ in a 
traditional evolutionary sense, in that they will be less skilled at collecting food or avoiding predators. But 
they will be perversely satisfying to players keen on exploring the boundaries of the Spore architecture. … 
‘Our philosophy is,” [Spore executive producer Lucy] Bradshaw said, “if it’s going to break, it should 
break funny.’”  
72 Alexander Pope, Iliad. ll. 111-16. 
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The first Line here presents with a Contradiction in Terms; for while Bees 
are a close embodied Crowd, how can they possibly spread? Besides, what 
does the Translator mean, by a close embodied Crowd? What Tautology, 
what Fustian is this? As if every Crowd was not close. And what does he 
mean by embodied? What Idea to the Mind does that Word clearly and 
distinctly present? In short Crowd is nothing but a Botch, and a meer 
Crambo to Cloud. For who ever heard of a Crowd of Bees? A Crowd of 
any thing implies Confusion; but it appears by the following Lines of 
Virgil, that Bees, when they swarm, are under Command, and by 
consequence, not without Order…73 
 
In identifying this “way of seeing” in Pope’s poetry, I am not making a claim for Pope’s 
(or Dennis’s) prescience; rather, I’m observing that Pope’s poetic talent for composing 
perspectives is suited for theorizing how “ways of seeing” and composing affect—
indeed, effect—“ways of thinking.” Strikingly, Dennis’s critique of Pope resembles a 
frequent criticism of Manovich’s own slipperiness in rendering his new media theory, 
that he is insufficiently focused on distinctions in his desire to draw connections among 
disparate objects. In New Philosophy for New Media, Mark B.N. Hansen detects a “a 
more obscure theoretical incapacity to see beyond contemporary framings of media, 
[resulting in] a picture that constantly threatens to reduce new media to a mere 
amplification of what came before.”74 Hansen’s critique is that Manovich is too 
concerned with the formal qualities of the objects he is studying and insufficiently 
historical, a danger that comes from surveying across time and space in the tradition of 
McLuhan’s work. 
In his account of Spore, Johnson is reframing what is now basically a truism from 
McLuhan: media technologies are not just representations of how we see—they construct 
                                                
73 Dennis, II: 124. “Crambo” is an eighteenth-century rhyming game in which players tried to exhaust a 
rhyme for a particular word: a constraint-based poetic genre that depends on recursive and absurd 
accumulation, a fitting artifact of procedure for this study! 
74 Mark B.N. Hansen, New Philosophy for New Media (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, 2004), 32. I take Hansen’s criticism seriously and I suppose I risk some of that same 




our concept of what vision is, what objects to examine, how to examine them, and how to 
compose those ideas into media that will let other people see in them in explicable, 
knowable, shareable ways. In her monograph on technologies of vision in eighteenth-
century satire, Katherine Mannheimer argues for how theories of visuality and aesthetics 
emerged from mediations of optic technology on the printed page. She writes: “Just as 
vision was becoming the ever-more favored mode of encountering the world, the world 
itself was arguably becoming ‘more visual.’ In the natural sciences in particular, the 
invisible was becoming visible: from microscopes to air-pressure gauges, technology 
opened up to the observer a new dimension of ocular perception and consciousness…”75 
Theories of visuality emerge from print’s ability to render optical technologies’ frames 
within frames; those theories then loop back into poetic language of perception and 
consciousness. Pope has a facility for rendering the self-replicating, self-organizing 
behaviors of what would much later be theorized as complex systems—and he does so in 
the highly replicable, organizable form of the couplet.76  
                                                
75 Katherine Mannheimer, Print, Visuality, and Gender in Eighteenth-Century Satire: The Scope in Ev’ry 
Page (New York: Routledge, 2012), 6.  
76 Peter Stallybrass and Ann Blair have traced other examples of bee behavior in their work on Renaissance 
and Enlightenment information storage systems. See for example, their work with German Quaker Francis 
Pastorius, who organized “his massive manuscript compilation Francis Daniel Pastorious, His 
Alphabetical Hive of More than two thousand Honey-combs Begun in the year 1696. Pastorius’s ‘Paper-
hive,” as he called it, was the final alphabetical ‘digestion’ of a series of smaller notebooks on diverse 
subjects….” He had remediated that system from humanist scholars who had in turn digested it from 
Plutarch’s recommendation of keeping a common-place book. Blair and Stallybrass formatted Pastorius’s 
hive into a table with columns for the Bee’s Work (gathering nectar from, depositing pollen, making 
honey), how the bee’s work corresponds to the Material Support of media (one gathers information from 
books, collects it promiscuously in marginal notes, arranges those juxtapositions in a common-place book). 
See Blair and Stallybrass, “Mediating Information: 1450-1800,” in This Is Enlightenment, eds. Clifford 
Siskin and William B. Warner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 139-163, 151-52. Stallybrass 
uses the same material elsewhere to make a point about the extensive history of print databases and what 
we can learn from considering Renaissance forms of database work in digital humanities classrooms. See 
Stallybrass, “Against Thinking,” PMLA 122.5 (2007), 1580-85. In that piece, Stallybrass argues against 
models of trying to replicate critical commonplaces of themes and close-reading in favor of doing things 
with texts like common-placing them to see what patterns emerge. 
 
 47 
Here Pope is like Borges: a world-builder of alternate epistemological spaces, 
especially those that require “modeling … incoherent and dizzying stuff” as a mass. 
Borges’s dreamer in “The Circular Ruins” is engaged in an ongoing, recursive process of 
dreaming and re-dreaming in order to make sense of his situation: “Each night he 
perceived it with greater clarity, greater certainty. He did not touch it; he only witnessed 
it, observed it, corrected it, perhaps, with his eyes. He perceived it, he lived it, from many 
angles, many distances.”77 Yet for Borges’ dreamer, the proliferation of perceptions does 
not reveal the largest error: he is dreaming. In fact, those vivid scenes exacerbate the 
error, for they are so immersive that his dreamer loses track of his position as a mediator. 
He cannot be self-aware, be a critical figure, if he does not realize which genre he is 
participating in. From Chaucer to Borges and beyond, the dream vision oscillates 
between immersion and hyper-mediation; Pope’s translation of the Fama model of 
mediation in Fame and the Dunciad shows a historical moment of print saturation when 
the genre becomes aware of its own mediating abilities, so much so that it can hyper-
mediate itself. 
This project takes its thesis—that efforts to contain errors have the paradoxical 
effect of proliferating them—from Pope’s description of spontaneous generation in the 
Essay on Criticism, in which he figures the ways in which emergent behavior in worms 
could be mapped onto social critical behavior: “Those half-learn’d Witlings, num’rous in 
our Isle, / As half-form’d Insects on the Banks of Nile: / Unfinish’d Things, one knows 
not what to call, / Their Generation’s so equivocal.”78 When a critic is prone to 
animadverting corrections, errors multiply prodigiously—like Dennis’s willful 
                                                
77 Borges, 98. 
78 Alexander Pope, Essay on Criticism, ll. 40-44. 
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misreadings, like the creatures in Spore. Ironically, Dennis describes his work of 
detecting and animadverting on these errors as a kind of emergent procedure of mediating 
the page with so much ink— the aggregation of small quips and corrections becomes one 
gigantic blot. He appropriates a line from Ben Jonson to account for his mass of 
corrections: “if a Man should go about to examine and correct them, he must make all 
they have done but one Blot. The Good is so entangled with their Bad, that forcibly the 
one must draw on the other’s Death with it. A Spunge dipt in Ink will do all. ---Comitatur 
punici Librum Spungit.”79 
Dennis’s criticism is comically literal-minded, but it is also a figure of itself: he 
zooms in on small details and gets overwhelmed by the larger picture of the scene, which 
is mostly conventional in its rehearsal of the tropes of an eighteenth-century prospect 
poem. He goes on: “Well! we will allow that from the prodigious Height where he stands, 
he might behold the Ocean. But could he possible from that Height discern the 
Mountains, the Rocks, the Wastes, the Forests, nay, such minute Objects, as the very 
Ships and single Trees?”80 The Eighteenth Century Collections Online digitization of 
Dennis’s pamphlet records a funny piece of marginalia here (see figure 3): a reader has 
written “Chaucer” in the margin next to Dennis’s scathing critique of Pope’s play with 
perspective. Chaucer does not describe the prospect in these specific terms in Hous of 
Fame, but the anonymous eighteenth-century reader’s skepticism about how Dennis 
collapses the distinction between mediations is striking, for it demonstrates how the older 
version and translation interact on a specific reader’s page in unexpected ways.  
                                                




This initial prospect of the Temple of Fame provokes multiple incidents of 
remediation. Pope has remediated Chaucer’s dream vision into another familiar 
eighteenth-century poetic genre by folding in conventions of the prospect poem; this 
hybrid genre remediates the scene in both theoretical senses of the term as it “remedies” 
(and perhaps exacerbates) the disorientation of the scene with the conventions of another 
representational form. Dennis the critic seeks to remediate (in the sense of remedy) 
Pope’s errors of perspective—and in fact does so, textually, by animadverting on each 
passage with more criticism and hyper-mediating his presence, thus generating more 
vociferous utterances to swirl around at the Temple of Fame. Finally, the digital scan of 
Dennis’s animadversion indicates how an anonymous historical reader’s experience of 
accessing and commenting on the connections between a medieval vision and its 
neoclassical translation in one period can be remediated and preserved with new 
technology—another kind of utterance to be added to the heap. The organizing principle 
of authorship frames these remediations by labeling and sorting the utterances as poetic 
lines, critical assessments, or anonymous marginalia. But the allegorical figure of Fama 
herself plays each of these channels at once as creator, arbiter, and scatterer. “Here is its 
self-referential organization,” writes Stanitzek, “whatever enters into communication—or 
inversely: what Fama observes—is taken up and processed according to her own 
nonpreprogrammed [that is, non-predictive] criteria; Fama operates self-referentially, and 
in the manner of a process building on its own strength.”81 In so doing, she challenges a 
controlling conceptual frame of authorship in favor of something more chaotic that 
generates its own power from processes of self-organization, a “wild order” of a complex 
system of transmission. 





Strategies of Mediation: Interfaces and Inscriptions 
 
As an over-determined liminal space, this remediated prospect of the Temple of 
Fame is a kind of poetic interface, a generic threshold that produces reflection on the 
epistemological implications of mediated perspective. So how does a swarm behave in 
such an interface, as mediated by the unit of the metaphor and couplet? In The Interface 
Effect, Alexander Galloway argues that the interface is less a defined technological 
feature (in a video game, say) and more of a conceptual threshold for understanding 
media. “Interfaces are not simply objects or boundary points,” he argues, “they are 
autonomous zones of activity. Interfaces are not things, but rather processes that effect a 
result of whatever kind. … Interfaces are themselves effects, in that they bring about 
transformation in material states. But at the same time interfaces are themselves the 
effects of other things, and thus tell the story of the larger forces that engender them.”82 
Galloway is arguing for the recursive quality of the interface, a quality that is 
dramatized—and in fact tested—in the infinitely refracting contests of mediation in The 
Temple of Fame. In sometimes sharp conversation with Bolter, Grusin, and Manovich, 
among others, Galloway argues that an interface is not solely (or even) a state but a 
process and, recursively, an effect of that process’s work. Genre theorists have been 
making such an argument for some time: a genre is not a thing but an organizing behavior 
of a group of texts that change over time.83 As it circulates in the heady print marketplace 
                                                
82 Alexander R. Galloway, The Interface Effect (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), vii. See Hansen, 32-46 for 
a related critique. 
83 See Carolyn Miller, “Genre as Social Action.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 70 (1984) 151-167. Miller’s 
article is partly a review of what scholars of genre and rhetoric had published up to 1984, and though she 
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described by Pope (as well as Addison and, later in the century, Lloyd), the dream vision 
is a generic strategy, an interface, for translating literary history at a moment of concern 
about the ways in which their authorial legacy resembles that media maelstrom of the 
poem.  
The poem represents multiple moments of interface, as in that introductory 
account of standing “betwixt earth, seas, and skies” or a few lines later when Pope’s 
speaker encounters a stone material interface of literary historical memory:  
The wondrous rock like Parian marble shone, 
And seemed, to distant sight, of solid stone. 
Inscriptions here of various names I viewed, 
The greater part by hostile time subdued; 
Yet wide was spread their fame in ages past, 
And poets once had promised they should last. 
Some fresh engraved appeared of wits renowned; 
I looked again, nor could their trace be found. 
Critics I saw, that other names deface,  
And fix their own, with labour, in their place (ll.29-38) 
 
The effects of Fama’s interventions are iterated over and over again on this stone face as 
critics vie with authors for lasting fame, but these effects are also difficult to distinguish 
and require the “distant sight” that Dennis was so contemptuous of, an oscillating means 
of zooming in to observe particular disputes but rising above the fray to assess a longer 
legacy. Fama presides over the scene with this power of judicial mediation, but the 
speaker has his own abilities of remediating through poetic description and ekphrasis. 
There is a kind of contest of the multiple definitions of mediation taking place: Fama the 
                                                                                                                                            
does not describe her work as emergent, the article itself actually proceeds through a set of assessments of 
the field that gradually increase in complexity—including a chart of hierarchies and a list of generalized 
features that resembles what the programmers in Spore might produce as a game design document. Some 
excerpts: “1. Genre refers to a conventional category of discourse based in large-scale typification of 
rhetorical action; as action, it acquires meaning from situation and from the social context in which that 
situation arose. 2. As meaningful action, genre is interpretable by means of rules, genre rules occurs at a 
relatively high level on a hierarchy of rules for symbolic interaction. 3. …Genre is a form at one particular 
level that is a fusion of lower-level forms and characteristic substance….” (163). 
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allegorical mediator of literary history, whose judgments are carved on temples, libraries, 
museums, canons, versus the speaker-poet, who makes more media. 
The ephemeral state of an author’s fame is matched by the iterative process of 
remediation, be it in critics’ remediations or in some other process of republication or 
refashioning that keeps it circulating in some form or another. There is a recursive 
relationship between media state and media process: to exist in a state (even an 
ephemeral one) means that one may circulate at the Temple and thus join the procession 
to be reformulated. An utterance must always have that temporary state, in a genre, say, 
in order to be eligible for the pageant. Paula McDowell argues for separating Pope from 
McLuhan’s championing of him as Typographic Man: “Pope would never have dreamed 
of separating the technology of printing from its users. (In fact, his satire was criticized 
for being too personal.) He used the word ‘print’ chiefly as a verb, not a noun—to 
indicate a process, not a product.”84 McDowell’s phrase “dreamed of” is ironic here, for 
in making a historicist claim about Pope’s attitudes, she evokes the non-historicist mode 
of dreaming and visionary logic: the speaker of “The Temple of Fame” is dreaming, not 
the publicity- and legacy-obsessed author. Yet that irony is not a rejection of her claim 
for its rhetorical phrasing, but rather a note that making these kinds of distinctions may 
engender the very figurative leaps that are being criticized. Philosopher Daniel Dennett 
argues that in our contemporary media environment, we conflate states and processes of 
mediation to no unmanageable confusion, 
… living as we do in a world of abstract artifacts that jump promiscuously 
from medium to medium. It’s no longer a big deal to go from the score, to 
the music you hear live, to the recorded version of the music. You can 
jump back and forth between media very rapidly now. It’s become a fact 
                                                
84 Paula McDowell, “Mediating Media Past and Present: Toward a Genealogy of ‘Print Culture’ and ‘Oral 
Tradition,’” in This Is Enlightenment, eds. Siskin and Warner, 229-46, 236. 
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of life. It used to be hard work to get things from one form to another; 
that’s not hard work anymore, it’s automatic. You eliminate the 
middleman. …This removal of all the hard work in translation from one 
medium to another makes it all the more natural to populate your world 
with abstractions, because you find it’s hard to keep track of what medium 
they’re in.85 
 
The genre of the dream vision, populated as it is by abstractions and poetic descriptions 
of process, is a way of accounting for this difficulty in keeping track of promiscuous 
mediations. In the Temple of Fame, one must embrace, or at least bear witness to, the fact 
of so many proliferating mediums and media. 
This is a challenge for any critic, especially Galloway, who is a polemicist 
seeking to intervene on these theories of remediation. Early on, he even sounds a little 
like Dennis as he announces: “The remediation argument (handed down from McLuhan 
and his followers including [Friedrich] Kittler) is so full of holes that it is probably best to 
toss it wholesale.”86 Galloway challenges the idea of totally promiscuous mediation and 
remediation, for there are media artifacts that do not “jump” between states as easily as 
Dennett indicates they are able to do because the process of generally defined 
remediation would destroy the artifact. “Recorded sound may remediate performed 
music,” Galloway writes, “but what is being remediated when a musician plays magnetic 
tape backward and hears for the first time a true sonic reversal (not simply the reversal of 
phonemes)?” He continues to pile up more difficult examples: “Or consider the 
computer. A computer might remediate text and image. But what about a computer 
crash? What is being remediated at that moment? It can’t be text or image anymore, for 
they are not subject to crashes of this variety.”  
                                                
85 Daniel Dennett, “The Computational Perspective,” Science at the Edge: Conversations with the Leading 
Scientific Thinkers of Today, ed. John Brockman (New York: Sterling Press, 2008), 115-128, 123. 
86 Galloway, 20-21. See Friedrich Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young 
and Michael Wutz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
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As Tillotson reminds us, Pope’s dream vision is more obviously remediable 
through the language of cinema and music. Yet I am intrigued by the gauntlet Galloway 
throws down here: “So is a computer crash an example of non-media?” His challenge 
illuminates how he believes “the remediation hypothesis leads very quickly to a feedback 
loop in which much of what we consider to be media are in fact reclassified as non-
media, thereby putting into question the suitability of the original hypothesis.”87 Pope’s 
inscriptions in stone—which are both eternal in some spaces and liable to fade away in 
other, arbitrarily demarcated locations—may stand in for other kinds of inscription that 
the computer crash is indeed mediating: unpredictable code errors, sudden memory 
erasures, or even digital traces that we thought we had deleted but are still present in deep 
inscription that we cannot access.88  
Such apparently alien artifacts might instead re-spatialize the field of media 
studies. In Mechanisms: New Media and the Forensic Imagination, Matthew 
Kirschenbaum investigates artifacts of digital inscription in digital storage and encryption 
that are not immediately legible through our methods of close-reading; in a move of 
ingenious recursion, he generates critical language by refashioning vocabulary from 
bibliography and textual studies for reading what had been thought to be “black boxes” of 
unreadable material. He distinguishes between the “formal materiality,” which is not 
medium-specific and can abstract meaning through metaphors (as I have been doing thus 
far in playing with general definitions of remediation), and “forensic materiality,” which 
“rests upon the instrument mark or trace, the inscription that is as fundamental to new 
                                                
87 Ibid. 
88 For further connections, see Pope’s description of inscriptions that are susceptible to heat and cold, just 
like we’re warned about keeping digital devices in normal temperature ranges: “Nor was the work impaired 
by storms alone, / But felt th’approaches of too warm a sun” (ll. 41-42). 
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media as it is to other impositions and interventions in the long technological history of 
writing.” As Kirschenbaum sees it, “writing practices engender an eruption of tools and 
techniques to fix, expunge, and recover their meaning bearing marks and traces.”89  
This is an apt description of the situation at the Temple of Fame, and 
Kirschenbaum’s work is a reminder that the ephemerality of fame that Pope worried 
about for his own authorial legacy in print has diverse manifestations in digital media.90 
They may include: traces we wanted to erase, legacies of authorial production in obsolete 
formats, pamphlets that get scanned into digital databases and preserve material traces 
that would have been forgotten otherwise, and many more odd artifacts of inscription. I 
shall return to these artifactual challenges later in the chapter when I consider the media 
of “glitch art” that plays with breaking digital media as a challenge to art and 
epistemology. Kirschenbaum argues that the experience of contending with these diverse 
types of inscriptions generates the “forensic imagination” in which we seek to imagine 
what it would be like to recover relics of the past and ”construct legible records of what 
happened on the other side of a present singularity.” The characteristics of this 
imaginative space should sound familiar from Pope’s poem: “The prevalent aesthetic 
markers of the forensic imagination: extreme juxtaposition, or oscillation of spatial and 
temporal scale; a precision vocabulary that bespeaks an intimacy with industrial 
procedure and fabrication; beauty in novel proximity to mundane objects, here dust and 
                                                
89 Matthew G. Kirschenbaum, Mechanisms: New Media and the Forensic Imagination (Cambridge: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2008), 70-71. 
90 In his essay about Shakespeare and the history of information, Galey makes a similar reading of Milton’s 
epitaph to Shakespeare: “Since a digital text’s ‘deep impressions’ are merely positively or negatively 
charged electrons on a magnetized disk surface—or the microscopic impressions laser etched into an 
optical disk—the devices we now associate with computing provoke a complex set of responses to 
preservation, largely in the absence of a single trusted substrate for digital archiving. In digital media, 
preserving data means keeping numbers flowing” (Galey, “Networks of Deep Impression,” 290). 
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debris that are revealed” to be precious materials.91  That description echoes Pope’s 
description of the Temple’s outward face: 
The wall in lustre and effect like glass, 
Which o’er each object casting various dyes, 
Enlarges some, and others multiplies; 
Nor void of emblem was the mystic wall 
For thus romantic Fame increases all. (ll.131-36) 
 
As an interface that enlarges, increases, and multiplies media, the Temple of 
Fame has different conceptual orientations than, say, a Renaissance memory palace, 
which sought to organize belief into discrete rooms for intellectual and spiritual 
accessibility.92 Mary Carruthers writes of how errors do the work of reconfiguring a 
memory palace:  
For us, making a mistake of memory is a failure in accuracy, failure 
exactly to iterate the original material. In antiquity and the Middle Ages, 
problems involving memory-phantasms are described as heuristic 
(recollective) rather than as reproductive problems, and are due to a failure 
to imprint the phantasm properly in the first instance, thus causing 
confusion and recollective loss. … Forgetting is a technical error, due to 
such things as insufficient imprinting or mis-addressing, and errors of 
recollection are thus perceptual in nature, if the mind’s ‘eye’ cannot see 
clearly or looks in the wrong place. But if one’s images are clearly made, 
and if one’s routes to them through the mass of individual phantasms 
stored in memory are properly marked, and fortified through practice, one 
will safely and securely find one’s place.93  
 
The highly reproducible generic components of the dream vision—ekphrasis, couplets, 
allusions, and, as I shall discuss in the next section, the repetitive rehearsal of the epic 
invocation—each have a multiplier effect in the interface. Swarms enter, and the interface 
proliferates that stuff not by consolidating it, but rather by dispersing it further. 
                                                
91 Kirschenbaum, 251-52. He takes these particular characteristics from close-reading Nicholson Baker’s 
novella The Mezzanine. 
92.The classic studies are Frances Yates, The Art of Memory (1966) (London: Random House, 1992); 
Jonathan Spence, The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci (New York: Penguin Books, 1985).  




Theorizing in media res 
 
In explaining the affective possibilities of the forensic imagination, Kirschenbaum 
cites Lisa Gitelman’s formulation: “inscription is a form of intervention.”94 Pope’s 
speaker evinces this desire to record “meaning, identity, and intentionality”95 at the 
Temple of Fame—but his intervention will be temporary while Fama’s judgment will be 
decisive in the world of the poem. What The Temple of Fame registers, then, is the 
attempt to intervene, to find other means of mediation that will subvert Fama’s power and 
to seize a creative identity as an author who can remediate the scene. Here Pope’s focus 
on Fama as Fame rather than as gossip indicates the ways in which meaning, identity, and 
intentionality become over-determined in this imaginative space.  
The Temple is an amalgam of architectural styles—a building version of an 
animadversion as rendered in alternating plain and italic types—which are historically 
recognizable as classical or Gothic, but also taken out of time by their subsumption into 
the interface.96 Susan Stewart theorizes this attempt to recontextualize the past in other 
media forms, to create artifacts as a strategy to “bypass the contingencies of time: by 
                                                
94 Lisa Gitelman, Scripts, Grooves, and Writing Machines: Representing Technology in the Edison Era 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 3. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Steven Johnson presents the Gothic cathedral as an interface: “‘The principle of the Gothic architecture,’ 
Coleridge once said, ‘is infinity made imaginable.’ The same could be said for the modern interface. Where 
the flying buttresses of Chartres rendered the kingdom of heaven in stone, the information-space on the 
monitor embodies—‘makes imaginable’—the otherwise invisible cotillion of zeros and ones whirling 
throughout microchips.” Interface Culture: How New Technology Transforms the Way We Create and 
Communicate (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 42. Though Galloway does not mention the popular science 
texts about media interfaces that have saturated the techno-populist market in recent years, he has some 
moments of conceptual agreement and disagreement with Johnson. 
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creating new antiques, the author hopes to author a context as well as an artifact.”97 A 
collection of these artifacts makes up a “distressed genre” in Stewart’s terminology, “in 
order to emphasize their artifactual nature—that is, their guise of self-referentiality,” a 
guise that in the Temple of Fame has been present, albeit with different goals and 
textures, since Chaucer adopted the form. For Pope, the self-referentiality is an attempt to 
authorize his fame-seeking. Stewart continues in a key that sounds much like 
Kirschenbaum’s digital forensic imagination, here attuned to artificial classicism: “The 
period’s deepening historical awareness of the classical world was supplemented by a 
rising archaeology that demonstrated both the reappearance and disappearance of the 
past. Thus the desire to produce speaking objects, objects both in and out of time, seems 
an inevitable outgrowth of his development.” The Temple of Fame is an interface for 
those kinds of historical and ahistorical interventions. 
Speaking theoretically and not technically, Galloway calls the interface an 
“allegorical device that will help us gain some perspective on culture in the age of 
information,” as it stands for “thresholds, those mysterious zones of interaction that 
mediate between different realities.”98 His initial example of a textual interface is the epic 
convention of beginning in medias res, in the middle of the action wherein the poet 
invokes the Muse for assistance in mediating the scene: 
The poet does not so much originate his own song as serve as a conduit for 
divine expression received from without. … All media evoke similar 
liminal transition moments in which the outside is evoked in order that the 
inside may take place. In the case of the classical poet, what is the outside? 
It is the Muse, the divine source, which is first evoked and praised, in 
                                                
97 Susan Stewart, Crimes of Writing: Problems in the Containment of Representation (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1994), 66. 
98 Galloway, 54, vii. 
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order for the outside to possess the inside. Once possessed by the outside, 
the poet sings and the story transpires.99 
 
As Cynthia Wall notes, this is Pope’s métier: she opens her critical assessment of his 
“Poetic Spaces” by noting his frequent appropriation of the epic convention of opening in 
medias res, in the middle of the action, “or, as we might say, in the midst of spaces” in 
order to carve out a place for composition. She cites the opening lines of Epistle to 
Arbuthnot, in which Pope is “besieged by aspiring authors”: “So the poem acts pre-
emptively, opening itself by closing the door, to create a sustained refuge of 419 lines 
where the poet can figure out how he got here in the first place.”100 Pope’s framing 
thresholds are zones of media interactions that are always populated by swarms (of 
people, of printed materials); he evokes thresholds to separate authors from hacks, but the 
behavior of the swarm is too enticing for him to keep outside the story.  
That scene of squabbling among authors is familiar from The Temple of Fame and 
the Dunciad, in which Pope appropriates the conventional epic invocation for his own 
devices.101 He reiterates the interrupted invocation until it is an interface that not only 
                                                
99 Galloway, 32. I turn to Richard Bentley’s appropriation of the technique for a kind of editorial possession 
in chapter 2. 
100 Cynthia Wall, “Poetic Spaces,” Cambridge Companion to Alexander Pope, ed. Pat Rogers (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), 49. See also Murray Roston, Changing Perspectives: Literature and the 
Visual Arts 1650-1820 (Princeton UP, 1990). Roston sees Pope’s Essay on Man as negotiating between 
authorial presentation and classical genre: “That assertion is countered through the verse-essay by the 
implication that the poet himself has nonetheless succeed somehow in looking through the cosmic 
gradations, has perceived the order beyond, and may therefore serve, despite that general prohibition for 
mankind, as a trustworthy mentor for the reader. Yet the assumption of privilege is never conveyed, even 
indirectly, as resulting from a Miltonic ascent on the part of poet, an inspired vision of the heavens; only as 
the outcome of rational assessment and discrimination”—that is, participation in a genre (84). In the terms 
of this chapter, this is an oscillation between generically rendered perspectives and authorial hyper-
mediation. 
101 Chaucer’s House of Fame has several generic markers of Invocation in Book III:  
“O God of science and of light, 
Appollo, thrugh thy grete might, 
This lytel laste book thou gye! 
… 
That in myn hed ymarked ys— 
Loo, that is for to menen this, 
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registers estrangement in this media maelstrom, but also produces it. The Temple of Fame 
is an entire poem of being caught in medias res, as the speaker is always caught in the 
middle of a procession or on his way to another confusing prospect of “a structure fair / 
Its site uncertain, in in earth or air” (420-21) where he is caught in a bedlam of news, 
rumors, predictions, and more: “all neither wholly false, nor wholly true” (457). There is 
no way to distinguish what is outside and what is inside in this space: 
Above, below, without, within, around 
Confused, unnumbered multitudes are found 
Who pass, repass, advance, and glide away; 
Hosts raised by fear, and phantoms of a day 
…. 
Each talked aloud, or in some secret place, 
And wild impatience stared in every face 
The flying rumours gathered as they rolled, 
Scarce any tale was sooner heard than told 
And all who told it added something new, 
And all who heard it made enlargements too 
In every ear it spread, on every tongue it grew. (ll. 458-472) 
 
Galloway begins with the epic invocation as a simple building block of the interface that 
he may use for a stable critical foundation for his media criticism. But Pope has shown 
that convention of entering in media res n to be a strategy of hyper-mediation and not just 
immersion. He has shown it to be malleable by means of its infinite replicability and 
capacity for figuring—and producing—complex behavior in print media. The 
indistinction of insides and outsides must remain that way; the poetic interface is not 
something to be broken down into smaller parts, for those parts are not predictive of the 
larger media phenomenon. Pope appropriates the epic convention for his satire, and, in 
his virtuosically repetitive remediation of the convention (stacking frames upon frames), 
                                                                                                                                            
The Hous of Fame for to descryve—” (ll. 1091-1105) 
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he also appropriates the conventional authorial behavior to express some anxiety about 
participating in such a vaunted form after the great epics of Homer and Virgil. 
Pope’s greatest play with remediating the epic convention for media commentary 
is in the Dunciad, in which the meddling hyper-mediator Martinus Scriblerus interrupts 
the very first line of the poem to draw the eye to the footnotes. Scriblerus’s intervention 
is a play on Richard Bentley’s and Lewis Theobald’s conjectural criticism, as he indicates 
a supposed “variant” text which abstracts the first line of the Aeneid into media content: 
“In the first edition it was ‘Books and the Man I sing.’”102 Here is a proliferation of 
thresholds that are never crossed fully because they keep being reframed with more 
mediation: the opening lines of the author’s invocation of a poetic muse are interrupted 
by a fictional-but-recognizable mediator’s insertion of his own media.103 Of course, 
Dennis is right there, ready to miss the point of this satire by training his critical faculties 
to the wrong place: “P. sings Books, and not an Action; and the Author who pretends in 
an Epick Poem to sing Books instead of singing an Action, is only qualified to sing 
Ballads.”104 Yet again, in making this petty point, Dennis actually describes what’s 
fascinating about Pope’s remediation of the convention from that of commencing epic 
action to that of multiplying mediations of abstractions: Pope makes the process of 
                                                
102 Alexander Pope, The Dunciad. n.1. in The Dunciad in Four Books, ed. Valerie Rumbold (New York: 
Pearson Longman, 2009), 97. 
103 The Dunciad has a kind of interface inside an interface; as it is dedicated to Jonathan Swift and ups the 
ante on his proliferating prefatory remarks to The Tale of a Tub, The Dunciad contains various dedications, 
advertisements, letters to the publisher, etc. For this space of textual interfaces, Galloway turns to Gerard 
Genette’s theory of thresholds and intraface from Thresholds [Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation, 
trans. Jane E. Lewin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)]. We can imagine Scriblerus’s notes 
as constituting “…this imaginary dialogue between the workable and the unworkable: the intraface, that is, 
an interface internal to the interface. The intraface is within the aesthetic. … The interface is indecisive 
fore it must always juggle two things (the edge and the center at the same time)…” (40).  
104 John Dennis, “Remarks on Pope’s Dunciad,” II: 361. I like to think of Dennis as being so wrong that he 
swerves back toward an interesting, compelling way of looking at Pope—a fitting critical move in the 
Temple of Fame. 
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iteration into a theory of itself. Where Galloway positioned the epic invocation as an 
interface, Stewart makes a similar formulation for what it mediates:  
This inclusive capacity of the epic depends upon a capacity for 
objectification as well as for distancing. The epic gathers and incorporates, 
in a reverent way, what has gone before it. Thus the epic marks the 
objectification or artifactualizaton of literature: literature as document, not 
so much absorbed into its context of production as a survival or remnant 
of that context.105 
 
The temple poem is a recursively distressed genre: it is an older form that calls attention 
to how it has been translated, artifactualized, remediated over time, but it is also about 
that very subject as it records, allegorizes, and theorizes the processes by which the 
distressing gains its artifactual power. 
  
 




  In describing the whispers and chatterings as scraps of stuff, Pope objectifies the 
sounds that echo in the Temple of Fame. They thrive in the medium of gossip, a kind of 
agar for growing print culture: 
But straight the direful trump of slander sounds  
Through the big dome the doubling thunder bounds; 
Loud as the burst of cannon rends the skies 
The dire report through every region flies 
In every ear incessant rumours rung, 
And gathering scandals grew on every tongue (ll.332-37) 
 
As the Temple’s physical location is over-determined as a liminal space, so too is it over-
stated as an aural echo chamber, with adjectives like “dire” repeating in neighboring 
couplets, thunder “doubling” (the poem is full of stormy sounds), and the hoary clichés of 
both thunder and cannons being deployed in rapid fire. These lines literally enact the 
                                                
105 Stewart, 75. 
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proliferation of sounds they are describing. The sounds develop outrageous features and 
self-adapt like the emergent beings in Spore: “A thousand wingèd wonders fly / Borne by 
the trumpet’s blast, and scattered through the sky (ll. 486-87). It is not just a synesthetic 
shift from immaterial sound to material stuff that can gather and grow, for Pope further 
artifactualizes them (in Stewart’s vocabulary) when he allegorizes them in terms which 
echo his lines in Essay on Criticism about the spontaneous generation of bad criticisms—
“When thus ripe lies are to perfection sprung, / Full grown, and fit to grace a moral 
tongue” (479-80)—and which call to mind Jonathan Swift’s evocative description of 
“order from confusion sprung” from “The Lady’s Dressing Room.” The sounds take on 
lives of their own, lives which have social, textual histories generated by their 
remediation in the poem.  
 Sounds grow these extra poetic features in their remediation from aurality to 
textuality, thus dramatizing how the stage of mediation may create an author out of a 
listener. As electronic music composer, DJ, and critic David Toop puts it, “listening then 
is a specimen of mediumship, a question of discerning and engaging with what lies 
beyond the world of forms. When sound, silence, and other modalities of auditory 
phenomena are represented through ‘silent’ media, this association of mediumship 
becomes more acute.”106 Per the old saw about trees falling in a forest, sound requires a 
listener in order to be registered as having occurred—its presence is both immersive and 
dependent on a mediator. Here, Galloway’s critique of Bolter and Grusin for their main 
                                                
106 David Toop, Sinister Resonance: The Mediumship of the Listener (New York: The Continuum 
Publishing Group Inc., 2010), viii. Toop began his career as a DJ before branching out to write in the 
popular music press in the United Kingdom. From his other book titles—which include Ocean of 
Sound: Aether Talk, Ambient Sound and Imaginary Worlds (1995), Exotica: Fabricated Soundscapes in a 
Real World (1999), Haunted Weather: Music, Silence, and Memory (2004)—one can get a sense that his 
work is highly recursive, as he juxtaposes examples from his encyclopedic knowledge of sound in 




focus on visual media actually presents a means for understanding their work in the realm 
of sonic media, for he has provided a means of understanding how the epic poet 
interfaces his muse by means of singing language into text.107 
The Temple of Fame is a series of interfaces that create a sensory overload for the 
Pope’s listener-speaker, which in turn generates an awareness of the multiple, conflicting 
channels of Fama and a space to realize his own mediating role as poet who seeks Fame. 
Toop’s description of the experience is impressionistic—it is overwrought and vague at 
the same time—but it resembles Pope’s listener-speaker’s similarly over-determined 
situation: 
Dwelling in every written text there are voices; within images there is 
some suggestion of acoustic space. Sound surrounds, yet our relation to its 
enveloping, intrusive, fleeting nature is fragile (a game of Chinese 
whispers) rather than decisive … sound floating upwards or through the 
air, either writing itself in to the outer reaches of the human environment 
or thinning into unimaginably insubstantial states of materiality: thin, 
thinner, thinnest yet never quite nothing. Sound unearthed through written 
memory and other forms of inscription, on the other hand, is closer to 
metaphors of sediment, a collecting of dissipating earthly stuff: silt, dust 
and partial objects that must be sifted, as if by an archaeological dig, from 
other impacted matter underfoot. The problem, we realize from examining 
the ways in which sound is understood, is that sound is described through 
a fog of confusion.108  
 
With his repetitions and clichés, Pope’s listener-speaker is dramatizing that double logic 
of remediation: he is immersed in a chaotic sonic landscape and highly aware of the 
enabling limitations of metaphor in mediating that experience. Such an awareness is 
present in Chaucer’s poem as well, as A.C. Cawley traces the appearances of the word 
“fame” in Chaucer’s poem and argues for a “definite progression” from fame as rumor to 
consolidation in fame as the author’s renown: “Fame is the end-product of countless 
                                                
107 Galloway, 34. 
108 Toop, viii, 34-35.  
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reports, chirkings, rounings, and jangles. Soaring heaven-wards in the Eagle’s talons, he 
follows the upward course of all the sounds and words that are uttered on this earth until 
he reaches the heights of the House of Fame, where human noises are given a name and 
consolidated as fame or ill fame.”109 Pope’s phrase “intellectual scene compose” from the 
beginning of the poem takes on multiple meanings of composing in vision and in text, of 
describing the remediation and artifactualization of his sensory experience that solidifies 
his authorial status. When he becomes a speaker, he gains a voice.  
 
Mosaics and Pageants Produce Remediation 
 
In composing those previous paragraphs, which are over-full with authors’ names, 
I am conscious of how I have been mediating between so many voices. It is my attempt to 
stage a conversation among disparate, sometimes disputing critics who work across 
different mediums and critical traditions. In my criticism I am recursively replicating the 
diverse pageants of the Temple of Fame and the hyper-mediations of the Dunciad. This is 
Toop’s critical method of inspired juxtaposition—he draws from the sounds of the Aeneid 
to Irish folklore to electronic music in his synesthetic riffing on the sonic “fog of 
confusion”—and it is also Marshall McLuhan’s “mosaic or field approach” to 
configuring the intellectual and social space of print technology. The Gutenberg Galaxy 
is a series of long quotations from McLuhan’s vast, wide-ranging library about the 
history of communication, with some glosses by McLuhan in the text and gnomic section 
headings that provoke connections between disparate authors and fields of study. In his 
author’s note, McLuhan argues for the accretive value of the approach: “The alternative 
                                                
109 Cawley, 13. 
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procedure would be to offer a series of views of fixed relationships in pictorial space. 
Thus the galaxy or constellation of events upon which the present study concentrates is 
itself a mosaic of perpetually interacting forms that have undergone kaleidoscopic 
transformation—particularly in our own time.”110 McLuhan’s book is configured as a 
progress tale of sorts from orality to literacy111 to electronic media that also warns about 
implications of these sensory and intellectual changes. Critic Christopher Ricks detects 
more confusion than juxtaposition in McLuhan’s writing, but his description is 
appropriate here: “The style is a viscous fog, through which loom stumbling 
metaphors.”112  
Pope figures a similar juxtapositional, hyper-mediated approach in the Dunciad, 
where “generic blurring immediately becomes both part and emblem of a parade of 
fundamental anarchy.”113 The stuff of confusion, the spontaneously generating media 
from the Essay on Criticism and The Temple of Fame become artifactualized as 
representatives of genres that recombine and reproduce more, different swarms:  
Call forth each mass, a poem, or a play; 
How hints, like spawn, scarce quick in embryo lie, 
How new-born nonsense first is taught to cry, 
Maggots half-form’d in rhyme exactly meet, 
And learn to crawl upon poetic feet. 
Here one poor word an hundred clenches makes, 
And ductile Dulness new meanders takes; 
There motley images her fancy strike, 
Figures ill-pair’d, and similes unlike. 
She sees a mob of metaphors advance, 
Pleased with the madness of the mazy dance; 
                                                
110 McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, [i].  
111 McLuhan’s student Walter Ong remediated his mentor’s work in Orality and Literacy: The 
Technologizing of the Word (London: Methuen & Co., 1982). 
112 Quoted in Marvin Kitman, “The Invention of Lasagna Made the Pullman Car Obsolete,” The Legacy of 
McLuhan, ed. Lance Strate and Edward Wachtel (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, Inc., 2005), 73-83, 74. The 
title of that essay is both a parody of and homage to McLuhan’s juxtapositional “long zoom” approach to 
media history. 
113 Sitter, 10-11. 
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How Tragedy and Comedy embrace; 
How Farce and Epic get a jumbled race; 
How Time himself stands still at her command, 
Realms shift their place, and ocean turns to land. (I.58-72) 
 
In this mock-epic, Pope has refashioned his descriptions of proliferating media from 
older poems, performing the very process of remediation through genre as he’s 
describing it. That recursion replicates itself further in criticism of the poem, as Sitter for 
instance engages more metaphors with which to describe the performance of the 
multitude: “Personification seems almost too somber a word to describe Pope’s technique 
here: the literary quantities are animated into the puppet-like rapidity of ‘the madness of 
the mazy dance’ with great comic skill.”114 Sitter turns to other media—puppetry and 
animation—to render Pope’s poetry, producing a kind of infinite proliferation of frames 
of remediation.  
Pope himself performs a similar self-replicating media move as the inchoate 
sounds from The Temple of Fame aggregate into an entire book about the musical tortures 
of opera in the Dunciad. They clash and produce more confusion, more mediation: 
O Cara! Cara! silence all that train 
Joy to great Chaos! let Division reign:  
Chromatic tortures soon shall drive them hence,  
Break all their nerves, and fritter all their sense: 
One Trill shall harmonize joy, grief, and rage, 
Wake the dull Church, and lull the ranting Stage; 
To the same notes thy sons shall hum, or snore, 
And all thy yawning daughters cry, encore. (IV.53-60) 
 
The Temple is an abstracted space for pageantry; “the ranting Stage” is a fully realized, 
three-dimensional space (and a genre) for these noises to resound and recombine in 
chaotic performance. Remediating Pope in music allows this spiral to spread further, as 
composer Elliott Carter was inspired by the final couplet of the Dunciad—“Thy hand, 




great Anarch! Lets the curtain fall; / And Universal Darkness buries All” (IV.655-56)— 
to end his 1961 Double Concerto with “a mad jazzy piano cadenza, spastic harpsichord, 
shrill brass, and furious drums… giv[ing] way to a disintegrating fade-out.”115 Carter’s 
extraordinary climax is a kind of picture inside a picture of the organizing figure Alex 
Ross uses in The Rest is Noise, where he argues that critics registered all of the musical 
movements of the twentieth century, from atonalism to folk music to electronic music 
(and many, many other forms), first as noise before they embraced them: “Ultimately all 
music acts on its audience through the same physics of sound, shaking the air and 
arousing curious sensations. … What delights one group gives headaches to another.”116 
Even before the advent of early twentieth-century atonalism and “found sounds” that pop 
up in Carter’s works, Pope had rendered that affective excess in his description of how 
the proliferating operatic voices “break all their nerves, and fritter all their sense.” Ross 
explains his juxtapositional method as embracing that difficulty in discerning “noise” 
from signal: “the story criss-crosses the often ill-defined or imaginary border separating 
classical music from neighboring genres ... [Composer Alban] Berg was right: music 
unfolds along an unbroken continuum, however dissimilar the sounds on the surface. 
Music is always migrating from its point of origin to its destiny in someone’s fleeting 
moment of experience.” His description of noises that jumble and cohere in unexpected 
ways, very much like what he sees in his subjects such as Carter—as well as what’s 
happening in Pope’s poetry and McLuhan’s mosaic history of communication 
technologies.  
                                                
115 Alex Ross, The Rest is Noise: Listening to the Twentieth Century (New York: Farrar, Straus, and 
Giroux, 2007), 404. 
116 Ross, xi, xiii. 
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McLuhan takes the dark, chaotic Dunciad couplet that had inspired Carter and 
draws a line from Pope to modernist print culture: “This is the Night from which Joyce 
invites the Finnegans to wake.”117 He ends The Gutenberg Galaxy with a series of short 
sections about Pope as a Typographic Man: “Pope’s Dunciad indicts the printed book as 
the agent of a primitivistic and Romantic revival. Sheer visual quantity evokes the 
magical resonance of the tribal horde. The box office looms as a return to the echo 
chamber of bardic incantation.”118 In the discrete unit of a single section heading in a 
book about a gigantic sweep of time, these three sentences teem with visual and sonic 
media from different historical periods. Primitivism, Romanticism, tribalism, bardic 
orality—all are revived and jumbled together in that sentence to evoke the historicity of 
print consciousness and its forward-looking qualities that enabled cinema and media 
capitalism. The media juxtapositions recall the processions of tribes and bards at the 
Temple of Fame; they also resemble the structure of the Temple itself, with its 
mismatched Gothic and classical styles. The section heading is a mosaic that reflects and 
enacts the progress narrative of The Temple of Fame’s account of emergence through 
remediation. Fittingly for a book about how perceptions of spaces change as more tools 
are discovered to see objects inside them, that section heading is an example of infinite 
regression, with each revival or forecast containing a picture of itself. The texts and 
authors quoted in The Gutenberg Galaxy are part of a clamor; their communications and 
                                                
117 McLuhan, 263.  
118 McLuhan, 255. The section headings that precede this section indicate how McLuhan’s work has 
influenced Galloway, Toop, and especially Bolter and Grusin, who contributed an essay called 
“‘Remediating’ McLuhan” to The Legacy of McLuhan (pp. 323-45). (That essay was one of many forms 
that the theory of remediation would take in addition to its publication as a full-length book.) For example: 
“Nobody ever made a grammatical error in a non-literate society, The reduction of the tactile qualities of 
life and language constitute the refinement sought in the Renaissance and repudiated now in the electronic 
age, The new time sense of typographic man is cinematic and sequential and pictorial, Typography cracked 
the voices of silence…” (238-50). 
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theories emerge from the juxtapositions between blocks of quotations. They are also 
subject to change with new configurations. In this way, The Gutenberg Galaxy is a kind 
of thematic, methodological remediation of Pope’s Temple of Fame and Dunciad in its 
narrative of sensory overload that creates the mediating power of authorship.119  
I want to use this point about the self-replicating tendencies of remediation to 
consider the critical framework of James McLaverty’s Pope, Print, and Meaning, a 
monograph that works in biography, theory, and book history to tell the details of Pope’s 
participation in the production of his works. Published in 2001, McLaverty’s monograph 
theorizes the hyper-mediations of the Dunciad’s proliferating prolegomena and footnote-
studded pages by turning to Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of heteroglossia. To make the term 
useful, McLaverty (and Bakhtin) must make a functional critical slippage (a metaphor) in 
registering these “voices” that are really printed words. As Toop has indicated, there is 
always a distinction between the sounds that voices make and their textual condition, a 
kind of artifactualization of the voice when it becomes part of silent media. The 
Dunciad’s voices are especially artifactualized, as they are quotations, parodies, and 
burlesques that depend on their textuality to serve their generic purpose of replicating 
prodigiously.  
                                                
119 McLuhan’s authorial status is such that he was literally artifactualized in Woody Allen’s 1977 film 
Annie Hall. As he stands in line to see The Sorrow and the Pity at the movie theater (a media frame within 
a frame), Allen’s Alvy Singer overhears a stranger paraphrasing one of McLuhan’s concepts incorrectly. 
He argues with the amateur media theorist and conveniently pulls McLuhan into the frame to huff: “you 
know nothing of my work!” McLuhan also appears in David Cronenberg’s 1983 film Videodrome, as the 
media prophet Brian O’Blivion (played by Jack Creley), who communicates only through a television 
broadcast signal, never face to face. O’Blivion helps disseminate a videocassette called Videodrome, which 
carries a malevolent, noisy signal that causes brain tumors to generate spontaneously in anyone who 
watches it. Technological recursion is rendered as body-horror in Cronenberg’s film. 
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To explain heteroglossia, McLaverty has to paraphrase and synthesize multiple 
essays by Bakhtin, which he is reading in translation—that is, he remediates Bakhtin’s 
theory of heteroglossia through multiple frames in order to activate it: 
By heteroglossia Bakhtin means the stratification of language into various 
dialects or languages. These dialects are social, attached to groups of 
generations; they express points of view, ideological positions; they 
compete to describe the world. Any utterance takes its meaning from its 
relation to both prior and alternative utterances; one speaks always in 
response to an already spoken question. A literary genre can recognize and 
build positively on this dialogue or try to suppress it. Any utterance, great 
or small, is subject to centripetal forces trying to unify language (or gain 
hegemony for one dialect) and centrifugal forces recognizing social 
diversity and development.120 
 
This distillation is stranger than it appears to be, as though the frames of remediation 
through translation, synthesis, paraphrase are replicating “heteroglossia” through the 
distorting lens of Pope’s Dunciad and its chaos instead of merely being condensed into a 
summary. In that last sentence, McLaverty adds more figurative language of centripetal 
and centrifugal forces to describe the vectors of communication—together with textual 
voices, that’s a lot of figurative language, very nearly a “mob of metaphors.” It is a mob 
that describes mob behavior, or the emergent qualities of so many circulating voices that 
cohere by genre or some other classification, only to recombine in other contexts. He may 
be inadvertently calling up Pope’s own description of generic mixing through “figures ill-
paired” from the Dunciad in order to describe Bakhtin’s own description of generic 
mixing. In McLaverty’s new context, Bakhtin’s own voice from his writings has become 
a kind of artifact that recursively takes on the characteristics of that text, the Dunciad, 
which it’s been used to describe and theorize. 
                                                
120 James McLaverty, Pope, Print, and Meaning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 85. See Mikhail 
Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael 
Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).  
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McLaverty describes his rubric in graphing terms—“What is needed is a grid on 
which Pope’s work can be plotted”—that can be said to remediate the Russian formalist’s 
theory into a visual medium that reflects Pope’s own dense grid of authorial, paratextual 
interventions on the pages of the Dunciad. The grid is enabling for McLaverty in part 
because of the limitations in its applicability: 
The Dunciad Variorum in some respects looks like a work attempting to 
break the bounds Bakhtin sets for poetry by coming to terms with 
heteroglossia. Its prolegomena, appendices, and footnotes show it to be a 
truly many-voiced work. And yet its very bibliographical complexity 
suggests a reservation that must enter the analysis and may ultimately 
determine its outcome. The Variorum is more aware of other books, and of 
itself as a book, than it is of other voices. In many ways this adds a 
welcome refinement to Bakhtin’s account, which tends to remove authors 
and their voices from the muddle of publication, with its economics, 
censorships, and corruptions. The utterances Bakhtin accounts for are 
idealized, the products of some sphere of equality and freedom, whereas 
those Pope is concerned with are commodities….121 
 
What’s striking about McLaverty’s turn to “heteroglossia,” then, is that he overloads the 
first few pages of the chapter with description of Bakhtin’s theory, but the theory 
becomes less useful to him after he voices this caveat. I’m left wondering how useful the 
term really is for him—except that it produces that insight about the distinction between 
voices and “voices” in print. In McLuhan’s mosaic terms, the juxtaposition of Pope and 
Bakhtin creates a kind of productive gap in which McLaverty may mediate his own 
theory of Pope’s authorial status.122 Perhaps this productive distortion is often the 
remediating function of critical vocabulary, of critical voices that are appropriated into 
new conversations, thus changing both the lens and the object under examination. Texts 
                                                
121 McLaverty, 84, 86. 
122 Neil Rhodes notes the convergent evolution of these two ideas about multiple channels of voices by 
McLuhan and Bakhtin: “The oral polyphony that McLuhan recognized in Nashe … is what Bakhtin 
recognized first in Dostoevsky and later in Rabelais as he merged his own theory of polyphony with a 
concept of the carnivalesque. But McLuhan seems to have reached this point quite independently of 
Bakhtin, since his Rabelais study was first translated into English in 1968 and Dostoevsky in 1973.” 
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are quoted in fragments that are decontextualized and recontextualized: in Dennett’s 
terms, the critically abstracted pieces of texts jump between media (and critics) easily.123 
We see that phenomenon most visibly in the hyper-mediations of the Dunciad itself.  
Thus far, I have tried to perform that kind of productive distortion in this pageant 
of critics and their various textual offerings to the Communications Temple of Fame. 
McLaverty’s translating, synthesizing, paraphrasing, and applying “heteroglossia” is a 
replication (and proliferation) of the frames of mediation in the Dunciad; I have noticed a 
similar tiling effect with Bolter and Grusin’s “remediation.” Bolter and Grusin remediate 
McLuhan not just conceptually but structurally in their book about that concept, in which 
they accumulate examples and juxtapose theories, historical examples, and close readings 
of new media objects. Remediation’s design is a mosaic of text, images, and notes on the 
wide vertical margins that are deliberately left undigested into the paragraphs of text. The 
method is also the object is also the effect. 
 
 
Mosaics, Pixels, and Glitches in the Temple of Fame 
 
 
With these replicating metaphors of sight, sound, structure, and chaos in critical 
narratives about media history, there is also a tactile question of preservation: What holds 
these mosaics together? They can be reassembled in new critical contexts to demonstrate 
                                                
123 Dennett would probably want to gloss over the voice/textualized “voice” distinction, but that glossing 
over is a critical move that he’s practicing consciously in order to articulate an argument about how normal 
abstraction is in our critical consciousness of media: “The idea of abstraction has been around for a long 
time, and 200 years ago you could enliven a philosophical imagination by asking what Mozart’s Haffner 
Symphony is made of. It’s ink on pieces of paper. It’s a sequence of sounds as played by people with 
various stringed instruments and other instruments. It’s an abstract thing. It’s a symphony. Stradivarius 
made violins; Mozart made symphonies, which depend on a physical realization but don’t depend on any 




and retheorize remediation infinitely, but then what? One can rearrange the tiles of a 
mosaic endlessly, but arguments and crystallized insights are what endure as quotable 
material in critical discourse. If Fame’s and Dulness’s mediating powers are capricious 
and their decisions are arbitrary, what kinds of criticism can account for this contingency 
and unpredictable emergent behavior?  
With its multiple revisions and versions, the Dunciad is a record of tight authorial 
control, but it is also one that registers its own contingencies. Even from a practical 
standpoint, citing the different editions Pope rewrote and revised produces more 
mediation and more footnotes, as Catherine Ingrassia and Claudia N. Thomas have noted 
in their introduction to More Solid Learning, where they self-consciously note that “new 
perspectives” on Pope with critical apparatus could replicate the very features that Pope 
objects to in his critique of pedantry.124 Ingrassia and Thomas’s new perspectives come 
from critical theory that scholars found productive to apply to Pope at the historical 
moment when the academy was taking stock of how feminism, performance studies, and 
other forms of cultural studies would change the objects under their purview. Here I want 
to try out a new tool with which to create a critical theory of media distortion: how does 
contemporary media theory about—and experiments in—“glitch” technology let us 
understand something new about Pope’s (and McLuhan’s, and Bolter and Grusin’s, 
among others’) theories of mediation? 
                                                
124 Catherine Ingrassia and Claudia N. Thomas, More Solid Learning: New Perspectives on Pope’s 
Dunciad. (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 2000). For example: “…the seductive momentum of 
Pope’s couplets traps the reader within the poem and often softens the obscurity of a line or allusion. That 
is the genius of the text. A piece of writing inextricably tied to the impulses and passions of popular and 
consumer culture appears elevated, transhistorical, and canonized. …. Literary scholarship on The Dunciad 
perpetuates Pope’s model and potentially replicates the binaries he constructs within the poem.” (23-24). 
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Glitches are artifacts of technological malfunctions like static, pixelated images, 
and other digital distortions. The term was coined by astronaut John Glenn in 1962 to 
refer specifically to a sudden change of voltage in electrical current, but it has been 
abstracted to apply to instantiations of technological error, especially in the digital 
realm.125 Even in its technical context, it is difficult to distinguish cause and effect in a 
glitch. The spike could have a cause that was knowable or it could be random; likewise, 
the effect of the surge could be predictable, devastating, disfiguring, unnoticed until later 
observation, or any combination of those things. With regard to The Temple of Fame, this 
context renders that poem’s numerous storms into glitch generators: in a thunderstorm, 
electricity changes states as it moves through the medium of water vapor to the ground, 
observed visually as a flash of lightning and sonically as a rumble of thunder. It appears 
“betwixt air, seas, and skies” and changes states in these contexts.  
Glitches are compelling tests of Galloway’s challenge about what counts as 
media: are they media themselves, or are they accidents that halt processes of mediation? 
Glitch artists and theorists are interested in finding these accidents in “the wild” and 
capturing them via screen-grab—for example, a digital video feed or a video game may 
freeze, pixelate, re-color, or fragment the image, or Google Maps may have a problem 
rendering an aerial prospect from its satellite and produce weird artifacts of highways that 
appear to buckle or lead nowhere.126 Or these artists may also generate glitches 
                                                
125 See Curt Cloninger, “Glitch Linguistix: The Machines in the Ghost/ Static Trapped in the Mouth,” 
GLI.TC/H READER[ROR] 2011, eds. Nick Briz, Evan Meaney, Rosa Menkman, William Robertson, Jon 
Satrom, Jessica Westbrook. (Unpublished Books, 2011) 
(http://gli.tc/h/READERROR/GLITCH_READERROR_20111-v3BWs.pdf, 23-41), 28. 
126 See Clement Valla, “The Universal Texture,” Rhizome.org July 31, 2012. 
http://rhizome.org/editorial/2012/jul/31/universal-texture/ “Our mechanical processes for creating images 
have habituated us into thinking in terms of snapshots - discrete segments of time and space (no matter how 
close together those discrete segments get, we still count in frames per second and image aspect ratios). But 
Google is thinking in continuity. The images produced by Google Earth are quite unlike a photograph that 
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deliberately by introducing errors, deletions, interpolations, or foreign objects into code, 
if it can be accessed and mediated through a text editor or some other interface. Glitches 
are like the digital form of Stewart’s distressed “new antiques,” except they produce alien 
artifacts rather than familiar patinas of historicity. 
As in Toop’s notes about how sounds signal a moment for a listener to notice the 
medium—a sound has to be turned into something else in order to be shared, whether it’s 
described in words or recorded in some sonic media—glitches have to be remediated in 
order to even exist, and thus they present moments for reflecting on how humans mediate 
themselves through digital technology. Peter Krapp describes the art and music 
movement: “If computers can become equal performance partners via complex self-
referential processes of digital signal processing for musical composition and audiovisual 
display, then ‘the separation between man and machine disappears in the proliferation of 
transaction were the artist neither acts nor navigates interactively,’ as one glitch pioneer 
conjectures.”127 The easiest glitches to engineer are the ones that involve forcing an 
image file such as a jpeg into another kind of media file like a text file. New media 
performance artist Curt Cloninger seeks to theorize glitches with a familiar term, 
heteroglossia, in noting how glitches indicate a moments where the mediation between 
humans and machines is somehow distorted, where they seem to be talking past one 
another. Cloninger cites Bakhtin’s “The Problem of Speech Genres”: “Each text (both 
oral and written) includes a significant number of various kinds of natural aspects devoid 
                                                                                                                                            
bears an indexical relationship to a given space at a given time. Rather, they are hybrid images, a 
patchwork of two-dimensional photographic data and three-dimensional topographic data extracted from a 
slew of sources, data-mined, pre-processed, blended and merged in real-time. Google Earth is essentially a 
database disguised as a photographic representation.” 
127 Peter Krapp, Noise Channels: Glitch and Error in Digital Culture (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2011), 67. Krapp is quoting Achim Stepanski’s liner notes to 2001 composition Clicks 
and Cuts 2, produced by the recording collective Mille Plateaux, named for Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari’s influential theoretical work of the same name (see Krapp, 143n.) 
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of signification... but which are still taken into account (deterioration of manuscript, poor 
diction, and so forth).”128 These moments that challenge signification are still voices in a 
dialogic text: “There are not nor can there be any pure texts. In each text, moreover, there 
are a number of aspects that can be called technical (the technical side of graphics, 
pronunciation, and so forth)….” As glitches, these specifically digital instantiations of 
technical aspects take on lives of their own; they are “speaking” in ways that present even 
more challenges to the problem of speech genres. They talk in code that is fundamentally 
different from speech that signifies through words, metaphors, and tone. They are 
ephemeral artifacts that change state and meaning as they are preserved, translated, 
remediated, and shared in new formats.129 Cloninger’s turn to Bakhtin can be seen as one 
way of answering Lev Manovich’s call in The Language of New Media to develop “a 
theoretical analysis of the aesthetics of information access as well as the creation f new 
media objects that ‘aestheticize information processing.”130 Is that new language a 
remediation of older media studies vocabulary from film studies into new genres for new 
objects, as Manovich often points to, or are there other languages that get remediated in 
the creation of these aesthetic theories? 
As with McLaverty’s analysis, it’s worth noting that Cloninger front-loads his 
essay with Bakhtin but never exactly articulates the payoff of the citation, and many of 
the connections I’ve made above are my own glosses, extrapolations, and reframings. 
Cloninger never crystallizes his insights about Bakhtin and instead presents a bunch of 
                                                
128 Cited in Cloninger, 28. 
129 The question of their ephemerality and preservation seems important to consider, perhaps in 
conversation with Paula McDowell’s essay about the history of “ephemerality” as a concept. See “Of 
Grubs and Other Insects: Constructing the Categories of ‘Ephemera’ and ‘Literature’ in Eighteenth-Century 
British Writing,” Book History 15 (2012), 48-70. 
130 Manovich, 217. 
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remediated images from various contexts in order to give a pre-history of glitches without 
digital media: an “analog” glitch of the Book of Durrow from 600 AD that is decaying as 
the inscribed pigment eats the vellum medium, or Gerhard Richter’s extraordinary 
Woman Descending a Staircase, a gigantic oil painting from 1965 that appears from a 
glance to be a larger-than-life-size blurry photograph. His essay is a mosaic of these 
remediated images, as under-theorized as his appropriated critical vocabulary but 
suggesting an alternative form of argument out of their juxtapositions. This is perhaps the 
point of the exercise (or a generous reading of the essay): Cloninger describes why 
Bakhtin is so useful for critics to make juxtapositions of disparate historical artifacts 
because “Bakhtin is like gaffer’s tape. He adheres tightly when suitably applied, but he 
releases his grip quickly when it is time to decouple things and move on to new locales 
and configurations.”131 Though Cloninger never makes the explicit connection here, it’s 
fitting that gaffer’s tape is used to secure electrical equipment on film and television sets, 
so the comparison becomes a way of mediating among the glitch’s original meaning of a 
surge in a current, cinematic media technology, and the mediating technologies of theory. 
He emphasizes the contingency of his criticism, in order to match the glitchy digital 
objects he is examining.  
In some ways, Cloninger’s dense essay resembles Martinus Scriblerus blundering 
into the footnotes of the Dunciad with his pedantic flights of fancy. With that 
                                                
131 Cloninger, 28. Cloninger is playing with the idea that “perhaps philosophers are like adhesives.” He sets 
a scene for a pageant of theorists to perform juxtapositions so he may reflect on what theorists of new 
media take and give back to critical theories that pre-date the media objects under analysis: “Plato is like 
Elmer’s Glue: he is ubiquitous; he holds things together well enough; and everyone has swallowed him at a 
young age unawares without any immediately fatal results. Derrida is like duct tape: it is tempting to apply 
him to everything, but if you apply him too liberally to problems that need a less than all-encompassing 
approach, the results will be very sticky and munged-up with a bunch of deconstructive residue which 
largely obscures the original problem. If McLuhan is a thin rubber band (more or less useful in his analysis 
of media), then Debord is a thick rubber band (trying earnestly to outwit the trap of media 
spectacularization), and Baudrillard is a silly band (resigned to play in a mediated simulacrum).” 
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comparison, it’s also possible to think of Scriblerus as a glitch that Pope introduced into 
the media of the poem. To be sure, Pope controls his bad mediator Scriblerus in the 
Dunicad while glitch artists let their interpolations run amok. Scriblerus is like a glitch 
that gains sentience and takes on a life of its own outside of its initial medium132 as he is 
remediated by Pope himself and others who embraced his satire of learning. The 
Dunciad’s satire of Dulness becomes a program or a protocol to follow in order to 
satirize other texts and intellectual methods; Scriblerus generates associational practices 
in the Scriblerus Club (of which Pope and Swift were members), the Kit-Kat Club, and 
the Connecticut Wits.133 Martinus Scriblerus’s errors become authorized and authorizing 
when he “writes” his memoirs in 1741 as a collaborative production of the Scriblerians 
(mostly John Arbuthnot). McLaverty notes how Scriblerus became a picture within a 
picture of critical methods: “Unintentionally, Pope created through Scriblerus the critical 
voice that came to dominate mid-twentieth century criticism of his poetry. … This 
                                                
132 The funniest, most poignant example of this phenomenon is the 2012 animated film Wreck-It Ralph, 
which takes place in a video arcade game. Wreck-It Ralph (voiced by John O’Reilly) is the unhappy villain 
in a video game, but he just wants to be a hero in another story. He travels through the electrical current of 
the game—there is even a “Surge Protector” security guard who checks to make sure that characters stay in 
their own games—to visit a popular racing game called Sugar Rush, a kind of car chase through Candy-
Land. There he encounters a flickering, pixelated character named Vanellope von Schweetz (voiced by 
Sarah Silverman) who can never participate in the races because she is a glitch: “everyone here says I’m 
just a mistake and that I wasn’t even supposed to exist.” A pariah who hangs on the edges of the game’s 
world and causes trouble, she can’t leave the game because she is stuck in the medium. She learns how to 
use her glitchiness to zap through certain stages in the races, giving her a superpower of sorts that she can 
use to win races and be a featured character in the game after all.  
133 As they met at Yale during the 1780s, the Connecticut Wits were Joel Barlow, David Humphreys, John 
Trumbull, and Timothy Dwight, all of whom went on to more serious careers in American poetry. The 
Connecticut Wits deployed Scriblerian methods and the character himself in the Plagi-Scurriliad, the 
Progress of Dulness, and the Anarchiad, a satire of the Articles of Confederation which they claimed 
(impossibly, waggishly) Pope had plagiarized sixty years earlier. See John P. McWilliams, Jr., The 
American Epic: Transforming a Genre 1770-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
“Assuming that any reader must know the famous ending of The Dunciad (‘Lo! Thy dread Empire, Chaos! 
Is restor’d; / Light dies before thy unreading word’), the American poets politicized it to serve as the 
climactic couplet of their first number: ‘Thy constitution, Chaos, is restor’d; Law sinks before thy 
uncreating word.’ Pope’s literary Dulness has evidently become the lesser evil. The Word America needs is 
one of Law, but the only constitution restorable through popular clamor is the constitution of Chaos, rather 
than the Constitution creating federal unity” (81). 
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interpretation of Scriblerus seriously reduces the dialogic energy of this section of the 
apparatus by identify a single, shared critical position, and it leads to a diminished role 
for the particular in the poem.”134 Scriblerus is a glitch that (who?) generates recursive 
satirical and critical behaviors. 
In Cloninger’s critical context, glitches perform like satires in how they distort 
objects we think we know. His essay appears as a perfunctorily formatted version of a 
presentation from a glitch media conference, collected in a digital journal of those 
presentations called GLI.TC/H READER[ROR] 20111, so the speech genre is further 
problematized in this new context. Like Cloninger’s, the essays are recursive not only in 
their analyses but also in their remediations from performance/presentation to essay to 
digital document. In their introduction to the journal, the editors—who call themselves 
GLI.TC/H/BOTS as a challenge to concepts of agency and coherent collective 
authorship—play with how the digitally printed format shifts the performative priorities 
of the conference presentations. They indulge in coding wordplay that needs to be seen 
and mulled over in order to be understood:  
The GLI.TC/H algorithms favor these rubric.cube$:  
function rubrix() {  
var deconstructive != generative;  
var fractures != constructs;  
var inaccurate != accurate;  
var misuse != use;  
var absent != present; 
var revealing the system != denying the system; 
var glitchspeak != language;135 
 
By imitating and translating the Python coding language in order to synthesize new 
theoretical provocations out of juxtapositions, the GLI.TC/H/BOTS are being playful 
                                                
134 McLaverty, 99. 
135 “GLI.TC/H/BOTS,” FWD: READER[ROR], 12. 
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with the objects they are examining and sharing.136 The hybrid language is deliberately 
frustrating, funny, provocative, cute, superficial—or all of those things—but it seems to 
be composed to keep the language and the objects under study as “difficult” as possible. 
They seem to want to keep glitches weird, and so they make the language that describes, 
translates, synthesizes, and analyzes them weirdly, so that the artifacts are not subsumed 
into clear communication. They want to preserve the noise by making more of it, perhaps 
as a barrier against assimilation. Yet I will risk some assimilation here to note that those 
pairings resemble that “mob of metaphors” that generates chaos in the Dunciad. That 
chaos spontaneously generates connections and more metaphors.  
Glitches are phenomena that can be studied through Kirschenbaum’s forensic 
materiality in that they are traces of something gone awry in a code, yet they also 
provoke the forensic imagination as they hint at some kind of agency that is mysterious, 
sometimes beautiful, and random. As Kirschenbaum theorized it, the forensic 
imagination engages with extreme juxtapositions, oscillations between states and scales, 
technical vocabulary that may be mystified by metaphor, exhaustive details of one’s own 
procedures, and unlikely moments of awe in the mundane. The glitch aesthetic 
incorporates these criteria into contingent, self-consciously strange and estranging, self-
reflexive theories about the sparks that fly from interactions between humans and 
machines. Though they are clunky, those theories may travel to other contexts—say, to 
Pope’s poetry in this chapter.  
                                                
136 Galloway is critical of how corporate media have appropriated the language of “play” and the term has 
become ubiquitous, if not also sinister: “one ‘plays around’ with a problem in order to find a workable 
solution,” thus conjoining play to labor and creating “ludic capitalism.” There’s some question, then, as to 
what it means for the GLI.TC/H/BOTS to seize it back: “Romanticism and cybernetic systems theory: play 
today is a synthesis of these two influences. If the emblematic profession of the former is poetry, the latter 
is design. The one is expressive, consummated in an instant; the other is iterative; extending in all 
directions. … Today’s ludic capitalist is therefore the consummate poet-designer, forever coaxing new 
value out of raw, systemic interactions (consider the example of Google)” (28). 
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Glitches are manifestations of errors or noise that distort the signal—in allegorical 
terms, they are like Error and Fame presiding together at Dryden’s or Lloyd’s Temple, 
their interventions visible as effects with indeterminate causes. Deanne Williams and 
other digitally-minded medievalists have noticed how “with no apparatuses to discern 
between true and false things, the information that is collected in the House of Fame 
resembles nothing so much as the Internet,”137 yet this is the critique leveled, sometimes 
too glibly, at many forms of media, print included. Fame and Error are mediators; in this 
digital context they can be said to be allegorical figures of algorithmic sorting as they 
determine the preservation status of an artifact in arbitrary ways, even as their supplicants 
try to infer some larger patterns of intentionality or means of intervening in the 
procedure. As Dennett puts it:  
An algorithm is an abstract process that can be defined over a finite set of 
fundamental procedures—an instruction set. It is a structured array of such 
procedures. That’s a very generous notion of an algorithm—more 
generous than many mathematicians would like, because I would include 
by that definition algorithms that may be in some ways defective. …You 
can take any bit sequence at all and feed it to your laptop as if it were a 
program. Almost certainly, any sequence that isn’t designed to be a 
program to run on that laptop won’t do anything at all—it’ll just crash. 
Still, there’s utility in thinking that any sequence of instructions, however 
buggy, however stupid, however pointless, should be considered an 
algorithm. Because one person’s buggy, dumb sequence is another 
person’s useful device for some weird purpose, and we don’t want to 
prejudge that question. (Maybe that ‘nonsense’ was included in order to 
get the laptop to crash at just the point it crashed!)138 
 
Even in deliberate glitch creations where the “purpose” is creative, intentionality is 
difficult to pin down because while a human may insert these changes to the script, it is 
difficult to predict the immediate effects of those interventions as they disrupt code and 
                                                
137 Williams, 162-63. Williams also cites Ruth Evans, “Chaucer in Cyberspace: Medieval Technologies of 
Memory in the House of Fame,” Studies in the Age of Chaucer: The Yearbook of the New Chaucer Society 
23:1 (2001), 43-69. 
138 Dennett, 124. 
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algorithmic functions. Glitches also problematize how to gain a vantage point for a 
historical perspective of change over time in that they present the possibility of artifacts 
that cannot be saved or retrieved in a malfunction—fatal systems errors—how can you 
make safeguards to see what you can’t predict as a source or effect of weird glitch? The 
GLI.TC/H/BOTS ask a related question in the self-reflexive language of how an 
algorithmic instruction “returns” information: “What does saying ‘glitch is/has formed 
communitie[s] or even a genre’ actually return?”139 They worry about the desire to 
contain glitches or domesticate them in a genre and want to preserve (or create) some 
alternative forms of associational practices that challenge conventional ideas about 
collectivity and intentionality. Genres can be self-organizing, however, as they change 
priorities and members over time, so it may happen that these objects glitch (or send a 
surge through) the concept of genres by highlighting contingency and malleability as 
priorities in any genre formation. 
The uncertain digital fortunes of glitches resemble the textual proliferations of 
satire, in which an author may have deliberate targets of distortion, but interpretations can 
veer wildly out of control. We see that phenomenon in Dennis’s stubborn, long-winded 
misreadings of Pope’s writings, in Pope’s appropriations and ventriloquisms of his 
dunces’ language, in Scriblerus’s peripatetic travels. At a panoramic level, we can see the 
widespread artifacts of satire’s proliferation in J.V. Guerinot’s 1969 bibliographical 
study, Pamphlet Attacks on Alexander Pope.140 Pope’s satires sent spikes of electrical 
current through Grub Street, provoking more authors to participate in the fray of hackery, 
                                                
139 Ibid. 
140 J.V. Guerinot, Pamphlet Attacks on Alexander Pope 1711-1744: A Descriptive Bibliography (London: 
Methuen Press, 1969). This descriptive bibliography surely deserves some new media attention from 
Zotero or another citation-aggregating system. 
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pedantry, and satire. In a descriptive bibliography such as Guerinot’s, the goal is 
summary and breadth of these concatenations—a zoomed-out approach to study the 
patterns of print proliferation that McLuhan argues is the most appropriate way to view 
Pope’s work: “His intense concern with the pattern of action in his armed horde of 
nobodies has been mistaken for personal spite. Pope was entirely concerned with the 
formalistic pattern and penetrative and configuring power of the new technology. His 
readers have been befogged by the ‘content’ obsession and the practical benefits of 
applied knowledge.”141 McLuhan is not being querulous here; his insistence on pattern 
over content is an argument for the ways that the mosaic approach generates not just new 
insights about a particular work but different kinds of arguments about change over time. 
 
The New Aesthetic: Is Curation a Form of Theorizing, a Social Behavior, or Both? 
 
  Glitchy pixelated images are the digital versions of McLuhan’s mosaics, not only 
in their similar appearance but also in their properties to theorize accumulation and 
transformation of media. In 2011, media analyst James Bridle began collecting glitches 
and other images that displayed “the eruption of the digital onto the physical” as a means 
of exploring how we “see like digital devices.”142 Bridle called this phenomenon “the 
New Aesthetic” and curated a Tumblr (or image-sharing blog archive) of these images 
that displayed strange interactions between people and their tools. As epigrammatized for 
optimal dissemination on social media, the New Aesthetic claims that “the look is 
                                                
141 McLuhan, 262-63. 
142 James Bridle, “#sxaesthetic.” booktwo.org. March 15, 2012. http://booktwo.org/notebook/sxaesthetic/ 
Bridle announced the experiment on Really Interesting Group blog on May 6, 2011 




metaphor” for new collaborations between humans and technology. That vision is both 
immersed in a digital media environment and attuned to noticing when the frames don’t 
match up, when there’s a glitch that reminds us of our technologically hyper-mediated 
vision. 143  
The liminal but hyper-mediated prospects at the House and Temple of Fame are 
literary predecessors to the images rendered by surveillance drones. In poems such as 
Windsor Forest, Pope participated in eighteenth-century debates about aesthetics in the 
garden and natural landscape; the curators of the New Aesthetic tumblr disseminated an 
image that literally zooms out to marvel at the aerial views of brightly colored Dutch 
tulip fields that look like pixels: “it looks like the earth corrupted and 
stopped rendering correctly.”144 Glitches are especially vivid reminders of how weird 
these interactions between humans and technology can be—they are manifestations of 
how metaphors are productive errors (x is not really y, but the juxtaposition generates 
new ideas).  
In the initial stages of publicizing the New Aesthetic, the goal was collection 
rather than the articulation of a fully fleshed out theory—for definition was what the New 
                                                
143Although I see the New Aesthetic as a vivid example of Bolter and Grusin’s double logic of remediation, 
Bridle’s initial provocation and popularization owed more to Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of the rhizome. 
The New Aesthetic was discussed at length on Rhizome.org, a new media art and criticism blog. The 
rhizome is itself a self-replicating metaphor about self-replication. See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). 
144 “jaymo.” “Flying Over the Tulip Fields in Anna Paulowna.” The New Aesthetic tumblr, February 4, 
2013. http://new-aesthetic.tumblr.com/post/42296196669/thejaymo-flying-over-the-tulips-fields-in-anna 
This citation is difficult to format because it is a tumblr post that has been reblogged several times and the 
name of the photographer (presumably Anna Paulowna) has been lumped into the title of the post, then 
affixed with commentary by jaymo. Bibliographers, academic institutions such as the Modern Language 
Association, and publishing institutions such as the Chicago Manual of Style developed guidelines for 
citing printed animadversions and aggregations—that is, they developed social and institutional means of 
proliferating (and enforcing) these behaviors, which in turn produced more writing, more citations. As 
Siskin would put it, more is different on the Internet: Digital humanities scholars are still working on a way 
to account for just how to record reblogs, unacknowledged appropriations from others’ blogs, and Internet 
hat-tips, among many other behaviors. 
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Aesthetic problematizes in its foregrounding of seeing over explaining.145 What’s 
important is to juxtapose and assemble, and then reassemble the images into new 
configurations to record the political and social implications of a world newly seen by 
drones, surveillance cameras, webcams, and other digital devices. Those image-
arguments are then remediated onto more screens in the shareable social media catalog of 
the New Aesthetic tumblr. The New Aesthetic tumblr shared work by the GLI.TC/H 
collective, yet the two glitch purveyors could not be more different in self-presentation or 
media attention. Where the GLI.TC/H/BOTS add weirdness to what they’re 
disseminating in embellished language that’s difficult to understand, Bridle makes his 
concept easy to digest and share. As a result, the GLI.TC/H/BOTS have not been 
domesticated into popular media, where the New Aesthetic has been promoted and talked 
about frequently in media and digital art communities in the last few years.  
Writing about the New Aesthetic panel at the technology media conference South 
by Southwest (SXSW) in 2012, science fiction novelist and “Dead Media” theorist Bruce 
Sterling calls it “attempted imposition on the public of a new way of perceiving reality” 
but wonders what it amounts to beyond novelty or quirkiness. He worries that it is easy to 
share in a tweet—“hey, this is cool”—but has little substance behind it: 
Those cats just don’t herd yet; that puzzle is still in its pieces. One can try 
to cluster them, in a vague ecumenical way, by saying, ‘This is how 
contemporary reality looks to our pals, the visionary machines.’ But that’s 
not convincing. I recognize that this is an effective, poetic formulation, 
and I’m touched by that, but it’s problematic. When you abandon the feel-
good aspect of collectively discovering new stuff together, and start 
                                                
145 Bridle: “But what has also been brilliant is that other people have pitched in. I first realised that NA was 
‘a thing’ not in that first blog post (I would have given it a better name) but when people started responding 
and writing about it. They started coming to me, bringing things, and saying ‘is this New Aesthetic?’ or 
even ‘I think this is ‘New Aesthetic’ and I’d go yes, possibly, or better, why do you think that? Names have 
power—here he interrupted his talk and blog post about the talk with a slide of Aleister Crowley, for 
reasons that I could not exactly interpret!—“giving something a name gives you power over it, but it also 
gives other people power too. Other people can pick up your tool and use it” (“sxaesthetic.”). 
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getting rigorous and picky about what you’re actually perceiving, the New 
Aesthetic Easter eggs rather overflow their wicker basket.146 
 
From unherdable cats to overflowing baskets of Easter eggs, Sterling stacks up images 
and metaphors in order to criticize the cutesiness of the New Aesthetic’s image-sharing 
platform. Just as Bolter and Grusin and McLaverty replicate the very qualities of the 
phrases they appropriate in their criticism, Sterling cannot help but make more vivid 
images in his critique of the New Aesthetic’s tendency to disseminate weird images. 
Pope, too, evinces a hyper-productive pleasure in accumulating that which he is 
criticizing in the Dunciad. 
Sterling’s succession of metaphors for chaos that cannot be contained is more apt 
as a description than a criticism of the New Aesthetic’s possibilities of proliferation 
through self-organizing social behaviors in digital media. The New Aesthetic is not just a 
means of aestheticizing the ways in which we see like digital devices; it is as a theory of 
the proliferation of these images of technologized vision, wherein under-theorized 
sharing and accumulating is the engine of new protocols and behaviors. It theorizes its 
own transmission through the lens of glitches that would impede or distort it in 
unexpected ways. As the GLI.TC/H/BOTS built glitchiness into their work in order to 
self-reflexively remediate the effects of their examinations of weird objects, so too we 
might say that the New Aesthetic builds in superficiality in order to reproduce the 
slipperiness, ubiquity, and “dumbness” (they don’t speak for themselves) of these 
glitched images. The GLI.TC/H/BOTS and Bridle each claim to resist collecting the 
glitches into a genre, yet they have revealed how genres are made out of priorities and 
critical protocols rather than out of labels. 
                                                




Some of these protocols look like errors, as library historian Matthew Battles 
points out in his critique of the New Aesthetic’s proliferating metaphors: “…the New 
Aesthetic is practicing something like the pathetic fallacy—that time-honored conceit of 
poets that attributes feeling to inanimate objects. Indeed there is an element of pathetic 
fallacy here, which promises all the richness and poetic power poets have used it to body 
forth.”147 Battles situates this generative poetic error in eighteenth-century philosophical 
treatises which sought to pin down and theorize causes and effects in the world:  “It’s an 
attempt to frame something akin to Spinoza’s notion of Natura naturans—nature 
‘naturing’—nature expressing itself in its unfolding, a process whose edges we barely 
touch.” Pathetic fallacy may be an error, but it is a generative one, as Battles 
acknowledges. Seeing like a device may mean limited, problematic forms of recognition, 
but, like Sterling’s replication of protocols he was trying to criticize, these errors are 
themselves records of incomplete, error-prone attempts to intervene in unstable agencies 
and interactions.148 As Battles puts it: “There is a strong sense that with computers and 
their networks, something is going on in there, something emergent and radically other, 
which nonetheless does begin to infiltrate our edges.”149 Who and what are acting and 
interacting in these alien artifacts may be difficult to describe or theorize: what’s inside 
the glitchy artifact and what’s outside (in its circulation and remediations) are difficult to 
distinguish in the infinite regression of mediations and remediations. The edges are 
difficult to discern as they become glitchier. 
                                                
147 Matthew Battles, “But It Moves: The New Aesthetic and Emergent Virtual Taste.” metaLAB@Harvard. 
April 8, 2012. http://metalab.harvard.edu/2012/04/but-it-moves-the-new-aesthetic-emergent-virtual-taste/ 
148 Bruno Latour has not weighed in on the New Aesthetic yet, but his work on Actor-Network theory may 
be compelling to describe how glitches produce distorting, amplifying, generative, and destructive 
interactions among agents. See Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network 




The mediations that are most obvious to track are those social behaviors of 
sharing and recontextualizing in social media platforms. In recent years, the phrase 
“curate” has gained currency in the realm of social media; curation is no longer just a 
professional marker that indicates one’s institutional affiliations with a museum or a 
library, as it may also describe a behavior that anyone can practice, even anonymously. 
Thus one curates a Tumblr full of images, quotations, memes, reblogs, and commentary 
to share with other users, or one curates a Pinterest page to indicate one’s tastes. Curation 
in this context is not primarily a top-down imposition of professional status and taste-
making, but rather a bottom-up, self-organizing jumble of varying intentions, usage 
patterns, lenses of selection, and audiences. There are, of course, real worries to be 
registered about de-professionalization and de-institutionalization of museums and 
libraries if anyone can be a curator. Who or what is Fame in this scenario, who are 
authors, what is the work of an editor beyond selection? 
Yet for Bridle and other Tumblr curators, the change to crowd-sourcing one’s 
objects of interest has enabled more, different kinds of study. At the SXSW panel, art 
critic and then-editor of Rhizome.org Joanne McNeil historicized the New Aesthetic 
within the context of other art and media history, calling attention to how media reframe 
other media. Her presentation begins with the familiar claim from McLuhan—
“Advancing technology always brings a new way of seeing”—and she curates images 
from map-making, Abstract Expressionism, and Italian Futurism, among others, in order 
to situate the New Aesthetic in a kind of pixelated mosaic of noisy media:   
Television also created a new way of seeing. Robert Rauschenberg's 
collage-like pieces were inspired by the snow and flicker of a TV set. John 
Cage said Rauschenberg's work looked like ‘many television sets working 
simultaneously all tuned in differently.’ These concepts were further 
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expressed in the work of video artists like Nam June Paik and Dara 
Birnbaum. Digital art — net.art or work with new media — further 
explores the glitches and failures of technology…150 
 
The citation of Cage’s remediation of Rauschenberg is especially compelling here as he 
reframes painting in terms of the newer medium of television; as music critic and 
historian Alex Ross discusses at length in The Rest is Noise, Cage himself was invested in 
making connections between sounds, sonic artifacts, and notations of these artifacts in 
such works as Imaginary Landscape No. 1, 4’33”, the Variations pieces, and many 
others.151 McNeil’s survey resembles the many other lists by the poet Pope, the DJ Toop, 
Ross, McLuhan, and other critics who use lists to make an argument about the value of 
heaps, juxtapositions, mosaics, and the kinds of unpredictable media that emerge from 
those accretive methods. Even my phrase “survey” is glitched recursively in that previous 
sentence because I am discussing a descriptive list of media about the distortions of 
surveying methods in the New Aesthetic. 
Writing about glitches recursively is a feature of critical engagement with the 
phenomenon, even when it’s skeptical. Still reveling in his own figurative language, 
Sterling charges Bridle and the New Aesthetic’s fans to articulate a clearer idea about 
where it will go next:  
                                                
150 Joanne McNeil, [SXSW panel presentation about the New Aesthetic], March 14, 2012 
http://joannemcneil.com/index.php?/talks-and-such/new-aesthetic-at-sxsw-2012/ As with Cloninger’s 
essay, there is a slippage between the presentation and the preserved form it takes on McNeil’s blog, as she 
includes her slides and the interstitial claims she made, but the post may resemble a mosaic more in its 
preserved state than in its performed state—an artifact of remediation.  
151 See Ross, 364-69. See also Kyle Gann, No Such Thing as Silence: John Cage’s 4’33” (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2010) and Nick Briz, “Glitch Art Historie[s] / contextualizing glitch art—a perpetual 
beta,” in GLI.TC/H/ READER[ROR], 53-58. “Cage developed a systematized approach to composing 
music through chance experiments, using coins or the I-Ching. This approach of intentionally marring 
chance to systems is not unlike approaches developed by glitch artists. Cage was also very interested in the 
role ‘noise’ played in music and art. Often disregarded as unwanted interference by popular music, noise 




[T]he New Aesthetic is a gaudy, network-assembled heap. It’s made of 
digitized jackstraws that were swept up by a generational sensibility. The 
products of a ‘collective intelligence’ rarely make much coherent sense. 
… The New Aesthetic is moving out of its original discovery phase, and 
into an evangelical, podium-pounding phase. If a pioneer village of 
visionary creatives is founded, and they start exporting some startling, 
newfangled imagery, like a Marcel Duchamp-style explosion-in-a-shingle-
factory… Well, we’ll once again be living in heroic times!152 
  
The panel presentation at SXSW that prompted Sterling’s excitement and skepticism was 
such an evangelizing event. It was an event designed to generate as many connections 
between programmers, marketers, bloggers, musicians, filmmakers—media-makers, all 
of them—and promote their work, sometimes in the crassest ways. Sterling’s peppery 
phrases are a reminder of Siskin’s point about the ways in which emergent behavior 
comes from aggregating individual productions (in anthologies, collections of authors’ 
works, magazines), leads to new kinds of social behaviors and organizations, and in turn 
generates more material and larger organizing concepts of Literature, “cultures,” and 
nationalism. In the digital media that contain and comprise glitches and their genres of 
collection, curation, and criticism, “more is different” once again. Sterling calls for social 
behaviors that will generate pioneer villages and cultural movements: though he wants to 
criticize the New Aesthetic for not having a clear vision of itself, he in fact makes the 
case for its emergent qualities that do not need such a single organizing principle beyond 
self-replication and aggregation.153 What he thinks is a bug is really a feature.  
 
Glitched Experiments, Glitched Reflections 
                                                
152 Ibid. 
153 Indeed, Bridle ended the experiment and moved on to new projects after a little more than a year, but the 
tumblr’s followers reactivated it and continue to collect artifacts there. In this way, even the editor/curator’s 
organizing role became decentralized as the crowd of tumblr users took a different kind of control over the 
project. Because the tumblr aggregated images, snippets of articles, and other stuff from many different 




Let’s say the GLI.TC/H/BOTS is a clunky, difficult, too-clever-by-half love letter 
to glitch aesthetics that’s both over-theorized in its parade of theorists and under-
theorized in what insights are actually gained from those citations. Let’s say the New 
Aesthetic is a jerry-built, jury-rigged concept that is under-theorized and prone to 
producing metaphors and pathetic fallacies when it is discussed and criticized. For those 
reasons, reflecting on those diverse, alienating, error-prone products of critique is a 
valuable project that might make way for theories of arbitrary and contingent 
proliferation. This is why the New Aesthetic is useful for problematizing how 
surveillance and drone visions are sources of power that we are only beginning to 
conceptualize as we try to understand how those tools work. The world has become 
“more visual” since the eighteenth century; the glitches captured or created in these 
pixelated New Aesthetic images call attention to the possibility of surges that represent 
alternatives to that power. Bridle responded to criticisms of the New Aesthetic’s 
flimsiness by noting that it’s a critique of the network that reproduces the vernacular of 
the network as a mode of recursive critique: “Every satellite image posted is a meditation 
on the nature of mapping, that raises issues of perspective and power relationships, the 
privilege of the overhead view and the monopoly on technological agency which 
produces it.”154  We already have some of those strategies from studying the 
proliferations of satire’s ephemera—or indeed any number of media maelstroms.  
Working with the idea that more material engenders new kinds of writing, social 
behaviors, and mediations, Siskin and his colleague William B. Warner articulate four 
                                                
154 James Bridle, “The New Aesthetic and Its Politics.” http://booktwo.org/notebook/new-aesthetic-
politics/, June 12, 2013 
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“cardinal mediations” of changes in “infrastructure, genres and formats, associational 
practices, and protocols [which] establish the conditions for the possibility of 
Enlightenment.”155 In order to theorize the Enlightenment as “an event in the history of 
mediation,” they form a self-reflexive mosaic of Francis Bacon’s Great Instauration 
(which took many forms in Bacon’s refashionings and revisions), Immanuel Kant’s 1784 
essay “What is Enlightenment?” and Foucault’s use of Kant’s essay as a “touchstone for 
defining his own project” in the many genealogies of knowledge he produced over the 
course of his career. Each of those texts presents an organizing call to reflection and then 
practices that reflection as critique of existing infrastructures, genres, associational 
practices, and protocols. What’s more, they each reflect on how to assess change over 
time in critical writing:  
Foucault, too, did not hesitate to treat Kant’s ‘us’ and his arguments as 
preludes to the present. Our modern habit of self-reflexivity, he declared, 
dates from Kant’s strategy of ‘deporting the question of the Aufklärung 
[Enlightenment] into critique’: the ‘critical project whose intent was to 
allow knowledge to acquire an adequate idea of itself.’156 
  
Siskin and Warner’s title for their essay underscores their own self-reflexive goals of 
generic critique: “An invitation in the form of an argument.” Their mosaic of Bacon, 
Kant, and Foucault is self-reflexive, too, because it is also a site of participating in the 
conversation about how one produces knowledge and proposing plans for reorganization.  
Some kind of engine is needed to generate this self-theorizing: that engine is 
remediation. Remediation works through protocols of translation, quotation, distillation, 
                                                
155 Clifford Siskin and William B. Warner, “This is Enlightenment: An Invitation in the Form of an 
Argument,” in This Is Enlightenment, 1-33, 12. See also note 17 above. The essays in This Is 
Enlightenment come from a conference, thus modeling and generating the very associational practice and 
forms of writing that they are studying in the Enlightenment period.  
156 Siskin and Warner, 1, 3. They are quoting Foucault, The Politics of Truth, ed. Sylvere Lotringer, trans. 
Lysa Hochroth and Catherine Porter (Los Angeles: Semiotext[e], 2007), 67. 
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juxtaposition, and other critical writing strategies; as I have noticed these protocols in 
scholarly writing in this chapter, they tend to reproduce elements of what they’re 
criticizing. Remediation instantiates itself in self-reflexive genres like the magazine 
article, the call for wide-scale critique of organizations of knowledge, the synthetic think-
piece, the conceptual art/writing project, the idea for a Tumblr—and, to return to the first 
part of this chapter, the Temple poem. The Temple poem is less polemical than “an 
invitation in the form of an argument” in that it stages indeterminacy and repetition with 
unpredictable results. What are new versions of the Temple? The Tumblr is a Temple; the 
panel presentation at a glitch studies conference or a media technology festival is a 
pageant of motley figures passing through a Temple. In these final pages of the chapter, I 
want to work recursively and use the material I have synthesized from Pope and the 
glitch aesthetics to examine seventeenth-century material, in the hopes that such an 
experiment will refract light on many different kinds of objects. 
As I have theorized it thus far, the Temple poem is not just a representation; 
rather, it is a model of an institution that engenders a fractious, proliferating critical 
debate about the relationships among media and mediators. In Foucauldian terms, it also 
provokes debate about the ways in which the knowledge produced in that institution 
reifies and distributes power, as seen in Fame’s arbitrary judgments. The trope served as 
a structural metaphor for Thomas Sprat in his 1667 History of the Royal Society: “It 
[London] is the head of a mighty Empire, the greatest that ever commanded the Ocean: It 
is compos'd of Gentlemen, as well as Traders: It has a large intercourse with all the Earth: 
It is, as the Poets describe their House of Fame, a City, where all the noises and business 
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of the World do meet.”157 The Royal Society was a network of scientists, statesmen, and 
other correspondents who experimented, recorded the results, circulated those results, and 
responded to one another in correspondence that was collected into volumes for the 
organization. These volumes were full of curiosities, rumors, descriptions of virtuosos’ 
collections, personal accounts, tales that may have been embellished, and arguments 
among members. Sprat calls the Royal Society a House of Fame in a general sense of its 
being a cardinal mediator of social, institutionalized interactions, but the volumes, too, 
are full of the chaotic lies, rumors, disputes, and fragments that emerge in the poem itself. 
The print mediations are small-scale versions of the Society’s mediations. In the several 
versions of the Great Instauration and New Organon, as well as in New Atlantis, Bacon 
remediated his ideas for such an institution into different genres over the course of his 
career. In some of these remediations, he returned to the image of a temple and the 
liminal space of the horizon as a visual representation of his speculative perspective.158  
By zooming backwards in the chronological logic of the chapter, looking 
backwards from Pope’s Temple to Bacon’s pillars of the New Atlantis, I want to glitch 
this image. Or, rather, first, I want to notice Bacon’s attention to glitches in the image and 
what those glitches may produce. In New Atlantis, Bacon writes a speculative travel 
narrative about a visit to the far-off land of Bensalem, where the visitor encounters a 
                                                
157 Cited in David Wheeler, “‘So Easy to Be Lost’: Poet and Self in Temple of Fame.” Papers on Language 
and Literature 29.1 (1993), 3-28, 5.  
158 See Sarah Hutton, “Persuasions to Science: Baconian Rhetoric and the New Atlantis,” in Bacon’s New 
Atlantis: New Interdisciplinary Essays, ed. Bronwen Price (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2002) 48-59. “The motif of a new world of learning beyond the seas waiting to be discovered is figured in 
the title page of the volume in which the story was first printed, Sylva Sylvarum. Here the Atlantic is 
signified by the imposing frame of the Pillars of Hercules—the markers of the limits of the old world. … 
[I]t deftly recapitulates the title page of The Advancement of Learning which uses the same image of the 
Pillars of Hercules, but has an outward-bound ship in place of the seaborne globe… The Pillars of Hercules 
are signifiers of intellect, denoting the limits of knowledge. By implication, the Atlantic beyond is the 




series of scholars, governors, and other authorities who relate extraordinary 
advancements of learning. It is a kind of pageant of figures whose stories are often 
interrupted by various errands, only to be reframed with another tale within a tale. The 
visitor hears of many different laboratories at Salomon’s House; near the end of the tale, 
he hears of all of the technologies of vision they have invented and what new objects they 
can see in the “perspective-houses,” 
…where we make demonstrations of all lights and radiations and of all 
colours… all multiplications of light, which we carry to great distance, 
and make so sharp as to discern small points and lines. Also all colorations 
of light: all delusions and deceits of the sight, in figures, magnitudes, 
motions, colours; all demonstrations of shadows. We find also divers 
means, yet unknown to you, of producing of light, originally from divers 
bodies. We make artificial rainbows, halos, and circles about light. We 
represent also all manner of reflections, refractions, and multiplications of 
visual beams of objects.159 
 
They produce knowledge by repeatedly looking for new objects to examine and new 
ways to examine them. They look for errors—“delusions and deceits of the sight”—and 
theorize how those errors might appear to be visual phenomena and produce artifacts of 
visualization.160 In New Atlantis and Bacon’s other proposals, these experiments in the 
transmission of visual phenomena engender new forms of mediation such as theories, 
diagrams, and speculative tales so that they may be transmitted in print.  
New Atlantis uses the mise en abyme technique in its interpolated tales, which in 
turn reflects the image of the Pillars of Hercules that so intrigued Bacon to keep 
                                                
159 Francis Bacon, New Atlantis in Major Works, ed. Brian Vickers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, 
2002), 485. There are also other sensory experiment laboratories: sound-houses, perfume-houses, “houses 
of deceits of the senses; where we represent all manner of feats of juggling, false apparitions, impostures, 
and illusions; and their fallacies” (486). 
160 Bacon conceptualized sources of error as Idols, or images of the mind produced by faulty reasoning, bad 
learning, and other sources. For a discussion of artifacts produced by visualizing technologies, see Michael 
Lynch, Art and Artifact in Laboratory Science: A Study of Shop Work and Shop Talk in a Research 
Laboratory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985). 
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remediating it: on and on, the replications in multiple mediums proliferate toward the 
horizon. Amy Boesky links the proliferation to the tale’s emphasis on novelty:  
More for Bacon becomes the absent presence, the father who must be (and 
can never be) shown something new. Novelty in the New Atlantis thus 
becomes a quality which is used as a defense as well as an instrument for 
constructing and interpreting Nature. This fetishizing of the new partly 
explains the aura of urgency in New Atlantis. Interviews are no sooner 
granted than they are broken off, officials called away in haste. Something 
is always on the brink of happening…161 
 
More is different is new. Inside and outside the story, studying “all manner of reflections, 
refractions, and multiplications of visual beams of objects” produces theories of self-
reflexivity and attention to how stories are refracted through specific techniques of 
perspective, how they’re fragmented or interpolated. As it replicates in visual and textual 
form, the image of the temple’s pillars becomes a figure for Bacon’s interest in what lay 
beyond the horizons of producing knowledge in settled forms, as he continually revised, 
recombined, and remediated various announcements and plans for The Advancement of 
Learning, The Great Instauration, The New Organon. Sometimes these plans were 
fragmentary, or they played with genres of aphorisms, lists, or the essay form that Bacon 
called “knowledge broken” in The Advancement of Learning.  
Knowledge broken, knowledge glitched. Knowledge is glitched as the tools for 
rendering with it (the technologies, the genres) become insufficient for the task at hand. 
In the glitch aesthetic, the genres of the panel presentation and the Tumblr are 
performative, contingent, fragmentary, superficial, clunky—glitchy in and of themselves, 
dramatizing their own insufficiency in order to engender more contingent theories. In 
Bacon’s writing, instauration is an emergent phenomenon of iterations, fragments, and 
                                                
161 Amy Boesky, “Bacon’s New Atlantis and the Laboratory of Prose,” in The Project of Prose in Early 
Modern Europe and the New World, eds. Elizabeth Fowler and Roland Ireene (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 138-153, 151. 
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reorganizations in new genres—including the genre of speculative travel narrative in the 
New Atlantis that would inspire Borges and many of the filmmakers, video game 
designers, and virtual reality innovators who help Bolter and Grusin form their mosaic of 
remediation. The desire to theorize is enacted through remediation. Siskin and Warner 
explain how Bacon’s Philosophical Works were remediated in the middle of the 
eighteenth century by Peter Shaw, who translated and reorganized the plans with an index 
and a glossary:  
The purpose of this retooling was not to preserve Bacon’s oeuvre as it had 
originally appeared but to allow the texts to become different—and thus 
participate in the kind of ‘renewal’ that was now understood to be 
possible. The glossary therefore, does not ‘give exact Definitions’ but ones 
that ‘facilitate’…And the translation is not ‘direct’ but ‘a kind of open 
Version…’ 162  
 
With Shaw’s refashioning of Bacon and its instauration of the concept of Enlightenment 
in mind, I will close this chapter with a multimedia experiment to remediate Pope’s, 
Bacon’s, and Swift’s work into the glitch aesthetic.  
Following Manovich’s prefatory “dataset” of reflexive images from The 
Language of New Media,163 with this remediation I want to generate reflexive, refractive 
questions about this and subsequent chapters. I’ve selected three images to glitch: the 
frontispiece to Pope Alexander, a 1729 satirical pamphlet that attacked Pope’s 
                                                
162 Siskin and Warner, 18. They point out that as Shaw’s remediation of Bacon was being published, “the 
Royal Society was remediating itself: new members now had to be proposed in writing and the written 
certificates signed by those who supported them. New associational practices thus underwrote the sense 
that something different was happening.” They are quoting Francis Bacon and Peter Shaw. The 
Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon. 3 volumes. (London, 1773). Shaw performed a similar refashioning 
project with Robert Boyle’s many different works. 
163 As a reversal to the convention of placing explanatory images in the center or end of a book, Manovich 
interfaces The Language of New Media with a “visual prologue” or “dataset” of still frames from Dziga 
Vernov’s 1929 avant-garde film, Man with a Movie Camera (iv-xxxv).  
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Catholicism;164 an engraving of William Hogarth’s oil painting The Distrest Poet, which 
imagines Pope’s dunce Lewis Theobald composing in his garret165; and Bacon’s Pillars of 
Hercules from the frontispiece to Advancement of Learning. I “edit” these texts (two of 
which are in part satires on editing, the third which has been edited from its partial state) 
by making them jump among digital formats and introducing errors via their code editor. 
As digital objects that have been scanned and reproduced widely on the Internet, they 
have already been remediated multiple times already. I also remediate Swift’s satire The 
Battel of the Books into sound waves by running its text through an audio editing 
interface as a further play with how editing artifactualizes sensory experience. Peter 
Krapp notes the irony of the widespread availability of these kinds of glitching programs 
on code-sharing and -experimenting sites like github: “…in a recursive system where 
                                                
164 [anonymous artist], frontispiece to Pope Alexander (London, 1729). See Guerinot and Ileanna Baird, 
“Visual Paratexts: The Dunciad Illustrations and the Thistles of Satire,” in Book Illustration in the Long 
Eighteenth Century: Reconfiguring the Visual Periphery of the Text, ed. Christina Ionescu (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010). Baird and I both spoke on the “Publicity and the Public Sphere” 
panel at the American Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies in April 2013. She presented her work on 
methods of visualizing and mapping Pope’s dunces, and I presented this material about Pope and glitch art 
in a different form. Although we were both interested in visualizing Pope (literally) from new perspectives 
enabled by digital media, she was concerned with presenting her methods in order to clarify the specific 
insights to be gained from such coding work, and I was more interested in the speculative, theoretical 
possibilities of these distortions. We talked past each other, but even this phenomenon of a glitched 
conversation was interesting to me as an artifact of panel presentation social behavior. 
165 William Hogarth, The Distrest Poet, painted in 1736, remediated into an etching in 1741 and reproduced 
widely. The engraving has an epigraph in copperplate handwriting to name the subject of the satire: 
“Lewis Theobald, 
Studious he sate, with all his books around, 
Sinking from thought to thought, a vast profound: 
Plunged for his sense, but found no bottom there; 
Then wrote and flounder'd on, in mere despair.”  
Pope revised those passages for the four-book Dunciad, replacing them with even more vivid language of 
the hack poet’s distress, and Theobald was replaced by Cibber. Peter Seary discusses more revisions to the 
illustration: “As early as 1737 William Hogarth, who was a subscriber to the edition [of Theobald’s 1733 
edition of Shakespeare’s works] published ‘The Distrest Poet’, which in the first issue (3 March 1737) 
presented the poet writing a copy of verses with a title alluding to Theobald’s early poem, ‘The Cave of 
Poverty’ and with Pope’s verse portraits in The Dunciad as a motto. Hogarth was evidently persuaded to 
alter his print, and the second issue (15 December 1740) erased the verses and substituted ‘Riches a Poem’ 
for ‘Poverty a Poem’ However, the identification of Theobald with poverty and dullness had been renewed 
by publication of Hogarth’s print.” See Lewis Theobald and the Editing of Shakespeare (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990), 203. 
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differentiations between data and programs and obsolete, it comes as no surprise that here 
should be a Glitch plug-in for audio software that chops up audio files and applies a 
variety of effects, depending on how much you tweak the controls.” Krapp is pointing out 
that at least some of the contingencies of glitching are still mediated by humans, and it’s 
wish fulfillment to say one has totally given over one’s creative processes to machines. 
This objection does not seem devastating; rather, it shows another chapter in the complex 
history of editing, to which we may now add glitch-editing to the new tools for 
advancements in learning. Krapp continues: “With unremarked irony, the Web site for 
that Visual Studio Technology software plug-in warns: ‘This version of Glitch is still just 
a prototype and contains a few bugs—obviously I am working towards fixing everything 
as soon as possible.’”166 What might these kinds of editors have to say back to print 
editors who are less open about the contingent nature of their book, worried as they are 
about institutional needs to produce new editions, new knowledge in the academy—with 
dwindling resources? 
I explain my glitching methods in brief reflections next to the images; in a further 
turn of the remediating spiral, some of the images quote and refashion Marshall McLuhan 
and Quentin Fiore’s classic 1967 work of media theory and graphic design, The Medium 
is the Massage. A design-minded remediation of The Gutenberg Galaxy, The Medium is 
the Massage contains brief essays, snippets of quotations, gnomic pronouncements, 
aphorisms, repeated phrases, and sometimes-illegible text overlaid against images from 
advertising, contemporary art, stock photography, cartoons, and other media. The book 
opens with a statement of a grand analog glitch aesthetic, as it were: philosopher A.N. 
Whitehead’s proclamation “The major advances in civilization are processes that all but 
                                                
166 Krapp, 68. He is quoting http://illformed.org/blog/glitch 
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wreck the societies in which they occur,” in stark white sans-serif font against a black 
background, with an even larger sans-serif proclamation above the text: “and how!”167  
The title, The Medium is the Massage, is a typo that has taken on a life of its own: 
Actually, the title was a mistake. When the book came back from the 
typesetter's, it had on the cover ‘Massage’ as it still does. The title was 
supposed to have read The Medium is the Message but the typesetter had 
made an error. When McLuhan saw the typo he exclaimed, ‘Leave it 
alone! It's great, and right on target!’ Thus, there are now four possible 
readings for the last word of the title, all of them accurate: Message and 
Mess Age, Massage and Mass Age.168 
 
The title is an artifactualized error; like visions, sounds, touches (and presumably the 
tastes and smells one can find in the houses of Bacon’s New Atlantis), errors must be 
noticed and mediated in order to exist. They always present a kind of ontological 
challenge as they are created by detection and given substance by mediation through 
language. In Borges’s evocative language, they are the rope of sand to be woven or the 
coins to be minted from the wind. They lack substance, but they also attract other media 
                                                
167 Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, The Medium is the Massage (New York: Touchstone, Simon & 
Schuster, 1967), 6-7. McLuhan and Fiore include a citation page for each of the images they use in The 
Medium is the Massage, but they do not cite the sources of the quotations other than to tie them to authors, 
but not the texts in which the phrases appear. It is provocative to consider this practice in the context of the 
promiscuously circulating utterances and scraps of half-sayings in The Temple of Fame, as well in the 
context of fair use of scanned images from eighteenth-century texts that are circulated widely on the 
Internet and can be appropriated (and transformed) by anyone. Such miscellaneity deliberately frustrates 
academic institutional guidelines for citation! Compare to Jonathan Lethem’s strategy of citing his 
plagiarisms with discreet superscript and endnotes in “The Ecstasy of Influence” Ecstasy of Influence, 
(New York, 2012), or David Shields’ piecemeal, somewhat arbitrary approach to citing his deliberate 
plagiarisms as a matter of argumentative method in Reality Hunger (New York, 2012).  
168 Eric McLuhan, “Commonly Asked Questions (And Answers)” http://marshallmcluhan.com/common-
questions/. Curiously enough—and fittingly so for this discussion of the inability to distinguish between 
truths and untruths in the Temple of Fame—the Wikipedia entry for the book cites a competing version of 
the story, as told by McLuhan’s biographer: “According to McLuhan biographer W. Terrence Gordon, ‘by 
the time it appeared in 1967, McLuhan no doubt recognized that his original saying had become a cliché 
and welcomed the opportunity to throw it back on the compost heap of language to recycle and revitalize it. 
But the new title is more than McLuhan indulging his insatiable taste for puns, more than a clever fusion of 
self-mockery and self-rescue — the subtitle is “An Inventory of Effects,” underscoring the lesson 
compressed into the original saying.’” “The Medium is the Massage.” Wikipedia Commons Organization, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Medium_Is_the_Massage  As Deanne Williams and Ruth Evans have 
noted, Wikipedia itself is a kind of digital, real-life Temple of Fame, with a constant stream of 




in the form of animadversion, theory, metaphors, and other mediating language: they are 
sticky like the rumors at the Temple of Fame. The glitch resists some of that mediation in 
verbal language, only to surge through in other forms of coded language. Thus 
McLuhan’s charge to his readers resonates not only with the New Aesthetic and its 
critics, but also with those visitors to the Temple of Fame who see their work preserved 
or frittered away in the processes of remediation: “Students of media are persistently 
attacked as evaders, idly concentrating on means or process rather than on ‘substance.’ 
The dramatic and rapid changes of ‘substance’ elude these accusers. Survival is not 
possible if one approaches his environment, the social drama, with a fixed, unchangeable 
point of view—the witless repetitive response to the unperceived.”169 
                                                
169,McLuhan and Fiore, 10. 
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Interstitial Note: What Did My Remediation Design Experiment Teach Me About 
Textual Editing? 
 
The printing of pictures, however, unlike the printing of words from movable types, 
brought a completely new thing into existence—it made possible for the first time 
pictorial statements of a kind that could be exactly repeated during the effective life of 
the printing surface. This exact repetition of pictorial statements has had incalculable 
effects upon knowledge and thought… This means that, far from being merely minor 
works of art, prints are among the most important and powerful tools of modern life and 
thought. Certain we cannot hope to realize their actual role unless we get away from the 
modern snobbery of modern print collecting notions and definitions and begin to think of 
them as exactly repeatable pictorial statements or communications, without regard to the 
accident of rarity or what for the moment we may regard as aesthetic merit. We must 
look at them from the point of view of general ideas and particular functions, and 
especially, we must think about: the limitations which their techniques have imposed on 
them as conveyors of information and on us as receivers of that information.” 
--William Ivins, Prints and Visual Communication (1953)170 
 
“Expression within glitch art is often self-referential, with the substance and story being 
that of the generative processes and serendipitous encounters that give error its form.” 




I ended the previous chapter with a thought experiment in rendering Francis 
Bacon’s perspectival instaurations and the distorting satires of Alexander Pope and 
Jonathan Swift as glitch art. Satire is already a distorting procedure of exaggerating 
features; the glitches are artifacts of another kind of mediating procedure that further 
garble and disfigure what one sees. The procedure starts with an image, translates it into 
code, then randomly interpolates gibberish into the code and attempts to translate that 
new code into a now-distorted image (if it doesn’t totally break it first). The glitches were 
not procedurally complicated, but the interpolated errors had unpredictable visual 
manifestations which made the images blocky, possibly ugly, and impossible for the 
                                                
170 William Ivins, Prints and Visual Communications (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1953), quoted in 
McLuhan, Gutenberg Galaxy, 76-77. 
171 Lital Khaiken, “The Radical Capacity of Glitch Art: Expression through an Aesthetic Rooted in Error” 




computer to “read” (or render) in some places. The Temple of Fame, ruled by the 
thousand dissembling tongues of Fame and sometimes by her attendant goddess Error, is 
an allegory for this glitchy transmission over time, a generic interface of the poetic dream 
vision with which to understand the abstractions that iterative, recursive remediations of a 
text can engender. In playing creatively destructive visual editor of Hogarth, the 
anonymous engravers of Bacon’s frontispieces, Pope, and Swift, I proposed a practice of 
reading with/despite these pixelated distortions. Inspired by McLuhan’s language and 
design innovations, I think of those images as an interstitial experiment in remediating 
moments in the past through movable mosaic pieces, possible transmission errors, half-
formed theories, and other distortions of mediation. As Manovich puts it in his reflexive 
text for his own paratextual experiment: “Borders between different world do not have to 
be erased; different spaces do not have to be matched in perspective, scale, and lighting; 
individual layers can retain their separate identities rather than being merged into a single 
space; different worlds can clash semantically rather than from their own universe.”172 
Manovich’s critics have argued that it is difficult to tell whether he believes he is 
recontexualizing or decontextualizing these images: I have the same questions about my 
own experiment here, and I want to keep reflecting on what the implications of 
oscillating between those two modes of remediation. 
                                                
172 Manovich, xix. See Manovich’s chapter on Interfaces in The Language of New Media, in which he 
traces coneptions of interface through “cultural interfaces,” print, and cinema (63-115). Yet that move was 
also controversial, as the editors film journal October resisted Manovich’s enthusiastic, slippery 
connections between cinema and digital media. October had used Vernov’s images, too: “…it is with some 
doubt that we listen to these same theoreticians of the new digital media proclaim that cinema and 
photography—with their indexical, archival properties—were merely steps on the path to their merging 
with the computer in the uber-archive of the database. Much of was most important to cinema and 
photography is wiped away by such a teleology. And much of what seems most critical in contemporary 
artistic practice reacts to just such an erasure” (quoted in Galloway, 6.). See “Introduction,” October 1000 
(2002) 2-5, 3-4.  
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This experiment is a sort of obverse of Janine Barchas’s method of reading visual 
evidence in Graphic Design, Print Culture, and the Eighteenth-Century Novel, in which, 
following Gerard Genette’s theorizing of paratexts, she reads texts in the context of their 
design on the page. Like McLaverty, who reads Pope’s work through his authorial 
control of his pages, Barchas is interested in how the multiple agencies of printers, 
editors, and authors interact in novels—and in how authors incorporate these conflicts 
and collaborations into the literary stuff of novels. The monograph opens with a 
reproduction of the title page to the first edition of Henry Fielding’s Joseph Andrews 
(1742), which has a satirical correction of an imaginary error: “Among other Errors, the 
Reader is desired to excuse this: That in the Second Volume, Mr. Adams, is, by Mistake, 
mentioned to have sat up two subsequent Nights; when in reality, a Night of Rest 
intervened.” She goes on to read Swift’s Description of a City Shower, already an 
overflowing with stuff: “a triplet that tops with a graphic flourish and the rhythmical 
excess of an alexandrine a poem comically devoted to the piquancy of observed detail 
and to notions of material excess and overflowings” with the advertisements that 
surrounded it in its publication in the Tatler in 1710. In its material context, “the 
juxtaposition of poem and advertisement on the printed page enhances and extends a 
reading of the Shower, irrespective of authorial control—or even intent.”173 I was 
inspired by Barchas’s work, yet in some ways I wonder if it confirms what we already 
know and believe about agencies in print: it is tied to claims about the facticity of 
                                                
173 Janine Barchas, Graphic Design, Print Culture, and the Eighteenth-Century Novel (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), [i], 1-4. She sees her work as “plotting a return course to the author in 
order to validate the interpretive implications of a graphic design with reference to authorial control, self-
consciousness, or intention. While this study treads softly on the notion of an ‘authoritative’ edition in its 
discussion of generic forms, it registers graphic design as ‘literary’ only if the author was involved in or 
cognizant of its, production. … In this sense, this study aligns itself with Genette’s ‘more or less’ 
philosophy towards consideration of authorial intention.” (11). 
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historical context, that agencies can be recovered by reading the right kind of evidence. 
Joseph Andrews’ imaginary error and the city’s glut of stuff pose compelling questions of 
ontology that could inspire other kinds of readings like the ones in my theoretical reading 
of abstractions, materiality and immateriality, and emergence in the Temple of Fame. So 
I’ve glitched the materiality of the contexts that Barchas is recovering not to find the past, 
but to show the errors that are present and perhaps unrecoverable as context.  
Following Genette’s theoretical work and Grafton’174, we look to footnotes, errata 
sheets, printer’s notes, and other practical paratexts to solidify a sense of context, to give 
texture and depth to a reading. Those haptic metaphors are commonplace, and, like the 
visual metaphors we use to describe examination, focus, and perspective in critical work, 
they have a way of proliferating in order to define the methods of study. In No Medium, 
Craig Dworkin considers contemporary art and poetic media objects that resist being read 
as obvious objects of study; his re-spatializing of the field with these apparently illegible 
objects calls attention to these metaphors of space and context: “the functioning of the 
paratextual indices … requires a spatial and physical context. For the writer, that context 
is what relates the footnote to the spatial and material logic of collage; the footnote, as 
Hugh Kenner suggests, ‘is a step in the direction of discontinuity; of organizing blocks of 
discourse simultaneously in space rather than consecutively in time.’”175  Kenner’s 
interest is in modernist poetics and Dworkin’s is in postmodern and contemporary 
poetry—those forms of attention to the discontinuities of paratext are thus part of specific 
historical contexts themselves. What does it mean to veer precipitously, even 
                                                
174 See Grafton, Defenders of the Text; The Footnote: A Curious History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1999; Bring Out Your Dead: Past as Revelation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2001). 
175 Craig Dworkin, No Medium, (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2013) 
77, quoting Hugh Kenner, Flaubert, Joyce, and Beckett, 39. 
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anachronistically between eighteenth century printed materials and their digital forms, 
and what can glitches reveal about the possibility of errancy in both positive and negative 
senses of the word? Dworkin argues that paratext is always unstable: “In the acts of 
reading invoked by the paratextual index, not only are the spatial coordinates of the page 
and the volume of the volume evoked, but the reader’s body is put into motion.” There is 
no foundation to be unearthed—as scholars, we are caught between the foundations of 
historicity and the immateriality of that which we are examining and creating. What 
Dworkin does with illegible text, Manovich argues for the value of thinking about avant 
garde cinema to study new media objects. His preliminary “dataset” paratext of film stills 
take him out of the film’s immediate context and into a reflective space of remediation: 
“Borders between different worlds do not have to be erased; different spaces do not have 
to be matched in perspective, scale, and lighting; individual layers can retain their 
separate identities rather than being merged into a single space; different worlds can clash 
semantically rather than form their own universe.”176 The glitch artifact is the limit case 
of this generative problem. 
In this way, I’m inspired by George W.S. Trow’s satire “In the Context of No 
Context,” where he claims that the purpose of television (and one could add any form of 
new media) is “to establish false context and to chronicle the unraveling of existing 
contexts; finally to establish the context of no-context and to chronicle it.”177 Originally 
published in The New Yorker in 1980, Trow’s essay is a critique of media proliferation 
that uses the same visionary language of McLuhan, yet it’s flipped into its mirror image 
as a critique of the mosaics that media proliferation engender. McLuhan’s mosaics make 
                                                
176 Manovich, xix. 
177 George W.S. Trow, Within the Context of No Context (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1981), 82.  
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new contexts out of rearranging so much stuff; Trow calls this flexibility the context of 
no context. Like Alexander Pope, Trow registers his satire (and fascination) with media 
proliferation by calling attention to problems of scale:  
That movement, from wonder to the wonder that a country should be so 
big, to the wonder that a building could be so big, to the last, small 
wonder, that a marketplace could be so big—that was the movement of 
history. Then there was a change. The direction of the movement paused, 
sat silent for a moment, and reversed. From that moment, vastness was the 
start, not the finish. The movement now began with the fact of two 
hundred million, and the movement was toward a unit of one, alone. 
Groups of more than one were now united not by a common history but by 
common characteristics. History became the history of demographics, the 
history of no-history (44). 
 
Trow’s evocation of the way that media reduce scale and produce gossip as news is 
evocative of the House and Temple of Fame; his essay is a cool, epigrammatic dream 
vision satire, the obverse of Pope’s Dunciad. I think of how errors operate in the context 
of no context: the errata sheet is tied to a particular edition and its evidence is supposed to 
be erased in subsequent editions, yet there are more errata that come through corrections. 
Their status as media objects is interstitial. 
These glitched images are also operating in the context of no context—grabbed 
from the Internet, where they had been circulating already with haphazard citations or 
none at all, and abstracted into data before being re-made as new images, then grabbed 
again and put into a sequential order on PowerPoint. The interstitial quality of the images 
is a means of “glitching” the progress of the dissertation so far: what does the blocky, 
visually strange and estranging, experimental, “plagiarized” (in the sense of remediating 
McLuhan), undigestable material do to glitch my writerly attempts at synthesis, clarity, 
conformation to the generic expectations and conventions of academic discourse, and 
textured explication elsewhere?  
 
 109 
Digital humanities projects may be praised for beauty, clarity, and usability—that 
is, if they can maintain funding and other forms of institutional support over a long span 
of time past the initial interest phase. That is, digital humanities projects do not often get 
to record their own failures in a self-reflexive way; one does not usually have the luxury 
of experimenting with deliberately frustrating those ideals of clarity and simplicity so as 
to see other forms of producing knowledge. In her defense of close-reading and keeping 
sight on the literary in digital humanities scholarship, Laura Mandell cites John 
Unsworth’s reassurance to humanities scholars at a 1997 conference that digital 
humanities work models ideas in new ways: 
‘Imagining what you already know’ is a good description of modeling in 
many humanities contexts: for example, in building a model of Salisbury 
Cathedral, or the Crystal Palace, as we did at the Institute in Virginia, you 
could say that we were imagining what you already know about those 
structures. However, interestingly, the act of modeling almost always 
brings to the surface of awareness things you didn’t know you knew, and 
often shows you significant gaps in your knowledge that—of course—you 
didn’t know were there. Of course, in some cases—maybe even in all 
cases that I’ve mentioned—one could (in principle) do this kind of 
modeling and even the quantitative analysis without computers: you could 
model the crystal palace with toothpicks and plastic wrap; you could do 
the painstaking word-counting and frequency comparison by hand. But 
you wouldn’t, because there are other interesting things you could do in 
far less time.178 
 
When, in 1997, Unsworth reassured his audience of literary scholars that the digital 
humanities shows them what they already know, he was attempting to assuage fears of 
obsolescence. But when I read that reassurance, I have a completely different worry: that 
this framing undercuts the possibility of seeing what we didn’t already know. Modeling 
                                                
178 John Unsworth, “New Research Methods for the Humanities” (Lyman Award Lecture, 
National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, NC, November 11, 2005), http:// 
www3.isrl.uiuc.edu/~unsworth/lyman.htm, cited in the epigraph to Mandell, 755. 
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is one mode of scholarship, but there must be other forms of mediation that don’t keep us 
secure in what we’ve already learned, just in prettier ways. 
This experiment and the subsequent chapters work recursively to try out such a 
model of reading for distortion by producing it, often by juggling textual objects that 
resist close reading or synthesis, just like these images. They are about discourses on 
error and the social interactions that such mediations produce—but the errors themselves 
seem to be lurking behind this work as less visible as not resolvable in the analysis, 
always undigestible. They produce a hybrid realm for a critic: part of it mediable through 
writing, and yet there are objects that challenge the ontology of the criticism—do errors 
exist in and of themselves, or do they need to be perceived in a medium. What happens to 
a corrected error—does it exist in its corrected state? What happens to a correction that 
generates more errors—what kinds of agencies are procedural and what are the products 
of concatenation? Following McLuhan, I noted how the obsession with the content or the 
what of media—and error—might limit the kinds of investigations that I can perform, 
choosing instead to zoom out and consider how those errors and corrections are mediated. 
Building on the previous chapter’s interest in emergent phenomena, I advocate for 
editorial and critical methods that emphasize more, different contingencies, variations, 
and experimental gestures instead of those that prioritize fixing the final, consolidated 
word on an author and a text. 
 Instead of being remediated in critical discourse, they could also be forms of 
demediation, “the process by which a transmissible text or image is blocked by the 
obtruded fact of its own neutralized medium,” as Garrett Stewart describes it in his 
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arguments about the objecthood of books when they serve as art objects.179 They could 
challenge the conventions of tracing the steps of “textual transmission” that is key to 
book history, rendering 
their interiors off limits, locked down in illegible dry dock like 
decommisioned vessels of textual transport. Whether withdrawing under 
the lengthening digital shadow or not, verbal mediation is at once beneath 
and beyond all use in such [demediated] forms—except for its 
contemplated absence, throwing the viewer back on an entirely 
associational sense of reading the nonsequential sign function of a disused 
cultural instrument now become, under negation, its own epitome and 
icon. 
 
Stewart’s description aspires to theorizing these objects as different from books as 
containers for content and literary form, yet he reproduces the very literary language that 
demediation gestures toward: colorful extended metaphors and generative abstractions.  
But most importantly, I want to advocate for remediation (and perhaps 
demediation) as a practice as much as a theory, one that becomes more useful when its 
recursive properties are taken advantage of rather than treated like flaws or 
superficialities in the idea. Those flaws reveal themselves in remediations, and they are 
all the more compelling for that exposure in an unfamiliar context, a context of no 
context that glitches what we consider what that term even means. 
                                                





Chapter 2: Richard Bentley’s Hazy Horizons of Editing: Theories of Mind, 
Mediation, and Emendation 
 
“Every text has variants of itself screaming to get out, or antithetical texts waiting to 
make themselves known.” 
--Jerome McGann, The Textual Condition (1991)180 
 
“This middleman, the editorial man of straw, was literally a mediator between Milton and 
the Bentleian wrath of damnation, which is already too offensive, even as applied to a 
shadow.”  




Introduction: Bentley’s Whispering Variants, as Viewed from Atop Mt. Horeb 
 
 
  The generative confusion of sight and sound that was so compelling to Alexander 
Pope casts a new light on Jerome McGann’s invocation of variants “screaming to get out” 
of a text. Where would they go if they “got out”? How can the visual medium of the 
page—whether it is cluttered with hypermediating footnotes or pretending to a pristinely 
“unmediated” experience with an author’s intended text—register the aural disruption of 
“screaming”? McGann uses that epigrammatic synesthesia as a gambit for his project in 
The Textual Condition: to argue for the inherent instability of meaning that the 
production of texts always engenders. He is being rhetorical, metaphorical, even 
melodramatic, to stage an entrée for his interest in digital hyperlinks as an alternative 
interface with which to experiment in textual editing.  
                                                
180 Jerome J. McGann, The Textual Condition. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 11. He 
extends this playfulness by titling this section about the multiplicity of textual productions “The Garden of 
Forking Paths,” in a nod to Borges. This chapter takes its structural format from that metaphor. 
181 Thomas De Quincey, Collected Works (1871) 5:83, cited in Steve McCaffery, Prior to Meaning: The 
Protosemantic and Poetics (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 62. 
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I shall return to McGann in a moment, but I want to add seventeenth-century 
textual critic Richard Bentley to this constellation of editors who introduce the error of 
sensory confusion as a means of generating new theories of mediation. Where McGann’s 
variants scream, Bentley’s variants whisper in voices that are only detectable by that most 
perspicacious editor: Richard Bentley himself. Bentley gained his fame as an editor of 
classical texts who could examine ancient texts minutely and produce voluminous textual 
notes about sources, interpolations, and plagiarisms. His method of parallel criticism 
combined the goals of classical criticism—philological investigation of textual history—
with those of Biblical criticism as it was practiced at the end of the seventeenth century, 
where glossing passages was seen as a generative exercise to converse with religious 
texts. He had gained considerable fame from his work in both forms of textual 
commentary: in his famed critical editions of Horace and Manilius, and in his work 
translating natural philosophy for religious interpretations in the Boyle lectures that 
popularized Isaac Newton’s theories of motion. His methods combined close scrutiny of 
texts with virtuosic displays of knowledge to detect interpolations, plagiarisms, and 
alternate translations to synthesize what he believed to be the best possible versions. With 
this generative method of conjectural criticism, he took the humanist practice of close 
textual study and transformed it into a kind of activist scholarship of ridiculing the 
Ancients and promoting the Moderns. That debate turned on the question of what readers, 
editors, and printers should do with classical texts: admire them as faultless exemplars of 
Ancient virtue or scrutinize them as intricately textual, material documents that could be 
examined minutely—even infinitely—as a Modern project of knowledge production.  
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When Bentley turned his “conjectural” method of mediating texts to a modern 
text in John Milton’s Paradise Lost, he produced artifacts of that procedure that earned 
him the enmity and ridicule not only of familiar Ancient partisans like Alexander Pope, 
but also of other sensitive readers of Milton. In their justifiable critiques, they saw 
Bentley’s bulky annotations to the first two lines of Milton’s Paradise Lost as editorial 
hubris. He takes up nearly half of the first page of his 1732 edition of Paradise Lost 
defending his conjectural emendation of the line, “That on the secret top of Horeb”: “Our 
poet dictated it thus, That on the SACRED top Of Horeb.” In order to justify his conjectural 
emendation from “secret” to “sacred,” Bentley accumulates multiple Biblical examples, 
homophonic logic, hazy natural history (literally so: the natural history of haze), and 
pleas to logic. The entire long note is worth quoting for its audacity, the prodigious 
virtuosity of a textual editor who had higher ambitions for his work: 
Some perhaps may prefer the present Reading, Secret top; because in most 
Countries the high Mountains have against rainy Weather their Heads 
surrounded with Mists. True, but yet it’s questionable, whether in the wide 
and dry Desert of Arabia, Mount Horeb has such a cloudy Cap. I have in 
my Youth read several Itineraries, whether the Travellers went up to the 
Top of Horeb; and I remember not, that they take notice of its Cloudiness. 
And a just Presumption lies against it from Holy Writ, Exod. viii, whether 
the Israelites, encamp’d at the foot of Horeb, could find no Water; which 
was provided miraculously [sic], when Moses smote the Rock with his 
sacred Rod; for all Natural History informs us, and Reason vouches it, 
That a Mountain, whose Head is cloudy, has always running Springs at its 
Foot. But allowing all, and granting that Horeb was like the European 
Hills; yet no Poet hitherto has on that account said The Secret; but the 
Cloudy, Misty, Hazy, Grey Top. Nay, allow further, That Secret Top is a 
passable Epithet; yet it is common to all Mountains whatever; but Horeb, 
whose Ground was holy, Horeb the Mountain of God, Exod.iii 1; 1 Kings 
xix, 8, deserved a Peculiar Epithet. If therefore (which the best Poets have 
adjudg’d) a Proper Epithet is always preferable to a General one; and if 
Secret and Sacred are of a near Sound in Pronunciation; I have such an 
Esteem for our Poet; that which of the two Word is the better, That, I say, 
was dictated by Milton.182 
                                                




Bentley’s marginal note appears on the first page of the poem as an attempt to mediate 
the visual perspective from the secret (that is, indefinite) top of Horeb through a sonic 
artifact of procedure. In this way, Bentley’s digressions about ways of mishearing are not 
just evidence of his wrongheadedness and the prodigality of his errors; rather, they evince 
the problems that the act of rendering sound creates for a mediator who works in print 
and usually describes his work as a visual practice of comparing what he can see. 
McGann’s overstatement of variants that scream to be heard is a manifestation of this 
strangeness in mediating mixed senses. The peculiarities of sound as a remediated, error-
prone phenomena can reveal new opportunities for considering the history of textual 
editing: what can sound editors teach their textual cousins?183  
The editorially contrived “secret” top of Horeb is the site of this experiment in 
reconsidering auditory perspective, even as it must come in the form of an imagined, 
erroneous mediator. “Sacred” tops is not an accepted reading of the text in any edition 
other than Bentley’s; of all of the conjectural emendations he made to the text, only two 
or three are still accepted, and even those had already been put forth by Bentley’s 
predecessors Patrick Hume and Zachary Pearce. Both Pearce and Hume cited substantial 
                                                
183 I was inspired to think of Bentley as a sound editor and a theorist of sound by reading about famed film 
and sound editor Walter Murch’s wide-ranging theories of how humans perceive visual and aural 
phenomena together. Murch the editor thinks of his work in terms of a practice—how he will fit sounds to 
visual cues—but he is also an autodidact philosopher who is always reflecting on his practice. He was 
required to reconsider his previous work when he worked as sound editor on the 2005 film Jarhead, which 
contains a scene of Marines watching the famous “Flight of the Valkyries” scene from the 1979 film 
Apocalypse Now, for which Murch won an Academy Award for Best Sound. In recursively re-recording the 
sound from a previous film in a new context, Murch had much to say about the theories he has generated 
from practice. Lawrence Weschler captures some of Murch’s synthetic and synesthetic expansiveness as he 
draws connections “[f]rom visual projection to the perception of sound. Unsurprisingly, Murch has 
developed elaborate theories regarding the perception of sound…. [he] is convinced that we perceive sound 
along a spectrum from encoded to embodied—language existing on the extreme end of the encoded side of 
spectrum and music at the extreme end of the embodied—and that these types of sounds get processed on 
different sides of the brain….” See Lawrence Weschler, “Valkyries Over Iraq: Walter Murch, Apocalypse 
Now, Jarhead, and the Trouble with War Movies,” Uncanny Valley and Other Adventures in Narrative 
(Berkeley: Counterpoint Press, 2011) 181-218, 191-92. 
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Biblical sources for “secret” as a non-controversial modifier that needed no suggestion of 
a variant; their method of methodically cataloguing Biblical references, tracing similar 
language in Milton’s other works, and finding contemporary literary examples is a far 
more straightforward practice than what spills over in Bentley’s burgeoning, 
presumptuous editorial asides. In assessing Bentley’s tendency to suggest changes rather 
than explain what was present on the page, editor Marcus Walsh notes, “Pearce is 
generally prepared to work harder to account for the idiosyncratic in Milton, offering 
interpretation rather than conjecture.”184 Walsh’s considerable experience in producing 
scholarly editions of eighteenth-century texts is always at the center of his historical 
studies of editorial method, so his approval of Pearce’s descriptive annotation of 
Paradise Lost is a (positively inflected) judgment of functionality. Walsh does not reject 
conjecture out of hand, for he argues that the practice is “a necessary part of any editorial 
process that aspires to do more than transmit the errors of a single inadequate witness.”185 
Walsh situates these conjectures in his heuristics of editorial practice, to see how editors 
developed interpretative procedures in the eighteenth century; conjectural flights of fancy 
like Bentley’s fail the heuristic test of functionality. 
But what if there were a way to bracket functionality, in favor of theorizing the 
errors produced by problems in remediation of texts through new technologies of 
transmission?186 As I noted in the previous chapter (and experimented with myself), these 
                                                
184 Marcus Walsh, “Bentley, Our Contemporary.” The Theory and Practice of Text-Editing: Essays in 
Honour of James. T. Boulton, ed. Ian Small and Marcus Walsh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 171.  
185 Walsh, Shakespeare, Milton, and Eighteenth-Century Literary Editing, 120. 
186 Indeed, I can trace a crystallization of the sonic remediation argument in this chapter to a moment on the 
Vancouver subway at the ASECS meeting in 2011 when I read a sign about dictation training to be a court 
reporter. I was thinking about the paper I was about to deliver about Richard Bentley’s charges of 
mishearing and mistranscription, and so I was attuned to thinking about protocols of dictation and 
transcription. I recalled a friend who worked as a programmer for a hedge fund but who could not type due 
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forays are writing technologies that produce half-formed ideas, too-eager proselytizing of 
new methods, interpretative errors, misprisions of historical evidence, anachronisms, and 
other dysfunctions. They are, as poet and frequent translator of ancient Greek Anne 
Carson puts it in her essay about the nuances of translation: “the willful creation of error / 
the deliberate break and complication of mistakes / out of which may arise / 
unexpectedness.”187 Exacting, pedantic Bentley and experimental, gnomic Carson are so 
far apart in their treatment of ancient Greek poetry that they nearly meet each other in 
their polarity.  
And yet, these moments of unexpectedness were the Ancients’ fears, too: that 
consolidated, admired knowledge of the past would be eclipsed by newfangled hyper-
mediations that called too much attention to themselves. In the Dunciad and The Battel of 
the Books, Pope and Swift turned the conjectural method against itself into a tool of satire 
and distortion to show recursive thoughts that had taken on lives of their own and 
eclipsed what they were supposed to be thinking about; it is conventional to notice that 
Pope and Swift delight in what they profess to despise. I see the Ancients-Moderns 
debate as a series of escalations in recursion: in their countless satires and 
animadversions on each other’s works, Ancients and Moderns alike generated many 
(sometimes too many) frames of mediating commentary. In so doing, they initiated self-
                                                                                                                                            
to a disability; he had two typists who take dictation of the code he created, and the three of them 
developed a collaborative language of ordinary English and dictated programming languages in order to 
mediate his ideas into actionable work. Their mediating practice was legible only to them, and the results of 
their daily work were algorithms that are doubly non-transparent to traders who saw only the results.  
187 Anne Carson, “Essay on What I Think About Most” in Men in the Off Hours (New York: Knopf, 2009), 
50-56. Carson’s translations resemble, at a high level of sophistication and strangeness, McGann’s theory 
and practice of “deformance” as a strategy of interpretation, which he developed with Lisa Samuels as a 
way of thinking about editorial work and performance as creative endeavors, not just corrections. See 
McGann and Lisa Samuels, “Deformance and Interpretation” New Literary History 30:1 (1999) 25.56. 
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reflexive critical practices of engaging with the past that became the foundation of 
debates that would engage future critics, editors, authors, and readers. 
At the end of the last chapter, I translated and interpolated code into images of 
satire as experiments in recursive distortion. These pixelations resemble Bentley’s blocky 
marginalia explaining his own editorial interpolations and intrusions. They also resemble 
the cascading windows of variants that McGann’s hyperlinks can produce. For Bentley, 
McGann, and me, seizing the role of the editor-as-thought-experimenter produces more, 
different mediation: hypermediation that allows for theorizing the illusory quality of an 
unmediated experience with a text. The bibliographer Randall McLeod, writing as 
Random Cloud, hypermediates his editorial work with images, textual and typographical 
play, and puns; he draws these mediative provocations from the objects of study 
themselves, such as George Herbert’s shape-poem, “Easter Wings.” Cloud describes this 
problem of recursion: “As the printed shape-poem is inherently an object of both reading 
and gazing, it cannot exist wholly in a single spatiality and temporality. In our 
performative processing of this poem-that-is-a-picture, we cannot be in all modalities at 
once.”188 Bentley is not so self-conscious or playful a mediator as Cloud, but it is striking 
that they both turn to the interstitial, the indeterminate to perform their interventions; the 
critical indeterminacy is not just postmodern (a sometime charge against Cloud’s work) 
but rather inherent to the mediation itself, and it surfaces in combinations with different 
forms, media, and genre at distinct historical moments. As Bolter and Grusin describe 
this the interstices of media space in Remediation: “Where immediacy suggests a unified 
visual space, contemporary hypermediacy offers a heterogeneous space, in which 
                                                
188 Cloud, “FIAT fLUX,” 72.  
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representation is conceived of not as a window on to the world, but rather as ‘windowed’ 
itself—with windows that open onto other representations of other media.”189 
Bentley’s questionable charges of misheard lines and lack of oversight on the text 
are fundamentally issues of mediation. This problem stems from mediation in its multiple 
forms: what comes between an author and a text, how is a text mediated in print, what are 
the implications of a text’s medium and how it may be studied and disseminated in other 
forms? Bentley’s editorial artifacts serve as objects of study that present new ways of 
thinking about mediation, agency, technology, and the social practice of editing. His 
connection to McGann is their preoccupation with a visual metaphor for situating their 
wide-ranging perspective: with a nod to Hans-Robert Jauss’s theory of a “horizon of 
expectations” within a genre, McGann theorizes an “editorial horizon” which “forces one 
to reimagine the theory of texts—and ultimately, the theory of literature—as a specific set 
of social operations.”190 With the note about Mt. Horeb, Bentley creates an editorial 
horizon of sorts, composed of conjectures that socialize promiscuously with the text of 
the poem, as they remain on the margins but also dominate the physical space of the 
reader’s page. He poses the impractical but generative possibility of prioritizing 
contingent conjecture—and error—over settled, authorized text.  
Conjecture is the flashpoint of Bentley’s legacy as an editor of Milton. His entire 
project is flawed beyond these prodigious readings because of a larger problem with his 
method of turning to fiction to mediate his conjectures. Milton was blind when he 
composed Paradise Lost and dictated it to his daughters and another secretary; after an 
                                                
189 Bolter and Grusin, 34. 
190 McGann, 21. See Hans-Robert Jauss, “Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory,” trans. 
Elizabeth Benzinger. Literature in the Modern World: Critical Essays and Documents, ed. Dennis Walder. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.) 67-75.  
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initial publication of the poem in 1667, he revised the poem from a ten-book structure to 
a 12-book structure and made significant changes in this structural revamping in 1674. 
The poem went through multiple editions under the auspices of editor Jacob Tonson, but 
typographical errors were manifold in these editions.191 Bentley found more than typos: 
he argued that he had found pernicious evidence of editorial tampering, evidence that the 
amanuensis sought to “vilely execute that Trust, that Paradise under his Ignorance and 
audaciousness may be said to be twice lost.” He explained that “any Errors in Spelling, 
Pointing, nay even in whole Words of a like or near Sound in Pronunciation, are not to be 
charg’d upon the Poet, but on the Amanuensis… [who] thought he had a fit Opportunity 
to foist into the Book several of his own Verses.”192 In Bentley’s explanation, Milton 
would not have been able to see these interpolations because he was blind. Yet this 
amanuensis was a sort of fictional figure or projection that was not based on any 
biographical information or textual history that could be ascertained from the printed 
editions or from the record of anecdotes and word of mouth. Bentley’s correction of 
“secret tops” to “sacred tops” is but one example of the overdetermined correction of an 
imaginary mistake by an invented corrector: it crafts out of whole cloth a scene in which 
                                                
191 R.G. Moyles outlines the early bibliographical history of the poem in The Text of Paradise Lost: A Study 
in Editorial Procedure (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985). Moyles explains Tonson’s printing 
practice: “The fourth edition of Paradise Lost (1688), then, becomes typical of all Tonson’s editions; it 
exhibits a manifest contradiction. While care (increasing with each subsequent editing) has been taken with 
the printing and some minor improvements have been achieved, no attempt has been made to clear the text 
of corruptions or to collate the copy-text with the authoritative originals. Side by side with the few new 
improvements are the errors of the copy-text and the new errors introduced unknowingly” (37). See also 
Stephen Dobranski, Milton, Authorship and the Book Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999) and The New Milton Criticism, eds. Peter Herman and Elizabeth Sauer (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). 
192 Bentley, Preface, [3]. 
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Milton mumbled the term and the amanuensis misheard him, perpetuating a mistake until 
one sagacious editor could fix the author’s real intention.193  
Bentley’s contemporaries pointed out that the editor could not really believe such 
a justification for exercising a heavy hand in rewriting passages that were not to his taste, 
as he was inconsistent in his own account of the history of Milton’s revisions and the 
history of the text’s transmission. Samuel Johnson called the blameworthy amanuensis “a 
supposition rash and groundless, if he thought it true; and vile and pernicious, if, as is 
said, he privately allowed it to be false.”194 Thus it is not just the content of Bentley’s 
conjectures that has relegated him to being a cautionary tale of an editor encroaching on a 
text: it is the very act of conjecture itself and the diffuse, unpredictable consequences of 
its mediation. His reputation, at least among Miltonians, never recovered.  
Bentley is always “notorious.” Jonathan Brody Kramnick traces Bentley’s fall 
from historicist grace, as his conjectures involved less citation of precise historical 
information about the classical past and more speculation: “In the notorious edition, the 
process of ‘emendation’ extended until it seemingly capsized under its own weight, 
correcting to a point where the claims no longer appeared to be historical, but rather, 
from the eyes of Pope no less than Bentley’s disciple Theobald, to be anachronistic and 
capricious.”195 In his reception history of Paradise Lost, John Leonard echoes the Bentley 
                                                
193 From a contemporary perspective of disability studies, Bentley’s appropriation of the fact of Milton’s 
blindness for his own purposes is an error of larger consequence and deserves further study. See Georgina 
Kleege’s “Introduction: Blindness and Literature”: “It is safe to say that blindness has held a particular 
fascination in every culture since the beginning of time. Since sight is understood to be the predominant 
sense in humans, the loss of sight is assumed to be tantamount to a loss of life, or a loss of a fundamental 
quality that makes someone human.” Journal of Literary and Critical Disability Studies 3:2 (2009), 113-
114. I would like to thank Helene Deutsch for suggesting this angle on Bentley’s overstepping his editorial 
bounds. 
194 Samuel Johnson, “Life of Milton,” Lives of the English Poets, vol. III, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
195 Jonathan Brody Kramnick, Making the English Canon: Print Capitalism and the Cultural Past 1700-
1770 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 2008), 91. 
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ridicule in a bald statement: he is “the most notorious of Milton’s editors,” “a laughing-
stock,” and “a crank … his emendations [are] laughable, but he exposes genuine tensions 
in the poem.”196 Bentley’s most recent biographer, Kristine Louise Haugen, opens her 
rehabilitative project by describing how his name “evokes both loathing and fascination” 
as “a cautionary example.”197 Haugen repeats the charge in her chapter on his “notorious” 
Paradise Lost, which she calls “the most redoubtable of all his editions”—such 
protestations guarantee that she will seek to rehabilitate him, to remediate him in the 
genre of the critical reassessment biography. Walsh calls him “a necessary antagonist”198 
while David Scott Kastan tags him with an epithet—“even… the often maligned Richard 
Bentley”—in including him in the “community of engagement with the poem, which 
more than most seems to need their labors.”199 These are conventional situating moves 
for any biographer or editorial assessor, but Bentley’s own interest in situating himself as 
an editor is highly unconventional. Bentley’s note is substantially focused on locating a 
space for conjecture atop Mt. Horeb, where secrecy is an error and the sacred is what is 
discovered by its correction. Bentley’s hypermediation is theoretical as a raison d’être for 
the endeavor, and its prominent placement on the page underscores its value as a 
                                                
196 John Leonard, Faithful Laborers: A Reception History of Paradise Lost, 1667-1970, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), II:400, I:22. Leonard repeats crank four times on the same page. 
197 Kristine Louise Haugen, Richard Bentley: Poetry and Enlightenment (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2011), 1, 211. 
198 Walsh, 162. 
199 David Scott Kastan, Preface, Paradise Lost (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2005), viii. 
Kastan, for example, devotes several pages to outlining his decision to emend the accidentals in the text and 
use modern punctuation: “We come to a text anticipating that the punctuation we encounter signals logical 
relations. If this is an error, it is not one that Milton expects us to make. … Nonspecialist readers need 
signposts to negotiate the syntax, and it hardly seems in their interests to insist on a system of punctuation 
that at best can be shown to approximate Milton’s intentions and that, because of the changed function of 
punctuation in modern English, will inevitably make the meaning of the poem less rather than more clear to 
a modern reader” (lxxiii-iv). In this and other careful explanations of his and other editors’ practical 
considerations, he explains his rationale of maximizing clarity. 
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disquisition on mediation: what are the agencies that come between an author and a 
reader, and how could one record those interventions on a page?  
One can put the blame on Tonson for shoddy oversight, but other sources of error 
inside the mechanism of the printer’s shop were anonymous and diffuse. Haugen points 
out that Bentley had plenty of precedent for blaming these multiple sources of error, from 
classical interpolators to “the unscrupulous friends and printers whom it was customary 
for seventeenth-century poets to blame for hurrying unauthorized verse collections 
through the presses.”200 Such gestures were generic, then—conventional: “Both in the 
task of defending others’ texts and in the task of defending one’s own, that is, 
contemporaries were notably ready to conjure up editorial demons as the necessary 
prelude to their exorcism.” Bentley embodies all these dispersed sources of errors in 
textual transmission into a device that could explain any type of error, be it accidental, 
willful, or something less assignable. To be sure, it is a flawed theory of mediation that 
collapses contingencies and interpretations alike into a single explanatory device.  
But that error is meaningful in and of itself. Johnson’s anger at Bentley’s “vile 
and pernicious” invention is telling: it is anger at a theory, anger at the exposure of how a 
mediating heuristic device can be artificial and mechanical rather than transparent. With 
obfuscatory emendations like the one that commences the poem, Bentley mediates an 
alternate perceptual edition of Milton’s poem, in which the transmission of sound, haptic 
misprisions, and visual carelessness are theorized as sources of obscure, distributed 
agency. Treating Bentley as a theorist of error—and not just its practitioner—is a way to 
resituate him as a theorist of editing rather than just a cautionary tale. The stakes of this 
reconsideration are not to rehabilitate Bentley from his notoriety; rather, the haziness of 
                                                
200 Haugen, 217. 
 
 124 
his theory figures a means of theorizing the interstitial agencies of errors and the ways 
that critics reproduce them recursively. 
 
Critical Lenses on Bentley’s Theory and Practice  
 
Bentley tends to serve critics as lens: he mediates a mirror view for some critics 
who share his interests (and I include myself here) or he mediates a warping lens for 
those who would use him as an object lesson. Classicists remember Bentley far more 
fondly than Miltonians do, for they can cite his brilliant, expansive practice of conjectural 
emendation when it yielded correctness, not just perverse, tangential approaches to 
theorizing error by generating it. After his work editing Horace and Manilius, he joined 
William Wotton and other members of the Modern cohort to expose the Epistles of 
Phalaris, a text that William Temple and his Ancient compatriots had declared an 
exemplar of virtue that should be studied so it could be imitated. He found so many 
interpolations, anachronisms, stylistic lapses, and historical errors that he filled more than 
one hundred pages with devastating, sometimes sarcastic corrections. It was almost too 
easy for Bentley to correct these errors by escalating a pamphlet war with the Ancients 
about tangential charges of more plagiarism, satirical misinterpretation, and charges of 
moral misconduct. In The Battle of the Books, the great chronicler of the Ancients-
Moderns debate Joseph M. Levine details the stages of the internecine quarrel about 
theories and practices of scholarship, where Bentley’s corrections yielded knowledge 
about the past. “The end of Bentley’s works, then, was historical knowledge, not perhaps 
entirely for its own sake, though very much released from its dependence upon 
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literature,” writes Levine in assessing Bentley’s salvos in the Battle. “He saw the classics 
as individual and variable pieces written in specific and differing circumstances and in 
need of historical explication. But he was as interested in their information as in their 
literary merit and he was eager to use them, along with nonliterary evidence of coins, 
inscriptions, and monuments, to restore the whole life of the ancient world.”201 He 
claimed his method of conjecturing interpolations and textual variations in fragmented, 
oft-revised classical texts could be applied to a Modern text such as Milton’s, but the 
nature of changes were fundamentally different with texts that had been transmitted by 
modern editors, typesetters, and printers. 
When Bentley’s practice produces knowledge, he is heroic; when it produces 
pedantic artifacts of his theories that are literally not grounded but instead situated on a 
hazy mountain, he is satirized in the Battel of the Books and the Dunciad. Where Levine 
had confidently described Bentley’s productive marriage of editorial theory and 
prodigious practice in classical editing, he struggles to describe the ignominy of his later 
work:  
Bentley’s Paradise Lost remains a puzzle. Just why the great man should 
think of editing a modern poem, in obvious haste and against all advice, 
and risk his reputation as the most celebrated scholar of his time is not at 
all apparent. … [h]e had no obvious credentials for his new task, and in 
fact he blundered badly. The world of letters was scandalized, and despite 
an occasional attempt at exoneration, has continued to find the episode 
amusing. There is probably not much that can be done now to salvage 
Bentley’s reputation in this matter, but it is undoubtedly worthwhile to 
look again at what he was attempting…202  
 
What do you do with Bentley? Levine’s story is engaging when he can assess the editor 
as a producer, a consolidator of editorial practices, a generator of knowledge in a 
                                                
201 Joseph M. Levine, The Battle of the Books: History and Literature in the Augustan Age (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), 75. 
202 Levine, 245. 
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rollicking back-and-forth. But when Bentley produces not knowledge but some artifact of 
procedure, he is wandering in the liminal space of errancy, thought, theory, attempts, 
non-practice (“there is probably not much that can be done now”). As David W. Bates 
argues in his conceptual study of error, Enlightenment Aberrations: Error & Revolution 
in France, these are the spaces to reconsider the radical implications of how 
Enlightenment thinkers consistently grounded concepts of knowledge in error: “And if 
knowledge itself was always a potential error, then the deviation that was error might 
very well point the way to new truths. The search for truth … was in essence an attempt 
to disentangle (without any sure guide) the merely accidental deviation from the more 
productive aberration that held out the promise of some future discovery.”203 Bates reads 
the discursive, frequently recursive writings of British empiricists and French 
philosophes as productive spaces that did not always have a clear purposive orientation, 
where they could indulge in errancy as a means of discovery.  
Classicists’ perspectives on the interstices of Bentley’s theory and practice of 
conjecture are more than just celebrations of the content of his corrections; everyone 
seems to approve of the digressive expansiveness, the accumulative nature of corrections 
that are larger than the sum of their parts. Classicist C.O. Brink assesses the virtuosity of 
Bentley’s Epistle to Mill from 1691, in which he annotated other scholars’ work to reveal 
insufficiencies, assumptions, and errors: “Each of the discussions corrects not only the 
single mistake it starts from, but somehow manages to open beyond itself to a wide tract 
of ancient literature on which it sheds new light unexpected by even the most learned and 
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critical among his contemporaries.”204 Bentley could expand on any error with both 
scholarship and sharp judgment; G.P. Gould calls his notes “not so much a commentary 
on the old chronicles as a set of dazzling dissertations pegged upon a random set of 
appalling howlers.”205 Brink and Gould, in praising Bentley, highlight what Bates notices 
about the generative nature of theorizing error: it is not just the content of his corrections 
that makes his conjectures interesting, it is also the unintended effects of the associative 
thinking. David Konstan and Frances Muecke assess Bentley worship among classicists 
as a kind of awe at his procedure: “His vigorous partisans … speak even of his errors in 
the spirits in which an admirer once acknowledged that Arthur Rubinstein now and then 
hit a wrong note: mistakes, yes—but what mistakes!”206 
It is not just classicists who see Bentley in themselves. Iconoclastic critic William 
Empson saw Bentley as someone like himself, an interpreter, when he gestures 
confidently but vaguely: “it was not that his methods were wrong but that the mind of 
Milton was very puzzling.”207 Empson praises Bentley for replicating—retrospectively—
his own critical idiosyncrasies. Likewise, his biographer Haugen wants to consolidate 
Bentley’s legacy by claiming him as a consolidator of Milton’s legacy: “Bentley’s active 
interventions were socially necessary in their own right so that Milton could receive the 
protracted textual ministrations that confirmed his prestige, while Bentley in turn 
received credit both for his virtuosic work and for his association with the poet.”208 It is 
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not surprising that a critical biography such as Haugen’s would seek to situate him in a 
more conservative, author-centric tradition. Such a move to re-center the author is a 
recursive one in the generic priorities of biography: like Empson, Haugen replicates her 
own priorities in recognizing and projecting those qualities in Bentley the critic, Bentley 
the authorizer. Critic Christopher Ricks assesses the editor as oddball: “provocative 
though Bentley is, it is misleading to give a central position to one who is incorrigibly 
eccentric” and “Bentley, like the anti-Miltonists, has a great gift of getting hold of the 
right thing—by the wrong end.”209 For my part, I am partial to seeing Recursive Bentley, 
the theorist of error who himself is errant. I take Ricks’s assessments of Bentley’s 
wrongheadedness as features rather than bugs of his criticism; the sly adjective 
“incorrigible” is a note about how Bentley is obsessed with correcting through his own 
idiosyncrasies, how he perpetuates the errors he is trying to theorize. 
In The Myth of Print Culture, Joseph Dane argues that Bentley’s fortunes are 
bound up in the myth-making of bibliography as a theoretical field rather than a 
professional practice: he is always instrumentalized in this myth-making as either “editor-
hero” to the classicists or “editor-villain” as a Miltonist.210  He is an instrument because 
he must be situated as someone who either made or broke the rules, but those rules are 
always abstractions or generalizations that Dane worries get in the way of examining 
particular examples in the texts. As Dane sees it, it’s an unexamined fallacy that “Bentley 
was working within the strictures of a presumed ideal of textual criticism often 
articulated but never demonstrated (the desirability of fullest possible collation) and that 
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Bentley practiced such textual criticism in his classical works, which he did not.”211 That 
is, Dane argues that Bentley’s methods in classical and modern texts were too various to 
be consolidated as a coherent practice. But Dane, too, is instrumentalizing Bentley for his 
own critique by claiming this methodological variety as a reason to reject theorizing 
about bibliographic practice. I suspect he would be concerned with my argument about 
Bentley as a theorist of error in this chapter, for he is skeptical of any attempts to move 
Bentley from the discrete to the abstract: “Rather, the book has been absorbed into [the 
idea of] ‘Bentley’—the Bentley of the Dunicad, the Bentley of Cambridge, and now, 
more amusingly, the romanticized ‘Great Editor‘ and Conjecturer Bentley, whose 
towering achievements were somehow belittled by his work on Milton.” Dane worries 
that Bentley in these epithet forms is no longer an agent in his own right but rather an 
agent of whatever frame a critic needs him to be. But when he serves as a historical 
example in a polemic such as Dane’s attack on print culture as an abstraction, he has been 
artifactualized in a different form—criticism here is self-reflexive even when it’s making 
the case against such a theoretical orientation.  
On the other side of the looking glass, there are the proliferations of theoretical 
perspectives that cause more commotion and confusion. Most bombastically, 
contemporary avant-garde poet Steve McCaffery posits Bentley as “the first 
poststructuralist?”—the question mark is intentionally ahistorical and provocative—who 
“embraces instability, understood, however, not in its current deconstructive sense of 
free-play, pansemiosis, undecidability, and festive aporia, but as strictly symptomatic of 
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historical corruption—a sickness conceived in textual genesis and transmission.”212 
McCaffery’s list of critical terms that Bentley supposedly embraces is exuberantly over-
full and recklessly projective, yet I want to lean on the apparent obfuscation to see what it 
yields. I am less interested in the content of the list than in the list itself as an artifact of 
mediating Bentley through the vocabulary of contemporary poststructuralist theory. The 
question mark in calling Bentley “the first postructuralist?” signals the critical chapter as 
a thought experiment, a generic form that marks its own contingency, provisionality, and 
possibility of usurpation as positive characteristics of academic discourse. Indeed, much 
of McCaffery’s prolific career as a poet and critic is devoted to testing the seams of 
critical vocabulary and mediation.213 McCaffery intersected with McLuhan in the 
Toronto arts and communications scene in the 1970s, a disparate group who interpreted 
the studies of orality to produce “a generation of poets who were to make their name in 
concrete poetry—poetry that appeared to move the opposite direction from orality, 
sculpting language into icons of typography, even when ‘sound’ poetry was the poets’ 
avowed aim.”214 For his own work on “Easter Wings,” McLeod/Cloud may be said to 
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join fellow Torontonians McCaffery and McLuhan another concretist who applies his 
interests to bibliography as a study of communications. Like McLeod/Cloud and 
McLuhan, McCaffery is acting like his subject in embracing out-there conjecture for the 
speculative possibilities of playing on the margins and reveling in punny linguistic 
haziness.  
McCaffery’s dense stack of references and difficult allusions looks like Bentley’s 
own gloss on Mt. Horeb; in this way, he resembles Empson and Haugen in his habit of 
treating Bentley’s work as a textual object to be processed recursively through his own 
method. If Dane, Walsh, Kastan, and Haugen have institutional reasons for embracing 
pragmatic theorizing of Bentley, McCaffery the poet can distort him in provocative ways. 
As a committed practitioner of pataphysics, he is of the party of “projectors, quacks, and 
lawyers not a few” who come to the Temple of Fame, and whose incoherent productions 
produce a cloud of competing meanings:  
So from a spark, that kindled first by chance, 
With gathering force the quickening flames advance; 
Till to the clouds their curling heads aspire 
And towers and temples sink in floods of fire.215 
 
McCaffery revels in this position as a radical poet who is interested in the fact of non-
transparent language, an always already problematic mediator of meaning. He practices a 
version of Viktor Shklovsky’s oft-cited formulation: “The technique of art is to make 
objects ‘unfamiliar,’ to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of 
perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be 
prolonged.”216 Here, there’s a provocative possibility that editorial practice can serve to 
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defamiliarize rather than familiarize readers with authors: Bentley and Milton are 
significantly made part of the background of McCaffery’s chapter, and the theoretical 
insights are foregrounded, to the point of productive distortion. Eighteenth-century 
editors are engaged in ongoing, often contentious debates about whether the evidence of 
their labor should be silently erased from a text, in favor of a supposedly unmediated 
readerly experience of Milton, Shakespeare, or other authors. They debate how editors 
mediate an author’s legacy and whether their paratextual objects such as prefaces, 
footnotes, queries, and bickering are forms of critical assistance, hyper-mediation, or 
both. Bentley’s conjectures defamiliarize Milton’s language by introducing doubt about 
hearing, transcription, and interpolation—and in so doing suggest possible extrapolations 
into theories of textual transmission and distortion over time. 
Writing of Barthes and aporias in 2001, McCaffery is also practicing a form of 
critical belatedness that fits in well with Milton’s own sense of writing an epic after 
Homer and Virgil. Craig Dworkin argues that mediums are “caught between impossible 
chronologies,”217 in their specific form and their abstract qualities of being identified in 
genres or disciplines. He asks “whether media look forward or backward for their 
definition. That is, does their determining factor reside in their prior inscription or in their 
inscriptibility?” Paradise Lost is a poignant text to test this idea of the inscriptibility of 
impossible chronologies. It is composed of multiply framed looks backward to past 
Biblical and classical texts, then framed again by Bentley’s scholarly endeavors to situate 
it as Modern text he could use for his future fame—and then framed again by later 
editors’ concerns about Bentley’s notoriety. Dworkin’s provocations for how these 
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textual objects may act as thought experiments that extend our understanding of 
mediation compelled me to think about my initial desire to keep McCaffery as silent as 
possible in this analysis. At first I wanted to reject his work as a remnant of bygone 
historical moment for complicated poststructuralist poetic theory or resign it to the 
footnotes. Yet to do so would be repeating what Bentley’s more practical assessors have 
done with his idiosyncratic work: to prioritize consolidation over speculative 
possibilities. Dworkin and McCaffery present difficult, unyielding language as a medium 
for critical exploration, an experiment in recursive difficulty. Indeed, McCaffery’s 
criticism is generated through idiosyncratic composition protocols that actually do have 
something to say to Bentley. His frequent collaborator bpNichol describes their 
composition process: 
We’ve always typed. We type with maybe one of us typing what’s in our 
mind and then we kick an idea around. And then maybe I dictate to Steve 
while he types. And maybe I’m typing, and he’s dictating to me. And I’m 
adding something as I think of it. And then we go over it. So it happens at 
the time of writing. And part of it is just getting that moment together. 
…Partially, it’s also a tension between Steve’s type of language and my 
type of language. He likes the technical, academic—I don’t mean that in a 
bad way—scholarly language. … And we try to leave room for that, as 
opposed to me superimposing my voice or Steve’s. I find it obfuscates 
things for me. I often have to say, ‘Well, what does that word mean?” So 
he explains it. I’m increasing my vocabulary like crazy. He’ll say it means 
such=and-such, and I’ll say, well why not use that word instead? He’ll 
say, well this is a perfectly good word—it’s in the dictionary.218 
 
With this description of McCaffery & Nichol’s collaborative poetic practice, one gets a 
clearer perspective, so to speak, on what McCaffery sees in Bentley and his amanuensis. 
It’s a historical projection of a compositional ethos backward in time—an anachronistic, 
self-reflexive glance backward. But what if that kind of error-mediated vision is 
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productive: not of historical fact, but of some kind of poetic creation? It’s a stretch to say 
it’s in the vein of Milton’s own sense of productive belatedness in Paradise Lost, but not 
too much of one. I see McCaffery’s dense list, too, in the coded list of procedures that the 
glitch theorists produced in GLI.T/CH READER[ROR]: appropriative, confusing and 
thus error-provoking, and thus finally exciting to dip into to see the value of distortion 
and creative destruction.219  
 
The Usefulness of Overdetermined Metaphors for Editorial Perspectives 
 
 
After this situating work, however, I must make a crucial move to reorient 
Bentley as a theorist of error: I must bracket his correctness, underscore his wrongness, 
and reorient the perspective toward editorial practice’s processes of iteration, 
proliferation, and dispersal—as if in a cloud. McCaffery quotes to Roland Barthes’s 
metaphor of a cloud of meaning as a starting place for enquiry:  
…if we grant ourselves the right to start from a certain condensation of 
meaning … it is because the movement of analysis, in its endless process, 
is precisely to explode the text, the first cloud of meanings, the first image 
of content. The stake of structural analysis is not the text’s truth but its 
plural; the task, therefore, cannot consist in starting from form in order to 
perceive, illumine, or formulate content (there would then be no need of a 
structural method), but quite the contrary, in dissipating, deferring, 
reducing, dissolving the first content under the action of a formal science. 
Analysis will find its profit in this movement, which gives it both the 
means of starting an analysis from several familiar codes and the right to 
drop these codes (to transform them) by advancing, not into the text 
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(which is always simultaneous, voluminous, stereographic), but into its 
own labor.220 
 
Barthes’ description of a starting point that circles around itself as a means of generating 
structure resembles Bentley’s own picture of an editor atop Mt. Horeb who assembles his 
structure of footnotes as the scaffolding of the poem. It is a description of recursion as an 
intellectual practice: “starting an analysis from several familiar codes … and advancing 
… into its own labor.” The work it generates is stereographic, with multiple points of 
view that contend but do not necessarily resolve into a particular perspective of what one 
should focus on; the eye can travel and change its focus. It provides a three-dimensional 
view of a scene of the text and the labor that has remediated it.  
Such a stereoscopic perspective on labor is not limited to post-structuralism; it is 
also a means of understanding editorial work as multi-focal and processual rather than as 
successive or consolidated into a single best practice. In his sociological study of 
procedures for producing knowledge, The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and 
Practice, Andrew Pickering distinguishes between “representational and performative 
idioms for thinking about science” as a kind of practice for producing knowledge. The 
representational idiom “is more or less obligatory” for practitioners who want a heuristic 
of assessment: “what else can one ask of knowledge other than whether it corresponds to 
its object?”221 The performance idiom allows for multiple agents—actors, say, who play 
different roles—to participate in the practice of producing knowledge. Pickering’s 
vocabulary of performance opens up the possibility of reframing Bentley’s conjectural 
criticism as a method of performing thinking on the printed page—a method that 
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produces the genre of the thought experiment. “Reframing” is a critical commonplace 
that Bolter and Grusin adopt from performative media like cinema and video games to 
describe hyper-mediation as a series of overlapping frames that call attention to 
themselves as frames, just as Bentley does when he frames the opening lines of Paradise 
Lost off the page with his own discursive conjectures. Structurally, the work of 
“reframing” creates that conceptual three-dimensional space of multi-focal practice. 
Pairing Pickering’s analysis of practice with Bolter and Grusin’s theories of remediation 
also clarifies “remediation” as an ongoing practice, rather than a state.222 Conjectural 
emendation is a performative method that always exists within itself, about itself because 
it generates material by reflection about its work as a practice of mediation.  
Conjectural emendation is discursive because it is recursive, and for that reason it 
is maddening to those whose own editorial practice is oriented toward creating a finished 
product. must make decisions and substantiate them with explanation of his practice—
their job is to assess. The editor and editorial historian Marcus Walsh thus assesses 
Bentley’s work as an example of misguided editorial practice that does not generate 
knowledge which corresponds to its object but rather draws attention to itself as a 
performance.  For Walsh, Bentley’s work “offers the lesson that to ignore the difference 
of the past, to privilege the critic’s quest for significance to himself over the interpreter’s 
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quest for author’s meaning, is to run some risk of comparison of author’s achievement 
with critic’s achievement…”223 Those who emulate Bentley run “some risk of becoming 
endlessly the subject of essays like this one,” as their performance takes the focus away 
from the text itself. This is a warning about the dangers of recursion, of the folly of 
becoming the subjective performer of analysis rather than its agent. 
That reflection is enabled by the editor’s performance at working with the 
limitations of how one can transmit thought over time, over multiple mediators and 
mediations in print. Thus I agree with Dane’s characterization of Bentley’s work—“What 
[he] produces is a questioning, self-reflexive text, with his own nagging voice in the 
margin and in the notes”224—but for very different, abstract reasons rather than the 
insistent particularities that Dane advocates for. Leah Marcus experiments with such a 
practice in her monograph Unediting the Renaissance, which is a kind of thought 
experiment in working with Renaissance editions of Shakespeare, Marlowe, and Milton 
so as to study how those texts—and critical concepts of authority, textual stability, 
intention, and revision—have been shaped by editors’ assumptions over time. Marcus 
calls her work “an activity that all editors should engage in as part of their own 
revisionary efforts, that all readers should practice mentally even as they make use of 
edited texts.”225 Her work is a thought experiment in noticing frames of mediation as a 
kind of practice. The phrase “unediting” is provocative in that it appears to be claiming 
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an immersion into the texts—yet the reflective, reflexive genre of the thought experiment 
occasioned by that performative provocation actually allows her to remediate the texts 
into three-dimensional spaces of critical reflection.  
In this vein, Pickering argues that it is important to find ways of observing, 
studying, and theorizing interstitial places where the production of knowledge becomes 
vexed and an act of judgment can flatten a contest of agencies. He articulates a theory of 
multiple agents who produce knowledge: “Scientists, as human agents, maneuver in a 
field of material agency, constructing machines that … variously capture, seduce, 
download, recruit, enroll, or materialize that agency, taming and domesticating it, putting 
it at our services…”226 McGann has found a way of mediating between the two demands 
of practicality and abstract visionary work by situating his work on a horizon, as an 
experiment in form and practice. Marcus, too, evokes a horizon in her description of how 
a thought experiment changes the shape of objects under study:  
In the new textual studies—the ‘new philology’—and in historically 
oriented modes of poststructuralist criticism, the text loses its privileged 
separateness and is conceptualized as part of a much wider vectoring of 
forces and objects. This reconceptualization is understandably difficult for 
scholars trained in the earlier modes to accept. It requires an imaginative 
leap rather like the giving up of the isolate majesty of the traditional image 
of Gibraltar, which can no longer be perceived as distinct from the shifting 
seas around it. As one of my Iberian students has kindly pointed out, 
Gibraltar has beaches on its far side where sea and sand intermingle: for 
us, it is not quite the majestic and clear-cut monolith…227 
 
Thus Bentley’s hazy horizon has a future as a space of thought experiment. Here is an 
attempt to map that description onto Bentley’s space of conjectural criticism as he 
practiced it specifically on Milton: The phantom amanuensis is way of theorizing the 
interactions between multiple human agents (both identifiable and anonymous, individual 
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and collective), printing presses, emending readers, and other, less identifiable forms of 
mediation. The errors that appear in these spaces of failed attempts are sometimes clearly 
Bentley’s bad ideas, but they are also artifacts of conflicted agencies in print production.   
The editors Kastan and Walsh have every reason to diminish Bentley in an 
account of Paradise Lost’s editorial fortunes, for they are editorial practitioners invested 
in clarity, functionality, and practicality.228 As Walsh puts it, “the notorious edition of 
Paradise Lost represents an early case of non-objective editing.”229 Bentley’s practice is 
highly impractical and idiosyncratic. It is dysfunctional because Bentley applied it with 
such a heavy hand, his theory obscuring—and altering—the object it was supposed to 
illuminate. To recast Bentley as a theorist of sensation and agency is to luxuriate in this 
dysfunctional space and observe the more ambiguous effects of his performance. His 
over-reaching illuminates how errors accumulate in interstitial spaces between theory and 
practice. The practice of correction is not about erasing or silencing these errors, but in 
reflecting on what they teach us about critical perspective as mediation. 
Bentley’s Mt. Horeb, then, is both a place to localize the Muse and emphasize the 
obscurity that surrounds that location.230 Bentley makes a world of his own out of 
noticing—inventing—errors in Milton and correcting them with hyper-mediation. These 
                                                
228 Marcus acknowledges that a reflection of practice may mean that she does not satisfy those readers who 
have expectations of representational idioms rather than performative ones: “Like any book that attempts to 
mediate between disciplines, it has required a delicate balance between them and runs the risk of being 
condemned by both. I have, I am sure, included far too few textual details to satisfy most bibliographers, 
far too many to be palatable to other readers still laboring under the misconception that such matters are of 
no consequence. …Throughout the book, I have been quite speculative, more interested in suggesting 
direction for further inquiry than in offering definitive statements” (ix). That “attempt to mediate” is 
striking for how it calls attention to a double practice of mediation, of working between and of working 
with media. 
229 Walsh, 162. 
230 Walsh does not pursue his idea that “Bentley’s impulse to re-create is analogous to that which led 
Dryden to write a ‘dramatic transversion’ of Paradise Lost in The State of Innocence and the Fall of Man” 
(167) because a comparison of the two remediations would not be germane to his consideration of 




corrections can be structural in both senses of the word, as reception historian John 
Leonard notes that Bentley “does not want to breach any walls. He sees himself as a 
respecter of limits and boundaries (despite being the most eccentric comet in the history 
of Milton criticism).” With that epithet, Leonard indulges in some wordplay that 
appropriates Bentley’s perspectival and structural errors and makes them criticisms:   
Navigating Milton’s universe, he often collides with walls he fails to see. 
Encountering Uriel’s line ‘The rest in circuit walles this Universe’ (III, 
721), he refers ‘The rest’ not (as he should) to the ‘Ethereal quintessence 
(III, 716) that remained after the creation of the stars, but to the stars 
themselves. Since ‘Starrs’ (III, 718) are plural, this reading imports a 
grammatical error that he at once leaps to correct: ‘Walls: Rather, The rest 
in circuit WALL’ (203). Bentley effectively replaces the shell of the 
universe with a figurative wall of stars.231 
 
His misty mountain gambit is nearly conventional among philosophers of sensation, for 
David Bates observes: “it is striking how many Enlightenment figures address the most 
crucial epistemological questions by using topographical metaphors and imagery.”232 
Milton himself plays with this topological space of error in his description of apostasy 
(“of erring, from the path remote”).233 As the editor’s first foray into editorial work, the 
annotation points to the possibility of confusion prior to any illumination of the secret.  
This foregrounding of error—and then doubling it in a cloud of secrecy—is not 
just Bentley’s idiosyncratic reading of a line; it is a statement of an Enlightenment ethos. 
Prior to any conception of truth comes the identification of what must be corrected: the 
error precedes the correction, and the correction is generative for future endeavors of 
identification, classification, rectification. Bates describes how Enlightenment 
conceptions of truth were “endlessly deferred in this intellectual context, given both the 
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extreme limitation of the operations of the human mind and the admitted uncertainties of 
all sensible observations.”234 Thus Bentley’s hubris in situating his idiosyncratic editorial 
work at the secret top of Mt. Horeb is, more provocatively, a form of philosophy about 
exposing the need for generative, experimental space to explore the process of theorizing 
the spread of errors rather than just the right answers. Though he had championed 
Bentley’s aggression in promoting historical knowledge in the Epistles of Phalaris 
controversy, Levine allows of the Paradise Lost blunder: “Bentley’s hypothetical editor 
seems thus a desperate device to free him from the constraints of the received text so that 
he could emend its ‘faults’ with impunity. … Bentley may even have believed, with some 
of his modern admirers, that it was less the rightness or wrongness of his conclusions that 
really mattered than provoking critical thought.”235  
This can be fertile territory for theorists. McGann finds this “editorial horizon” to 
be exhilarating, “the very emblem of what is meant by the praxis of literature and the 
imperative to praxis.”236 Like Jay David Bolter, McGann is committed to recursion as a 
method, as indicated by the repetition in the title of his 1983 book, The Critique of 
Modern Textual Criticism, which he reissued with a new reflections and a foreword by 
David Greetham in 1992. The Textual Condition is a reflection on how his practice 
changed over a twenty-year period from 1971 to 1991 and a look to the future, which he 
imagines being mediated in part by innovations in hypertext; 2004’s Radiant Textuality is 
another iteration of that meta-reflection on theory and practice in the work of editorial 
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mediation.237 He turns to three “case histories” to test his theories in practice, and it is 
striking that one of those tests is a “hypothetical case” of generating as many possibilities 
of editing Dante Gabriel Rossetti as possible. McGann is a working textual editor whose 
habits of self-reflection come from examining the institutional constraints on these 
editions—a university press, say, may be more interested in a teaching text or an 
authoritative edition, and less interested in a recursive thought experiment—and using 
those constraints to enable theoretical reflections. 
But that horizon also appears blurry and frustrating to other practitioners who see 
a higher value in pragmatism than heady philosophizing. In an introduction to a 
collection of essays about editorial methods, Walsh and his co-editor Ian Small call 
textual editing “an inevitably pragmatic activity” that they contrast to a “surfeit of 
theorizing” that has made their work more difficult to navigate as their objects of study 
are illuminated differently—and, similar to Bentley’s theoretical application, altered—by 
deconstruction, poststructuralism, theories of mediation, and the sociology of scientific 
knowledge. Walsh and Small stake their position in no uncertain terms: “Generally 
speaking, the relationship between theory and practice in the whole field of literary 
studies has become increasingly strained. …In the general impetus to institute the study 
of theory as an end in itself, to create what some have called a ‘theory industry,’ the 
relationship of theory to practice has been lost sight of.” They quote Jauss’s term “the 
challenge of a practice to theory” and posit a pragmatic prism through which to redefine 
theory as an instrument of clarification, consolidation, and pragmatism, or “theory arising 
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out of attempts to characterize and defend conflicting editorial practices.”238 (It is striking 
that McGann and Walsh and Small appropriate terminology from Jauss, but this 
coincidence speaks to the ways that, even in producing criticism of literary theory for its 
abstractions, Walsh and Small find the gestures to be useful.)  
This is a narrow definition of theory that is limited to a representational idiom for 
practice. I can appreciate this practicality—this is a theory defined by its functionality 
and applicability—at the same time that I am skeptical of this desire for consolidation 
that obscures the conflicts among agencies. I am pushing on a non-standard reading of 
Bentley as a test case for theorizing the errors that arise in interstitial spaces of agency, as 
opened up by my theorizing of the Fama model of media maelstrom. Such a project 
means taking apart what is consolidated and making a different kind of causal claim. It is 
a claim for a theory of agency as an emergent process that is larger than the sum of its 
practical procedures and, indeed, cannot be predicted by the particular properties of a 
heuristic device.  
Walsh and Small’s language is remarkable for how, in assigning agency to a 
“surfeit of theory” for mangling the true objects of textual study, the syntax mirrors the 
same perceptual and agentive confusions that Bentley generates as he is dwelling on 
vexed mediation atop Mt. Horeb. The viewer “loses sight” of the object, only to find an 
obscurity “arising” out of disparate phenomena. “Arising” is the tipoff to a set of 
agencies far more complex than a consolidation of opinions about editing practices; it has 
a vague source and chain of effects. It is the composition of granular pieces of disparate 
information into a perspective with an unclear fixed source. This coincidence is in part a 
                                                
238 Marcus Walsh and Ian Small “Introduction…” The Theory and Practice of Text-Editing: Essays in 




function of the manifold visual metaphors of criticism: point of view, perspective, 
examination, lens of analysis, and so on. The coincidence is doubled by the fact of the 
textual editor’s object—variants, marks on a page—that is more specific than a literary 
critic’s larger toolbox. The coincidence is tripled by the historical fact of Milton’s 
blindness, so that these metaphors are all the more pointed and easy to appropriate, 
whether opportunistically and clumsily—as Bentley did in creating a fictional secretary—
or opportunistically and grandiosely, as editor Helen Darbishire remarked of her 1952 
edition of Milton’s Poetical Works: “My aim has been to offer a text as near as possible 
to that which Milton himself would have given us, if he had had his sight.”239 The claim 
to textual editing as a means of recovering authorial intention is a heuristic device240—
not a settled norm as Darbishire was able to claim—in which interstitial definitions of 
agency are subsumed under an author as an organizing principle.  
If one wants to press harder on theory than immediate practicality, any textual 
critic is in some sense a theoretician of the interstices of mediation and perception 
because they are composing visual information into a set of interpretations. Ironically, 
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Walsh’s survey of practitioners bears out this observation about the way that visual 
metaphors of criticism tend to aggregate and produce effects beyond their individual 
perspectives. Walsh positions Bentley as a kind of cautionary tale who helped strengthen 
the practical usefulness of authorial intention in the eighteenth century. Bentley, he 
argues, is our contemporary because he is “a limit-case of a critical subjectivism that 
blankly refuses to interpret the code, to know the context of a literary work.”241 As a 
contrast with Bentley’s obscurantism, Walsh quotes practitioners of New Bibliography 
who seize on the word “intention” to situate their practice in a functional setting. When 
Walsh puts pressure on “intention” as a concept, he (perhaps unintentionally) breaks 
down the term as one created by sensory composition metaphors: James Thorpe, Fredson 
Bowers, E.D. Hirsch, and Thomas Tanselle all compose meaning and intentionality out of 
the manifold possibilities in that they “posit the most probable horizon for the text” and 
“reproduce in himself the author’s ‘logic,’ his attitudes, his cultural givens, in short, his 
world.”242 Walsh reads Hirsch’s and Tanselle’s defenses of editorial interpretation as an 
example of how “the reconstruction of the author’s text is inevitably and intimately 
connected with an act of objective interpretation of the author’s intended meaning; and 
that interpretation must be validated against the cultural and linguistic contexts of the 
text’s original moment of production.”243 To posit the most probable horizon, to 
reconstruct a scene of original composition, to reproduce a scene of logic, to recreate 
context: all of these are descriptions of world-building that resemble Bentley’s creation of 
a world for interpretation atop Mt. Horeb on the first page of his edition of Paradise Lost.  
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With these turns to Bowers, Hirsch, Tanselle, and other bibliographers, Walsh is 
laying out a varied field of disputes in the field, but this critical convention, too, is a form 
of world-building and construction of a perspective. It is a survey to create a fixed point 
from which to argue. Bibliographers must create it to have a foundation for practice—or, 
crucially, they may also claim to be reconstructing it and give it a pointed perspective of 
intentionality, variability or subjectivity or the multiple lenses of historicist enquiry. In 
Surprised by Sin, critic Stanley Fish argued for the value of a reader’s interpretative 
“swerve,” an embrace of confusion or error that could produce thematic insights about 
Paradise Lost.244 Blending bibliography and textual interpretation, McGann echoes 
Barthes’ invocation of stereographic space when he theorizes texts as ways of seeing, not 
objects just to be seen: “a ‘text’ is not a ‘material thing’ but a material event or set of 
events, a point in time (or a moment in space) where certain communicative interchanges 
are being practiced. This view of the matter, this theoria or way of seeing—holds true as 
much for the texts we inherit and study as it does for the texts we will execute 
ourselves.”245 
Walsh’s survey and McGann’s “ways of seeing” each illuminate the way that 
bibliographers overdetermine their visual sense as a way of describing practice in 
consolidating theoretical terms. The metaphors of composed vision that each 
bibliographer uses to explain practice are remarkably similar to those that Bates finds 
among his encyclopedistes: “Let us stop here a moment and glance over the territory we 
have just covered,” writes d’Alembert in his Discours preliminaire de l’Encyclopédie, 
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making the surveying move familiar to any essayist who is situating his argument. But 
like Bentley, d’Alembert must account for errors before he can generate knowledge, and 
this space is almost more real to him than the theory he is expostulating. Between certain 
knowledge and the limitations of human knowledge lie “innumerable clouds …spread 
there as by some flashes of light that seem to burst out at intervals to attract us. One 
might compare the universe to certain works of a sublime obscurity whose authors 
occasionally bend down within reach of those who read them, seeking to persuade them 
that they understand nearly all…”246 D’Alembert’s description resembles Bentley’s 
theory of haze at the same time that it warns against overreaching to articulate it. Bishop 
George Berkeley uses similar language in his Treatise Concerning the Principles of 
Human Knowledge, which claims in its subtitle to detail the “Chief Causes of Error and 
Difficulty in the Sciences” (1710, rev. 1734): “the largest views are not always the 
Clearest, and … he who is Short-sighted will be obliged to draw the Object nearer, and 
may, perhaps, by a close and narrow Survey discern that which had escaped far better 
Eyes.”247 D’Alembert joins Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Berkeley, and other 
Enlightenment philosophers of sense and sensation in sharing what is perhaps the key 
concern of the period—classifying how sensation produces knowledge—while at the 
same time worrying about how one would mediate that sensory knowledge within the 
limitations of language and classificatory structures.  
Detailing sources of error that have the potential to impede the study of 
knowledge becomes like the rhetorical figure of occupatio, of filling space with 
                                                
246 D’Alembert, Discours preliminaire de l’Encyclopedie, quoted in Bates, 28. 
247 Bishop George Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge. Wherein the chief 
causes of error and difficulty in the sciences, with the grounds of scepticism, atheism, and irreligion, are 
inquired into (London: printed for Jacob Tonson, 1710, 1734), 5.  
 
 148 
objections to what writing cannot capture in the linguistic mediation of sensation—thus 
creating a theory out of errors. In The Rhetoric of Error from Locke to Kleist, Zachary 
Sng traces conceptions of error from the eighteenth century to contemporary 
deconstructive theory, analyzing Paul de Man’s “Semiology and Rhetoric” for its self-
reflexive consideration of how one forms knowledge through reading. He engages with 
the possibility, indeed, the productivity of misinterpretation: “What de Man describes is 
one could say, knowledge about error turning out to be itself in error, but only if one 
remembers that error never names just one thing in such a description.”248 That is, being 
wrong could engender a concatenation of future bad behavior: “…this supposed 
knowledge stands in relation to ‘real’ knowledge as error stands in relation to knowledge 
(once again, a deviation from the right path), but also, that this knowledge is set into 
perpetual errance, consigned to a ceaseless and aimless wandering that takes the form of 
suspension and infinite repetition or recursion.” But Sng and de Man are also excited by 
this possibility of wandering, of making strange loops to investigate what’s enabled by 
self-reflexive critical discourse, as they’ve indicated by their willingness to adumbrate 
such possibilities in their close readings of Locke and deconstructionist alike. The cloud 
of objections expands to fill whatever space it inhabits, as Bentley’s first page of 
Paradise Lost illustrates memorably. In this way, Bentley is well situated to join Locke 
and Berkeley as a philosopher of sensation—specifically sensory errors—but visual 
perception is not the only determining source of error for Bentley’s embodiment of vexed 
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agency. Indeed, the ways that sound creates visual artifacts by means of metaphor are the 
source of many of his most egregious ideas.  
 




From secret to sacred: Bentley’s first editorial digression is not in fact an 
interpretation of a visual marker but rather the creation of a sonic crux of interpretation. 
Bentley pontificates on the nature of Milton’s achievement in his Preface: “the Author 
could so abstract his Thoughts from his own Troubles, as to be able to make it that 
confin’d in a narrow space, to Him a dark Chamber, surrounded with Cares and Fears, he 
could spatiate at large through the Compass of the whole Universe…”249 In Bentley’s 
imaginative account of Milton’s composition, the visual sense is at once obstructed and 
magnified by how his other senses compensate for it. “Of the five senses, vision is the 
most ‘distancing’ one. In vision, subject and object ‘appear’ as transparent,” explain 
Michael Bull and Les Back as they consider the challenges that capturing sound in print 
can generate.250 Bentley’s bulky editorial apparatus, then, underscores the non-
transparency—that is, its hypermediacy—of the subject and object of author and editor. 
Bull and Back continue, “Yet if, as Bishop Berkeley notes, ‘sounds are as close to us as 
our thoughts’ then by listening we may be able to perceive the relationship between 
subject and object, inside and outside, and the public and private altogether differently. In 
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its engulfing multi-directionality sound blurs the above distinctions and enables us to 
rethink our relationship to them.” The sound technology designer Gilbert A. Briggs was 
faced with this very problem of remediated sound as he tried to popularize audiophile 
technology in the 1950s by hosting comparison tests between concert hall recordings and 
live performances. As described by Greg Milner in his history of audio recording 
technology, Briggs took a hard line on idealized media technology as accessing a higher 
plane of sensory experience. In popularizing “hi-fi” or “high fidelity” technology, Briggs 
was mimicking the sonic version of Darbishire’s and other New Bibliographers’ claims 
about perfecting mediation: “As a concept, ‘high-fidelity’ suggest a quality with an added 
component of ‘truth.’ … A high-fidelity sound is one that sounds like your idea of what 
the world truly sounds like” but it is “aspirational” in that recording is always mediating 
sound through speaker technology as it immerses a listener.251 High-fidelity sound is an 
invention like “authorial intention” that’s used to collect ideas (and ideals) about 
mediation. Fittingly, Briggs used allusions to the din of the Dunciad and Paradise Lost in 
order to call forth this aspiration to mediating sound. 
In fact, the charge provoked even Bentley’s detractors and enemies to reconsider 
the sources of error, and though they certainly did not come to the same conclusions, they 
did begin to generate a theory of how errors may be transmitted through multiple sense 
mediations. The printer Jacob Tonson defended his previous editions: 
From this manner of writing them from his mouth, it is certain, that many 
errors in spelling, and printing, must needs have creeped into the first 
copy; and highly probable, that even in whole words of a like or near 
sound, one word was sometimes written down for another. These errors, 
being followed and augmented by those of the Printer in the first 
impression, received still an additional increase in the succeeding editions. 
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The like has happened to many other English books, in prose, as well as in 
verse, which have borne several editions, the last of which are generally 
the most incorrect; insomuch that in some of them it is necessary to have 
recourse to the first, as to a manuscript, to discover the true original 
meaning of the Author. …Which incorrectness is, I believe, chiefly owing 
to the inadvertency, and sometimes ignorance of Printers, who frequently 
undertake the correction of English books themselves.252 
 
Bentley’s thought experiment about all of the errors introduced by the senses, particularly 
the conflation of sight and sound, has high stakes for considering the way we use critical 
tools of mediation. Tonson treats the problem of correction as a practical one: errors are 
inadvertent and fixable through closer attention by authors and printers alike. Bentley’s 
corrections make reference to strangeness and the unknown—he treats errors as an 
epistemological problem. The very next note after the secret/sacred dissertation is a 
further test of the auditory hallucination: “Some Acquaintance of our Poet’s, entrusted 
with his Copy, took strange Liberties with it, unknown to the blind Author, as will farther 
appear hereafter.”253 Here are some of Bentley’s annotations on errors he believed to 
have been inserted by the amanuensis:  
• “I wish, for the poet and the Poem’s sake, that the Reader would be of 
my Opinion, that all this long Description of the outside World, the 
Limbo of Vanity, was not Milton’s own, but an insertion by his Editor. 
There’s nothing either of his Spirit or Judgment seen in it; in its 
several Parts it abounds with Impertinencies” (III.444) 
• “without criticizing it, I’ll propose in my thought, what, or what like, 
he would have given, could he have revised his Poem” (VII.239) 
• “I do not disapprove…but if the Author had thought of it, I believe he 
would have preferr’d this before it” (VII.299)  
 
In these commentaries, Bentley resembled nothing so much as a medium who speaks 
with the dead and interprets hazy messages. He noted this extra-sensory power of 
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mediation in his Preface, where he warned that some readers would “fancy this Persona 
of an Editor to be a mere Fantom, a Fiction, an Artifice to screen Milton himself.”254 
Other correspondents to the Grub-Street Journal, where many of the disputes about 
Bentley’s work took place, took the notion of a sinister, ghostly, or sub-human resonance 
in the text even further, calling the previous Tonson edition “full of horrid 
hallucinations.”255 Celeste Langan has argued that the specification of “blank verse” in 
the ballad genre (distinct from tragic verse or epic verse like that of Paradise Lost) at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century signals a problem of mediation from voice to print, a 
problem that provokes “a variety of audiovisual hallucination. Read silently, the poetic 
figure becomes that much more a sculptural or pictorial form; and, no longer subject to 
the immediate sensory input of verbal melody, the silent reader gains access to the 
mediated (i.e. narratively evoked) musical scene of the poem.”256 Langan’s argument 
could be both intensified and challenged by Bentley’s Fantom editor. She argues that “it 
is impossible to attribute this variety of audiovisual hallucinations to the poetic form as 
such; rather, they are intimately linked to the printed page.” Bentley’s Fantom is not just 
mediated by the page—he is a strange middleman who interferes in the musicality with 
his own suggestions, elisions, hypermediations. If Langan calls blank verse an 
audiovisual hallucination, then what’s a hyper-mediated hallucination? Is it an editor? Is 
it an editor’s stated rationale of theory and practice? In Hearing Things, Leigh Eric 
Schmidt devotes a chapter to how ventriloquism,  
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loosed from the confines of theological debate and biblical exegesis, had 
become a salient category in Enlightenment discussions of religion and 
had taken center stage as a form of rational entertainment. The expanded 
construction of ventriloquy provided a tangible way of thinking about 
oracular religion as rooted in illusion—that, indeed, various wonders of 
the devout ear had their origins in vocal deceptions that philosophers 
could pinpoint and magicians could demonstrate. In performative practice, 
the ventriloquists’ art also shifted focus of learned attention from the 
divide struggle over the soul to the protean malleability of personal 
identity, the fears and attractions of imposture, and the sheer pleasures of 
amusement.257 
 
Bentley’s Paradise Lost emendations seem to be a cousin to ventriloquism, yet they are 
performed in print and depend less on an illusion than a thought experiment. But what 
happens when editorial practice is theorized as an adjacent practice to ventriloquism or its 
other performative arts, to shift the center of its priorities from erudition to provocation. 
Bentley could not see his own work as anything other than erudition, yet there is 
something to be said for how the Ancients and Moderns combatants indulged in 
animadversions, footnotes that stole others’ textual voices for satirical purposes, and 
elaborate textual feats of showing each other up. It may be that Swift and Pope are more 
like the ventriloquists for their satirical performances, yet Bentley is somewhat of their 
party in his own ability to detect dialects and interpolations, like an audience member 
who is so familiar with the techniques that he may shout out rudely to ruin the immersive 
fun. 
This thought experiment about performance could generate other possibilities, as 
well. Bentley is historically, intellectually, spiritually far from a nineteenth-century 
medium who conducted séances and practiced automatic writing. Indeed, the phrase 
“matter and motion cannot think,” part of his confutation of atheism in the Boyle 
Lectures on Isaac Newton’s natural philosophy, would seem to disqualify him from any 
                                                
257 Schmidt, 136. 
 
 154 
weirder forays into spirituality.258 Bolter and Grusin have a recursive, McLuhan-esque 
way of reframing the agentive powers of the medium: “a medium is that which 
remediates.”259 But Bentley used those lectures to argue for how values could be 
transmitted through erroneous readings of texts—in these religious lectures delivered to 
the public, as in his classical scholarship and in his Milton scholarship, he insists on the 
way that interpretative tools mediate meaning. “Matter and motion cannot think” is a 
literary abstraction that is supposed to serve as a warning against the very practice of 
abstracting intentionality. With that warning about how abstraction can generate errors, it 
becomes possible to think of Bentley’s amanuensis as an abstraction of thought, not a real 
figure. Bentley uses this figure to make claims about right and wrong versions of the text, 
but the figure may serve a different purpose as a tool for considering the problem of 
mediating thought through abstractions rather than bodies—a problem that would occupy 
Locke, Berkeley, and other eighteenth-century theorists of mind. As John Durham Peters 
puts it in his genealogy of forms of communicable media, Speaking into the Air, 
seventeenth-century figures such as Locke, Hobbes, and Descartes were obsessed with 
vessels of mediation and the errors they transmit because they had such high spiritual 
stakes:  
The spiritualist view of communication oscillates between the dream of 
shared interiorities and the hassle of imperfect media. … Media, like 
bodies, become pipes that are interesting only in their tendency to become 
clogged. But media are not mere ‘channels.’ Media matter to practices of 
communication because embodiment matters. The body is our existence, 
                                                
258 Richard Bentley, “Matter and Motion Cannot Think or, A confutation of atheism from the faculties of 
the soul: a sermon preached at St. Mary-le-Bow, April 4, 1692 : being the second of the lecture founded by 
the Honourable Robert Boyle (London: printed for Thomas Parkhurst and Henry Morlock, 1692). 
McCaffery has an extended reading of Bentley’s editorial practice as inspired by his refutation of Lucretian 
atomism in the Boyle Lectures: “It is the Lucretian theory of motion, translated to the realm of the textual 
condition, that underlies Bentley’s fiction of the phantom editor and careless amanuensis, both of him 
contribute a clinamen [a swerve] away from the laminar ‘intention’ of the nominal producer” (70). 
259 Bolter and Grusin, 65. 
 
 155 
not our container… the body is not a vehicle to be cast off, it is in part the 
homeland to which we are traveling.260 
 
Bentley’s initial foray into conjectural criticism concerns the position of a body—at the 
top of a “sacred” mountain that can be embodied in textual examples and reconstructed in 
sound, rather than a “secret” mountain that remains (for Bentley) only an error—and in 
this way dramatizes the poet’s perspectival mediation of a scene. He must contest the 
position, the definition of the scene in order to test its status as a means of 
communicating the 12-book spiritual revelation in Paradise Lost. 
Editorial projects are an extraordinary testing site for questions about the gap 
between words and understanding, for the editor must make conjectures and 
presumptions about language, mediation, and transmission. If one can interface with 
ghosts that scream antithetically—as Bentley and McGann would have it—one can see 
the practice as producing not just a clear vision of a scene but a lush sensory experience 
of riotous thought. They must make these conjectures in an elaborate performance of 
simultaneous transparency and hypermediacy—they are transmitting the text through 
what Barthes rendered as the “code” of author’s intention, but they are also making the 
case for their privileged vantagepoint. In this way, they are both practicing and theorizing 
remediation of knowledge in the form of contested language. Locke writes that he had 
not considered the unit of the word when he began his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, “but having passed over the Original and Composition of our Ideas, I 
began to examine the Extent and Certainty of our Knowledge, I found it had so near a 
connexion with Words, that unless their force and manner of Signification were first well 
observed, there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning 
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Knowledge.”261 Locke’s Essay is more concerned with those linguistic impediments to 
understanding than articulating a theory of transparency.262 His metaphors of obscurity 
and mediation have a striking correspondence in Bentley’s own boast about the poet’s 
perspective on the sacred top of Horeb. Locke describes the problems of explaining 
understanding can tend toward recursion and generate errors: “At least they [words] 
interpose themselves so much between our Understanding, and the Truth, which it would 
contemplate and apprehend, that like the Medium through which visible Objects pass, 
their Obscurity and disorder does not seldom cast a mist before our Eyes, and impose 
upon our Understanding.”263  
Under this lens, Bentley’s gestures toward notions of cloudy, misty, hazy 
mountaintops look less like mere textual evidence and more like a kind of meta-
commentary on the obscurities inherent in interpretation, the secrets of conjecture. Locke 
then joins the critique of visual mediation with an auditory metaphor to further 
complicate the processes of transmission: “Were the imperfections of Language as the 
Instrument of Knowledge, more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the Controversies 
that make such a noise in the World, would of themselves cease; and the way to 
Knowledge, and perhaps, Peace, too, lie a great deal opener than it does.”264 But this 
statement is ironic—or at least only wishful—for the bulk of Locke’s Essay is devoted to 
exploring the ways that these “Controversies” radiate into new fields of study as 
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emergent phenomena.265 Bentley’s own taste for controversy is not just a contest of 
personalities or even of discrete arguments about Ancient and Modern texts; rather, these 
“Imperfections of Language” are generative of new knowledge. 
 
Theories of Mediation Are Made of Mistakes 
 
Imprecision, imperfection, and controversial correction aggregate into more than 
just a folly or a subject of notoriety. Errant corrections may enable new fields of 
knowledge—say, the philosophy of mind—wherein the subject and object of study may 
adapt by the means of controversy and debate. This change in object is Bentley’s 
unwitting accomplishment (and many may judge it to be a dubious one): conflict 
becomes the object of study and thus proliferates from the attempts to control the debates. 
The status of the mediator becomes vexed—no longer transparent, but hyper-mediated.  
In his essay about the scholarly origins of the term “mediation,” John Guillory 
describes the irony of Locke’s emphasis on error—and not clarity or pure 
understanding—in the Essay: “the wish fathers an interesting thought: the means also lie 
in the way, the medium makes communication possible and makes it fail…. The 
difference between language as medium (of thought) and writing as medium (of speech) 
produces a certain philosophical confusion, which turns around the conceptualization of 
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knowledge in an obliquely Modern way. Citing Locke’s correspondence with various parties in the dispute, 
Levine claims that “Locke did not, as he says, ‘love controversies,’ and he certainly remained aloof from 
the quarrel, particularly after Bentley joined the fray and the battle heated up, although he was undoubtedly 
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the medium in relation to a physical instrument.”266 Sng makes a similar point, calling 
attention to the problem of situating the source or agent of error: “The Essay’s multiple 
narratives of origin and its repeated emphasis on the need to clarify the medium turn out 
to constitute a coherent strategy to shield the integrity of its epistemology against the 
potential errors of language.”267 Bentley’s imaginary amanuensis is a conceptual 
embodiment of these conflicts: as a gambit, the blunderer makes intervention by others 
possible, and even necessary. His imaginary position vexes his status all the more so 
because he becomes an abstraction of error. In his genealogy of the term, Guillory turns 
to the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of mediation as an abstract process (2a): 
“Agency or action as an intermediary; the state or fact of serving as an intermediate 
agent, a means of action, or a medium of transmission; instrumentality.” Guillory parses 
the definition: “The basis for abstraction in this definition is the shift of focus from 
‘agent’ to ‘agency’, that is, to an impersonal process. This allows for any number of 
objects or actions to occupy the ‘third’ position of mediation.”268 Just as Bull and Back 
explain how the distinction between subject and object becomes blurry when sound is 
invoked (indeed, the mixed, synesthetic metaphor is necessary to highlight this 
strangeness), abstraction is the means by which agency can be obscured from authorial 
intention to something that accounts for errors without clear causality.  
Bentley’s repeated invocation of mishearing emphasizes this radical 
reconsideration of editorial mediation as consisting of multiple agents and forms of 
agency: even as he makes overstated claims about the imaginary source of the errors, the 
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very act of calcifying causality in such an audacious way calls attention to its own fact of 
begging the question about identifying the source. McCaffery describes Bentley’s 
audacity in heavily studded theoretical language that is too dense and too much like a 
vortex of critical terms: 
Contemporary twenty-first century readers can appreciate Bentley’s 
conjectural intervention as doubling the virtuality of certain signifiers, 
thereby critically destabilizing univocity, making the reader aware that the 
graphic seme partakes less of a trace structure than a phantom echo of 
another sense. It’s important, then, that Bentley isn’t addressed 
judgmentally, and that his suggestions be aligned with the received text 
dialectically in order to induce a third stage in critical assessment, treating 
the emendations as indications toward the poem’s own suppressed sign 
economy. Bentley’s principle of the approximate homonym rather than 
debating Paradise Lost actually enriches it with plural possibilities. 
Instead of disambiguating the textual cruxes, it invites us to receive them 
as semantic chords, proclivities in polysemeity that decenter the poem 
from any overriding univocal gravity.269 
 
Again, the most compelling thing about McCaffery’s reading is how distorted it gets in 
throwing so much at the wall to see what sticks—from their joint interviews it’s clear that 
his collaborator bpNichol could be both inspired and frustrated by that discursiveness. It 
is a model of criticism that we are not used to privileging in our turn away from post-
structuralism, in which we are instructed to march toward a vaunted but profoundly 
vague notion of clarity.270 It is a thought experiment in and of itself: a test of concepts 
that bump up against one another and form a jumble of too many ideas at once, allowing 
for the possibility of recombination and novel conflict. I want to argue for the value in 
keeping McCaffery’s work somewhat difficult to understand, for I believe that it 
approximates the same kind of critical acumen that Bentley is provoking with his own 
digressions and dense notes. This ambition to practice and theorize at the same time 
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resembles Swift’s swirling vortex of Modern learning and the spider’s entrails from the 
Battel of the Books: 
Erect your Schemes with as much Method and Skill as you please; yet, if 
the materials be nothing but Dirt, spun out of your own Entrails (the Guts 
of Modern Brains) the Edifice will conclude at last in a Cobweb: The 
Duration of which, like that of other Spiders Webs, may be imputed to 
their being forgotten, or neglected, or hid in a Corner. For any Thing else 
of Genuine, that the Moderns may pretend to, I cannot recollect; unless it 
be a large Vein of Wrangling and Satyr, much of a Nature and Substance 
with the Spider's Poison; which, however, they pretend to spit wholly out 
of themselves, is improved by the same Arts, by feeding upon the Insects 
and Vermin of the Age. As for Us, the Antients, We are content with the 
Bee, to pretend to Nothing of our own, beyond our Wings and our Voice: 
that is to say, our Flights and our Language; For the rest, whatever we 
have got, has been by infinite Labor, and search, and ranging thro' every 
Corner of Nature: The Difference is, that instead of Dirt and Poison, we 
have rather chose to till our Hives with Honey and Wax, thus furnishing 
Mankind with the two Noblest of Things, which are Sweetness and 
Light.271 
 
McCaffery may even delight in doing the spider’s work in the corner, and as a concrete 
poet who revels in cobwebs of print, he might delight in thinking of that corner as a 
marginal space like the space of the page.  
In his essay “Ambiguous Traces, Mishearing, and Auditory Space,” Paul Carter 
analyzes what can be generated out of the act of mishearing. His argument turns on the 
differentiation between hearing and listening that is occasioned when one must make 
sense of mishearing: “Listening becomes cultural work where the ground rules are not 
established. There, vocalizations may or may not signify. They produce ambiguous 
auditory traces. Listening, unlike hearing, values ambiguity, recognizing it as a 
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communicational mechanism for creating new symbols and word senses that might 
eventually become widely adopted.”272 Carter’s description is close to Bolter and 
Grusin’s concept of remediation, for the switch from hearing to listening is occasioned by 
the realization of one’s status as a mediator. Crucially, the realization of error causes this 
reconsideration. For Bentley, conjecture is a tool (which may produce errors), conjecture 
as abstraction rather than answer. But abstraction as a tool for mediating thought 
guarantees reformulations of that tool by future readers, whether in satire or in 
animadversions. 
Error is minute and multifarious, but it is also an abstraction: the typo-ridden 
fortunes of Milton’s Paradise Lost were certainly due much more to anonymous 
typesetters and inattentive printers than to a single, blameable figure, but the nature of 
conflict is to identify causality as a way to try to control it. Any reader’s oscillation 
between reading and hearing words is an errant path. Milton himself played with the idea 
of mediating sound and sense, notes Peter J. Manning, as he remediates Langan’s media 
theory, so to speak, by considering her work on ballads with the blank verse of Paradise 
Lost (he calls this exercise in critical recursion “applied Langan”, “plac[ing] a frame 
around” her work on ballads). He quotes the visual metaphors of light and revelation 
from Book I and then pauses to reflect on the effect of that quotation as a form of 
remediation: “I quoted at length from Book I of Paradise Lost in part to stage an 
experiment, trusting that my readers would subvocalize the passage as they advanced 
down the page. Subvocalizing seems to me an important mode midway between oral 
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delivery and silent reading.”273 Manning’s thought experiment is a means of teasing out 
the slippages between multiple meanings of a word—just as Bentley did. Manning 
describes our critical slippages in referring to Milton’s poetic “voice”: 
Milton speaks in his prefatory note of ‘the sense various drawn out from 
one verse into another,’ but though ‘sense’ here points to meaning, it 
subtends also, as teachers who for generations have advised student 
baffled by Milton’s elaborate syntax to read the poem aloud have known, 
sense, the material source of sound. The ease and frequency with which 
we speak of Milton’s organ tones or Milton’s poetic voice points likewise 
to the continuing effect of his sound on our response to his verse.274 
 
Milton himself anticipates the diffusion of the term in sound, print, and spirit: “Apostate, 
still thou err’s, nor end wilt find/ Of erring from the path of truth remote…”275As 
Guillory glossed Locke’s Essay, that which facilitates understanding also gets in the way. 
The “Fantom” amanuensis who mishears embodies all of those overdetermined 
causalities. 
In fact, Bentley’s contemporaries, in trying to fathom his reasons for such a 
bizarre Fantom, position him as a kind of theorist of mind who lacks the right tools. The 
eighteenth-century satirist David Mallet described Bentley’s method as replacing writing 
with alien objects devoid of sense—in multiple meanings of the word: 
Holds high the scourge o’er each fam’d Author’s head, 
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Nor are their graves a refuge for the Dead. 
To Milton lending sense, to Horace wit, 
He makes ’em write what never Poet writ: 
The Roman Muse arraigns his mangling pen, 
And Paradise, by him, is lost agen. 
Such was his doom impos’d by heaven’s decree 
With ears that hear not, eyes that shall not see.276 
 
Mallet’s accumulation of negative formulations—what was never writ, doubled by his 
linking Bentley’s “ears that hear not” as an unmusical editor of poetry with Milton’s eyes 
that see not. Compare Mallet’s barbs with Pope’s critique of Bentley’s protégé Theobald 
who pedantically cites “all such reading as was never read” in the Dunciad; these critical 
riffs on editorial errors hinge on the unlikely paradox of prodigious accumulation through 
sensory deprivation.277 That attention to sensory reading calls to mind Leah Price’s 
critical questions about what contemporary practitioners of book history identify as their 
objects of study, and what kind of tools we use to identify and study them:  
One way to describe “the way we read now” is to say that we don’t read at 
all. … Where the humanistic social sciences once borrowed literary-
critical tricks to interpret nontextual objects, literary critics today mine 
other disciplines—bibliography, history of science, even archaeology—for 
a vocabulary in which to describe the nontextual aspects of a particular 
category of material object; books. Instead of ‘reading’ sewer systems, 
critics now smell leather bindings. Far from ‘reading’ the stock market, we 
tabulate paper prices. As the metaphor lost its export value, critics began 
to abandon the thing itself.278  
 
So the sensual nature of reading has trumped the content in Price’s account—the content 
of thought has become something based in the senses rather than the brain. Or perhaps 
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these are linked in the way that Bentley argued they were, albeit in a wrongheaded way. 
The editor’s application of conjecture occurs through sensory recovery, but those senses 
differ between individuals. They represent a paradox of practice: it is both a consensus of 
procedures that is discussed among individuals, but it is reliant upon individual senses 
that may be especially discerning, idiosyncratic, or wrong. 
 Thus one problem with identifying a Fantom amanuensis, even as a thought 
experiment about applying conjecture to vexed mediation, is that other readers do not 
read editorial projects as thought experiments. One of Bentley’s antagonists imagined the 
end result of conjectural criticism as it produced only literary artifacts:  
Imagine a Head laboriously skilled in Prefaces, stuff’d with common 
places, and muddled with Index-hunting; add of Authors, and a pleasure 
arising more from such blemishes found out, than any beauties and graces 
in writing. Who will admire at such imaginations, thus possessed with the 
defects of other writings, if whatever is disagreeable should necessarily 
flow into them. … We see no true criticism but a mean appearance of it, 
when false editions are consulted, and blunders of transcribers stuff’d into 
volumes to fill their size, shall we admire such Authors diligence or 
ridicule their judgment?279  
 
The critic makes a satirical plan to best Bentley at his own game: “I seek for the worst 
editions, because my notes will hereby be more numerous, and my triumphs over some 
harmless mistakes more frequent.” This is a theory of mind composed entirely of artifacts 
of procedure, an overstuffed brain composed of errors. It is a model of a less useful critic 
or editor, but it may be an exciting idea to play with the problem that remediation is not 
always joined with remedy.  
 Swift’s satire on Bentley’s conjectural follies in the Ancients-Moderns debate is a 
dramatization of this phenomenon: he remediates the story as a literal Battle of the 
Books, but the outcome is obscured by “missing” sections of the manuscript as it has 
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been “restored” incompletely, and thus generatively. “Hic pauca desunt,” “Desut nun-
nulla,” “Alter hiatus in Ms” all appear in the margins of Swift’s account of how Ancient 
books swarmed to battle their Modern counterparts: tellingly, the missing sections occur 
at moments where there could be resolution in the debate, but in their absence there is 
only more material to annotate. Swift’s satire of these kinds of annotations has a literal 
referent in the debates between Bentley and his Ancient interlocutors, who charged him 
with pedantic use of his interpolative skills in assessing the Epistles of Phalaris.280 These 
features are distorted by their remediation into a new genre, as Swift theorizes at the 
beginning of the Account: “Satyr is a sort of Glass, wherein Beholders do generally 
discover every body’s Face but their Own; which is the chief Reason for that kind of 
Reception it meets in the World…”281 The proliferating apparatus to A Tale of a Tub is 
another form of this theory made material. It is a satire of useless heuristic devices that 
accumulate artifacts of their generic conventions of introducing, dedicating, and so on, 
but the Satyr’s Glass also magnifies the double logic of remediation by increasing the 
artifacts of hypermediacy. The Tale accumulates wordplay on visual and aural distortions 
and matches them with “a digression in praise of digressions,” matching satire’s theory of 
distortion with its practice. 
 Swift’s satire on Bentley’s accumulative folly in ascribing textual variants (visual 
phenomena) to aural hallucinations puts me in mind of Douglas Hofstadter’s Le Ton 
Beau de Marot, a gigantic experiment in translating one fifteenth-century French poem 
more than a hundred times through different means: professional translators, amateurs, 
Oulipo-style constraint-based attempts, machine translations, and other odd imaginative 
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projects.282 And, like Bentley’s discursive, homonym-enabled emendations283, the joke of 
the title is based on an aural pun: Le Ton Beau de Marot is a pun on Le Tombeau of 
Marot, wherein tombeau would mean tomb and, more generally, a work of art to honor 
someone. Hofstadter joins McLuhan and Cloud as an inveterate punster who uses the 
visual wordplay as a probe, for “the pun is a perfect example of a visual form that has a 
suppressed acoustic resonance in its multilayered and simultaneous meanings, likewise 
achieved through the discontinuous spacetime of the [print] mosaic.”284 Most of the 
translations in Hofstadter’s work are not very good; certainly that poem is nothing like 
Paradise Lost in its complexity, so the thought experiment is a more apt fit with a simpler 
object to begin with. The artifacts can shine because we do not expect entirely great 
interpretations. Instead, the act of translation is revealed to always be a mediation, and 
the radically different effects of different tools is underscored. Hofstadter is a cognitive 
philosopher, not a professional translator, and the book is an extraordinary, wide-ranging, 
collaborative attempt to play with contemporary work on artificial intelligence, theories 
of mind, linguistic and generic translation, and other digressions. It is a literary 
experiment in the neural net theory of minds working in concert, creating errors, 
correcting them, changing through these processes. 
 
Sapere aude!: The Genre of the Thought Experiment 
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Here I want to argue for reframing Bentley’s work a thought experiment based on 
the premise that readers could hold multiple possibilities in their heads at the same time. 
The specific, systematizing term “thought experiment” can be traced back to its German 
coining Gedankenexperiment by Ernst Mach in 1897, but historians of science and 
historians of rhetoric have found it plenty of other sources: ancient Greek mathematical 
proofs and dialogues, Baconian induction, the Cartesian theater of the mind, and so on.285 
It’s historically appropriate to situate Bentley’s work among these Ancient and Modern 
thought experiments; when these historians in different fields are engaging in cross-
disciplinary debates about how their expertise qualifies them to situate the genre in a 
specific time and functionality, they are rehearsing many of the same arguments in the 
Battle of the Books and engaging in much of the same scrutiny of disparate texts and 
argumentative stakes. Even the very work of historicizing the thought experiment fits 
well with Bentley’s special talent of detecting anachronisms in the Epistles of Phalaris.  
Bentley was proud of his conjectural criticism, appropriating a line from his 
translation of Horace, sapere aude (dare to know!), to justify his controversial claim that 
the older texts were not to be consulted so much as the editor’s own mind. Bentley uses 
the phrase dare to know to champion his own tool of using his knowledge to mediate 
texts:  
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In these our Labours upon Horace, a good deal more is owing Conjecture, 
than to the Assistance of Books, and if I mistake not, what arise from 
Conjecture is much more certain than what is founded upon the Authority 
of Books, for in various Reasons the very Authority often imposes upon, 
and flatters the depraved Itch of your pitiful Emendation. …I would not 
have you pay a blind Veneration to dealers in Books alone, but dare you to 
think for yourself.286  
 
The invitation to produce knowledge by experimenting with mediating one’s self was 
generic in these thought experiments. Clifford Siskin and William B. Warner cite the 
eighteenth-century uses of sapere aude! from the Society of Friends’ motto to Kant’s 
famous 1784 essay “What is Enlightenment?”287 They do not cite Bentley’s remediation 
of Horace in the form of his defense of conjectural criticism, but to read Bentley’s 
account of conjectural criticism with Bacon’s opening lines of the New Organon, though, 
is to see the method as a tool:  
The human intellect is the source of its own problems, and makes no 
sensible and appropriate use of the very real aids which are within man’s 
power; the consequence is a deeply layered ignorance of nature, and as a 
result of this ignorance, innumerable deprivations. He therefore judged 
that he must make every effort to find a way by which the relation 
between the mind and nature could be wholly restored or at least 
considerably improved. But there was simply no hope that errors which 
have grown powerful with age and which are likely to remain powerful for 
ever would (if the mind were left to itself) correct themselves of their own 
accord one by one, either from the native force of the understanding or 
with the help and assistance of logic. The reason is that the first notions of 
things which the mind accepts, keeps and accumulates (and which are the 
source of everything else), are faulty and confused and abstracted from 
things without care; and in its secondary and other notions there is no less 
passion and inconsistency.288 
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Bacon’s celebration of tools could be the celebration of Bentley’s conjectural criticism—
or the critique of it. Bacon and Bentley are both responding to similar problems of how to 
mediate knowledge from a single mind to a larger audience so as to advance knowledge. 
Editorial work and theories of mind may be considered as part of the same problem of 
mediation—a problem that Bentley’s self-proclaimed heir A.E. Housman half-articulated 
in his famous essay on classical editing, “The Application of Thought to Textual 
Criticism.” Housman explicitly modeled his emendatory practice on Bentley’s practice 
and frequently held him up as the exemplar of what the practice could generate. Yet in 
this essay, his explanations of this generativity sound positively Lockean. Housman 
insisted that whereas he could not define thought except through abstractions and 
mediating metaphors, he could approach it through explanation of tools:  
The things which the textual critic has to talk about are not things which 
present themselves clearly and sharply to the mind; and it is easy to say, 
and to fancy that you think, when you really do not think, and even what, 
if you seriously tried to think it, you would find to be unthinkable. 
Mistakes are therefore made which could not be made if the matter under 
discussion were any corporeal object, having qualities perceptible to the 
senses. The human senses have had a much longer history than the human 
intellect, and have been brought nearer to perfection: they are far more 
acute, far less easy to deceive. The difference between an icicle and a red-
hot poker is really much slighter than the difference between truth and 
falsehood or sense and nonsense; yet it is much more immediately 
noticeable and much more universally noticed, because the body is more 
sensitive than the mind. I find therefore that a good way exposing the 
falsehood of a statement or the absurdity of an argument in textual 
criticism is to transpose it into sensuous terms and see what it looks like 
then. If the nouns which we use are the names of things which can be 
handled or tasted, differing from one another in being hot or cold, sweet or 
                                                                                                                                            
are numerous, though, except in one case, not important; but, as they throw light upon the manner in which 
books passed through the press in Bacon’s time, I have subjoined a list of all that I have noticed. The cause 
of these differences is not difficult to conjecture. Corrections were made while the sheets were being 
printed off, and the corrected and uncorrected sheets were afterwards bound up indiscriminately. In this 
way the number of different copies might be multiplied to any extent,’” quoted in McKitterick 121-22. 




sour, then we realize what we are saying and take care of what we say. But 
the terms of textual criticism are deplorably intellectual and probably in no 
other field do men tell so many falsehoods in the idle hope that they are 
telling the truth, or talk so much nonsense in the vague belief that they are 
talking sense.289 
 
This passage is self-consciously convoluted at the very same time that it’s making 
claims to absolute clarity: it is a model of the double logic of editorial remediation in its 
simultaneous aspiration to transparency and hyperattention to mediation through 
metaphor and other comparative language. Housman’s essay is very much a product of 
the early 20th-century fascination with editing as an objective science, but even that 
orientation points the way toward reconsidering Bentley as a precursor to cognitive 
philosophers interested in thinking about the mind as mediated by tools. The ghostly 
figure of the erroneous mediator is a manifestation of the anxieties about the 
incompleteness of these mediations, the noise that is created in trying to explain a 
concept as complex as thought.  
 Though they worked in different fields, it’s tempting to speculate about what 
Thomas Kuhn would have made of Housman’s “Application of Thought to Textual 
Criticism”! For historians of science, Kuhn’s “paradigms” are a touchstone for assessing 
the history and functionality of the thought experiment. Kuhn argues that error is a 
constitutive feature of the thought experiment—or at the very least an important outcome, 
for errors expose anomalies in previous paradigms and conceptual frameworks: “The 
concepts ‘corrected’ in the aftermath of thought-experiments displayed no intrinsic 
confusion. If their use raised problems for the scientist, those problems, were like the 
                                                
289 A.E. Housman, “The Application of Thought to Textual Criticism,” Proceedings of the Classical 
Association 18 (1921), 70. 
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ones to which the use of any experimentally based law or theory would expose them.”290 
Kuhn’s scientist may correct errors based on theories that resemble Housman’s editorial 
methods, but he then relishes not just the completion of correction, the fixing of an error, 
but rather the ways that fixing engenders difficulties. Simon Jarvis has advocated for an 
emphasis on editorial labor in discussing eighteenth-century editorial projects, for surely 
to judge them on the specific instances of correctness or incorrectness would return only 
a list of blunders. Jarvis argues, “Historicist philology…needs to understand itself as a 
historical project, rather than as the inevitable victory of sound method; but it can only do 
this by understanding the division of intellectual labour in which it originated and by 
which it continues to be mediated.”291 Jarvis’s call is a call for historicism, a disciplinary 
paradigm that allows scholars to move beyond judgments of good correction/bad 
correction toward creating a larger social context for understanding how past editors 
devised those judgments, as well as the limitations of those judgments as paradigms 
shifted.  
But what of Jarvis’s own paradigm, wherein historicism is the priority above 
speculation or theoretical flight of fancy? By the time he edits Paradise Lost, Bentley is 
an editor outside of a paradigm, even as he believed he was establishing one in his 
championing of the Modern cause. Kuhn continues: “[The scientist’s errors] arose, that 
is, not from his mental equipment alone but from difficulties discovered in the attempt to 
fit that equipment to previously unassimilated experience. Nature rather than logic alone 
                                                
290 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (second edition) (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1962/70), 261. 
291 Simon Jarvis, Scholars and Gentlemen: Shakespearean Textual Criticism and Representations of 
Scholarly Labour, 1725-1765 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 274. 
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was responsible for the apparent confusion.”292 Bentley and Housman match considerable 
knowledge to intuition in their claim of sapere aude!, yet they run into difficulties when 
they extend beyond “unassimilated experience.” Kuhn’s “paradigm shifts” have been 
debated and refined considerably since they defined a field of intellectual history in the 
1960s, but I pause on his work to show a crucial divergence between book historians and 
intellectual historians: the role of distinct content in an error to be fixed. Bentley and any 
editorial practitioner after him seize on specific errors to be corrected as their practical 
work; they run into some explanatory problems when they must speculate beyond an 
accumulation of particular, discrete corrections.  
 
Textual Editing in the Society of the Mind 
 
Conjectural criticism is recursive—rather than solely purposive or 
consolidative—because the very nature of remediating thought is recursive. Or as 
Douglas Hofstadter’s colleague Marvin Minsky puts it in his seminal set of thought 
experiments, Society of Mind, “thinking changes thoughts.” I see Minsky, Hofstadter, and 
McLuhan as theorists who relish writing speculative books of tools, with interests in the 
emergent possibilities of using and misusing those tools. In the chapter entitled titled 
“Head in the Clouds,” he argues:  
An idea with a single sense can lead you along only one track. Then, if 
anything goes wrong, it just gets stuck—a thought that sits there in your 
mind with nowhere to go. … Rich meaning-networks, however, give you 
many different ways to go: if you can’t solve a problem one way, you can 
try another. True, too many indiscriminate connections will turn a mind to 
mush. But well-connected meaning structures let you turn ideas around in 
your mind, to consider alternatives and envision things from many 




perspectives until you find one that works. And that’s what we mean by 
thinking!293  
 
As Paul Carter puts it in his argument for generative mishearing that exposes the 
listener’s position as a mediator: “The aim is not to end the communication but to keep it 
going. Whereas hearing remains monological, listening is always dialogical. Ideally, 
conversation evolving out of ambiguity and mishearing retains these signs of what cannot 
be fully communicated.”294 There is Bentley’s head in the hazy, misty, clouds of his 
conjectural emendation of a single, erroneously claimed homonym in Milton: the rich 
meaning-network of sight, sound, and spirit engendered by conjectural criticism 
facilitates new ways of thinking and mediating those thoughts.  
Yet thought experiments have a strange way of existing both inside and outside 
their time: I have had to labor, sometimes with a stretch of historicist practice toward 
speculation and anachronism, to situate Bentley in the thought experiment. Such labor 
has been interesting and provocative for me in this writing task. Randall 
McLeod/Random Cloud’s’s margin-busting, punny bibliographic textual experiments 
playfully interpolate the anachronism of concrete poetry into early modern textual 
studies, and many have found his provocations to be mind- and discipline-expanding. His 
detractors try to play versions of his own game, so that even in their critiques, they are 
indulging in thought experiments and speculation. Joseph Dane, for one, frames his 
                                                
293 Marvin Minsky, The Society of Mind. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 64. Though he turns to 
theories from information science, Guillory does not cite cognitive or artificial intelligence theories of 
mediation in his discussion of agency. These theories may be outside the scope of his genealogy, but it’s 
interesting to compare Guillory’s work with Minsky’s description of the “Society of Mind” as “a scheme in 
which each mind is made of many smaller processes. These we’ll call agents. Each mental agent by itself 
can only do some simple thing that needs no mind or thought at all. Yet when we join these agents in 
societies—in certain very special ways—this leads to true intelligence” (17). Peters discusses artificial 
intelligence and communication in later chapters of Speaking into the Air, although he does not address 
Minsky’s or Hofstadter’s more popular works. 
294 Carter, 44-45. 
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objections as a thought experiment in an “interlude” that does not fit inside the chapter 
form of the monograph—one in which he (unintentionally) sounds much like Richard 
Bentley imagining the evil Fantom amanuensis: “How, I imagine Prof. McLeod thinking, 
would these same textual critics deal with the tradition of the visual image? Not just 
images generally (which are transmitted I assume by the same imagined processes and 
missteps that apply to textual transmission), but those images that are transformations (or 
representations) of originary typographical constructions?”295 He repeats the discursive 
marker of the thought experiment so frequently that he points to the indulgent amount of 
speculation he believes is present in McLeod’s analysis: “If Prof. McLeod was ever 
thinking what (for my own convenience) I imagine him to have been thinking… Let us 
look at what McLeod does here, as well as what he might or would have done, 
circumstances having been other than what they were…” When McLeod responds at the 
end of the interlude in a playful email, he suggests incorporating his response to the 
materialist critique in the impossible, immaterial form of cloud, which situates him 
somewhere near Bentley in the provocative headspace of manic glossing.  
 There are institutional resistances to these conjectural, speculative forms of 
knowledge production, resistances that are understandable in our contemporary age of 
diminishing resources for humanist study. As McGann and other textual scholars explore 
ways that digital humanists might claim different kinds of resources to make new editions 
                                                
295 Joseph Dane, Out of Sorts: On Typography and Print Culture (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2011), 93-94. Dane’s more polemical critique is that McLeod’s work is performative but not actually 
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of exposing a particular problem in textual-critical theory, these poems and their histories presented him 
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invalid codes set up by the editor of a literary text, we come to a truth that is transcendent of the half-truths 
held by those who naively follow valid codes of that editor.” (94) 
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and new forms of media scholarship, they are often placed in the position of joining 
practical bibliographic skills into the speculative realm. Leah Marcus imagines the 
possibilities for auditory-enhanced scholarship in her essay, “The Silence of the Archive 
and the Noise of Cyberspace,” which ends with a series of briefly considered proposals 
for recordings of recitations, examples of historical pronunciation, and other critical 
ventriloquisms enabled by digitally recorded sound. Her attention to provisionality and 
contingency is striking: she seems to want to hold back any radical ideas for fear of 
underestimating the technicalities of scale of labor and institutional support that such 
auditory enhancements might require—reasonable fears, to be sure. She mentions but 
basically rejects voice synthesis as “impractical” and is careful to note that shorter works 
could be performed and recorded by voice actors who would encounter interesting 
problems of historical accents, early modern pronunciation and diction, and other 
questions of interpretation. “Or, failing that,” she continues, hedging her bets again, “if 
the technology proves to be too expensive for long texts, such editions could build in 
audio elements to give users the feel, if not the actual capacity for assimilation via the ear 
as well as the eye.”296 It’s a speculative essay, so Marcus’s insistence on practicality and 
technical details seems somewhat misplaced, but instead of merely asking why she didn’t 
dream in more radical ways, I might take her sense of contingency as a feature, not a bug, 
of writing about experiments in scholarly work. She imagines an interlocutor correcting 
her and telling her what’s practical and impractical; Bentley gives a clue as to why that 
might be a protective position to take.  
                                                
296 Leah S. Marcus, “The Silence of the Archive and the Noise of Cyberspace,” The Renaissance 
Computer: Knowledge Technology in the First Age of Print, ed. Jonathan Sawday and Neil Rhodes New 
York: Routledge, 2000, 17-27, 27.  
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Such a recontextualization is perhaps a rehabilitation of Housman, too, though I 
am not advocating a return to nineteenth-century ideals of so-called editorial practices. 
Rather, what happens when we zoom the opposite direction from discrete corrections to 
large-scale practices? Instead of assessing the content of errors and corrections, we 
consider them in aggregate, and we study the discourse that’s produced to account for the 
aggregation. We zoom out to observe the iterative, recursive process of correction as 
mediating thought over and over again, by multiple agents at different moments in time. 
In Bentley and Housman, we see not just their idiosyncratic (erroroneus) commentary, 
but also their more expansive and strange interests in thought experiments about the 
relationship between a desire for immersion and a pleasure in hyper-mediation. 
But Bentley’s editorial phantom is also a kind of extended counterfactual 
experiment in alternative forms of mediation, wherein his conjectural emendations and 
explanations resemble speculative fiction about ongoing battles among amanuenses, 
printers, readers, and authors—battles he had already fought and mostly won. Catherine 
Gallagher traces the European Enlightenment origins of that genre, from Gottfried 
Leibniz’s Theodicy—satirized in Voltaire’s Candide as “the best of all possible 
worlds”—to the proliferation of counterfactual military histories about what might have 
been after the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. “What stimulates this desire 
to tell it like it wasn’t?” Gallagher asks, drawing the eighteenth-century interest in the 
genre forward to assess the contemporary explosion of the genre. “My most general 
answer to the question is that we undertake counterfactual investigations when we want 
to apply various kinds of judgments to history—often moral judgments, but not 
exclusively—rather than, for example, just to know about the past or even understand 
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it.”297 Gallagher’s explanation of why counterfactuals and speculative accounts flourish 
at particular moments illuminates one reason why Bentley’s Paradise Lost is so 
notorious: it exposes the unsettled aftermath of the Ancients Moderns debates and the 
desire to judge a final victor in the quarrel.  
The Ancients-Moderns debate is a military battle fought with books and 
pamphlets, as Swift’s Battel of the Books so memorably illustrates; Bentley’s Paradise 
Lost is an after-the-fact alternate history of a conflict among so many mediators of 
Milton’s text, waged in the fog of war atop Mt. Horeb. Joan DeJean makes a similar 
argument as to why we repeat versions of the Ancients-Moderns debates in contemporary 
“Culture Wars.” She reads the French querelles in the context of contemporary debates 
about canonicity, diversity, taste, and culture, in a kind of productive anachronistic 
comparison of the two fins de siècle. Her warning is to remember the lessons of the past: 
“the history of the seventeenth century’s involvement with Culture Wars can serve as a 
cautionary tale for all those with a stake in the outcome of today’s intellectual crisis, by 
indicating some of the problems we will encounter before we reach the end of this line, 
and also where we will almost certainly end up, unless we are able to avoid the pitfalls 
created for each other by our precursors.”298 I agree with many of DeJean’s readings of 
the correspondences between anti-intellectualism past and present, and yet I wonder if 
her historicist priorities somewhat limit her to a hoary pronouncement about 
remembering history.  
                                                
297 Catherine Gallagher, “Telling It Like It Wasn’t” [Plenary Address to the 2009 Meeting of the Pacific 
Ancients and Modern Language Association annual meeting] Pacific Coast Philology 45 (2010), 12-25, 13. 
298 Joan DeJean, Ancients and Moderns: Culture Wars and the Making of a Fin de Siècle. Chicago: 
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How does Bentley’s notoriety fit into a counterfactual genre of thought 
experiment—and how might his counterfactual experiment show us alternative 
possibilities for addressing a battle of books and digital humanities as we engage with 
ever-growing questions about mediation, editorial gatekeepers, and institutional support? 
Gallagher lists multiple features of the counterfactual genre:  
1) They need a stable substratum of uncontroversial facts, but the 
counteracts described in the narrative exceed the facts; 2) they tend to 
privilege the role of individuals in history, but they also de-realize those 
individuals by fracturing them onto multiple versions; and 3) they are 
oriented toward future action, but they repeatedly slide sideways across a 
menu of simultaneous options. Therefore, on the levels of plot, character, 
and temporality, counterfactual history produces narrative features that we 
sometimes call ‘post-modern’: indeterminacy, multiplicity, and non-
linearity.299  
 
Bentley’s conjectural criticism enables him to extend “uncontroversial facts” of the 
poem’s language into the realm of the speculative in such a way that “exceed[s] the facts” 
of what is on the page, what had been transmitted through various editions (even when 
printers unwittingly introduced errors into the editions). His amanuensis “privilege[s] the 
role of the individual” to a risible degree, “de-realiz[ing]” him into a “Fantom” form that 
can be distributed and fractured in the act of mishearing, mistranscribing, interpolating 
his own passages, and committing other errors. Gallagher’s third criterion of 
counterfactuals’ multiplying effects helps explain why Bentley can be called “the first 
post-structuralist?” by postmodern poet McCaffery and “our contemporary” cautionary 
tale by editor Walsh. Again, he is a warning sign of a paradigm that is about to shift, in 
which the counterfactual is an important genre for making sense of new forms of 
knowledge.  
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Conclusion: ‘Unediting’ the Social, Reassembling the Social  
 
One of Bentley’s most infamous changes to Paradise Lost was in its final couplet, 
where he changed: “They hand in hand with wand’ring steps and slow, / Through Eden 
took their solitary way” to “Then hand in hand with SOCIAL steps their way / Through 
Eden took, with HEAV’NLY COMFORT CHEER’D.”300 He argued:  
It contradicts the Poet’s own Scheme, nor is the Diction 
unexceptionable…. And how can the Expression be justified, with 
wand’ring Steps and slow? Why wand’ring? Erratic steps? Very improper, 
in the Line before, they were guided by Providence. And why slow…? 
And why their solitary Way? All Words to represent a sorrowful 
Parting…? Shall I therefore, after so many prior Presumptions; presume at 
last to offer a Distich, as close as any be to the Author’s Words, and 
entirely agreeable to his Scheme? 
 
As with his first digression on the first lines of the poem, this is not an accepted reading 
of the poem—yet there is something recursive in the way that he makes Adam and Eve’s 
steps social, just as his own editing is a kind of social thought experiment in debate and 
digression. Calling Bentley a theorist of mind and comparing him to Minsky is a 
somewhat ahistoricist comparison, but perhaps that ahistorical tool can generate a 
different kind of network with which to consider his work beyond notoriety. The 
ahistoricity is a glitch, but a revelatory one: As Kramnick has discussed in his account of 
historicism as a method of investigation, Bentley’s own methods made claims to hyper-
historicity at the same time that they veered toward hyper-mediation of his own time 
period’s obsession with escalating the Ancients and Moderns historical controversy. 
Kramnick writes: ““A self-consciously modern ideal of print changed the criteria of 
textual validity in such a way that previous texts were seen to be obscure, unreliable, and 
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in need of scholarly administration. The vocation of the textual critic turned to providing 
a regular and error free version of the past.”301  
Yet elsewhere Kramnick has also speculated about how cognitive theories might 
illuminate aspects of literary study that are less situated in historicist methods: “criticism 
is as a rule skeptical of framing older texts with present-day models. The risk is one of 
anachronism or universalism”—that is, errors—“either shoehorning recalcitrant 
descriptions of the mind into our current language of cognition or locating both within a 
timeless and unchanging account of the psyche.”302 Those errors may be anathema to 
historicism, but they may also be generative. When Kramnick begins to limn the contours 
of such an experimental investigation into theories of cognition, he does so in terms that 
resonate with Bentley’s own work from the Boyle Lectures in “Matter and Motion 
Cannot Think.” Kramnick’s distinction shows the ways that heuristics frame these 
abstractions into theories: “What the mind does is process information; what the mind is, 
ultimately, is an abstraction from matter.” Kramnick does not account for Bentley or his 
mediating Fantom in his work because the conjectural method is a swerve away from the 
empirical tradition that’s the focus of his enquiries in that article and Actions and Objects, 
his study of how actions are mediated in literary writing in the seventeenth and 
                                                
301 Kramnick, 87. See also Kevin Pask, “Ancients and Moderns: The Origins of Literary History,” Modern 
Language Quarterly 73:4 (2012), 505-26. “In effect, our scholarly [contemporary] infrastructure, including 
historical periods and the concept of national literatures, which animated the early modern debates about 
literary historicity, has quiely migrated over to the side of the hoary Ancients—as a protocol of literary 
criticism that is simultaneously scorned and tacitly observed” (525-26). 
302 Kramnick, “Empiricism, Cognitive Science, and the Novel,” The Eighteenth Century 48:3 (2007) 263-
285, 263-5. Kramnick indicates the ways in which cognitive theories are addressed prolifically in the 
period: “Mental content (one’s own and others’) was an intense concern for the period that developed both 
the representational theory of mind and the literary genre in which the theory is most fully explored. 
Theory of mind, as I’ve described it so far, works as well as it does with the architecture of mental 
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eighteenth-century philosophy and novels.303 Bentley’s Fantom editor is such a challenge 
to that mediation of action—what kinds of action does a thought experiment engender? 
what are its limitations?—and it’s an avenue that’s worth pursuing as a test beyond the 
work of the novel, into other genres that mediate thought and conflicts of thought over 
time, through the variorum process.  
 
                                                




Chapter 3: Prospects of Error: Textual Editing as an Unlikely Form of Menippean 
Discourse 
 
“SHAKESPEARE’s Words have always appear’d to me like what he make his Hamlet 
compare to, an unweeded Garden grown to Seed: And I am sorry there is still reason to 
complain, the Weeds in him are so sparingly thin’d, that, not to speak out of compass, a 
thousand rank and unsightly ones are left to stare us in the Face, and clog the Delight of 
the expected Prospect.” 
--Lewis Theobald, Shakespeare Restored (1726)304 
 
“He feels the foundations of that discipline trembling….” 
--Thomas Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow (1973)305 
 
 
Introduction: Genres of Remediation 
 
 
Where Alexander Pope’s supplicants to Fama were suspended somewhere 
between earth, sea, and sky, and where Richard Bentley’s editorial mediator was high 
atop Mt. Horeb in a fog of pseudo-productive confusion, Lewis Theobald has his feet 
planted firmly on the ground. The ground, the page, as he sees it in Shakespeare 
Restored, is strewn with errors: typographical errors, misprisions, mishearings, bad 
mediations produced by previous editors, namely Pope. Theobald frames Shakespeare 
Restored as a book-length correction of Pope’s errors in editing a single play, Hamlet, 
and extends that work in a larger editorial project in 1733. As he notes grandly, Theobald 
appropriates his metaphor of the text as an unweeded garden from Hamlet and 
recursively generates his own extended metaphor of editing as creating a vantagepoint 
and a prospect. He believes the foundations of the history of theater are about to tremble. 
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In the previous two chapters, I have discussed Pope’s and Bentley’s compositions 
of cluttered, foggy prospects and the ways that those prospects are hyper-mediated on the 
page. I have argued that they are compelled to situate texts in the unstable, yet generative 
double logic of print remediation, wherein they claim an immersion in the sensory 
experience of the text but also delight in the hyper-media such immersion produces in 
footnotes, satires, proliferating or misleading thought experiments, and sensory spectacles 
of overload. Their critical perspectives are literally made of errors—even, especially 
when they claim to be unfiltered. These genres of prospect-composing are genres of 
remediation in both senses of the word: they render a visual perspective into the medium 
of print, and they seek to remedy the errors generated in that mediation through satirical 
and/or editorial work that is often framed as a moral intervention into the text. 
“I have discharg’d the dull duty of an editor to my best judgment,”306 Pope writes 
dismissively in the Preface to his 1725 edition of Shakespeare’s Works, asserting his 
moral duty to canonize the playwright rather than attend to the materiality of collating 
prior editions. Although he enumerates “the many disadvantages under which [the plays] 
have been transmitted to us,” he sees this explanation as a means of dispatching more 
detailed explanation of specific collations. He favors a general claim of editorial 
judgment about displaying the author’s “beauties” and smoothing over his “faults.” Such 
an “aesthetic orientation was wholly reasonable within his historical context,” argues 
Walsh, for “he conceived his business as the mediation of Shakespeare, the author of a 
past and less cultivated age, to readers in his own.”307 Pope just happened to be at the 
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edge of a paradigm shift toward documentary collation and hypermediation in the printed 
editions. 
“Dull duty” was a complaint he had repeated from his work editing the Iliad 
(1720)—a jab at Bentley’s Modern methods and an argument about how editors should 
remediate texts through a neoclassical lens of polishing for taste.308 Plays are always 
remediated, as David Scott Kastan explains in Shakespeare and the Book, about the early 
transmission history of the quarto and folio editions:  
The printed play is neither a pre-theatrical text nor a post-theatrical one; it 
is a non-theatrical text, even when it claim to offer a version of the play 
‘as it was played.’ As it was played it existed in the theater, in the 
ephemeral sounds and gestures of dramatic action. … It is always, 
necessarily if tautologically, the play as printed; and as printed it ties its 
readers to the words on the page.309  
 
Here Kastan is tracing a materialist, historicist explanation of the distinctions between the 
media states of performance and print. He can be said to be tracing an idea of 
Shakespeare’s plays as existing in a state of recursive remediation: “Hamlet is not a pre-
existent entity that the text and performance each contain, but the name that each calls 
what it brings into being. Neither is more or less authentic than the other, for there is no 
external reality, apart from the texts and the performances themselves, that can provide a 
standard against which that authenticity might be measured.” In Scholars and Gentlemen 
and Making the English Canon, respectively, Simon Jarvis and Jonathan Kramnick set up 
a historicist rubric for assessing these different orientations toward editorial labor among 
Bentley, Theobald, Pope, and others, but in this chapter I am interested in considering 
                                                
308 “The grand Ambition of one sort of Scholars is to encrease the Number of Various Lections, which they 
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this recursive editorial work of print remediations and editorial apparatuses with some 
less immediately obvious juxtapositions with other eighteenth-century remediating genres 
like Menippean satire.310  
What genre of remediation does Pope believe he is working in? His is not an 
analysis of remedies to Shakespeare’s plays, but rather a progress narrative of 
remediating and consolidating the authorial legacy of a national poet. In his list of errors, 
he conflates mistakes and those who commit them into a generalized threat to posterity, 
as he names “arbitrary Additions, Expunctions, Transposition of scenes and lines, 
confusion of Characters and Persons, wrong application of Speeches, corruptions of 
innumerable Passages by the Ignorance, and wrong Corrections of ’em again by the 
Impertinence of his first Editors.”311 I italicized each “of” and “by” in the last part of that 
list as a way to show how convoluted and diffuse Pope’s claims about errant agency can 
be. He appears to give more weight to an abstraction (“Ignorance”) than the agent who 
would perpetrate the bad corrections. I have already noted in the first chapter how these 
abstractions populate his theories of remediation in the Temple of Fame, in which he  
allegorized how texts can change through multiple interventions over time and delighted 
in describing those throngs. What is a “wrong Correction,” anyway? It is an oxymoron 
that is also a warning about bad recursion, for it signals how an editorial intervention can 
set off a chain reaction of more errors, much to the delight of both Ancient and Modern 
partisans. For fortifying a national poet—and making his own name as editor of that 
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Labour 1725-1765; Kramnick, Making the English Canon: Print Capitalism and the Cultural Past; 
Margreta de Grazia, The Reproduction of Authenticity and the Apparatus of 1790 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1991); Colin Franklin, Shakespeare Domesticated: The Eighteenth-Century Editions (Aldershot: 
Scolar Press, 1991). 
311 Pope, Preface, x (emphasis added). 
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project—it was best for Pope not to indulge the creative possibilities of such a 
concatenation. (He could save those impulses for the Dunciad.) 
Where Pope could dismiss those “faults” with a sweep of his “judgment,” 
Theobald sees them as distinct sources, agents, and opportunities to enlarge the study of 
textual transmission of dramatic texts. Theobald had translated and written editorial notes 
for classical plays, including Aristophanes’ The Clouds and Plutus (both 1715) and 
Sophocles’ Electra (1714) and Oedipus (1715); in 1726, he turned his hand to editing—
composing, really—a “lost” Shakespeare play in The Double Falshood.312 He worked for 
the theatrical promoters John Stede and John Reade, where he picked up a considerable 
amount of knowledge about theatrical protocols among actors, prompters, directors, and 
other dramatists.313 As Bentley’s student, he saw his chance to apply that historical 
knowledge of theatrical mediation. The lofty, prolonged subtitle of Shakespeare Restored 
                                                
312 See The Double Falsehood, ed. Brean Hammond (New York: Arden, 2010). For this contemporary 
edition, the eighteenth-century spelling has been corrected from Falshood to Falsehood. Hammond has 
written a considerable amount of prolegomena to explain the choice for publishing what he and others have 
studied as a collaboration between Shakespeare and John Fletcher, as a means to study Shakespeare as a 
collaborative playwright, beyond the obvious collaborations of any theatrical work. Others have called the 
play a forgery or an overreaching mistake by Theobald to burnish his own reputation as the leading 
Shakespeare scholar of his day—namely, Pope, who satirized Theobald’s efforts in the Dunciad and Peri 
Bathous. The Double Falsehood has several layers of mediation: a heavily edited version (for even 
Theobald notes that he cleaned it up considerably) of a 1613 play called ‘Cardenno’ or ‘Cardenna,’ which 
is based on an interpolated tale from Thomas Shelton’s 1612 translation of Cervantes’ Don Quixote. 
Hammond notes ironically, “…of this long, rich and elaborately self-conscious piece of fiction, described 
by Cervantes as a ‘carded, spun, and selftwined threde’, Shakespeare and Fletcher seem to have made an 
almost insouciantly straightforward piece of drama, to judge by the fourteen short scenes of Double 
Falsehood as it stands” (42). (Theobald also wrote notes to an edition of Beaumont and Fletcher’s plays, so 
he was familiar with the material.) The Double Falshood is out of the purview of this chapter, but it is a 
kind of sequel in many ways to his feud with Pope, for he must find a way to mediate his own editorial 
agency in a complex web of agencies.  
313 Walsh argues that Theobald’s considerable documentary and theatrical practical knowledge are boons to 
his conjectural method: “A pervasive and persuasive feature of Theobald’s editorial judgment is its 
constant reference to what reading, and what meaning, is the most probably in the light of Shakespeare’s 
usus scribendi: his figurative habits, his tendency to anachronism, his idiolect, his metrics. The implications 
of Theobald’s correcting Shakespeare ‘from himself’ go further than particular readings” (Walsh, 
Shakespeare, Milton, and Eighteenth-Century Literary Editing, 145). For Theobald’s professional 
biography, see Peter Seary, Lewis Theobald and the Editing of Shakespeare (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990) and Richard Foster Jones, Lewis Theobald, His Contribution to English Scholarship (issued as 
dissertation at Columbia University, 1919, republished at New York: AMS Press, 1965). 
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illustrates how correction is a form of proliferation: “a Specimen of the Many Errors as 
well Committed, as Unamended, by Mr. Pope in his Late Edition of this Poet. Designed 
Not only to correct the said Edition, but to restore the True Reading of Shakespeare in all 
the Editions ever yet publish’d.”  
Thus even as they both gesture toward a stable goal of “restoration,” Pope and 
Theobald are working in two different genres of remediation that are more likely to go 
out of control (in terms of digression and ambition alike) than they are to consolidate 
editorial authority. The problem is the proliferating frames of mediation. Theobald seeks 
to remedy Shakespeare by remediating Pope in the form of an animadversion: he selects 
and italicizes specific errors he identifies in Pope’s work, corrects and dilates on those 
mistakes, and accumulates a text of these commentaries, out of which emerge his 
editorial theory of theatrical mediation and remediation. But these notes were also 
opportunities for satire and further chains of remediation by Pope’s allies, skeptics of the 
conjectural method, and future editors. Even as they practiced parallel criticism, 
Theobald’s colleagues were wary of the rhetorical exaggerations and escalating rivalries 
among editors. In marshaling their criticisms of Theobald’s discursiveness, they imitate 
him and thus add their own literary mediations to his already figurative language. Figures 
of speech proliferate in this field:   
[I]n a Science more fallible of all others, depending in a great Measure on 
the tottering Bottom of mere Conjecture, almost every Critic assumes the 
Air of Certainty, Positiveness and Infallibility; he seems sure never to miss 
his Way, tho’ in a Wilderness of Confusion, never to stumble in a Path 
always gloomy, and sometimes as dark as Midnight. Hence he dogmatizes, 
when he should only propose, and dictates his Guesses in the Despotic 
Stile. The Reader, and every Rival Editor, catches the same Spirit, all his 
Faults become unpardonable, and the Demerit of a few Mistakes shall 
o’erwhelm the Merit of all his just Emendations: He deems himself 
perfect, and Perfection is demanded at his Hands; and this being no where 
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else found but by each Writer in his own Works, every Putter-forth of two 
or three Emendations swells as big, and flings his Spittle as liberally on a 
Warburton, a Hanmer, or a Theobald, as if he were the Giant and they the 
Dwarfs of Criticism…314  
 
“A Wilderness of Confusion” is as evocative as “unweeded garden” for its sensory 
disorder, for its rendering of a theoretical landscape of error, amplified by so much 
snarling and sniping by critics on the hyper-mediated margins.  
Samuel Johnson dismissed Theobald as “a man of narrow comprehension and 
small acquisitions, with no native or intrinsick splendor of genius, with little of the 
artificial light of learning, but zealous for minute accuracy and not negligent in pursuing 
it. … A man so anxiously scrupulous might have been expected to do more, but what 
little he did was commonly right.”315 Peter Seary takes umbrage at the snub, noting that 
Johnson maintained many of Theobald’s specific emendations that he had praised 
backhandedly: “Lewis Theobald is, without question, the scholar whose methods and 
discoveries were most plundered by his successors as they sought to magnify their own 
achievements.”316 Yet Seary’s defensive language of magnification is a reminder of the 
lens of satire and how Theobald’s many footnotes were themselves expanded and 
distorted in Pope’s Dunciad. 
                                                
314 Preface, The Works of Mr. Francis Beaumont, and Mr. John Fletcher (10 vols.) (London, printed for J. 
and R. Tonson and S. Draper 1750), lx. 
315 Samuel Johnson, Preface to The Plays of William Shakespeare in Eight Volumes: With the Corrections 
and Illustrations of Various Commentators; to which are Added Notes (printed for Jacob Tonson, 1765), 
reprinted as “Preface 1765” in Johnson on Shakespeare, ed. Arthur Sherbo (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1968), VII: 95-96. 
316 Seary, “Lewis Theobald, Edmond Malone, and Others,” Reading Readings, ed. Joanna Gondris 
(Teaneck, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1998), 103-122, 103. Seary quotes Pat Rogers: 
“William Empson once put in a word for Bentley’s Milton, but not many voices have been raised in support 
of Lewis Theobald. Better to be one of the slashing Bentleys than one of the piddling Tibbalds, to employ 
Pope’s cruel distinction. But Shakespearean scholars have always realized that Theobald was far superior to 
his adversary in the skills of an editor” (106). Seary devotes much of Lewis Theobald and the Editing of 
Shakespeare to moving his subject out of the “Johnsonian shadow,” as he goes into considerable detail 
about the internecine dispute between Theobald and editors such as William Warburton, who piled on 




‘Wilderness of Confusion’: Menippean Satire as a Genre of Remediation 
 
What genre of remediation does Theobald believe he is working in, beyond a 
theatrical application of Bentley’s criticism? As practiced by Bentley, Theobald, and 
many other combatants in the Battle of the Books, animadversion is a cousin to the 
seventeenth-century genre of the anatomy. That genre’s most virtuosic example is Robert 
Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), subtitled What it is: With all the Kinds, 
Causes, Symptomes, Prognostickes, and Several Cures of it. Burton’s work is a very long 
collection of quotations from many medical and natural philosophy texts, joined together 
with digressive and synthetic commentary. It is another recursive work of remediation: a 
mosaic of many texts about remedies for natural ailments that are remediated by means of 
juxtaposition, translation, dilation, and annotation. It is also aware of itself—its bulk—in 
evincing the paradox that to remedy a body, a text, may also be to distend it. Burton is 
nearly glib about the possibility that he has introduced errors into these multifarious 
discourses.317 (Famously, it would be remediated again in Laurence Sterne’s Tristram 
Shandy [1760-65], where Sterne “plagiarizes” and animadverts on many sections of 
                                                
317 Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), ed. Holbrook Jackson (New York: New York 
Review of Books Classics, 2001). For example: “If we do wrangle, what shall we get by it? Trouble and 
wrong ourselves, make sport to others. If I be convict of an error, I will yield, I will amend. Si quid bonis 
moribus, si quid veritati dissentaneum, in sacris vel humanis literis a me dictum sit, id nec dictum esto. In 
the mean time I require a favourable censure of all faults omitted, harsh compositions, pleonasms of words, 
tautological repetitions (though Seneca bear me out, nunquam nimis dicitur, quod nunquam satis dicitur) 
perturbations of tenses, numbers, printers' faults, &c. My translations are sometimes rather paraphrases than 
interpretations, non ad verbum, but as an author, I use more liberty, and that's only taken which was to my 
purpose. Quotations are often inserted in the text, which makes the style more harsh, or in the margin, as it 
happened. Greek authors, Plato, Plutarch, Athenaeus, &c., I have cited out of their interpreters, because the 
original was not so ready. I have mingled sacra prophanis, but I hope not profaned, and in repetition of 
authors’ names, ranked them per accidens, not according to chronology; sometimes neoterics before 
ancients, as my memory suggested. Some things are here altered, expunged in this sixth edition, others 
amended, much added, because many good authors in all kinds are come to my hands since, and ’tis no 
prejudice, no such indecorum, or oversight” (33). 
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Burton’s work as a kind of comment about the remediating possibilities of that nascent 
genre.)318  
Theobald the anatomist, Theobald the curer is less inclined to irony in working 
through his figurative metaphors for errors. As one who believes in the “Science of 
Criticism” as a kind of anatomy, Theobald relishes classifying, naming, and defining 
errors. He calls Hamlet “a Specimen… of the epidemical Corruption, if I may be allowed 
to use that Phrase, which runs thro’ all the Work.”319 These “specimens” are reanimated 
in textual transmission, as when Theobald refers to errors as “the train of Blemishes, that 
deform those Pieces which stole singly into the World in our Author’s Life-time.” He 
charges that Pope “has frequently inflicted a wound where he intended a cure” and, in 
increasingly grisly language, nearly charges Pope with violence against Shakespeare in 
“attack[ing] him like an unhandy slaughterman; and not lopped off the errors but the 
poet.”320 The formulation of errors as “blemishes” comes from Bentley’s work; Bishop 
Hare praises Bentley’s healing of the text in his introduction to the Epistles of Phalaris: 
“Phaedrus sick and ulcerous up to now, would at last be restored to his pristine integrity 
by his powers, as though he were another Aesculapus.”321 Future editors of Shakespeare, 
                                                
318 That remediation produced one of my favorite idiosyncratic works of textual scholarship: On the 
Shoulders of Giants, Robert K. Merton’s attempts to trace the origin of the phrase “if I have seen farther, it 
is by standing on the shoulders of giants” in its many citations and remediations in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century texts, via Isaac Newton, Burton, and Sterne. The reissue of that book gets many more 
genres of admiration and imitation attached to it: “a Shandean Postscript,” “the Post-Italianate Edition,” 
with a Foreword by Umberto Eco (translated by William Weaver), an Afterword by Denis Donohue, and a 
new Preface and Postface by Merton (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965, 1985, 1993). 
Fittingly, Elizabeth Eisenstein says that she was inspired to write The Printing Press as an Agent of Change 
after reading Merton’s book and wondering about the role of print in the transmission of this image. Ever 
interested in the genres of provisional paratext, Merton encouraged her to do so and frame it as a 
“preliminary report.” See Eisenstein’s interview in Agent of Change, 409. 
319 Theobald, Shakespeare Restored, vii. Kastan notes the editors of Oxford Shakespeare have extended the 
phrase to New Bibliography: “Corruption somewhere is certain… the text is diseased.” (cited in Kastan, 
32).  
320 Theobald 1733, 68-69.  
321 Hare, Epistola Critica, vol. I: 5, quoted in Jones, 48. 
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including Johnson, Edward Capell, and George Steevens, employ the medical metaphor 
of blemishes and cures, although none were so explicitly gleeful as Theobald: “…The 
Assistance of Manuscripts is wanting to set an Author’s Meaning right, and rescue him 
from those Errors which have been transmitted down thro’ a Series of incorrect Editions, 
and a long Intervention of time, many Passages must be desperate, and past a Cure, and 
their true Sense irretrievable either to Care or the Sagacity of Conjecture.”322 Theobald is 
curing texts and Burton is curing bodies, but they are both expanding more than they’re 
trimming away. 
In pairing Burton and Theobald as mosaic-making remediators, I want to make a 
somewhat unlikely claim: Theobald’s work is a kind of Menippean discourse. Unlike 
“playful” Horatian and “scathing” Juvenalian satire, which are both easy to pin down 
with familiar epithets, Menippean satire is characterized by the variety of forms, tones, 
and subjects it incorporates—that is, remediates—into what is usually a satire of false or 
overbearing learning: “Menippean satire is of crucial importance precisely because it is 
formally disruptive and intrusive, a satiric solvent that acts as a catalyst for generic 
mixture and mutation…. The Menippean mode of writing permits movement up and 
down the literary scales (high and low, oral and literary, verse and prose) and between 
genres and forms of speech.”323 Of course, pedantic Theobald is more conventionally 
seen as the subject of a Menippean satire in the Dunciad, where Pope appropriates 
Theobald’s extended metaphor of curing texts with emendation and turns it into 
something ludicrous: “These few lines exactly describe the right verbal Critic: He is to 
                                                
322 Theobald (ed.) Works of Shakespeare in seven volumes: collated with the oldest copies, and corrected; 
with notes, explanatory, and critical (London: 1733), xli.  
323 R. Bracht Branham and Daniel Kinney, eds. and trans. Petronius: Satyrica (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996), xix. 
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his author as a Quack is to his Patients; the more they suffer and complain, the better he 
is pleased, like the famous Doctor of that sort, who put up his bills, He delighted in 
matters of difficulty. Some one well said of these men, that their heads were Libraries out 
of order.”324 Yet I don’t need to remove Theobald from his position as satirized dunce 
(Pope remediated the role of chief dunce with dramatist Colley Cibber in the 1743 
revision of the poem), for the Dunciad’s status as a gem of Menippean satire is secure. 
Pope’s Menippean satire is virtuosic; his remediations of Theobald’s discourse, 
performed for the stated purpose of exposing the moral faults of such pedantry, are 
imaginative and scathing and as he mixes them with critiques of other media such as 
opera, puffery and hack journalism, sniping satires, and theatrical spectacle. 
Rather, I want to reconsider some of the specific remediating functions of 
Menippean discourse by mapping it onto the genre of textual criticism. As in the 
Dunciad, textual criticism is often the subject of “a kind of intellectual prose satire 
[which] parodies prevailing forms of learned discourse,”325 but it shares with satire the 
double function of adapting media (say, plays) into other media (a printed edition with 
apparatus) and in remedying discrete errors. Burton, for his part, theorized how 
perception of each of the five senses is transmitted through a medium of some kind; in 
this way, he shares something with Bentley and Housman in being torn between theory 
and practice, with the conflict manifesting itself through accumulation of more 
examples.326 Howard D. Weinbrot studies the Ancients-Moderns debate as Menippean 
                                                
324 Pope, The Dunciad. III:189-90n. 
325 Garry Sherbert, Menippean Satire and the Poetics of Wit: Ideologies of Self-Consciousness in Dunton, 
D’Urfey, and Sterne (New York: Peter Lange, 1996), 4. 
326 Burton on sight and sound: “To the sight three things are required; the object, the organ, and the 
medium. … The medium is the illumination of the air, which comes from light, commonly called 
diaphanum; for in dark we cannot see. The organ is the eye, and chiefly the apple of it, which by those 
optic nerves, concurring both in one, conveys the sight to the common sense. …. To the sound, which is a 
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satire327; those debates take on a recursive quality as partisans remediate one another’s 
arguments through satirized textual editing, animadversion, and anatomy. Like 
animadversion, Menippean discourse expands through belaboring an argument; its 
replicability makes it hyper-generative “as an exiguous structure of opposition and 
combination, in which different kinds of writing have been juxtaposed to make a tenuous 
whole.”328 An editor like Theobald frames his work in terms of moral correction, making 
him a mirror of his satirist, Pope. Pairing the two genres reveals the extent to which 
textual criticism is a self-reflexive critique of its own protocols of learning and 
disseminating knowledge. In variorum editions and other forms of paratext, textual 
editors remediate one another by commenting on emendations, diagnosed or perceived 
errors, provocative or overreaching insights, invectives, and questions. They also 
formulate theories and histories of media and mediation as they account for the many 
ways that, say, plays and ballads become printed material, or how previous editors 
performed their interventions and inscriptions in texts. Fittingly, Arthur Sherbo begins 
The Birth of Shakespeare Studies with a kind of Menippean invention: he ventriloquizes 
and conflates two letters by Samuel Johnson and Thomas Warton about their labors as a 
means of showing that editing has always been conceived of as a collaborative, 
contingent endeavor. “The compleat explanation of an author not systematick and 
                                                                                                                                            
collision of the air, three things are required; a body to strike, as the hand of a musician; the body struck, 
which must be solid and able to resist; … the medium, the air; which is inward, or outward; the outward 
being struck or collided by a solid body, still strikes the next air, until it come to that inward natural air, 
which as an exquisite organ is contained in a little skin formed like a drum-head, and struck upon by certain 
small instruments like drum-sticks, conveys the sound by a pair of nerves, appropriated to that use, to the 
common sense, as to a judge of sounds. There is great variety and much delight in them; for the knowledge 
of which, consult with Boethius and other musicians. … Many delightsome questions are moved by 
philosophers about these five senses; their organs, objects, mediums, which for brevity I omit” (157-59). cf. 
Goodman, 17 for her history of how the term “medium” gained currency in the eighteenth century. 
327 Howard D. Weinbrot, Menippean Satire Reconsidered (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2005). 
328 Edward J. Milowicki and R. Rawdon Wilson, “A Measure for Menippean Discourse: the Example of 
Shakespeare” Poetics Today 23:2 (2002), 291-326, 298-99.  
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consequential, but desultory and vagrant, abounding in casual allusions and light hints, is 
not to be expected from any single scholiast, [for] a commentary must arise from the 
fortuitous discoveries of many men, in devious walks of literature.”329  
Indeed, the genre of Menippean satire is constituted by multiply framed editorial 
remediations from the classical tradition: there are no surviving Greek texts of Menippus 
as there are of Horace or Juvenal, and instead we have mentions and discussions of his 
satires in Latin Varro, who was championed in Dryden’s Discourse Concerning the 
Original and Progress of Satire (1693),330 and in Lucian, whose translated and 
popularized Dialogues of the Dead enabled a popular seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century mode of satire.331 Burton, for his part, names this genealogy of his work in the 
midst of his dense thicket of references: “I did sometimes laugh and scoff with Lucian, 
and satirically tax with Menippus.”332 In these ways, describing and practicing 
Menippean discourse involves textual editing of translations or quotations of prior texts, 
engendering studies of the material history of the texts that comprise its members. Thus 
Menippean discourse is a genre that can be scaled down through the protocols of textual 
                                                
329 Arthur Sherbo, The Birth of Shakespeare Studies: Commentators from Rowe (1709) to Boswell-Malone 
(1821) (East Lansing, MI: Colleagues Press, 1986), ix. 
330 Dryden’s Discourse Concerning the Original and Progress of Satire: “…[T]hat which we call the 
Varronian Satire, but which Varro himself calls the Menippean; because Varro, the most Learn'd of the 
Romans, was the first Author of it, who imitated, in his Works, the Manners of Menippus the Gadarenian, 
who profess'd the Philosophy of the Cyniques. This sort of Satire was not only compos’d of several sorts of 
Verse, like those of Ennius, but was also mix’d with Prose; and Greek was sprinkl’d amongst the Latin.” 
Essays of John Dryden, ed. W.P. Ker (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 65. Even Dryden’s discourse is 
marked by its many remediations. As Weinbrot notes, “Dryden’s ‘Discourse concerning the Original and 
Progress of Satire’ liberally borrows from Cicero, Quintilian, Casaubon, and André Dacier’s important 
‘Preface sur les satire d’Horace’ in his Oeuvres d’Horace. Dryden quotes Casaubon quoting Varro… So 
many notes would have been required to make Varro intelligible that Dryden almost certainly did not read 
his fragments before writing about them. In the ‘Discourse’ Dryden translates Dacier translating Casaubon. 
… Dryden neither mentions titles nor describes works, and he implicitly undercuts Bakhtin’s later 
assumption of ‘the unity and uninterrupted continuity’ of the influential Menippean-Varronian tradition” 
(Weinbrot, 33). See also: Joel Relihan, Ancient Menippean Satire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1993). 
331 See for example David Mazzella, “Diogenes the Cynic in the Dialogues of the Dead of Thomas Browne, 
Lord Lyttleton, and William Blake,” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 48:2 (2006). 
332 Burton, 19. 
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editing to study the remediated composition of individual texts out of their translated, 
animadverted materials; it can also be scaled up to consider how those texts perform 
satirical functions of commenting on the same kinds of learning that may be used to study 
it. 
Not for nothing is it called “the most elusive genre,” for it exists only as a 
remediation and thus requires and/or inspires subsequent contemporary critics to add to 
those layers of translation, summary, expansion by means of further distinction, 
adaptation, and self-reflexive imitation.333 Weinbrot names Johnson’s Dictionary (1755) 
as a member of the Menippean genre for the ways that it remixes, so to speak, many texts 
to make up its definitions, and many of those definitions have satirical barbs about the 
very folly of trying to fix a definition in language that is always changing: 
Definitions have been no less difficult or uncertain in criticism than in 
law. Imagination, a licentious and vagrant faculty, unsusceptible of 
limitations, and impatient of restraint, has always endeavoured to baffle 
the logician, to perplex the confines of distinction, and burst the inclosures 
of regularity. There is therefore scarcely any species of writing, of which 
we can tell what is its essence, and what are its constituents; every new 
genius produces some innovation which, when invented and approved, 
subverts the rules which the practice of foregoing authors had 
established.334 
 
For Weinbrot, Johnson’s Dictionary is a kind of mise en abyme of Menippea: an example 
of a form but also an ironic warning about the recursive folly in attempting to codify 
discourse in discourse. As he accounts for this self-reflexive, adaptable quality of the 
                                                
333 W. Scott Blanchard, Scholar’s Bedlam: Menippean Satire in the Renaissance (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell 
University Press, 1995), 11.  
334 Samuel Johnson, Rambler no. 125 (1751), quoted in Weinbrot, 3.  
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generic designation, he grants that it “often attaches itself to other kinds of works within 
other dominant genres, and peers in as occasion requires.”335 
Menippean satire received more popularization through Northrop Frye in The 
Anatomy of Criticism, another recursive work of anatomy that frames itself as a 
Menippean discourse at the same time that it defines the genre.336 It was also theorized 
with many more specific conventions by Russian formalist Mikhail Bakhtin, whom 
Weinbrot relies on extensively to outline the genre. As Dryden works with his texts in 
translation, so too does Weinbrot with Bakhtin, and the frames of remediation of the term 
proliferate as extensively as do Bakhtin’s many “rules” of the genre.337 To return to 
                                                
335 Weinbrot, 4. He begins his study with a list of works that could belong to that genre, which includes 
Burton’s and Sterne’s works: “Alice in Wonderland, Anatomy of Melancholy, At Swim Two-Birds, Bouvard 
and Pecuchet, Brave New World, Candide, Canterbury Tales, The Compleat Angler, Consolation of 
Philosophy, Crime and Punishment, [Samuel Johnson’s] A Dictionary of the English Language, The Divine 
Comedy, Erewhon, An Essay Towards the Theory of the Intelligible World, Gargantua and Pantagruel, 
Gulliver’s Travels, Hamlet, Holy Smoke, Ignatius his Conclave, The Life and Opinions of John Buncle, The 
Marriage of Heaven and Hell, The Metamorphosis of Ajax, Moby-Dick, [Francis Bacon’s] The New 
Atalantis, Portnoy’s Complaint, Praise of Folly, Rasselas, Romance of the Rose, Sartor Resartus, Tristram 
Shandy, Troilus and Criseyde, Ulysses, Utopia, A Voyage Round the World in a Pocket Library, The 
Waste-Land.” Weinbrot calls this list “less baggy than bulbous” and claims to want to put the genre 
definition “on a diet,” yet this claim is somewhat disingenuous given the apparent excitement he has at 
compiling this list. He seems to be practicing—in inflated metaphorical language—the very expansiveness 
that he wants to tamp down, making his own work an example of that which he is criticizing (2, 6). 
336 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, 1969). Frye writes of 
the anatomy genre, of which his own work belongs: “A clearer understanding of the form and traditions of 
the anatomy would make a good many elements in the history of literature come into focus. Boethius’ 
Consolation of Philosophy, with its dialogue form, its verse interludes, and its pervading tone of 
contemplative irony, is a pure anatomy, a fact of considerable importance for the understanding of its vast 
influence. The Compleat Angler is an anatomy because of its mixture of prose and verse, its rural cena 
setting, its dialogue form, its deipnosophisictical interest in food, and its gentle Menippean raillery of a 
society which considers everything more important than fishing and yet has discovered very few better 
things to do. In nearly every period of literature there are many romances, confessions, and anatomies that 
are neglected only because the categories to which they belong are unrecognized “ (312). See also Jonathan 
Hart, Northrup Frye: The Theoretical Imagination (London: Routledge, 1994). Hart observes that Frye 
“treats anatomy, and his own Anatomy of Criticism, as Menippean satire, and his early published fiction is 
Menippean in thematic content as well as form” (280). 
337 Weinbrot identifies fourteen, which range from “experimental fantasticality” and freedom from reliance 
on the real to scenes of madness and scandalous behavior (12). He is condensing and summarizing from 
Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1984). As I noted in previous chapters, remediating Bakhtin was highly productive and 
fashionable for scholars of a certain generation; what surprises me most is that the issues of translation and 
the unwieldiness of applying the theory seem to be enabling for James McLaverty, Curt Cloninger, and, 
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Kastan’s distinction between performances and printed editions of plays, Menippean 
discourse is “the name that each calls what it brings into being.” It is based on an 
abstraction of its many material forms, both in the bits of texts that are cobbled together 
in the satire and in the scholarly or critical reflection on those particular forms, which 
always seems to be done through several layers of translation and hyper-mediation. 
Marshall McLuhan claimed that his highly recursive, self-reflexive, self-
cannibalizing work could be considered Menippean satire, as it “present[s] the actual 
surface of the world we live in as a ludicrous image.”338 Under that distorting lens, The 
Gutenberg Galaxy’s mosaic approach of quoting and animadverting on passages from 
various works is a form of Menippean discourse about media history.339 Eugene P. Kirk 
argues for a lesser focus on the satire part of the genre, in favor of expansiveness for what 
it juxtaposes and invents out of those connections:  
The chief mark of Menippean style was unconventional diction. 
Neologisms, portmanteau words, macaronics, preciosity, coarse vulgarity, 
catalogues, bombast, mixed languages, and protracted sentences were 
typical of the genre, sometimes appearing all together in the same work. In 
outward structure, Menippean satire was a medley—usually a medley of 
alternating prose and verse, sometimes a jumble of flagrantly digressive 
narrative, or again a potpourri of tales, songs, dialogues, orations, letters, 
lists, and other brief forms, mixed together. … In them, Menippean satire 
was essentially concerned with right learning or right belief. That theme 
often called for ridicule or caricature of some sham intellectual or 
                                                                                                                                            
here, Howard Weinbrot. It’s not easy to fit so many works into those very specific fourteen rules, yet 
Bakhtin is Weinbrot’s main touchstone early in his book. 
338 Marshall McLuhan, Letters of Marshall McLuhan. eds. Matie Molinaro, Corinne McLuhan, and William 
Toye (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 517. For a nuanced account of the sometime 
disputatious relationship between McLuhan and Frye, sometimes carried out in satirical forms, see B.W. 
Powe, Marshall McLuhan and Northrup Frye: Apocalypse and Alchemy (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2014). McLuhan shared this double interest in medical anatomy and rhetoric, and he yoked them 
together under the term “ablation” in Understanding Media.. Like “remediation,” ablation/ablative has 
multiple meanings in different contexts that enable productive wordplay and slippages. See Cavell, 79-81. 
339 It is also a work of Shakespeare criticism, as McLuhan begins the book with a theory of perspective 
derived from close reading of King Lear: “The stripping of the very human senses themselves will be one 
of the themes of this play. The separation of sight form the other senses has already been stressed in Lear’s 
expression of his ‘darker purpose’ and his resort to the mere visual map” (13). 
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theological fraud. Yet sometimes the theme demanded exhortation to 
learning, when books and studies had fallen into disuse and neglect.340 
 
Kirk’s inventory of neologisms, preciosity, bombast, and obliqueness is familiar in its 
resemblance to critiques of McLuhan’s works for their slogans, technodeterminism, 
superficiality, and aptness for breathless misappropriation and misapprehension. But 
McLuhan’s work was also inspiring as an “exhortation to learning.” Menippean discourse 
may also articulate a program for remaking a field of study—a kind of reinstauration out 
of fragments, in a Baconian sense. Weinbrot names Johnson’s Dictionary and Bacon’s 
New Atlantis as Menippean satires, so the discourse may be a useful descriptor of media 
histories like McLuhan’s work; Friedrich Kittler’s Gramophone, Film, Typewriter and 
Discourse Networks 1800/1900; Bolter and Grusin’s Remediation; and Galloway’s The 
Interface Effect, among others. They are Menippean discourse in that they theorize their 
own production through incorporating and animadverting on a diverse array of texts. 
Historically, variorum editions are also a genre of Menippean media history that frame 
meta-insights and debates about remediation from performance to print as ongoing 
epistemological reflections about authority, paratextual technologies, and historicity. 
 
Trembling Foundations: Menippean Discourse About Disciplinarity 
 
“He feels the foundation of that discipline trembling…” In Pynchon’s terms from 
the 1973 Menippean satire Gravity’s Rainbow, the foundations of the disciplines 
mentioned so far—of editorial theory, media history, and literary studies—are beginning 
to tremble under the weight of so many texts, conventions, citations, and juxtapositions. 
                                                
340 Eugene P. Kirk, Menippean Satire: An Annotated Catalogue of Texts and Criticism (New York: Garland 
Publishing, 1980), xi, my italics. 
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In The Textual Condition, Jerome McGann evoked a specter of screaming variants along 
the editorial horizon of a changing discipline, a phrase that calls to mind the famous first 
line of Pynchon’s novel: “A screaming came across the sky.”341 The ground trembles, 
bombs parabolate overhead; the rowdy soldiers, dissolute movie directors, and confused 
spies of the novel are all engaged in some kind of vexed mediation. Gravity’s Rainbow 
pairs well with The Gutenberg Galaxy as a reflection on proliferating visual technologies 
and media. It is a mosaic rendered in fiction, as Pynchon crams his novel full of different 
media discourses: map-making, crude and scatological verse, vivid descriptions of 
cinema, military and espionage communiqués, aphorisms, and more. In the epigraph to 
this chapter, now buried beneath so many other references, we see Tyrone Slothrop 
wondering about the ends of the military intelligence mapping project he is assigned to: is 
there a meaning to the design in the map of projectiles he has been compiling? Is it a sign 
or an artifact of mediation?342  
McLuhan theorized the connection between these seemingly disparate 
technologies of weaponry and interpretative media in Understanding Media: “So runs 
this argument that links gunfire itself with the rise of perspective, and with the extension 
of the visual power in literacy.”343 He follows Francis Bacon’s claim in his 1620 
Instauration Magna that printing, gunpowder, and the nautical compass are the three 
tools have made possible the Great Instauration of human knowledge as a project of 
                                                
341 Pynchon, 1.  
342 And in terms of Tibbaldian Menippean discourse, it’s worth noting that Pynchon’s 1966 novel, The 
Crying of Lot 49, is a Menippean satire on learning in fields as diverse as information theory, calculus, and 
the material history of an imaginary Renaissance revenge tragedy, The Courier’s Tragedy, which the 
characters read for clues in the variants among the versions of the text they attempt to collate in their search 
that has no apparent end.  
343 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964, 1994), 341.  
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mediating knowledge through new use of tools rather than sole human reason.344 In a 
historical convergence that belongs in a Pynchon novel, military and bibliographical 
technology intersected during World War II when an intrepid bibliographer tried to 
mechanize the dull duty of collating textual variants. Charlton Hinman was a 
Shakespeare scholar who compared variations among editions of Othello while studying 
at the University of Virginia in the late 1930s. He joined the navy as a cartographer and 
cryptographer, and he became interested in how military scientists had tried to devise a 
way to identify bomb damage by comparing before and after photographs taken from 
airplanes.345 The aerial survey plan did not work because it was impossible to take aerial 
photographs of the same exact location for comparison, but the idea worked better for 
still photographs of taken from a fixed prospect, where a mirror mounted on the roof of 
the device could produce a stereographic image of, say, a page from different printing 
runs of a text where small variants might exist. As journalist Paul Collins describes it, 
“any change between the two would be interpreted by the brain as movement, with 
bombed gun emplacements rather appropriately appearing to shake violently.” the initial 
prototype was jury-rigged out of “[a colleague’s] son’s Erector set, two slide projectors, 
and sundry electric motors, mirrors, etc.”346 That provisional invention became an 
                                                
344 See Siskin and Warner, 5. Indeed, in one of his many swipes at Theobald, Pope involved his rival in a 
bizarre Scriblerian hoax in The Menoirs of Martinus Scriblerus, in which he made Scriblerus claim that he 
had discovered a means of measuring longitude via projectile-bombing. The satire was dense and 
complicated enough that it was remediated as fact in some histories of longitude. See the very strange story 
in Pat Rogers, “Longitude Forged.” Times Literary Supplement (Nov. 12, 2008). 
345 For an extraordinary queer history of military technology and New Bibliography, see Jeffrey Masten, 
“Pressing Subjects: On the Secret Lives of Shakespeare’s Compositors,” in Language Machines: 
Technologies of Literary and Cultural Production, eds. Masten, Peter Stallybrass, and Nancy Vickers (New 
York: Routledge, 1997), 75-107. Masten combines compositor theory that was practiced among 
bibliographers like Hinman during the 1960s with queer theory to show both the limitations of compositor 
theory for explaining complicated aspects of mediation by multiple agents, but also a kind of social history 
of who would served as a compositor in early modern printing. 
346 Quoted in Andrew Murphy, Shakespeare in Print: A History and Chronology of Shakespeare Publishing 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 48. Murphy is quoting Peter Blayney, ‘The Publication of 
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institutional bulwark as academic libraries and the CIA alike adopted the technology, but 
it was bulky and balky, and it soon became a dinosaur. When Collins visited the Folger 
Library in 2005 to try out the technology long after its vogue for use, he was at first 
unsure how to read with such a visual technology, hyper-aware of how his reading 
experience was being technologically mediated: “Mechanical collation can be curiously 
disorientating. Experienced users, viewing pages as a whole image rather than reading the 
words on them, run their eyes in an S-pattern down the page in a matter of seconds, much 
faster than they could read the actual text.”347 
Menippean satire is the solvent of pedantic learning, but it is also the glue for 
transhistorical media theory. Gravity’s Rainbow doesn’t have a direct target (so to 
speak!); its diffuseness is what allows the Menippean qualities to attach to such diverse 
media. In his study of Menippean Pynchon, Theodore Kharpertian argues for the generic 
label to be “a rhetorical trope that implies similarity in difference, synthesis in antithesis, 
and unity in diversity.”348 That is, it problematizes its own definition as a means to 
producing more speculation and self-reflexive questioning about the ends of that 
speculation: the discourse is always engendering an excess of epistemological questions 
about what it’s remediating.  
                                                                                                                                            
Playbooks,” in A New History of Early English Drama, eds. John D. Cox and David Scott Kastan, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 383-422. Randall McLeod has designed his own Portable 
Collator, which he describes using to examine variants of “Easter Wings” in “FIAT fLUX.” “Random 
Cloud” carries the joke forward by thanking McLeod in his notes for loaning the device (155n.17). 
347 Paul Collins, “As Shakespeare Liked It.” New Scientist 187:2511 (6 August 2005), 48-49, 49. See also: 
Steven Escar Smith, “‘Eternal Verities Verified’: Charlton Hinman and the Roots of Mechanical 
Collation,” Studies in Bibliography 53 (2000), 129-61. 
348 Theodore Kharpertian, A Hand to Turn the Time: The Menippean Satires of Thomas Pynchon (Teaneck, 
NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1990), 40. He argues: “If there has been an egregious error or 
blindness historically in the definition of satire, it is this: many definitions (Dryden’s, for example) limit 
satire to some form of attack while downplaying or ignoring the genre’s etymologically signified and 
historically practiced convention of carnivalesque variety.” (33). 
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That quality may explain why there is so much fractiousness in media history and 
theory—between, say, Theobald and Pope; McLuhan, Bolter and Grusin, and Galloway; 
or Elizabeth Eisenstein and Adrian Johns as they debate forms of agency and objects of 
knowledge in the history of print. In The Nature of the Book, Johns seeks to remediate 
Eisenstein’s “error” of sweeping technodeterminism in The Printing Press as an Agent of 
Change by exploring histories of the particular human agents: authors, printers, 
correctors, type compositors, engravers, readers of many classes, and so on. (I shall return 
to Johns and Eisenstein at length in the next chapter.) Reviewing Johns’s work, 
Eisenstein accuses him of misapprehending her argument and denying her credit for re-
spatializing the discipline of book history.349 They go back and forth in printed 
rejoinders, in some sense arguing over the best perspectives for assessing change over 
time and what mediations are most important for marshaling that evidence of change. 
Johns accuses Eisenstein of misrepresenting his work by animadverting on particular 
errors to show a false pattern and “she even applies the same technique to her own work, 
repeatedly quoting individual dicta from The Printing Press as an Agent of Change in 
synecdochic fashion as though such isolated statements were straightforwardly 
representative of the whole.”350 He worries about the recursive nature of her argument 
and its piecemeal evidence: “A reading practice that is applied to its own practitioners’ 
words as much as to others’ is one that may reasonably be regarded as entrenched.”  
What Johns perceives as flaws are also literary devices: synecdoche, 
animadversion, encyclopedic synthesis of sources, composing a prospect. Is Eisenstein’s 
                                                
349 Elizabeth Eisenstein, “An Unacknowledged Revolution Revisited,” The American Historical Review 
107:1 (2002), 87-105 and The Printing Press as an Agent of Change 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979/1982).  
350 Adrian Johns, “How to Acknowledge a Revolution,” The American Historical Review 107:1 (2002) 13-
14 and The Nature of the Book (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998).  
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prospect thus composed of errors, or are her errors in some sense enabling for a different 
perspective on media change? Eisenstein defends her long zoom approach in perspectival 
language that sounds familiar from Bentley, Pope, and Theobald’s own media prospects 
of their editorial work: “To say that a landscape viewed from the air looks differently 
from one seen from the ground is not to invalidate either perspective, let alone accuse 
either of ‘backsliding.’”351 In each of these cases, we have a kind of disagreement about 
the status of evidence and the kinds of claims that can be articulated and defended. 
Writing in terms of Pynchon’s Menippea, in which there are ongoing debates about how 
characters know what they know—and whether to assess this confusion as a subject or a 
product of the encyclopedic satires—Kharpertian calls attention to the problem of  
“generically indispensible antithesis of text and experience [which] precedes the effective 
performance of interpretation,” and which serves “to correct inadequate or erroneous 
conceptions of experience” in the act of interpretation. That is, in a Menippean satire, the 
experience of self-reflexive questioning may be at odds with the desire for settled 
interpretations, and we are caught in a disciplinary quandary: what is in the foreground of 
a study, and what is background? Is the goal discrete insights or large-scale theory—how 
does one zoom between the two realms?352 
This kind of correction to generic definitions, a re-situating of self-reflexive 
experience in the mediation of the text, was part of Theobald’s goal in goading Pope with 
Shakespeare Restored. He sought to remake the goals, protocols—disciplines (to evoke 
                                                
351 Elizabeth Eisenstein, “[How to Acknowledge a Revolution] Reply” The American Historical Review 
107:1 (2002) 126-128, 126. 
352 Alexander Galloway makes a similar critique of Lev Manovich’s work: “If one is willing to assent to a 
synecdoche model for media systems, then it follows that sources (or partial sources) will play a more 
important role, since the system/subsystem or whole/part arrangement necessitates that one think about the 
innards of things as one scales from outside to inside” (9). 
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both Pynchon and Foucault)353—of editorial work by adding more mediation of what one 
could call the “editorial function” of mediating an author’s work. Theobald’s subtitle 
indicates that he looks forward to others producing more media with his conjectural 
method; he anticipates McLuhan in claiming the future value of a method for theorizing 
media production. As McLuhan knew well, Menippean discourse diffuses agency in a 
carnivalesque way that can account for the many remediators of texts over time. 
Likewise, the editorial apparatus allows for multiple agents to interact with goals that 
may compete in small differences of readings but have a larger theory of framing and 
reframing the accumulation of discourse over time.  
D.F. McKenzie consolidates these diverse interactions into a descriptive theory of 
“the sociology of texts,” a phrase that generates abstract intellectual space for 
generalizations to be collected into a discipline while it also carves out room for 
enumeration of historical particularities and differences. McKenzie writes: “While the 
processes of composition, correction, and printing were universal, the relationship 
between them on any one day were constantly changing.”354 He describes the history of 
                                                
353 Foucault describes the process of systematization as one of setting up a hierarchy of goals: “Discursive 
practices are characterized by the delimitation of a field of objects, definition of legitimate perspective for 
the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories. Thus, each 
discursive practice implies a play of prescriptions that designate its exclusions and choices.” He argues that 
truth is not so easily extracted from a text; it does not “become pure speculation subject to the demands of 
reason…” Rather the search for truth is “a progressive enslavement to its instinctive violence.” This “will 
to truth” is progressive because it endlessly inscribes the need for its perpetuation. The possibility—indeed 
the need—for future reconsideration of an editor’s emendations is the basis of the discipline of conjectural 
criticism. The “instinctive violence” of a discipline’s will to truth is the contradiction between its stated 
goal of achieving a final formulation of truth and its procedure of self-proliferation, producing alternate 
readings, and insisting on reproduction as the means of attaining that goal. Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History.” Hommage á Jean Hyppolite (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971), reprinted 
in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1977, 163. 
354 D.F. McKenzie, Bibliography and the Sociology of Texts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 3-4. For an account of McKenzie’s career, see his collected essays and responses in Making 
Meaning: ‘Printers of the Mind and Other Essays, eds. Peter D. McDonald and Michael F. Suarez, S.J. 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2002), especially the Introduction, 3-10. 
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bibliographic theory and practice as working between these general ideas and detailed 
study of material history. When bibliographers began to take note of these social 
behaviors and conflicts in protocols, they developed complexity in their higher-order 
concepts about the nature of truth, accuracy, authorial intention, and editorial 
intervention: “… Paradoxically, this extension of knowledge about the context of book 
production, while it induced a scepticism about the kinds of truth some forms of 
bibliography might yield, also opened up the discipline … it released the subject from the 
straitjacket of induction”—which Housman had championed—“giving it a new 
imaginative life in the speculative range it now demanded.” As Joanna Gondris puts it in 
her recursively titled collection of essays about eighteenth-century editors of 
Shakespeare, Reading Readings: “The capacious variorum form engineers a conversion 
of interpretive differences into increments of critical response. The experience of reading 
the variorum commentary is of a growing sense of the extraordinary recalcitrance of 
apparently refuted versions of the text.”355 Her description of the apparatus resembles 
McLuhan’s mosaic or Bolter and Grusin’s frames upon frames of remediation: “Each 
reading, in each note, sets up a verbal impression or an image which simply will not fade 
away on the emergence of a new reading.”  
Gondris’s title of her essay in that volume, “All This Farrago,” refers to a 
criticism made by a reviewer of a 1784 variorum edition, who complained that the 
apparatus had grown too bulky—it is felicitous that Frye chooses “encyclopedic farrago” 
to describe the way that Menippean satire proliferates in its form and larger genre.356 
                                                
355 Joanna Gondris “‘All This Farrago’: The Eighteenth-Century Shakespeare Variorum Page as a Critical 
Structure” Reading Readings, ed. Gondris (Teaneck, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1998), 123-
39, 132. 
356 Frye, 311. 
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Gondris’s essay proceeds by staging four different textual cruxes in the eighteenth-
century variorum editions; although Reading Readings gestures to a recursive 
interpretative practice, she prioritizes the content of particular Readings over articulating 
a larger theory of Reading. Elsewhere in that volume, however, there is actually a 
Menippean satire of bibliography by Randall McCleod/Random Cloud, who is surely 
unique in favoring that genre for his bibliographical research in “a panoply of essays, 
written under a panoply of near-homophonic names”357 that would not be out of place in 
a Pynchon novel. In his recursive fashion, Cloud’s contribution to Reading Readings is 
“complicatedly polemic” for its dismissal of eighteenth-century editions as merely 
interesting, in favor of stressing the other remediations of Shakespeare’s plays in 
unconventional forms, different languages, and misprintings. “The acuity of Cloud’s own 
reading, his extraordinary responsiveness to the graphic medium of Shakespeare’s printed 
text, serves to qualify his decrial of eighteenth-century editions,” writes Gondris. She 
encourages a recursive reading of his work, a concerted attention to what kinds of 
readings his Menippean satire of bibliography might occasion through its deliberate, 
barbed but playful obscurity: 
For he is not so irreparably divided from the eighteenth-century editors 
(who authorize emendation-filled conflated texts rather than quarto or 
folio) that he does not also resemble them in his focus on the semantic 
difference of the minutest variants in a text. … Its inclusion within the 
volume also makes possible a questioning of Cloud’s emphatic 
devaluation of eighteenth-century editions, for the essays which his ushers 
forth assert—as Cloud’s writing itself does in the very energy of his 
reaction—the power of eighteenth-century editions to engage and inform 
[contemporary readers]…358 
 
                                                
357 Gondris, “Introduction,” Reading Readings, ed. Gondris, xii. He also designed a smaller, portable 




And yet, when I read the essay, I found myself more interested in the accumulations of 
estranging effects than in particular quotable moments from the text.359 It is difficult to 
describe or quote; it loses significant meaning in the translation/mediation on someone 
else’s page. This is an intentionally difficult effect and argument on Cloud’s part, a 
provocation of the very disciplinary procedures that he is studying. Indeed, Cloud’s 
argument is significantly stronger than Gondris’s about what we might learn from 
variorum commentary; where Gondris prizes conversation and maintenance of the 
structure, Cloud aims for conflict. In “FIAT fLUX” he argues: "Editing can scarcely be 
expected to divulge its own structures, until it is juxtaposed critically to the evidence it 
claims to report. In the contradictions that become vivid in such a juxtaposition, we can 
measure precisely the difficulties of [a text that has been remediated so many times in so 
many forms by different editors].”360 Where Bakhtin’s theories were easily transportable, 
applicable, and adaptable to Weinbrot’s and McLaverty’s texts, Cloud’s stay 
unassimilable, unable to be animadverted on. They also make me think of the blockiness 
of my own digital experiments—stubborn reactions to desires for consolidation, clarity, 
and transparency.    
With Cloud’s Menippean bibliography in mind, I must make one more note here 
about the difference between satire and discourse, especially as it concerns Theobald, 
who is the object of Pope’s satire but also, I am arguing, a practitioner of Menippean 
discourse. Edward J. Milowicki and R. Rawdon Wilson are interested, as I am, in 
                                                
359 For example: “All this variety! I bet you’re starving? You think I’ve been talking nonsense all this 
while, but look—today I’m the sane one. It’s those editors ware crazy. Haven’t done their homework. But 
I’d be choughed to buttocks to do it for them just this once, because—because, ever since I was a kid, I had 
this Towering Ambition to edit. Collating? Don’t you talk to me about collating. Why I ate and slept 
collation for years…” Cloud, “Shakespeare Babel” in Reading Readings, ed. Gondris 1-70, 19.  
360 Cloud, “FIAT fLUX,” 150. 
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bracketing the “satire” part of the genre and focusing instead on the generative nature of 
the remediating qualities of the form. They describe their argument as “giving generic 
shape to an indeterminate term, if that were possible… Menippean elements follow 
different paths, nomadic and elusive, to become integral parts of very diverse ways of 
writing. …. Menippean accurately refers to more than a type of satire. It names a way of 
writing that can best be considered as transgeneric…”361 Because I can recognize it in my 
own writing (and see it the anxiety in Johnson’s definition of definitions), I am fascinated 
by the recursive qualities of Milowicki and Wilson’s description of Menippean discourse, 
as they fold back on themselves, repeat themselves, and generally follow what could look 
like Shandean loops or Pynchonian parabolic data plots around the term: 
Undermining traditional literary structures, Menippean discourse… 
inevitably explores, then expands conventional generic boundaries, 
sometimes even approaching subversion. … Menippean discourse [is] a 
self-conscious, encyclopedic array of discursive techniques, both motifs 
and conventions, any subset of which can be employed for exploratory or 
subversive purposes in virtually any text. Menippean discourse constitutes 
a supple, if abrasive literary method with excessive parts but only 
exiguous structures and with an almost baffling range of uses. 
 
Their definition is unwieldy, unstable, and generative because they see Menippean satire 
as a device that’s supposed to topple by its very expansion and recursion: it is 
remediation for the purpose of distortion, subversion, and abrasion. In these terms, 
Johnson’s description of Theobald’s myopic, exacting, small-gains performance as an 
editor starts to resemble something like Tibbaldian Menippean discourse: he is distorting 
Pope’s polished texts, subverting it with his own niggling concerns, abrading it by adding 
more text. It is a “Wilderness of Confusion,” as Theobald’s anonymous critic put it. I 
prefer this generic account to McKenzie’s “sociology of texts” because it helps me see 
                                                
361Milowicki and Wilson, 292-93. 
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the ways that genres of remediation can engender conflicting agencies that are subsumed 
under a disciplinary importation of “sociological” discourse. 
 
McKenzie’s Riffing on Errors: Thought Experiments in Menippean Discourse 
 
McKenzie adumbrates “the sociology of texts” with a virtuosic close reading of 
how an apparent transcription error committed by famed New Bibliographers W.K. 
Wimsatt, Jr. and M.C. Beardsley forms the (perhaps now unstable!) foundation of a key 
New Critical text, “The Intentional Fallacy.” In subverting this foundational text, 
McKenzie is performing a kind of textual-editing-as-Menippean-satire. He is playing 
with the editorial irony that correcting errors is a means of proliferating them, that any 
critical prospect has flaws in its mediation of a textual scene. These flaws—whether 
obvious or invented by a rival—allow for future critics and editors to peek through and 
situate themselves as remediators of that vision. First printed in The Sewanee Review in 
1946 and anthologized widely as the source for theories of treating poems as objects 
outside of authorial context, “The Intentional Fallacy” identifies a kind of perspectival 
error in approaching poetic objects, which Wimsatt and Beardsley argue should be 
examined solely for their visible features without digressions to history, biography, or 
theories that would add a veil of mediation. It is “hard to name another essay which has 
so influenced critical theory and the teaching of literature,” notes McKenzie, yet “it has 
not, I think, been observed before that, if we include its epigraph, this famous essay on 
the interpretation of literature opens with a misquotation in its very first line…”362  
                                                
362 McKenzie, 20. 
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McKenzie analyzes Wimsatt and Beardsley’s invisible revisions of words, 
punctuation, and capitalization to show how their rendering of William Congreve’s 
prologue to The Way of the World (1700)—ironically, about his authorial control of his 
texts—proliferates errors even as they are espousing a strong, influential theory of de-
authored interpretation.363 Yet McKenzie is determined to be recursive in his criticism 
and reflect on what that moment of editorial intervention means—that is, to go beyond 
espying an error and animadverting with Tibbaldian glee. He uses his bibliographer’s 
tools of scrutiny to zoom in on the printed variants and zoom out to generate 
epistemological questions about the implications of the misprints and misprisions. It is a 
feat of both specific material history and wide-ranging, transhistorical speculation—it is 
in some ways like Cloud’s work in its gestures to scrutinizing typefaces and creative 
dilation, but it is less self-consciously weird. He mixes prose and verse (by quoting 
Congreve) and plays with perspectives from multiple kinds of texts, thus enacting a kind 
of editorial Menippean discourse. He turns Kastan’s warning about distinguishing 
between the technologies of theater and print into a kind of carefully proliferating thought 
experiment about mediation and remediation:  
But as a dramatic text, it was originally written to be spoken, and so other 
questions arise. Can we hear the voice of the actor Thomas Betterton 
conveying orally the ironies we now read visually? Congreve’s autograph 
                                                
363 Here is how Congreve’s authorized edition from 1710 (London: printed for Jacob Tonson) reads: 
He owns, with Toil, he wrought the following Scenes, 
But if they’re naught ne’er spare him for his Pains: 
Damn him the more; have no Commiseration 
For Dulness on mature Deliberation.” 
Copying out the poem in The Sewanee Review, Winsatt and Beardsley silently correct the capitalized nouns 
and remove the commas from the first line. Most notably the abstraction “Dulness,” the familiar abstraction 
from Pope and others, is just “dullness,” losing its satirical sting: 
“He owns with toil he wrote the following scenes;  
But if they’re naught, ne’er spare him for his pains: 
Damn him the more; have no commiseration 
For dullness on mature deliberation.”  
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letters show no concern for the niceties I suggested in the form of the 
epigraph. Am I therefore reading an interpretation of Congreve’s meaning 
by his printer, John Watts? Is Watts merely following a general set of 
conventions imposed at this time, with or without Congreve’s assent, by 
Congreve’s publisher, Jacob Tonson? Who, in short, ‘authored’ 
Congreve? Whose concept of the reader do these new forms of the text 
imply: the author’s, the actor’s, the printer’s, or the publisher’s? And what 
of the reader? Is a knowledge of Jonson, Betterton, Congreve, Watts, and 
Tonson a necessary condition of a ‘true’ reading? Does my own reading 
betray a personal need to prove that a technical interest in books and in the 
teaching of texts is now radically disjunctive, that bibliographical 
criticisms are in fact one? Visited by such questions, an author disperses 
into his collaborators, those who produced his texts and their meanings.364  
 
But if we acknowledge that this text was first delivered as a lecture in 1985 and then 
remediated as a scholarly text in 1999, can we hear the voice of the bibliographer Donald 
F. McKenzie conveying orally the ironies we now read visually? That is, the social 
occasion of the Panizzi lectures produces its own generative errors of interpretation—
artifacts of performance, the way a magician practices misdirection of his audience—and 
we are stunned by his virtuosic dilation on misprints.365 The quotability of the term “the 
sociology of texts” has ensured its adoption, its proliferation, its extension—indeed, its 
normalization into disciplinary practices. In this lecture and then textual performance, 
McKenzie is errant in the best possible way: by digressing, pointing out his possible 
assumptions and historicist projections, keeping our attention on remediation even as he 
is practicing it himself. McKenzie treats his intervention as reflexive, noting that the 
transcription error nonetheless constitutes “a record of the taste, thought and values of a 
                                                
364 McKenzie, 26-27. 
365 As she reads eighteenth-century editors and critics enumerate one another’s errors, Gondris notes the 
incantatory quality of animadversion: “the mockingly repetitive rhythm and the relentless numbering of the 
notes suggesting not only an absurd voluminousness but a meaningless sequentiality in the commentary. 
However, running counter to this suggestion of an insanely disparate succession of notes, the contents of 
the clauses describe notes that are complexly interactive. New notes test themselves against old ones; each 
reading breeds the next. This hint of a compensating dynamism in the variorum commentary is borne out in 




critical school which significantly shaped our own choice of books, the way we read 
them” and the way they have been institutionalized. “Any history of the book—subject as 
books are to typographic and material change—must be a history of misreadings,” he 
argues. “This is not so strange as it might sound. Every society rewrites its past, every 
reader rewrites its texts, and if they have any continuing life at all, at some point every 
printer redesigns them.”366  
Following my work with Bentley, I want to think about how textual editors 
negotiate between practical concerns and theories of knowledge and error, specifically 
how they negotiate by self-reflexive, farrago-prone errancy rather than consolidating 
knowledge into agreed-upon interpretations. Writing about the multiplicity of 
interpretations, adaptations, and other remediations produced at the end of the 
seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries, Michael Dobson carves out the 
beneficial “experiences” with a text from the errant ones. He describes how “…individual 
readers either misappropriate Shakespeare’s text (if they are bad readers), or both 
appropriate them and are appropriated by them (if they are good readers).”367 Such 
reading might be said to be participating in Menippean discourse, “Menippean 
inclusiveness, its encyclopedic nature, promotes extremely intellectual texts. The mere 
act of including one text within another … constitutes an intellectual exercise; Menippean 
discourse, since it permits the inclusion of radically disparate texts within an antagonistic 
matrix, makes the act even more intellectual and a matter of playfulness and wit.”368 
Menippists could resemble both “good” and “bad” readers and critics who examine a 
                                                
366 Ibid. 
367 Michael Dobson, The Making of the National Poet: Shakespeare, Adaptation, and Authorship, 1660-
1769 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 11. 
368 Milowicki and Wilson, 307. 
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specimen , distending it with a kind of false cure of commentary, and then perhaps self-
reflexively commenting on the implications of such a mediation. Cloud  appropriates and 
is appropriated by his objects of study, but he challenges what good, accessible, clear 
writing about these readings could look like. McKenzie has already demonstrated another 
set of possibilities in considering so-called errors as artifacts of historical taste, 
idiosyncratic editorial choices, and I have proposed that we can study them as 
calcifications of figurative language that take on lives of their own.  
“Reading Readings focuses on the phenomenon of the emergence and 
development in the eighteenth century of a critical genre that changes the possibilities of 
appropriation,” argues Gondris. “This genre—the Shakespeare edition—complicates 
Dobson’s model because the formal procedures, constraints and purpose of an edition 
themselves reposition reader and text.”369 The remediating structure of the apparatus is 
both limiting for what it can render on a single printed page, and also enabling of 
discourses that can produce new kinds of self-reflexivity and conversation—and thus new 
kinds of knowledge. Likewise, the genre of Menippean satire dramatizes epistemological 
questions about how we know what we know, as it “is based on the feeling there is 
probably no abstract certainty outside of us that we can know, merely the infinitely 
elating possibility that there might be, if only we could get by the claptrap of our own 
concoctions.”370 Theobald the textual editor knows something about that claptrap. He is 
sometimes wrong, never in doubt; he is both liberated and confined by his conjectures, 
his stinging performances, and the hyper-media they create.    
 
                                                
369 Gondris, “Introduction,” ix, xxvii. 
370 Anne Payne, Chaucer and Menippean Satire (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), 5. 
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Lewis Theobald: Gardener and Menippean Satirist of Perspective 
 
Theobald’s language of an unweeded garden is remediated from Hamlet, but it is 
also a familiar image in writing about any perceived glut or proliferation of stuff. His 
faith in rational systems was perhaps too great for him to appreciate fully the ironies in 
his choice of metaphors: Hamlet’s existential difficulty is that life is always full of 
troubles. Sorting them out and then finding new ones is a demonstration of futility. What 
would Hamlet do with The Anatomy of Melancholy? Burton realizes the paradox, as he 
describes how readers will find his text a fertile ground full of beauties and faults alike: “I 
am but a smatterer, I confess, a stranger, here and there I pull a flower.”371 He warned 
that animadverting on his faults was likely to obscure any felicities in the text, for 
corrections have a way of proliferating: “I do easily grant, if a rigid censurer should 
criticise on this which I have writ, he should not find three sole faults, as Scaliger in 
Terence, but three hundred.” Swift’s proliferating apparatus to A Tale of a Tub, an 
embodiment of Menippean satire in its distortion of scholarly productions, also engages 
in weedy discourse:  
Besides, most of our late Satyrists seem to lye under a sort of Mistake; that 
because Nettles have the Prerogative to Sting, therefore all other weeds 
must do so too. I make not this Comparison out of the least Design to 
detract from these worthy Writers; for it is well known among 
Mythologists, that Weeds have the pre-eminence over all other 
Vegetables.372  
 
Further, Pope’s friend William Broome, who had assisted in annotating the Iliad and the 
Odyssey, criticized Theobald’s restoration project with a pointed reference to the 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 30. Weinbrot calls his chapter on Swift’s Menippean 
satires “The Preeminence of Weeds” (115). 
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unweeded garden by turning his own metaphor against him: “These learned triflers are 
more weeders of an author, they collect the weeds for their own use, and permit others to 
gather the herbs and flowers.”373 Such recitations, appropriations, recursion, over-
reaching metaphors, and pathetic fallacies are devices familiar from the previous 
chapters: they are themselves errors that generate new poetic critical perspectives on how 
to know and mediate the world through sensory experience.  
Theobald makes bold flourishes with his sensory metaphors to show his 
anatomical method’s power of perspective: “Or, perhaps, the very Frame of our Nature is 
concern’d; and the Dissecters of an Eye and Ear can tell us what Membranes, or Organs, 
we owe the Communication of Pleasures, in which the rational Soul has no Share.”374 
McLuhan used Pope as an example of Typographic Man in The Gutenberg Galaxy, but 
Theobald’s dedication poses a related theory of editorial remediation as a form of 
restoring the communication of the senses of a text, both its significations and its 
perspectives (both senses of the word). Describing those pleasures of the soul requires 
language to transmit those sensory experiences; Theobald the editor controls, explicates, 
mediates these metaphors into a coherent system. He sounds something like McLuhan 
and Fiore in The Medium is the Massage, who intone: “Until writing was invented, man 
lived in acoustic space: boundless, directionless, in the dark of the mind, in the world of 
emotion, by primordial intuition, by terror.”375 The Medium is the Massage is a kind of 
multimedia Menippean satire that transforms its discourse through estranging graphic 
design. McLuhan and Fiore continue to describe writing as a social technology that 
organizes the world: “Speech is a social chart of this bog. The goose quill put an end to 
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talk. It abolished mystery; it gave architecture and towns; it brought roads and armies, 
bureaucracy. It was the basic metaphor with which the cycle of civilization began, the 
step from the dark into the light of the mind.” Fittingly for Theobald’s prospect as 
illuminated by conjecture, the illustrated headnote to his Dedication to Shakespeare 
Restored shows a man holding a torch to light the way (see figure 4).  
As the final flourish to that progressive history of writing technologies, McLuhan 
and Fiore quote a quatrain that echoes Housman’s abstractions and metaphors in “The 
Application of Thought to Textual Criticism”: “Whence did the wondr’ous mystic art 
arise, / Of painting SPEECH, and speaking to the eyes? / That we by tracing magic lines 
are taught, / How to embody, and to colour THOUGHT?”376 The synesthetic metaphors 
are scattered over accounts of media history as media reframe other media, but they are 
also endemic to descriptions of textual criticism, where they signal the uneasiness about 
the conjectural, imaginative, mediating role of the editor. Housman has over-determined 
empiricism; Theobald and Bentley have over-zealous metaphors and figurative language 
to embellish their conjectures that are generated by their immersive, recursive 
inscriptions on their texts. In his 1765 editorial preface, Johnson registers his skepticism 
and protest about the method by making recourse to non-media: “Whatever could be 
done by adjusting points is therefore silently performed, in some plays with much 
diligence, in others with less; it is hard to keep a busy eye steadily fixed upon evanescent 
atoms, or a discursive mind upon evanescent truth.”377 Yet even this mark of “silence” on 
“evanescent” media is registered in editorial apparatus of prefatory material: even in 
protest, Johnson is still practicing and theorizing mediation. 
                                                
376 Ibid. McLuhan and Fiore do not cite their source for the poem, but it was popular in nineteenth-century 
miscellanies and essay collections on art and cognition, where it circulated anonymously. 
377 Johnson, 1765 Preface, 107. 
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The conjectural method’s inscriptions are always theoretical interventions. Seary 
jokes that “although Theobald made his chief life’s work an attempt to recover the 
‘authentic’ text of Shakespeare and then to impose stability and order upon it, his views 
on quarto and folio textuality and the sociology of textual production perhaps exceed the 
wildest dreams of Barthes, Foucault, and McKenzie” as he theorizes multiple mediating 
agents and competing forms of agency.378 Kastan, Orgel, and other historians of theatrical 
remediation may quibble with some of Theobald’s claims about his editorial practice: 
Many Pieces were taken down in Short-hand, and imperfectly copied by 
Ear, from a Representation: Others were printed from piece-meal Parts 
surreptitiously obtain’d from the Theatres, uncorrect, and with out the 
Poet’s Knowledge. To some of these Causes we owe the train of 
Blemishes, that deform those Pieces which stole singly into the World in 
our Author’s Life-time. There are still other Reasons, which may be 
suppos’d to have affected the whole Set. When the Players took upon 
them to publish his Works intire every Theatre was ransack’d to supply 
the Copy; and the Parts collected which had gone thro’ as many changes 
as Performers, either from Mutilations or Additions made to them. Hence 
we derive many Chasms and Incoherences in the Sense and Matter. Scenes 
were frequently transposed, and shuffled out of their true Actor. Hence 
much Confusion and Impropriety has attended, and embarras’d, the 
Business and Fable. For there ever have been, and ever will be in Play-
houses, a Set of assuming Directors, who know better than the Poet 
himself the Connexion and Dependance of his Scenes; where Matter is 
defective, or Superfluities to be retrench’d; Persons, that have the Fountain 
of Inspiration as peremptorily in them, as King have That of Honour. To 
these obvious causes of Corruption it must be added, that our Author has 
lain under the Disadvantage of having his Errors propagated and 
multiplied by Time: because, for near a Century, his Works were 
republish’d from the faulty Copies without the assistance of any intelligent 
Editor: which has been the Case likewise of many a Classic Writer.379 
 
Theobald can render the abstract prospect of conjecture and self-promotion in lofty 
language, yet he can also populate a scene of vivid characters and action. He mixes high 
and low discourses here, plays with metaphor, moves from details to conjectural theories 
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of remediation. He accounts for both agents and forms of agency. Perhaps he is not an 
entirely correct theatrical historian, but here he shows his talent as a Menippean satirist of 
remediation. His account is like McKenzie’s not only in its subject (how errors are 
perpetuated) but in its self-conscious attempt to narrate errancy by zooming in and 
zooming out, delighting in the swoop. 
 In assessing this scene of meddling and negligent mediators with nods toward 
future disciplinary protocols from structuralism, post-structuralism, and cultural studies-
inflected book history, Seary gestures toward a thought experiment about theory as a 
form of mediation, even when it exists in the meta-theoretical realm of ahistorical 
speculation or anachronism in comparing Theobald to Barthes, Foucault, and McKenzie. 
The anachronism indicates the ways that historical conceptions of mediation and agency 
account for contingencies and disruptions before there is recognizable vocabulary for 
those phenomena. They are part of Theobald’s, Pope’s, and Johnson’s donnée. But Seary 
also makes a crucial mediation slippage in his idealizing of his biographical subject. In 
Seary’s description, Theobald’s theatrical training allows him “to strip away the veil of 
print and imagine the nature of the manuscript before a compositor, as well as the kind of 
misreadings such a manuscript might induce.”380 Describing Theobald’s immersion in the 
conventions of theatrical manuscript transmission, Seary falls into the double logic of 
remediation: he wishes for Theobald to have a pure, unmediated sense for theatrical 
protocols, but he frames that argument in terms of Theobald’s proficiency in sorting 
through the ephemeral hyper-mediations of theatrical stuff. “The veil of print” is 
figurative language that feels, literally, like a means of covering up the gaps of 
Theobald’s knowledge as well as the variety and strangeness of his description of 
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multiple mediations.381 Thus the next names on that list after Barthes, Foucault, and 
McKenzie could be Bolter and Grusin, who can help Seary assess how adaptation is a 
form of remediation, how editors frame other editors, and so on. 
Theobald delights in the role as conjectural editor who not only remediates his 
extensive knowledge of theatrical ephemera and protocols as he offers conjectures for 
emendations but also remedies the text as a moral corrector. He wants his mediations to 
remain “restored”—a kind of inverse of Pope’s “wrong Corrections,” in that the text 
cannot be de-mediated to a prior pure state, as it is always remediated through editorial 
work. He becomes a theorist of Depravity as he records emendations, gives reason for the 
corrections, and conjectures at other possible readings. In his explanation of the “pointing 
gestures,” or footnotes he uses, he explains that “without such Notes, these Passages in 
subsequent Editions would be liable, thro’ the Ignorance of Printers and Correctors, to 
fall into the old Confusion. Whereas, a Note on every one hinders all possible Return to 
Depravity, and for ever secures them in a State of Purity and Integrity not to be lost or 
forfeited.”382 He sees possibilities for correction on nearly every page: “As there are very 
few Pages in Shakespeare, upon which some Suspicions of Depravity do not reasonably 
arise; I have thought it my Duty, in the first place by a diligent and laborious Collation to 
take in the Assistances of all the older Copies.”383 “Depravity” is reiterated multiple times 
in order to signal Theobald’s prowess at managing both meanings of error and moral 
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decrepitude—the editor’s raison d’être is in its correction of both meanings of the word. 
To frame these editorial interactions in terms of a negative argument of “hinder[ing] any 
Possible Return to Depravity” is for Theobald a way to elevate himself and his method, 
but it also creates the possibility of seeing this interaction as a mediating tool. He 
describes his goal to set a rational, moral order to the editing process: “Emendations are 
so far from being arbitrary or capricious that They are establish’d with a very high 
Degree of moral Certainty.” With this overstated claim, he projects conjecture forward as 
a kind of progress narrative from text to civilization. 
Conjecture is an expansive, abstract practice, so it’s no wonder that it’s mediated 
in such flowery, moralized language. In his 1765 Preface to Shakespeare’s Works, 
Johnson assesses the history and future of conjectural criticism as he mediates his own 
guesses in the apparatus to that edition—for he knew those guesses would be remediated 
in even more expansive footnotes in future editions. He is hard on Theobald for preening 
about his metaphorical, moralized cures for depravity, calling them relatively minor 
interventions that took up large amounts of inscription. He also seizes on Pope’s disdain 
for collating multiple transmissions in favor of exercising a single judgment: 
This was a work which Pope seems to have thought unworthy of his 
abilities, being not able to suppress his contempt of the dull duty of an 
editor. He understood but half his undertaking. The duty of a collator is 
indeed dull, yet, like other tedious tasks is very necessary. … In perusing 
a corrupted piece, he must have before him all possibilities of meaning, 
with all possibilities of expression. Such must be his comprehension of 
thought, and such his copiousness of language. Out of many readings 
possible, he must be able to select that which best suits with the state, 
opinions, and modes of language prevailing in every age, and with his 
authour’s particular cast of thought, and turn of expression.384  
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Johnson was skeptical of the practice for the leaps it engendered, the gaps in knowledge 
that were exposed to future readers. Yet twenty years later, he, too, is tagged with the 
criticism for the hyper-mediation for his additions to new variorum editions:  
Dr. Johnson, from an excess of candour, and perhaps from a diffidence of 
the industry he had employed upon the subject, adopted a multiplicity of 
notes from various writers into his edition. Mr. Stevens [sic] has carefully 
preserved all this farrago, and beside it, we are now treated with the 
annotations of himself, Dr, Farmer, Mr. Tyrwhitt, Mr. Malone, 
&c.&c.&c.&c. So that, in the state in which the author now lies before us, 
Tacitus cum notis variorum is nothing to him….385 
 
Johnson shows the way that the remediating functions of textual criticism as Menippean 
discourse are both self-critical and generative: the distorting glass is turned at oneself and 
one’s peers/rivals, but it is also used as a tool for producing knowledge. Even, indeed 
especially as he engaged in the practice, he was wary of the recursive method of running 
back on oneself to produce more insights and wondered when or if that loop could close. 
That doubt is a necessary component of such an epistemological endeavor, for the 
expression of limitations is enabling of more reflection. From his perspective in 1765, 
before there was quite so much farrago, he expresses a hope and a warning at the same 
time: “Conjectural criticism demands more than humanity possesses, and he that 
exercises it with most praise has very frequent need of indulgence. Let us now be told no 
more of the dull duties of an editor.”386  
 
Errors as Moments of Change—or Moments To Change 
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Why are dullness and glut paired together so often in assessing disciplinary 
trends? The very pattern in their co-appearances, from the Dunciad onward, might be an 
indication that the critique is reflexive without being incisive (that is, there is a dull glut 
of critiques about dull gluts). The charge produces passionate responses, nevertheless. 
Assessing the diverse field of book history/histories in 2002, Robert Darnton returns to 
the proliferating metaphor of the unweeded garden—now grown into a forest as the 
metaphor expands yet further— to describe this “interdisciplinarity run riot”:  
[The history of books] now looks less like a field than a tropical rain 
forest. The explorer can hardly make his way across it. At every step he 
becomes entangled in a luxuriant undergrowth of journal articles and 
disoriented by the crisscrossing of disciplines—analytical bibliography 
pointing in this direction, the sociology of knowledge in that while history, 
English, and comparative literature stake out overlapping territories.387 
 
Is the foundation beneath Darnton’s disciplines trembling, or is there some other tectonic 
metaphor to invoke? For their parts, Eisenstein and Johns have strong opinions about how 
to cultivate those gardens; their debates provoke further commentary and different means 
of synthesizing or seizing distinctions from their work.388 One can tell by his detailed list 
of possible avenues of investigation that Darnton is not entirely condemning the hyper-
fertile state of the many overlapping interests, methods, objects of study, and social 
practices. Rather, he is describing a discipline that can’t help but be self-reflexive as it 
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studies how previous scholars have produced knowledge and how they approached 
changing technologies and institutional priorities. Book history as a discipline is 
recursive—just like Menippean satire. (There are even more perspectives to take into 
consideration: for example, he does not even mention media histories outside of the study 
of the book or statistical textual study.) 
In a special 2009 issue of Representations about the future of reading, Leah Price 
notes a similar proliferation in the fields of book history, but she uses it to call for more, 
different kinds of work. She recalls Pope’s and Theobald’s rhetorical fancies when she 
notes that  
…the bibliographical turn begins to look less like a flight from reading 
than a war on metaphor. For a hermeneutics of suspicion, substitute a 
poetics of deflation: the shift from text to book implies a slide from the 
literary to the literal, from the abstract to the concrete … A dogged (or 
mulish) taste for the mundane, the contingent, and the simple-minded 
finds its only outlet in puns. In a discipline that prides itself on discerning 
hidden depths, superficiality shocks like a purloined letter.389 
 
Price’s language here is self-reflexively critical: she sighs at metaphor and puns, yet she 
also engages in her own figurative, allusive language of stubborn animals and purloined 
letters. The proliferation has self-reflexive, emergent qualities: I believe this is the 
Menippean discourse bubbling up and allowing other literary discourses more familiar 
from poetry and fiction to attach themselves to critical insights about textual production. 
This ability to join genres of criticism and fiction is what makes McLuhan’s, 
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McKenzie’s, Cloud’s, and Theobald’s stories of history and errancy into imaginative 
writing; it is what makes Pynchon’s encyclopedic novels able to incorporate so much 
media theory into their carnivals and satires.  
That generic function of mixing discourses and frames of remediation reveals 
itself most visibly at moments of change, when there is a desire to assess how and where 
disciplines got to be where they are. In assessing Theobald’s historicist impulses and 
shortcomings, Kramnick cites Theobald’s appropriation of many aesthetic discourses in 
his attempt to situate his editorial method: he “draws on metaphors taken whole cloth 
from the discourse of aesthetics to authorize his own project and elevate Shakespeare. 
White the trajectory of Theobaldian method is to disengage the aesthetic from criticism, 
and the latter from editing, these binaries are not as much realized in Theobald’s project 
as retroactively discovered by his followers.”390 Satirizing Theobald’s unweeded garden 
in 1756, the playwright Arthur Murray proclaims the trend in editorial prospects through 
the figurative language from Shakespeare’s plays, through not just Hamlet but also 
Macbeth and A Midsummer Night’s Dream, finally, recursively, incorporating other 
editors and authors into the prospect crowded with allusions: 
The great Shakespear sat upon a Cliff, looking abroad through all 
Creation. His possessions were very near as extensive as Homer’s; but in 
some places, had not received sufficient culture. But even there 
spontaneous Flowers shot up, and in the unweeded Garden which grows to 
seed, you might cull Lavender, Myrtle, and Wild Thyme. Craggy rock 
hills, and dales, the woodland and open country, struck the eye with wild 
variety, and o’er our heads roll’d Thunder, deep and awful, and the 
Lightning’s flash darted athwart the solemn scene; while on the blasted 
Heath, Witches, Elves, and Fairies, with their own Queen Mab, play’d in 
frolic gambols. Mean time the immortal Bard sat with his eyes in a fine 
frenzy rolling, and writers both in the Tragic and Comic stile were 
gathered round him. Aristotle seemed to lament that Shakespeare had not 
studied his art of Poetry, and Longinus admired him to a degree of 
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enthusiasm. Otway, Rowe, and Congreve had him constantly in their eye, 
and even Milton was looking for Flowers to transplant into his own 
Paradise.391 
 
Gray’s flowery language is a satire of Theobald’s own recursive metaphor, but it is also a 
reminder of how Menippean discourse grafts itself onto other discourses by means of 
imitating figurative language. It exposes the structures and artifices of others’ writings by 
showing them to be formulaic and composed of other texts—this exposure is not a 
positive or negative function on its own, for all learning is in some sense a kind of artifice 
made out of manufactured insights and theories. There is no knowledge already “out 
there” to be perceived as an object; our prospects are composed of generative errors in 
remediating past media into new forms. 
Assessing the scene of clotted variorum editions in 1781, philosopher and 
aesthetic theorist James Harris praises conjectural criticism but warns editors of growing 
too sure of their ability to conjecture. Harris reanimates the over-used anatomical 
metaphors as a means of raising a concern about their limitations, self-consciously 
showing the conflict between the scientific language and the artistry involved in filling in 
the gaps of conjecture. Like Price, he mixes critical and literary metaphors of artificial 
structures: “Authors have been taken in hand like anatomical subjects, only to display the 
skill and abilities of the Artist,” he writes.392 There is a kind of confusion of editor and 
author function in this hyper-mediation: “the end of many an Edition seems often to have 
been no more than to exhibit the great sagacity and erudition of an Editor. The Joy of the 
Task was the Honour of mending, while Corruptions were sought with a more than 
common attention, as each of them afforded a testimony to the Editor and his Art.”  
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The generic function of mixing discourses and frames of remediation reveals 
itself most valuably at moments of change, when the self-reflection becomes too inward-
looking and the discipline feels too immersed in itself. There is a kind of disciplinary 
double logic of critical remediation, of being immersed in one’s own procedures but also 
feeling wary of too much critical mediation in the fields of study. Darnton self-
protectively, ironically longs for immersion in watermarks, say, and so he is keen to 
notice what he perceives to be errors or too-heavy mediations. He wonders if the overfull 
prospect could produce errors in overreaching scholarship that extends beyond its means: 
“The history of books has become so crowded with ancillary disciplines that one can no 
longer see its general contours.”393 But Theobald, Pope, and Johnson made similar 
critiques in that very figurative language as they assessed hyper-mediation: to notice a 
problem of perspective is to become aware of one’s situation in the double logic of 
remediation.  
With McKenzie’s and Cloud’s thought experiments/Menippean editorial 
satire/remediations in mind, I want to end this chapter with a thought experiment in 
overcrowding perspectives. I will juxtapose Bentley’s and Theobald’s hyper-mediated, 
conjectural prospect made of dilations on others’ errors with William Hogarth’s Satire on 
False Perspective (1754), which served as the humorous frontispiece to his friend John 
Joshua Kirby’s Method of Perspective.394  Kirby’s pamphlet was a remediation of Brook 
Taylor’s treatise on linear perspective from 1715, which was revised in 1719 and then 
adapted by mathematicians and perspectival painters alike throughout the eighteenth 
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... Being an attempt to make the art of perspective easy and familiar; to adapt it intirely to the arts of 




century. Kirby and Taylor both must find a way to mediate precise directions for visual 
mediation of a perspective in clear language. That remediation problem is a kind of 
thought experiment: how do you direct someone in language how to mediate a visual 
perspective? In addition to step-by-step instructions of perspectival procedures, they used 
diagrams to instruct readers how to draw their own projections and structures. In The 
Gutenberg Galaxy, McLuhan assesses the cultural implications of perspectival drawing 
and how that tool designates a position for situating one’s self and one’s knowledge: 
“The arbitrary selection of a single static position creates a pictorial space with a 
vanishing point. This space can be filled in bit by bit, and is quite different from non-
pictorial space in which each thing simply resonates or modulates its own space visually 
in two-dimensional form.”395  
The artist Hogarth does not have to worry about that text-to-language remediation 
thought experiment, so he. He makes his own remediation thought experiment in 
rendering as many errors in perspective as he can in his Satire: 
It is both a summary and parody of the artistic obsession with laws and 
systems of perspective, In this world it is as if the student of Alberti’s 
Della Pittura got just about everything wrong. The gentlemen in the right 
foreground casts a line into the river, but it drops behind the rod of another 
fisherman sitting on the bank in the middle ground of the composition. A 
woman leans out of an upper-story window to light a torch that man is 
carrying on a hill far beyond her, and a tavern sign swings form a wooden 
bracket whose arms are attached to parts of buildings that are spatially 
removed form one another. These visual puzzles and perspective mishaps 
were perhaps intended as a wake-up call to those artists who did not 
trouble to educate themselves in the laws of perspective, or perhaps they 
covertly cautioned artists against adhering to rules on paper rather than 
relying on their eyes to replicate reality.396 
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I like to think of Hogarth’s image as a visual Menippean satire that calls up not only the 
generative thought experiments in perspectival confusion that have bedeviled and enabled 
Pope, Bentley, and Theobald, but also as a kind of visual representation of many of the 
eighteenth century’s Menippean satires that Weinbrot mentioned in his long list. I can 
see—or perceive through my juxtapositional critical tools—Walton’s Compleat Angler, 
the urban confusion of the Dunciad, Swift’s satires of religion in the flattened church and 
his Lilliputians and Brobdingnagians in Gulliver’s Travels, and others. I put it in a 
genealogy of visual Menippean satires with McLuhan and Fiore, McCleod/Cloud, and 
my own work in remediating Hogarth in glitch art.  
Writing on The Poetics of Perspective, James Elkins argues for perspectival 
treatises like Taylor’s and Kirby’s as a moments in the history of epistemology and not 
just art history. Perspectives are tools: “The point of this excursion is to demonstrate not 
only the obvious fact that there is always error but that the amount of error is often large 
and even small discrepancies can block the retrieval of ideal geometry in part or in 
whole.”397 He continues with a statement that is as applicable to textual editing as it is to 
art history, as Theobald would have recognized well:  
Some discrepancies between paintings and their ideal geometries are 
unresolvable in the sense that refining the analyses will not help, and we 
must wait until new information comes to life if we hope to make any 
                                                                                                                                            
feet wide, considerably larger than Hogarth’s work). Fichner-Rathus calls it a “parody of a parody.” 
Hockney chose to parody the parody “because of its rather whimsical feeling. You could see what it was 
about, how Hogarth meant it; if you did not know the rules of perspective, ghastly errors like this would 
occur. But I was attracted to what Hogarth thought were the ghastly errors and I thought I also saw that 
they created space just as well, if not better, than the correct perspective he was praising.” In this way, 
Hockney saw the satire as generative of his own remediation and the errors that were being satirized as 
generative in their own way. The art history textbook from which this compare/contrast exercise was taken 
is another form of remediation, in that Fichner-Rathus has to describe Hogarth’s scene in language (the 
image is also reproduced on the page) and quote Hockney’s explanation—multiple forms of mediation are 
present on the digital page. 
397 James Elkins, The Poetics of Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 224-26. 
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progress on them. Even when most a painting is accurate to near the limits 
of the medium, it can happen that the absence of a single piece of 
informant will vitiate an entire reconstruction. An instance is the interior 
in Velazquez’s Las Meninas: because there is no foreshortened square in 
the fictive space, the length and proportions of the room cannot be 
discovered from the painting itself. 
 
Elkins’ argument is a reminder that my experiments here have plenty of antecedents, 
most notably in Foucault’s (literal) reflection on Las Meninas at the beginning of The 
Order of Things, in which he notes the recursive effects of the play on perspective that 
engenders new disciplinary organizational structures. That painting is a marvel of mise en 
abyme, of the way that noticing oneself in the act of perception is a means of engendering 
new ways of organizing knowledge: “We are looking at a picture in which the painter is 
in turn looking out at us. A mere confrontation, eyes catching one another's glance, direct 
looks superimposing themselves upon one another as they cross.”398 Where do Theobald 
and Pope see Shakespeare: do they see themselves in him as they mediate their prospects 
of error? Foucault asks a provocative question for readers, editors, and remediators alike: 
“And yet this slender line of reciprocal visibility embraces a whole complex network of 
uncertainties, exchanges, and feints. The painter is turning his eyes towards us only in so 
far as we happen to occupy the same position as his subject.”  
                                                
398 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage 




Chapter 4: Culture is an Error: Mediating Conjectures in Thomas Percy’s Editorial 
Theories 
“A theory of cultural change is impossible without knowledge of the changing sense 
ratios effected by various externalizatons of our senses. It is very much worth dwelling 
on this matter, since we shall see that from the invention of the alphabet there has been a 
continuous drive in the Western world toward the separation of the senses… The paradox 
… is that the two-dimensional mosaic is, in fact, a multidimensional world of 
interstructural resonance. It is the three-dimensional world of pictorial space that is, 
indeed, an abstract illusion built on the intense separation of the visual from the other 
senses.” 
--Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy (1962)399  
 
“But to suggest that each of these editors is merely a stupid scoundrel is really to miss the 
broader point: their culpability is institutional. It lies in the tradition of editing and 
editorial commentary itself, which exists in the creation of culturally palatable 
displacements of the evidence. Thus, the editors' derivations one from another essentially 
manifest their cultural loyalty—loyalty to the substitute, which their actions over the 
generations render incrementally more and more familiar and credible, as the evidence 
becomes excrementally more and more quaint and disregarded. The consequence is that 
the evidence, and the culture that produced it, appear alien in the culture of editing, even 
as it claims to bridge it to us.”  
--Randall McLeod, FIAT fLUX, (1994)400 
 
 
Introduction: Thomas Percy’s Editorial Projects Are Part of the Gutenberg Galaxy 
 
 
The mosaic qualities and functions of McLuhan’s Gutenberg Galaxy allow it to 
be a member of multiple genres: as I have noted so far, those remediating and remediated 
genres include theories of sensory perception and confusion, grand editorial statement of 
purpose in remediating the past, and Menippean satire. McLuhan’s work also fits into the 
genre of the conjectural history that was popular in the Scottish Enlightenment of the 
                                                
399 McLuhan, 42-43. 
400 McLeod, “FIAT fLUX,” 127-28, italics and bold original. 
 
 231 
1760s and 1770s. Paula McDowell links McLuhan’s work to this historical genre in her 
genealogy of the terms “print culture” and “oral tradition”: “in the late eighteenth century 
we begin to see the idea of communications technologies as part of an inevitable, 
unfolding sequence of human history.”401 McLuhan’s project is recursive: it is conjectural 
history from a zoomed-out perspective about the history of perspectives and what kinds 
of historical consciousnesses (conjectures) arise from those prospects. Thus he can 
abstract theories about the nature of abstraction, as seen above. He can also theorize 
about how manuscript technology is diffuse and doesn’t lend itself to theory the way a 
fixed perspective of print does: “Manuscripts were altogether too slow and uneven a 
matter to provide either a fixed point of view or the habit of gliding steadily on single 
planes of thought and information. … [D]etached habits of observation are quite 
uncongenial to manuscript cultures, whether ancient Egyptian, Greek, or Chinese or 
medieval.”402 McLuhan’s work can be considered as another version of Thomas Percy’s 
conjectural history of oral traditions, Reliques of Ancient English Poetry (1765). Percy 
the editor explains his synthetic method of piecing together “independent chain[s] of 
poems” in thematic “series” (like mosaics):  “Such specimens of ancient poetry have 
been selected, as either show the gradation of our language, exhibit the progress of 
                                                
401 McDowell, “Mediating Media Past and Present: Toward a Genealogy of ‘Print Culture’ and ‘Oral 
Tradition,’” 244. Before she arrives at these conjectural histories, her genealogy of “the eighteenth-century 
emergence of confrontational models of print and oral tradition” (243) moves from the seventeenth-century 
oratory tradition to Pope’s Dunciad and Swift’s Tale of a Tub, touching on theological debates about fixing 
Scriptural interpretations in sermons and in printed materials, to debates about the oral origins of Homer’s 
epics as they were debated in the Battle of the Books, into the elocution movement, and toward the ballad 
revival and its ensuing scholarly debates about authority, authenticity, and national origins of culture. 
Among the conjectural histories, she names Adam Smith’s Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1762-
63), Adam Ferguson’s Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), William Robertson’s A View of the 
Progress of Society (1769) and History of the Discovery  and Settlement of America (1777) and Henry 
Home, Lord Kames’s Sketches of the History of Man (1778). 
402 McLuhan, 28. 
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popular opinions, display the peculiar manners and customs of former ages, or throw 
light on our earliest classical poets.”403 
Percy styled himself as an editor not just of the English oral tradition but as a 
theorist of a worldwide manuscript culture who would disseminate these studies in print 
for wider study. Sounding something like McLuhan, Percy described this work: “the first 
attempts at composition among all barbarous nations are ever found to be poetry and 
song. The praises of their gods, and the achievements of their heroes, are usually changed 
at their festival meetings. These are the first rudiments of history.”404 During the 1760s, 
he devoted himself to and engaged his colleagues in various projects to remediate 
manuscripts and other cultural artifacts into print with significant editorial interventions 
to explicate those “peculiar manners and customs” of many nations. Like the other editors 
I have discussed so far, he sees remediation in both senses of the word: to polish faults 
through editorial remedy and to re-mediate them into the cultural histories of “manners 
and customs of former ages” and “the progress of popular opinions” like those 
conjectural histories that were also being published. McDowell calls the Reliques an 
“idealized narrative of ‘oral itinerant poets,’” stressing how Percy, his editorial 
collaborators, and other balladeers “forged a sharp conceptual (not actual) separation 
between ‘oral’ and ‘print’ ballads. In so doing, they contributed to the later binary of 
‘orality and literacy’ that many ballad scholars are still working to undo today.”405  
“Conceptual (not actual)”: that phrase is important beyond McDowell’s work of 
distinction-making. Conjectural criticism shifts between these two states, generating 
corrections, satires, theories of knowledge and media—and sometimes errors that mistake 
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404 Percy, Reliques, III:ii.  
405 McDowell, 243, quoting Percy’s Reliques, xlix. 
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a notion for a fact, and vice versa. The conjectural history does similar generic work of 
abstracting “the human mind,” as Mary Poovey quotes from William Robertson’s History 
of Scotland (1759), into a concept that can perceive itself and its agencies progressing 
over time. In The History of the Modern Fact, Poovey argues that the problem of 
induction (which is associated with Bacon and bedeviled Housman in the nineteenth 
century) “challenged the assumption that particulars one had yet to observe would 
resemble the particular one has already seen; to address the problem of induction, the 
philosopher had to explain how one could assume that systematic knowledge could be 
generated from what was inevitably an incomplete survey.”406 In conjectural histories, 
these abstractions generated notions of facticity and systematic knowledge. As 
conjectural criticism moves away from Bentley’s scholarly editing toward treating texts 
as cultural objects, the method’s abstractions also created slippages and conflations like 
that print/orality conceptualization that concerns McDowell in both Percy’s Reliques and 
McLuhan’s.visionary media theory.  
McDowell situates McLuhan and Percy in the genre of conjectural history so she 
can account for those kinds of sweeping generalizations across time and space as a 
convention rather than a problem or a fatal flaw in the projects, but she is still skeptical of 
the ways McLuhan’s works have been taken as historical studies rather than works of 
visionary literature. She is especially perplexed by the enduring popularity of McLuhan’s 
term “print culture” as it has made itself adaptable in so many discourses, noting that its 
proliferation owes something to its slipperiness and indistinctions: “McLuhan employed 
the term ‘print culture’ as one among many similar terms (‘typographic era,’ ‘Gutenberg 
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Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 215.  
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era,’ ‘mechanical era,’ ‘electric age,’ and so forth).“407 The phrase is associated with 
Elizabeth Eisenstein’s The Printing Press as an Agent of Change, where it takes on a life 
and agency of its own although Eisenstein only mentions it in passing, as well. McDowell 
notes that “it seems remarkable that Eisentstein’s explanation of her use of this specific 
term in her eight-hundred-page work consists of a brief remark in the preface and two 
footnotes in the opening chapter” and yet it has traveled widely and hyper-productively: 
“despite three decades of critique and refinement of the term and concept of print culture, 
the proliferation of projects and institutions under the rubric of ‘print culture’ studies 
seems if anything to have intensified.” For her part, Eisenstein notes that “the term print 
culture has been employed in so many diverse contexts that it is in danger of becoming a 
cliché.”408 (It’s fitting, perhaps, that “cliché” is a French onomatopoeia of the sound that 
a printing press makes when it delivers the impression of a printing plate!) 
McDowell is writing in the genre of genealogy, in which the work of distinction 
and the study of conflation are attendant processes by which she may study how orality 
and print became conceptualized and defined against each other. Foucault’s description 
of the gray process of minute documentary study—tracing conflicts, erasures and 
decaying, disputed documents—sounds much like Pope’s “dull duty of an editor” or 
Theobald’s weeds. There is farrago everywhere. Genealogies are textual studies of 
knowledge that has been crossed out, attenuated, or under-cited. Genealogy rejects the 
sweep of the conjectural history and explores how “the world of speech and desires has 
known invasions, struggles, plundering, disguises, ploys,”409 but it is also interested in the 
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conjectural history’s constitutive conventions of zoomed-out perspectives and recursive 
arguments about how to assess change over time (and imagine futurity).  
What is the role of error in this kind of genealogy, and what does one do when 
one sees it? It is understandable to want to correct these errors or slippages to gain clarity 
and greater explanatory power for one’s critical terminology. Yet the histories of errant 
readings from Pope, Bentley, and Theobald indicate the recursive nature of these 
corrections and reframings: errors accumulate through the very means that one uses to 
correct them. Taking a harder line than McDowell, Eisenstein’s recent critics such as 
Adrian Johns and Joseph Dane have identified these conflations and under-historicized 
references—errors, they call them—in histories of print technology, and they are 
concerned about the knowledge that is produced from that kind of abstraction. Arguing 
against Eisenstein for “the discreet charm of the discrete,” Dane writes how the very 
definition of evidence in these studies of print culture is already an artifact of our 
scholarly methods to conceptualize it: “the myth of print culture, and the identities of its 
objects—these things are now as entrenched in popular culture as they are embedded in 
scholarly culture.”410  
Yet in evoking the discrete, Dane has also repeated another abstraction—
“culture”—that emerged from eighteenth-century conjectural histories like Percy’s. 
Raymond Williams famously said in Keywords that “culture” is one of the two or three 
most complicated words in the English language”; he traced its moment of conceptual 
proliferation to the early nineteenth century, where “literature” also becomes an emergent 
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phenomenon.411 Jenny Davidson has traced how the term “culture” proliferates into 
multiple discourses of parentage, education, literary taste, scientific study, and 
ethnography, among others, during the eighteenth century. She sorts through the related 
uses of biology, breeding, and human nature and “[lays] them out in a sort of mosaic that 
shows unexpected and revealing facets, not just of eighteenth-century discussion, but also 
of the ways in which we continue to explore and explain human nature.”412 The term is 
proliferated through its very slipperiness—and debates about how slippery it is.  
In critiques of this proliferation, there is a pattern of reiteration turning to 
saturation turning to error. In Reassembling the Social, Bruno Latour traces the 
proliferation of “social” as a concept that became too useful and then not useful at all.  
The widespread citation of D.F. McKenzie’s term “sociology of texts” is one indicator of 
that concept’s popularity, as it served first as a multiplicity-encouraging corrective of 
New Bibliography’s claims to isolating texts outside of production and attempting to 
perfect a text through an invocation of recovering authorial intention. It becomes a given 
rather than an argument when it is invoked later. “Sociology of texts” becomes part of a 
foundation for criticizing Eisenstein’s large-scale “print culture” as Johns details the 
many agents who interact with print. Following Latour, Siskin and Warner have argued 
that “as with the concept of social in sociology, our emancipatory deployment of culture 
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what seemed to me very different implications, a use which made it almost equivalent to society: a 
particular way of life. …I looked up culture, almost casually in one of the thirteen volumes of what we now 
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may empty and simplify the objects it examines.”413 There is a recursive nature to these 
critiques of the diminishing returns of recursive scholarship, as they assess errors large 
and small in order to reframe investigations and objects of study. 
I am interested in this phenomenon as it generates from the problem of examining 
texts and concepts together in eighteenth-century conjectural genres like Percy’s. His 
blending of conjectural criticism and history lets us see how these two terms—print (as 
distinct from orality) and culture—became grafted onto one another through corrections 
that reified the abstractions. They are both vague on their own, both historicized in 
contentious ways, yet their combination is seemingly proliferable in many academic and 
popular discourses through corrective reframings and remediations. “A synthetic concept 
of print culture can do little to accommodate a multiplicity of readings,” argues Johns in 
his defense of Eisenstein’s critique of The Nature of the Book.414 Yet in many ways a 
synthetic—or synthesized—concept of print culture has generated a multiplicity of 
readings, and the errors remain embedded in tricky ways because they are both 
foundational and obvious as errors, so where does correction start and stop? To quote 
Siskin and Warner, is the “strategic vagueness” of the term “an inviting flexibility” or a 
“dirty secret”?415 What does it mean to attempt to correct that vagueness—what other 
unpredictable, non-purposive corrections have stemmed from that attempt at reassessing 
changes over time?  
Percy’s projects were successful in some sense at reinvigorating ballad collection 
and other antiquarian miscellanies in the middle of the eighteenth century. At the same 
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time, their reach almost always exceeded their grasp and most of the projects actually 
present a more interesting case for the problems of rendering print and culture together. It 
was not just that the tasks of collection, collation, translation, annotation, and discussion 
were complicated interactions; further, the agencies generated by these materials stymy 
or glitch the practices of close-reading, contextualization, historicity, and cultural theory 
that have been cited as the foundational disciplinary practices of the Reliques. 
 
‘A Huge Farrago of Learned Lumber’: Variorum Culture and Cultures  
 
 The Ancients-Moderns debate about editing the past for moral exemplarity or for 
knowledge production—mediating one’s taste or one’s learning—continued to have 
currency after Bentley, Pope, Swift, and others stopped reiterating and expanding their 
opprobria. Percy and his colleagues worked on editions of classical texts before they 
turned to English and Scottish ballads, and their debates about the design and editorial 
paratexts for those editions are familiar from previous versions of contests over 
mediation.416 In Always Already New, Lisa Gitelman assesses the documentary status of 
records and other texts in terms of arguments about technological and cultural change 
over time. Changes in media synecdochize larger concerns about changes in mediation:  
Records and documents are kernels of humanistic thought, of the 
specifically modern hermeneutical project that has been associated since 
the nineteenth century with university departments of history and literature 
                                                
416 Leah Dennis reads Percy’s editorial work through the lens of the Ancients-Moderns debate. See 
“Thomas Percy: Antiquarian vs. Man of Taste.” PMLA 57:1 (March 1942), 140-154. “It might be possible 
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writes Levine in The Battle of the Books (414). 
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as well as many broader, less academic institutions of public memory, like 
libraries and museums, and other resonant forms of authoritative cultural 
self-identification, such as anthologies, reference books, bibliographies, 
and similar compendiums. What these structures all variously entail is the 
cultural impulse to preserve and interpret, or better, yet, interpret and 
preserve, since taking their analysis down to the unit level of records and 
documents helps to reveal the interpretative structures that are always 
already in play within any urge or act to preserve.417 
 
Gitelman calls these documents and their protocols of preservation and analysis “the data 
of culture.” Her self-correction—“the cultural impulse to preserve and interpret” gets 
reversed to “better yet, to interpret and preserve”—is an echo of the contentious 
Ancients-Moderns debate about how those two protocols should be carried out.418 
Correcting the order of operations from preserve/interpret to interpret/preserve is a way 
of solidifying the protocols’ status as cultural data. The proliferation of arguments about 
that status becomes, reflexively, the evidence that’s used to recover those moments of 
contested mediation, but they never exist “outside” of that evidentiary status.  
Percy and his friend James Grainger rehearsed a version of the Ancients-Moderns 
debates about editorial mediation when they worked together on a translation of Tibullus 
in 1759, yet their concerns hinged on the practical rather than the theoretical dimensions 
of textual transmission. Grainger attempts to mediate between appealing to scholarship 
and taste in the design and paratext of the book—and ends up overcrowding it with notes 
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2006), xi-xii. 
418 It is also a reminder of how that phrase will take on political meanings later in the century in Edmund 
Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the Proceedings in Certain Societies in London 
Relative to That Event, (1790) ed. Conor Cruise O'Brien. (New York: Penguin Classics, 1986): “At once to 
preserve and to reform is quite another thing. When the useful parts of an old establishment are kept, and 
what is superadded is to be fitted to what is retained, a vigorous mind, steady, persevering attention, various 
powers of comparison and combination, and the resources of an understanding fruitful in expedients, are to 
be exercised; they are to be exercised in a continued conflict with the combined force of opposite vices, 
with the obstinacy that rejects all improvement and the levity that is fatigued and disgusted with everything 
of which it is in possession. But you may object—‘A process of this kind is slow. It is not fit for an 
assembly which glories in performing in a few months the work of ages. Such a mode of reforming, 
possibly, might take up many years.’ Without question it might; and it ought” (164).  
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and appreciations alike. “The design of the translator is very different,” Grainger writes, 
for “he has commented on his author as a Roman poet, and as a Roman lover: and 
although he owns himself enamoured of his beauties, (as who can draw a pleasing 
resemblance of a face which disgusts him?) he hopes he has not been blind to his 
imperfections.”419 He preserves the notes from previous translators and adds conjectures 
from himself and Percy, though those are separated as endnotes rather than footnotes. 
Grainger uses familiar metaphors to describe this work, which was somewhere between 
preservation of the social translation history and interpretation about which readings to 
retain and which could be edited out: “Tibullus required much of this weeding.”420 
Furthermore, the editorial work was designed “to dispel those Mists of Obscurity thro’ 
which one People has hitherto beheld another, which was to extend and elevate the 
Understanding; and to unite the more rational Part of our Fellow Creatures in one Social 
Family.”421 
Grainger’s “Social Family” is a more positive term for interactions with other 
editors than the Ancients or Moderns partisans would have used, a middle-ground-
seeking desire to preserve others’ interpretations as the highest priority of mediation of 
texts. It anticipates McKenzie’s statement of purpose for “the sociology of texts” to study 
variants as cultural data that provide “access…to social motives: by dealing with the facts 
                                                
419 Ibid, emphasis added. 
420 James Grainger. Advertisement to Poetical Translation of the Works of Tibullus, (London, 1758), 12. 
Scaliger (1577), the Dutch Brockhusius (1708), the English John Dart (1720), and the Italian Vulpius 
(1749). In the first edition of the translation, Percy insisted on leaving the Latin text on the page as a record 
of its cultural import, which Grainger worried would overwhelm the text but agreed to do: “as it is 
according to the Laws of Typography, …your version is to occupy the upper part of every page, and your 
friend’s [Tibullus’s] text is to be degraded to the bottom.” See Grainger to Percy, August 1, 1758. 
Illustrations of the Literary History of the Eighteenth Century, ed. John Nichols 8 vols (London, 1817-58), 
VII:261-2. 
421 James Grainger, Letter to Tobias Smollett, MD, Occasioned by Critical Remarks Upon a Late 
Translation of Tibullus (London, 1759), 25. 
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of transmission and the material evidence of reception, it can make discoveries as distinct 
from inventing meanings.” (“Inventing meanings” is a provocative statement about how 
McKenzie sees contemporary forms of conjecture!) He continues: “[Social] bibliography, 
simply by its own comprehensive logic, its indiscriminate inclusiveness, testifies to the 
fact that new readers of course make new texts, and that their new meanings are a 
function of their new forms.”422 Gitelman and McKenzie do not study the same kinds of 
media documents—they would consider themselves as tilling different fields in book 
history—yet McKenzie’s repetition of “new” calls up Always Already New. Gitelman 
appropriates that much appropriated critical formulation (framed variously by Kant, 
Marx, Heidegger, and others) to describe how the “novelty years, transitional states, and 
identity crises of different media” (in McKenzie’s case, in bibliographers’ mediating 
approaches to textual study) “stand to tell us much, about the course of media history and 
about the broad conditions by which media and communication have been shaped.”423 
Historically, McKenzie’s proposal of “the sociology of texts” occurs at the intersection of 
Eisenstein’s work being popularized and the widespread translation and American and 
British institutionalization of poststructuralist and semiotic approaches to literary study. 
That intersection is also important to situate in technological terms: before the Internet 
had changed notions of social media interactions but after the heyday of the facsimile 
edition as a means of enabling access to historical documents in academic libraries that 
could not afford to buy the limited number of material copies of older texts. 
Yet the success of the term in book history also occurred in part because of what, 
following Siskin and Warner, might be called its “strategic vagueness,” coupled with the 
                                                
422 McKenzie, 59. 
423 Gitelman, 1. 
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already valorized critical protocol of obsessively correcting and negotiating among 
multiple bibliographic interventions. It’s a term that congratulates its users for their own 
scrutinizing and negotiating habits—they may preserve their detailed practices while also 
interpreting anew and recording others’ interpretations. Bibliographers could add to their 
tasks the collation of previous bibliographic work. “Sociology of texts” has it both ways, 
for as Latour puts it: “when social scientists add the adjective ‘social’ to some 
phenomenon, they designate a stabilized state of affairs, a bundle of ties that, later, may 
be mobilized to account for some other phenomenon.”424 The newness of so many 
readings generated by the sociology of texts was a signal of its success, but it was also 
self-confirming success: “In situations where innovations proliferate, where group 
boundaries are uncertain, when the range of entities to be taken into account fluctuates, 
the sociology of the social is no longer able to trace actors’ new associations.” 
Indeed, the value of social editing and what it means to be social has always been 
under intense debate, even outside of the context of Ancient and Modern debates about 
approaches to mediating the past. Tobias Smollett criticized Grainger’s edition of 
Tibullus for its busyness and unnecessary preservation of so many past translators’ notes, 
insisting that Grainger use his editorial taste to choose among previous interpretations. 
Grainger defended his practice: “Pray Mr. Hypercritical Dr., is not this [variorum 
commentary] one of the approved Ways of commenting on a Poet?” In Grainger’s view, 
variorum commentary was a form of displaying taste, a way of congratulating readers on 
their own discerning abilities: “Altho’ the Sources of Imitation are not near so copious as 
Annotators had long imagined, and sameness does, by no Means, in many cases, imply 
Plagiarism; yet I have commonly heard Men of Taste allow, that they felt Pleasure, in 
                                                
424 Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory, 1, 11. 
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reading the correspondent Thoughts of different Poets on the same subject.”425 In 
Latour’s terms, these defenses of variorum editorial technology show uncertain 
boundaries of readerly interactions with texts, unsettled (recursive) debates about 
associational practices of engaging with past editions, and even questions about who was 
part of the social family, if they didn’t want to join such a hyper-mediated group.  
The bundle of ties from the variorum technology records sociality, but it is also 
bulky. Grainger’s critics noticed something like this ouroboros effect that congratulated 
editors for their hypermediations: social interactions leave significant material traces in 
print, as cluttered pages and stacks of paper. Smollett criticized “the vast congeries of 
notes grammatical, critical, and explanatory” as “a huge farrago of learned lumber, 
jumbled together to very little purpose, seemingly calculated to display the translator’s 
reading, rather than to illustrate the sense and beauty of the original.”426 Grainger’s 
response to Smollett’s review takes that recursive critique of over-saturation to still 
another level. In the margins of his printed response, he excerpts quotations from the Plan 
of Smollett’s Critical Review as a means of showing that Smollett had failed at his duties 
of fairly assessing another author’s work. He accuses Smollett of misquoting his work in 
drawing attention to particular bad translations and then affixes a footnote: “We will not 
misquote the Words of any Author, who may fall under our Inspection. vid. Plan of C. 
Review. … And therefore you promised not to exhibit a partial and unfair Assemblage of 
Blemishes of any Production!”427  
                                                
425 Grainger, Letter to Tobias Smollett, 20. 
426 [Tobias Smollett], “Review of Poetical Translation of the Works of Tibullus.” Critical Review VI 
(1759), 276. 
427 Grainger, Letter to Tobias Smollett, 20. 
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Smollett delights in identifying particular passages where Grainger used 
neologisms, Scotticisms, and other language that would have been out of place in 
classical poetry. Smollett’s identification of various errors in Grainger’s translation is a 
synecdochal method of identifying the error of the entire procedure: a single error stands 
in for the progress of depravity in the whole endeavor. To defend himself, Grainger 
reanimates the figure of Zoilus from the Ancients-Moderns debate as “an ingenious 
attempt to forestall criticism by illustrating its dangers in advance.”428 Adding to those 
increasingly convoluted defenses, he recursively appropriates Pope’s critique of 
excessive annotation in the Essay on Criticism as a criticism of Smollett’s work: “so 
innumerable are the Instances [of hyper-criticism] to be culled out of your part in the 
Critical Review that To tell them would a Hundred Tongues require, / Or one Vain Wit’s 
that would a Hundred tire.”429 That Pope’s critique of immoderate footnotes can be cited 
defensively by someone who had been criticized for such a practice shows how mobile 
that line was to recursive re-contextualization in eighteenth-century criticism!  
An errata list is another example of a feature that serves different social functions 
for the translator and reviewer: one sees them as a vehicle for transparency, the other for 
the hypermediacy of embarrassing error. The translator treats that paratext as a means of 
making corrections social and public; the reviewer has a different concept of “social” in 
animadverting on those errors. The media historian has other uses for such a document—
in this case, I am interested in its recursive features and tendency to be incorporated into 
                                                
428 Levine, 220. Zoilus was resurrected in the eighteenth century in Pope’s and Thomas Parnell’s 
collaborative translation, Homer’s Battle of the Frogs and the Mice. With the Remarks of Zoilus, to Which 
Is Prefix’d, the Life of Said Zoilus (London, 1717). Predictably, the Critical Review fired back at Grainger 
by reappropriating Grainger’s references: “nothing can be more just than to charge Dr. Smollett with the 
malevolent spirit of Zoilus, considering that he is supposed to have censured the works of that second 
Homer, Dr. James Grainger.”  See “Grainger’s Letter to Dr. Smollett.” Critical Review VII (London, 1759), 
141-158, 143. 
429 Grainger, Letter to Tobias Smollett, 3.  
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criticism rather than remaining as solely utilitarian documents for printers and correctors 
to assess. Authors, editors, reviewers, and translators had non-practical uses for those 
sheets that contradicted—or extended into the realm of interpretation—the contingent 
status of these pages that were meant to serve as directions to proof correctors and 
printers for material to be fixed, not to be preserved as another form of animadvertable 
document. Smollett draws gleeful attention to typographical errata in Grainger’s text. In 
amassing so many notes, he indicates, Grainger had not paid enough attention to 
minutiae. To one such note, Grainger fired back that Smollett knows the ways that a text 
leaves an editor’s hands in the print shop:  
Suppose now, you had imputed this double Solecism, as you term it, to an 
Error of the Press? You, Sir, who have so much to do with that Engine of 
Literature, must know, from many Years Experience, that no Accuracy 
can secure a Writer from its Mistakes. But as this was an Indulgence I 
could never expect from you, I rather chuse to refer you to the Errata, 
where, p. 46, you will find your double Solecism corrected.430  
 
Gitelman argues for the value of these kinds of documents and records of contentious 
preservation: they are “media as socially realized structures of communication, where 
structures include both technological forms and their associated protocols, and where 
communication is a cultural practice, a ritualized collection of different people on the 
same mental map, sharing or engaged with popular ontologies of representation.”431 In 
these back-and-forths, we see Grainger and Smollett engaging in ritualized rehearsals of 
past debates, but the errata note signals a kind of document that is less easy to access. 
Grainger and Smollett are quick to incorporate charges of all kinds of error into their 
rhetorical escalations but don’t treat it as a practical consideration, per se—it is always 
already “evidence” for them, never a document in and of itself.  
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In terms of glitch aesthetics, the errata sheet is a kind of ontological puzzle that 
doesn’t assimilate as well as it ought into our theories of agency. The ontological status 
of an error is always vexed: who made it? Who was responsible for correcting it? Who 
noticed it? What happened to it after it was corrected? Grainger’s and Smollett’s 
eagerness to subsume errors into rhetoric in their commentary shows their desire to both 
elide and exaggerate them in more mediation, but the errors remain stuck in the texts as 
artifacts of unresolved, indeterminate agencies, no matter how one generalizes them as 
records of social practices or smiles at their rhetorical flourishes.  
In early versions of this project, I had an idea to follow Johns’ work in The Nature 
of the Book and study these particular social interactions of correction on errata sheets. 
When I explained the project to historians, they saw it in terms of Marxist scholarship in 
social history (who are doing the corrections, what are the conditions of their labor, what 
is their social practice?432) or Latour’s work on the sociology of scientific knowledge.433 
They asked: are you going to go into texts and correct those uncorrected errors? Read 
errata sheets to see evidence of their social practices? In some ways, the history of these 
kinds of mediations is less recoverable because practices of interpretation have favored 
the readings of editorial apparatus as sociological evidence. What have been preserved 
are interpretations of content, which have been reflexively studied as social practices. 
“Social” and “cultural” are both terms that are reified by the evidence of how people have 
debated how to define them. Their recursive uses have recursive pasts.  
 
                                                
432 See T.N. Shane, Passed for Press: A Centenary History of the Association of Correctors of the Press 
(Association of Correctors of the Press, 1954). 
433 See Steven Shapin and Simon Schaeffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the 
Experimental Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) and Shapin, A Social History of the 
Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
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‘Placeless, Timeless’: The Life of an Abstraction in media res 
 
Gitelman knows her term “cultural data” is more complicated than it appears to be 
because documents and records have multiple histories of use and definition—that very 
complicatedness and how to account for it is the subject of her work. Like Dane, Johns 
worries that the “culture” part of “print culture” takes the history of the book into an 
abstract realm: “In [Eisenstein’s] work, printing itself stands outside history. The press is 
something ‘sui generis,’ we are told, lying beyond the reach of conventional historical 
analysis. Its culture is correspondingly placeless and timeless.”434 Johns is concerned 
with the abstractions Eisenstein attaches to print agency: her large concepts of 
standardization, dissemination, and fixity. He challenges each of those concepts with 
attention to particular social practices and agents involved in print production in early 
modern London—test cases in a material history of book production, including authors, 
printers, correctors, typesetters, readers, collectors, and censors. Johns argues for a 
narrowing of perspective so that one may see social distinctions among agents and 
agencies, social practices and disputes, political concerns about licensing and 
censorship—a textured account to challenge what he worries Eisenstein erases with her 
forceful argument and conceptual reading. I want to pause at the “placeless, timeless” 
critique and ask how this generic feature may be constitutive of these discussions about 
mediation. Indeed, I can trace one strand of the “placeless, timeless” version of media 
                                                
434 Johns. The Nature of the Book, 19, 10. I would be fascinated to see The Nature of the Book remediated 
through Latour’s Actor-Network theory, as an experiment in exploring the limitations of “social” in Johns’ 
work: what are the artifacts of this overused term, and what remain as useful accounts of these multiple 
printing and copying protocols? 
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history back to Percy’s project, wherein such a desire for comprehensiveness was a 
priority for defining the conventions of a cultural history. 
Percy was a witness to and participant in culture’s proliferation as a term that 
could conflate meanings and contexts. Remediating Williams’ Keywords method, Robert 
Young begins his essay “Culture and the History of Difference” by tracing the genealogy 
of the term “culture.”435 He notes that the first figurative use of “cultured” to mean 
refined—in distinction to the literal sense as in “of the soil of plants”—is registered in the 
Oxford English Dictionary as dating from 1764. The citation for the literal meaning is 
gardener-poet William Shenstone’s lines from his Elegies: “our cultur’d vales.” The 
citation to the figurative meaning is Oliver Goldsmith’s The Traveller: “The gentler 
morals, such as play / Thro’ life’s more cultur’d walks.” Given that their work of 
compilation and editing the Oxford English Dictionary has occurred over more than a 
century, the many editors who looked at this entry probably did not realize that their 
illustrative authors knew each other. Shenstone’s “cultur’d vales” in his expansive 
gardens at Leasowes were the site of many “cultur’d walks” of discussion among 
Goldsmith, the poet-doctor-editor Grainger, the printer James Dodsley, and the 
antiquarian Percy.  
Percy’s scope in compiling the Reliques was as broad as McLuhan’s, and he 
engaged all of his companions, including Shenstone and Goldsmith, in his projects. He 
wrote to his Welsh friend Evan Evans in 1761 to ask for materials:  “…I have procured a 
MS. translation of the celebrated Tograi Carmen from the Arabic: and have set a friend to 
translate Solomon’s Song afresh from the Hebrew chiefly with a view to the poetry…. 
                                                
435 Robert J.C. Young. Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1995), 29. 
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Then I have myself gleaned up specimens of East Indian Poetry, Peruvian Poetry; 
Lapland Poetry; Greenland Poetry…”436 In addition to these projects, he published a 
translation of a Chinese novel in 1761; a collection of Chinese poetry, apothegms, 
religious history, gardening, and theater in 1762; a collection of Icelandic poetry in 1763; 
and the Reliques in 1765. Shenstone consulted as an unofficial editor of Percy’s work, 
where he frequently made recommendations about design and paratextual materials.  
Percy consulted with Jacob Tonson to publish newly annotated editions of those 
eighteenth-century arbiters of taste, the Spectator, the Tatler, and the Guardian, and 
asked his many correspondents if they would contribute anecdotes for that project. “The 
Reliques was conceived and executed amid Percy’s fabulous bibliolatry,” writes Nick 
Groom, “and [it was] published in medias res: in the middle of the 1760s, central to 
Percy’s whole motivation and methodology of conceptualizing the value of literary 
sources, and pivotal in his work.”437 McDowell notes how Percy committed and then 
methodized the slippage between oral and print mediations: “Percy drew heavily on 
broadsides as well as manuscript materials, but he represented his ‘reliques’ as the written 
traces of originally oral compositions dating back to a sophisticated courtly society long 
                                                
436 Percy to Evan Evans, July 21, 1761, Percy Letters, ed. Cleanth Brooks and David Nichol Smitth 9 vols. 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1944-88), VI:10-13. See E.K.A. Mackenzie, “Thomas 
Percy’s Great Schemes,” The Modern Language Review, 43:1 (1948), 34-38 for a timeline of all these 
projects.  
437 Nick Groom, The Making of Percy’s Reliques (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 5. See also 
David Matthews, The Making of Middle English 1765-1910 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1999). In tracing how medieval literature was mediated by translators, typesetters, editors, publishers, and 
other artifact-obsessed mediators in the eighteenth century, Matthews describes the bifurcation in the 
eighteenth-century antiquarians’ approach to situating their artifacts in a progressive historical narrative: 
the ancient texts are considered highly important and interesting, but they are lacking in literary value 
because they are not considered objects of taste. “The ‘ancient’ literature, then, was distanced several times 
over.” Ancient literature is “not literary in the accepted sense, linguistically barbarous, its main interest lay 
in the strange and quaint. The paradox of the study of medieval literature was that the ‘ancient’ texts were 
always hypostatized in a distant, irretrievably other, historical past, from which the editor and reader had to 
pluck the familiar, that which would speak to their own age” (15). 
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before commercial print…. Percy’s preface elides over temporal, contextual, and 
historical differences in order to classify the ballads as ‘reliques.’”438  
Percy’s conceiving of himself in media res, as a mediator first and foremost, is 
one indication that “print” and “culture” in the Reliques are abstractions which construct 
and reify each other in their conjectural qualities. Eliding over temporal, contextual, and 
historical differences is how the interface obscures its own presence in favor of 
subsuming all disparate textual objects, no matter their material history, into a “project.” 
Groom argues that Percy’s orality-made-from-print was a strategy designed to valorize 
the act of mediation both by printing these oral ephemera and in mediating the ballads 
with a theory of orality: “the defining characteristic of Percy’s brand of literary 
antiquarianism [is] that the cultural value and significance of a source is defined by its 
medium of transmission. Percy sought his songs in archives and libraries, not in fields or 
streets, arguing that the oral tradition had visible literary traces.”439 The interface 
becomes generic, as Percy conceptualized his work to be situating knowledge in a 
material form of a conjectural history. The particular contents of the Reliques mattered 
less than their collection and mediation through valorizing apparatus that would signal 
their progress through arrangement and commentary (a value familiar to Pope, even if the 
work with collation was not to his taste). “Cultures save themselves,” writes Gitelman of 
these records and their remediations in forms like dictionaries and critical surveys. She 
argues for the problem of preservation as a lens onto our habits of interpreting our present 
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Eighteenth-Century Ballad Discourse.” The Eighteenth Century. 47:2/3 (Summer 2006), 151-178, 164. 
439 Groom, 5. 
 
 251 
moment: “And they save themselves according to a host of little-noticed assumptions that 
are particularly important to stop and think about in the present moment.”440  
“Of all the ways in which one could evaluate the significance of the literary 
appropriation of oral forms” writes Susan Stewart of “distressed genres” like the ballad or 
relic in the eighteenth century, “the most mistaken would be to assume that literature 
thereby records the lost world of preindustrial culture.”441 I am interested in Stewart’s 
hyperbole about the biggest error one could make: that error is critically engaging with 
idealized distressed texts as though there is some way to observe unmediated orality in 
the past, for to conceptualize media as evidence is to artifactualize it. The error in that 
critical engagement is that any knowledge produced by the study would be self-
confirming of its cultural status. Evidence is already mediated by its designation as such, 
and so these constituents of distressed genres “acquire all the characteristics of 
fragmentation, symbolic meaning, and literariness that are most valued by the literary 
culture.” In Stewart’s analysis, the elisions McDowell points out are endemic to their 
mediation—they never existed as something to be elided in the first place until they were 
artifactualized. The grave error Stewart identifies here is a signal of the double logic of 
oral/print remediation. One wishes for immersion in one’s artifacts, but the conditions of 
producing knowledge mean referring to frames of that artifactualization in the form of the 
other abstractions it produces: provenance, authority, historicity.  
Percy evokes his method through correcting errors—and insisting he can continue 
to correct more errors in future editions, thus opening a field of debate and study. 
“Wedded to no hypothesis, the Author hath readily corrected any mistakes which have 
                                                
440 Gitelman, xii.  
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been proved to be in this Essay; and considering the novelty of the subject, and the time, 
and place, when and where he first took it up, many such had been excusable.”442 His 
terminology is placeless, timeless on purpose, to generate more writing: “That the term 
Minstrel was not confined, as some contend, to a mere Musician, in this country, any 
more than on the Continent, will be considered more fully in the last Note at the end of 
this Essay.” The introductory essays, headnotes to the ballads, and the many notes that 
appear in the Reliques—glosses, brief notes on historical events, among other 
commentary—serve as what Siskin calls a “mediating layer of representation”443 that 
frames the artifacts and their explanatory annotation as “data for the construction of new 
histories—one in which the linking of that past to the present would demonstrate what 
Percy called ‘the increase of knowledge.’”  
Maureen McLane notes that though we may think of these elaborate paratexts as 
“labored, rebarbative, recherché,” they were “not extraneous to, but rather constitutive of 
the emergent genre of the ballad collection, a genre clearly recognized as such by its 
practitioners.”444 In Poovey’s terms, there had to be methods delineated for systematizing 
this knowledge through genre and abstract concept. Gestures toward the historicity of the 
materials in the collection had a forward-looking orientation, as well—always part of a 
progress narrative that could tell tales of an artifactualized past. The collaborative aspect 
of the projects meant a great deal to Percy, such that the social process of mediation 
(including editing and correcting the manuscripts by different members of the coterie) 
became more important than distinguishing his sources and their particular agencies. 
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Sources remained anonymous, whereas “transmitters [were] polite and learned,” writes 
McLane of the relationships among Percy, Shenstone, Goldsmith, Grainger, and 
others.445 She continues: “In the course of remediation and artifactualization into printed 
books, the multiple collaborations that made balladeering possible thus entered specific 
discursive spaces and submitted to specific protocols for representing and differentiating 
(and as one often discovers, suppressing or finessing) the kinds and degrees of mediation 
involved.”446  
McLane’s description of protocols for historicizing is useful for reflecting on 
other mediating protocols in dealing with historical evidence, as displayed in Johns’s and 
Eisenstein’s arguments about perspectives on print agency and historical narrative. Like 
Grainger and Smollett, they, too, have sharply worded critical protocols of representing, 
differentiating, suppressing, and finessing their diagnoses of each others’ misreadings and 
critical errors. Tellingly, like Grainger and Smollett, they each accuse each other of a 
recursive method of dealing with sources. Johns argues that Eisenstein’s own reading 
practices evince the very problems in mediation she argues do not exist. He cites what he 
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sees as her idiosyncratic readings of The Nature of the Book as evidence that meaning is 
not fixed in print, and then he zooms out to reveal his ingenious method of collecting so 
many misprisions: 
By now we have built up a simple but sufficient taxonomy of one reader’s 
responses to a printed book. The reading practices they reveal incorporate 
remarkable interpretative flexibility (in assessing errors). They add up to a 
sustained exemplification of the freedom of readers to make new 
meanings out of even quite closely argued texts. To the original author, 
these may seem tortuous construals, bizarre wrenchings out of context, 
and elementary confusions between actors’ categories and modern 
opinions.447 
 
As he did in charging her with animadversion, he situates what he sees as her error-prone 
reading practices in the very century she is turning to for her own historical evidence of 
his errors: he calls her a commonplacer. It could be noted that collecting someone’s 
misprisions and showing them as a “taxonomy” is also a form of critical commonplacing, 
so Johns may be having some fun with self-reflexive criticism here, though in his 
argument his own commonplaces must be a different form of artifactualized critique than 
Eisenstein’s. This satirical error collection and correction is clever close-reading on 
Johns’ part: 
But even when properly pursued, commonplace methods tended to be 
poor tools for systematic criticism. They were good for identifying 
piecemeal omissions but less good for confronting arguments, which they 
tended to be reduced to fragments. They often gave rise chiefly to new 
forms of old truths. What is striking is how uncannily Eisenstein’s 
procedures mirror all these traits. Her readings display the stand-alone 
character of commonplaces, and like commonplaces they seem to be 
immune from elimination on grounds of inconsistency. Her claims 
themselves consequently inherit the strengths and weakness of the 
commonplacing method, not least its inefficacy as a tool for critically 
examining received views.448  
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Johns criticizes Eisenstein for not acknowledging the disciplinary protocols that have 
been emerging in various forms of book history prior to her 1979 realization of print’s 
“sui generis” agential status. 
These are Zoilian outrages. Eisenstein, for her part, twice frames the difference 
between her technology-based argument and Johns’ focus on human agency in terms of 
the National Rifle Association’s slogan “guns don’t shoot people, people do,” and takes 
issue with Johns’ retroactive framing of the revolution: “while I argue that the 
establishment of printing shops in fifteenth-century Europe as instigating the 
communications revolution, Johns believes the ‘so-called’ printing revolution as a 
retrospective discursive construct that emerged only in the eighteenth or maybe the 
nineteenth century.”449 She accuses him of anachronisms and a recursive argument about 
the need for specificity in a historical argument: “His version of a printing revolution’ is 
not an eighteenth-century construct but a late twentieth-century one. It is inflected by a 
(postmodern?) sensibility that seems to be tone-deaf to the music of time.”450 I am 
rehearsing Johns’ and Eisenstein’s critiques at length not solely for their content but for 
the fact of their recursive strategies of identifying error. To identify error is to expound 
on it for the purpose of seizing the upper hand, but these seizures have a meta quality of 
flipping back on to themselves, or on to some abstraction like “context” or 
“postmodernism.” In irreverently placing Eisenstein’s methods in the eighteenth 
century—and in Eisenstein’s charging back “here, as elsewhere, Johnson is precise about 
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place but imprecise about date”451—they each find the “timeless, placeless” mode of 
argumentation to be too pleasurable.  
Siskin and Warner argue for “mediation” as a term that can evoke specificity of 
time and place and “helps us to avoid as well the debate that derails so many efforts to 
engage the power of print: since ‘mediation’ embraces both the technological and the 
human—it does not discriminate, that is, against, any particular form of agency—
discussing print in its history points us past the increasingly unproductive binary of 
technodeterminism.”452 “Mediation” is not just a term of compromise, here: it is an 
argument for the discursive space that critical terminology opens up. I have found that 
term and its recursive counterpart, “remediation” to be useful for both their flexibility and 
their own “dirty secret” proliferating, under-theorized meanings. My other reason for 
rehearsing the debates and creating congeries and farragoes of text and footnotes on these 
pages is performative, experimental. Johns’ and Eisenstein’s arguments are glitches on 
the chapter’s pages: they are tiles in the mosaic that remain stubbornly blocky as they halt 
the flow of argument in favor of recording anti-social behavior, refusals to assimilate into 
negotiating interpretation, and sabotages to understanding in favor of flourish. Grainger 
was familiar with such a technique: “If therefore I have erred in this I have willingly 
erred; and shall hardly alter my method for all your redoubtable Ridicule.”453  
 
Artifacts of Spatial History 
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452 Siskin and Warner, “An Invitation in the Form of an Argument,” 10. 
453 Grainger, Letter to Tobias Smollett, 22. 
 
 257 
The Reliques thus makes both specific claims about place and time, but it also 
erases traces of how those documents were situated in those contexts in favor of showing 
them as cultural artifacts. “The Reliques is clearly presented … as a Great British 
imperial endeavor, covering England, Scotland, Ireland, Wales, and the West Indies, 
significantly extending the borders of [Thomas] Warton’s 1753 collection, The Union: or 
Select Scots and English Poems,” writes Groom.454 “Percy was effectively generating a 
community of writers and scholars who would help him to create his vision of the past.” 
In order to situate Percy’s project, Groom invokes Benedict Anderson’s concept of an 
“imagined community”—“imagined rather than fabricated, more creative than a simple 
falsification.” Anderson argues that a sense of timelessness is key to constructing such a 
national consciousness, for “the idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically 
through homogeneous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which 
also is conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) in history.”455 
Although Anderson names the novel and the newspaper as the genres where this sense of 
timelessness flourished in the early eighteenth century, Percy’s cultural histories share 
these priorities of abstraction and mystification. Percy’s Reliques were already artifacts of 
mediation before they were evidence of the cultural differences that they served to 
                                                
454 Nick Groom, “‘The Purest English’: Ballads and the English Literary Dialect” The Eighteenth Century 
47:2/3 (Summer 2006), 179-201, 180-181. 
455 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso 
Press, 1983, 1991), 26. Anderson can be said to remediate Eisenstein’s vocabulary through the lens of 
nationalism: Anderson names “exchange and communication” (Eisenstein’s dissemination); “fixity to 
language,” and “languages-of-power” (these processes look something like Eisenstein’s standardization, 
except the agents are colonial administrators, not printers). He problematizes these terms by noting a 
critique of Eisenstein’s work similar to Johns’: “Eisenstein [comes] close to theomorphizing ‘print’ qua 
print as the genius of modern history. [Lucien] Febvre and [Henri-Jean] Martin never forget that behind 
print stand printers and publishing firms…” (44). McLane notes that although Anderson’s work, like 
Eisenstein’s, has undergone a number of reassessments and reframings since 1983, the eighteenth century’s 
proliferation of novels and newspapers, and their framings of colonial empires, remains a rich source for 
testing the concept of “imagined communities” (Balladeering, 89). 
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delineate. Their status as pre-print culture exists in an uneasy recursion: they are made by 
mediation, but they are also the subjects of that study of mediation.  
This is not a bug—it’s a feature of such a cultural intervention through 
inscription. We see it in Percy’s temporally and geographically wide sweep, as well as in 
McLuhan’s mosaic that turns disparate texts into artifacts of The Gutenberg Galaxy. Paul 
Carter, whose work on the ambiguities of mishearing I have already discussed, takes up 
McLuhan’s project of the history of mosaic-making. He argues that in a “spatial history” 
like McLuhan’s—and Percy’s, I believe—“the subject is not a physical object, but a 
cultural one. It is not the geographer’s space, although that comes into it. What is evoked 
here are the spatial forms and fantasies through which a culture declares its presence. It is 
spatiality as a form of non-linear writing; as a form of history.”456 Carter’s work of 
theoretical geography is especially compelling to consider with Percy’s globe-spanning 
spatial history, for Carter situates these theories in a history of colonial impositions in 
Australia (the continent Percy could not reach). 
Carter begins his thought experiment in writing “spatial history” of how Australia 
has been mediated in the colonial imagination with a story of a textual artifact that 
declares its own history of mediation. Sailing along the coast in 1805, British sailors 
“discovered a pewter plate ‘of about six inches in diameter on which was roughly 
engraven two Dutch inscriptions’ and named the place Cape Inscription.”457 In this 
moment of discovery (told in recognizable generic conventions of an exploration 
narrative), the sailors mediate themselves on the landscape by noting others’ prior 
mediations—they make an artifact by placing it in their own context of discovery and 
                                                
456 Paul Carter, The Road to Botany Bay: An Exploration of Landscape and History (Minneapolis: 




intervention. It becomes a meta-commentary on the act of inscription and cultural 
mediation. They translate and artifactualize the plate, thus remediating their presence 
multiple times over: “Rewritten and repeated [the name] serves as point of departure. But 
Cape Inscription, the name, is also the result of erasure: it also symbolizes the imperial 
project of permanent possession through dispossession. In short the name oscillates 
between two extreme interpretations.”  
I am interested in “oscillation” as a term because it may refer to a physical 
swinging back and forth of, say, a pendulum, but we also describe the oscillation of 
sound waves that are too small to be observed without mediating instruments. Thus 
“oscillation” is a critical term that calls attention to its own mediating and mediated 
qualities as a metaphor, as McLuhan knew well in his riffing on sensory perceptions and 
extensions. Using a version of the oscillation argument, McLane describes these practices 
of mediation as intentionally wide-ranging across space and time: “Eighteenth-century 
antiquarian balladeering toggles between the concept of culture and the historicity of 
media, between orders of knowledge and piles of data.” 458 They saw their work as 
mosaic-making: “Mediating between practice and theory, sifting through manuscripts, 
private letters, broadsides, books, and eventually oral recitations, English and Scottish 
balladeers (working circa 1760-1830) conjoined concepts and histories, emergent objects 
and modes of inquiry.” McLane has named ballads as an “emergent” genre several times; 
McDowell, too, talks about the “emergence” of the print/oral distinction during the 
eighteenth century. Earlier, I have discussed remediation as the engine of emergence; to 
this engine we can add the recursive relationship between close-reading and generalizing 
                                                
458 Maureen McLane, “Mediating Antiquarians in Britain, 1760-1830: the Invention of Oral Tradition; or, 
Close Reading before Coleridge” in This is Enlightenment, eds. Siskin and Warner, 247-264, 247. 
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about documentary evidence. Oscillation and toggling produce the kind of emergence 
that Foucault says that genealogies as record and enable: “Emergence designates a place 
of confrontation but not as a closed field offering the spectacle of struggle among 
equals”—as the rehearsal of social interactions among disputing editors might engender 
as an artifact of detailing the minute contents of their animadversions— “…it is a ‘non-
place,’ a pure distance, which indicates that the adversaries do not belong to a common 
space. Consequently no one is responsible for an emergence; no one can glory it in it, 
since it always occurs in the interstice.”459 Latour cites quotes nineteenth-century legal 
theorist Gabriel Tarde as “an alternative precursor for an alternative social theory”:  
In a multitude of forms, though on a smaller scale, the same error always 
comes to light, namely, the error of believing that, in order to see a gradual 
dawn of regularity, order, and logic in social phenomena, we must go 
outside of the details, which are essentially irregular, and rise high enough 
to obtain a panoramic view of the general effect; that the source and 
foundation of every social coordination is some general fact from which it 
descends gradually to particular facts, though always diminishing in 
strength; in short, that man acts but a law of evolution guides him. I hold 
the contrary, in a certain sense.460 
 
A mosaic configures spatial history, but its very contingency and tendency to 
reconfiguration make it a non-place for figuring other forms of agency, including 
alternative forms of sociality, as well. 
Carter, too, is interested in how metaphors mediate understanding by conflating 
ideas and also making them distinctive as evocative literary language of meta-cognition, 
meta-mediation:   
Cape Inscription is also a striking figure of speech, an oxymoron yoking 
writing and landscape in a surprising, even grotesque way. A geographical 
feature is made no bigger than a page of writing. It also indicates concisely 
                                                
459 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 150.  
460 Gabriel Tarde, Social Laws: An Outline of Sociology, trans. Howard C. Warren (Kitchener, Ontario: 
Batoche Books, 2000), quoted in Latour, 14. 
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and poetically, the ‘cultural place’ where spatial history begins: not in a 
particular year, not in a particular place, but in the act of naming. For by 
the act of place-naming, space is transformed symbolically into a place, 
that is, a space with history. And by the same token, the namer inscribes 
his passage permanently on the world making a metaphorical word-place 
which others may one day inhabit and by which, in the meantime, he 
asserts his own place in history.461  
 
In his own inscription of his work’s purpose, Carter cites Samuel Johnson: “‘There is 
something in names one cannot help feeling.’ But he meant much more than he 
intended.”462 That incantation, embellished with a gnomic statement of Johnson’s 
intentions and their haziness and/or futurity seems at first to me to be a rhetorical excess, 
an error that stands out from an evocative story and theory. He is reiterating the act of 
mediating the past through quotation: first by telling the story of the inscription, then 
riffing on it, and now quoting again with the gravitas of a Johnsonian anecdote, taken out 
of its historical context (as anecdotes are meant to be transported) and put into the free-
wheeling context of a spatial history. This flexibility of moving between bits of other 
texts to make a mosaic is engendered by print; the spatial history lets us perceive the 
ways that print and culture gain both reification and flexibility when they are 
conceptualized together. 
 
Chinese Artifacts of Conjecture and Examination 
 
Percy’s plans for the future of the Reliques, wherein readings would be corrected 
with more data and more theorizing, indicate how the study of culture is an artifact of 
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toggling and oscillating. McLane argues for the Reliques as a hybrid genre that produces 
a spectacle of its wide array of objects and possibilities for interpretation:  
The novel has long been discussed in terms of heteroglossia for its 
theoretically open form; its ungainly cousin, the eighteenth-century ballad 
collection, is equally notable for its mustering, display, and attempted 
disciplining of heterogeneous materials and its formidable textual 
apparatus: introductions, headnotes, footnotes, appendices, dissertations, 
commentaries. Such apparatus, offering historical, topographical, 
linguistic, political, and customary information, has the peculiar effect of 
distancing us (as it did perhaps its first readers) from the often sensational 
contents of the ballads.463\ 
  
As much as it describes the Reliques’ variety, her argument is also useful for considering 
the bagginess and incoherence of Percy’s other projects. The mosaic form of the spatial 
history reveals a recursive relationship between close-reading evidence and generalizing 
about it—then reading more evidence through that generalized lens. Oscillating and 
toggling produce culture, for “culture must paradoxically always take part in an 
antithetical pair or itself be divided in two.”464 Some of the pairs cultural historian Young 
names in Colonial Desire to enact this dialectic are: culture versus nature; culture versus 
civilization; a “rough” hierarchical sequence of -culture modifiers such as folk, working-
class, mass, and popular; and the recent discussions of high culture versus 
anthropological culture, or “culture as material production and symbolic systems.” This 
genealogy of culture indicates that though the term pretends to the progress narrative of a 
conjectural history, it is also stubbornly attached to toggling for that is its means of 
expanding its purview and presence. As Young puts it, culture “constantly reform[s] itself 
around conflictual divisions, participating in, and always a part of a complex, hybridized 
economy that is never at ease with itself…” That work of distinction-making is 
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conjectural in multiple senses, for those distinctions are artifacts of juxtapositions that are 
enlarged by theorization in generic conventions of the conjectural history. 
Goldsmith, who coined the term “cultur’d vales” that Young cites in his historical 
definitions of “culture,” demonstrates such slipperiness in his conjectural history of taste 
and education in Essay on the Present State of Polite Learning in Europe (1759), where 
he explains that taste is a process of distinction. Goldsmith’s work is to inscribe sets of 
distinctions that “lay the line between the enlightened philosopher, and the half-taught 
citizen; between the civil citizen and the illiterate peasant; between the law-obeying 
peasant, and the wandering savage of Africa….”465 Drawing lines in a spatial history is a 
way of organizing the materials for a historical project about the progress of refinement, 
of artifactualizing the cultural data. “In taste,” Goldsmith argues, “we have standing 
evidence, we can, with precision, compare the literary performances of our fathers with 
our own, and from their excellences, or defects, determine the moral, as well as the 
literary merits of either.”  
Goldsmith remediated this work in Citizen of the World (1760), a series of 
periodical essays supposedly written by a Chinese traveler to observe English manners, to 
document and close-read cultural differences. Citizen of the World begins in the genre of 
the dream vision, and the capaciousness of that genre allows for conjecture and satire of 
the artifacts of an imagination run rampant. The insights of distinction and cultural 
difference in Goldsmith’s work always reflect back on one another in distorted ways: 
they are objects of study and satire at the same time. “The medium of ventriloquism,” 
generically remediated here from Montesquieu’s Lettres Persanes (1721), serves 
Goldsmith’s oscillating purposes: ”the metropolitan notion of a fixed or essential cultural 
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otherness is here parodied to the extent that any such quality is revealed to be as fungible 
as clothing. ‘Chinese-ness,’ at least as it is seen through European eyes, is a construction, 
a kitschy tissue of sartorial and decorative signifiers bereft of a definitive source or 
application.”466 These cultural differences are artifacts of imaginative, transformative 
remediations, embellished by generic conventions from dream visions, conjectural 
histories, and drama.467  
Percy looked to Citizen of the World as a kind of reference work that would help 
him conceptualize difference in his editing of a four-volume Chinese novel, Hau Kiou 
Choaan (1762), which went through multiple remediations and translations on its errant 
path toward becoming heteroglossic documents about Chinese customs and literary 
productions.468 Where Goldsmith could mediate his work through imaginative 
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467 It is fitting, also, that Goldsmith’s decline narrative and pastoral elegy The Deserted Village (1770) 
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on the Early Literary Relations of Oliver Goldsmith and Thomas Percy,” The Review of English Studies 2:5 
(1926) 51-61; T.C. Fan “Percy’s Hau Kiou Choaan” The Review of English Studies, 22:86 (1946), 117-25. 
Fan explains that “limited knowledge of Chinese” among English bibliographers in the nineteenth or first 
half of the twentieth century (those dates could be extended to contemporary studies) made it difficult for 
anyone to compare the original Chinese text to see what Percy, Wilkinson (if he had any hand in the 
translation), or any unnamed translators had done. For example, Fan notes, only in the twentieth century 
did the Chinese begin to use diacritical marks, so the translator(s) had to make broad guesses: “Paragraphs 
run together; sentences run together; and dialogues become statements and statements become 
dialogues…” (Fan, 119).  
These essays of descriptive bibliography from the early half of the twentieth century fascinate me because 
they become, recursively, the materials for contemporary study of the history of bibliographic work of 
cultural description. What other kinds of work did Fan and Milner-Barry do besides mediating the history 
of badly translated Chinese novels through minute documentary study? 
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conventions of conjectural histories, satires, and dream visions, Percy was committed to 
the material stuff of collation and editorial apparatus. Those remediations and translations 
of Hau Kiou Choaan transmogrify a various, multiply mediated assemblage of different 
documents: a bulky document of Percy’s self-inscription as an editor and conjectural 
historian of the progress of Chinese manners. Yet they are not coherently theorized as the 
Reliques would be; instead, the editorial apparatus of each volume is full of reprinted 
essays by other collaborators, conjectural histories, half-finished essays about the need 
for more study. Predictably, the errata sheets grow longer and longer with every 
volume.469  
Percy was sensitive about its fragmented state. In the preface, he explains that the 
novel serves “not as a piece to be admired for the beauties of composition but as a 
curious specimen of Chinese literature” and as a “faithful picture of Chinese manners” 
and customs.470 In his research to augment Hau Kiou Choaan with historical and cultural 
essays, Percy remediates much of the specific satirical and imaginative language of 
Citizen of the World and Enquiry into the Present State of Learning, thus making 
documentary evidence out of fashion and refashioning. That outcome of remediation is 
hardly surprising, given how many media (textual, sartorial, generic) are involved in the 
study. What it reveals is not a scandal particular to Percy or Goldsmith, but rather the 
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470 Thomas Percy. Preface to Hau Kiou Choaan, (London, 1761), I:xiv-xv.  
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more general problem of proliferation. The act of distinction-making is mediated in 
generalizing language, so much so that it can be remediated from cultural object to 
cultural object, across geographical and historical space. In The Chinese Taste in 
Eighteenth-Century England, David Porter describes how Percy was both inspired by his 
artifacts and troubled by the work of cultural comparison: “… Percy finds in Chinese 
productions a model that is at once inspiring and unsettling, leading him simultaneously 
to repudiate Chinese claims to cultural greatness and to appropriate them for his own 
purposes.” Percy’s Chinese projects are like partial, under-theorized spatial histories for 
their remediations of so many different kinds of artifacts, yet they lack a conceptualizing 
vision. He cannot resolve between conjecture and creation: “he draws upon Chinese 
examples to expand his aesthetic imagination, only to disown them when faced with the 
implications of this debt within a cultural sphere increasingly constrained by 
considerations of nationalist exclusivity.”471 
From Percy and Goldsmith, as well as from Percy’s attempts to collect from so 
many other national traditions, we can see how the critical language to describe 
difference in these trans-cultural comparisons tends to look the same. The objects have 
been remediated as cultural data, but the too-proliferable error of these distinctions is that 
they are so linguistically and conceptually flexible as to be attachable to any analysis of 
difference. In Percy’s and Goldsmith’s mutually referenced (and sometimes plagiarized) 
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work, the explanatory notes about particular manners or customs in Icelandic, or Chinese, 
or even Peruvian poetry would be different, but many of the explanations of cultural 
difference through the specific phrases about barbarism, progress, and curiosity of 
artifacts would be similar. (Percy never made it to the Peruvians.) In criticizing the “myth 
of print culture,” Dane argues that bibliographers tend to make a priori assumptions 
about the evidentiary nature of their objects of examination: 
Scholarship has as its goal the discovery of continuities in the irritating 
singularities of the evidence: bits of evidence here, packets of evidence 
there, partial evidence here. These things do not exist ‘out there’ in 
history, of course. It is scholarship that defines ‘what is evidence,’ 
examining the ‘out there’ to define again, in more discrete packets bits of 
evidence.472 
  
The allusions to placeless, timeless culture that Johns criticized are a defining feature of 
the commentary in these eighteenth-century cultural histories because they are thought to 
be a means of telling a larger story about humanity. Dane invokes the problem of “out 
there” to damn such a contemporary concept of culture. He insists on observation and 
recording small variations in discrete copies (not just editions) of books to recover 
material history, but where is that concept as a discipline but also “out there” at a slightly 
different scale? Anderson describes how these documents led to further forms of 
conjectural history that solidified into disciplines because they were very good at getting 
scholars to imagine the futurity of their labor: “Out of these discoveries came philology, 
with its studies of comparative grammar, classification of languages into families, and 
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single objects without zooming out to assess the value of the evidence or how it fits into a larger pattern. 
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reconstructions by scientific reasoning of ‘proto-language’ out of oblivion.”473 These 
methods create disciplines out of imagined communities. 
Hence the irony of Grainger’s note about the status of Percy’s translation of Hau 
Kiou Choaan: “[Printer Ralph] Griffiths has sent me back the Chinese lady, and I assure 
you I like her in her new English garb.”474 As a cultural object, she oscillates between 
embellished, incomplete, plagiarized renderings of Chinese customs and her English 
remediation. She resists assimilation into a cultural conjecture because she is too glitchy 
to be consumed fully.  
 
The Possibilities of the Georgic: Remediation and Remediation 
 
Ever interested in making more projects, Percy re-extended his search for stuff to 
remediate to Grainger, who was by 1762 performing medical duties on the island of St. 
Christopher. He asked if Grainger if he would send him any extracts of Caribbean poetry 
or any information about Spanish romances that he intended to use to make an account of 
all of Cervantes’ sources for Don Quixote—the social history of Don Quixote, of sorts, 
and the kind of project that many scholars have produced in the years since then. 
Grainger speculated about how he might situate the islands on a conjectural timeline: 
“How far the North Americans are greater proficients in literature than the West Indians I 
cannot determine: sure I am they are men of less probity, from the specimens I have had 
of that country, and I can safely add not better scholars.” He wrote later: “nobody can tell 
me any thing of Charibbean [sic] poetry; indeed, from what I have seen of these savages, 
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I have no curiosity to know ought of their compositions.” Thus, he says, he cannot begin 
“rendering those works, which I conceive must add to your literary reputation, more 
perfect in their kind.”475  Believing he has no obvious materials at hand, Grainger can 
conceive of the project only in terms of abstractions: reputation and perfection as made 
by editorial mediation. (Grainger did send Percy a modern interpretation of the Caribbean 
tale of “Bryan and Pereene” for the Reliques.)476 Despite his skepticism, Grainger took up 
Percy’s enthusiasm for time- and space-bending remediation and translated, in language, 
place, and concept, Virgil’s Georgics through the lens of the Atlantic slave trade in The 
Sugar-Cane (1764).  
The georgic genre is devoted to remediation of material in multiple senses of the 
word: it is about the physical remediation of the earth and it is a remediated, translated 
classical genre. As Kevis Goodman notes, “the glorious laboriousness of reading the 
Georgics results from a complex, non-metric practice of reference; verba in the poem 
point in two directions at once—ostensibly, but not transparently, toward the details and 
cycles of agricultural work, and diachronically toward layers of previous poetic 
works.”477 Reading Dryden’s translation of the Georgics (1697), Jenny Davidson argues 
that the georgic’s mediating of agricultural labor in the form of poetry allows us to see 
the multiple valences of the word culture in the period: “Virgil’s poem displays its own 
worries about culture’s part in the struggle between improvement and degeneration, and 
                                                
475 Grainger to Percy, June 5, 1762, Illustrations of the Eighteenth Century, VII:278, 281.  
476 Grainger found or heard the tragic tale of Bryan and Pereene, about an English sailor who jumps off his 
vessel and tries to swim to his long-separated love but is eaten by a shark before he reaches the shore. But 
in introducing Grainger’s contribution in the Reliques, Percy first calls attention to an act of correction: an 
unrelated poem of Grainger’s needs correcting because a printer printed the wrong version, so he reprints 
the revised version. He then returns to the project at hand and tells the tragic tale. See Reliques, I:313-16. 
Percy corrects the couplet of Grainger’s “Ode on Solitude”: “Or at the purple dawn of day / Tadmor’s 
marble wastes survey” from “turned her magic ray” (314). This is the only account I can find in the 
Reliques of Percy correcting a poem that’s not under consideration in the cultural history. 
477 Goodman, Georgic Modernity and British Modernity, 28.  
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the Georgics is haunted both by the dangers of luxury … and by the limits on culture’s 
power to alter the natural world…”478 Thus the genre both revels in its remediations (re-
mediations and remedies) and sees the ways in which those remediations form 
incomplete labor: there is an unassimilable difference between physical and imaginative 
labor. The term has multiple meanings, but those meanings do not map onto one another 
completely or unproblematically. 
Before Bolter and Grusin theorized “remediation,” the term had agricultural roots, 
so to speak: environmental remediators labor to remove contaminants or pollutants from 
soil, groundwater.479 That meaning fits in well with Theobald’s notion of editorial work 
as weeding a garden: the metaphor indicates the ways in which eighteenth-century 
conjectural cultural editors like Percy differentiated and then redefined the multiple 
meanings of culture, as a cultural product of writing could be “improved” in the same 
way that a field could be cultivated by being remediated. Percy could joke to his 
gentlemanly editor-gardener friend Shenstone, who preferred shaped gardens and shaped 
pages clear of editorial farrago: “When you come to revise your poems, let me beseech 
you Not [sic] to be too excessive in your corrections. Your taste is so exceedingly 
refined, and you are so incapable of being satisfied, that I always tremble when you take 
up the pruning hook.”480 After Shenstone’s death the printer James Dodsley, Percy, the 
poet Richard Jago, and others helped compile a cultural history of Leasowes, complete 
with drawings, lyrics, and remembrances of the “cultur’d vales” of the estate, remediating 
                                                
478 Davidson, 59. 
479 Thinking in terms of the different discourses Davidson analyzes in Breeding, it makes sense that 
remediation is also used in educational contexts—a related form of culture as remedy. 
480 Percy Letters, VII:131-2.  
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the remediated garden in print.481 In a recursive twist, there is a georgic that discusses the 
remediated landscape of Shenstone’s gardens, the site of so many editorial meetings 
among Percy and his friends. In Edge-Hill (1767), Jago writes of Leasowes: 
Nor can the Muse, while she these Scenes surveys, 
Forget her Shenstone, in the youthful Toil 
Associate; whose bright Dawn of Genius oft 
Smooth’d my incondite Verse; whose friendly Voice 
Call’d me from giddy Sports to follow him 
Intent on better Themes—call’d me to taste 
The Charms of British Song, the pictur’d Page 
Admire, or mark his imitative Skill; 
Or with him range in solitary Shades, 
And scoop rude Grottos in the shelving Bank.482 
 
Percy and his friends could use remediation to tie Shenstone the author, editor, and 
gardener to a place—to make him timeless through collation, illustration, and other 
paratextual activities. Remediation is a process of remaking conceptual space in 
recursive, mosaic form; it is also a means of remaking the earth’s media. It is both 
material and conceptual, and the oscillation between those two states can be generative 
rather than just speculative. It can produce theories from conjectures. It can also produce 
hyper-mediation such that it is freighted down by the weight of those artifacts of 
conjectures.  
Eighteenth-century georgics often recombine with prospect poems and other 
conjectural features in order to tell a story of cultural improvement—and generic 
innovation—over time. They can indulge in their prospects of remediation, by 
remediation by visualizing “a glittering verbal tekhne, producing a medium (to metaxu, 
that ‘in-between’) capable of stimulating a work of reading that was not assumed to be 
                                                
481 William Shenstone, Works (London, 1764). 
482 Richard Jago, Edge-Hill (London: 1767), ll.340-350. See also Jago’s second edition, dedicated to 




the same as the work it described or—since the Georgics are not after all very realistic—
the work it simulated.” That remediation occurs “within a movement fascinated by 
optical and linguistic mediums.”483 Grainger’s project is invested in interrogating 
multiple versions of culture through transposing, denaturalizing, and then re-imagining 
the features of the georgic, then further improving (or at least hyper-mediating) that 
immersion into Caribbean labor with hundreds of annotations about cultivation on the 
island, the history of conquest, ethnographic descriptions, and other data. In Young’s 
terms, The Sugar-Cane articulates and redefines culture along many different antitheses. 
These antitheses include: gentlemanly composition and scholarly annotation, 
ethnographic history and high English poetic culture, cultivation and improvement, and 
an imagined community of generally articulated English values transplanted through 
colonization.  
That Atlantic ground for such poetic innovation was untilled, in more ways than 
one. In his preface, Grainger assesses the history of the georgic form and its 
contemporary practitioners, and says he can use technological terms of art (a generic 
convention in georgics, which registers the anxiety about the tension between poetry and 
labor) because “their example is a sufficient apology for me, for in their steps I shall 
always be proud to tread.”484 Grainger had reviewed Dyer’s The Fleece for the Monthly 
Review in 1757 and cites others in the opening lines of the poem, as scholarly labor 
joined to poetic labor:  
                                                
483 Goodman, 21. Goodman names these other eighteenth-century georgics: John Philips, Cyder (1708) 
John Gay, Rural Sports (1173, rev. 1720) William Somervile, The Chace (1735), Christopher Smart, The 
Hop-Garden (1752), John Dyer, The Fleece (1757), Richard Jago, Edge-Hill (1767), and James Thomson 
The Seasons (1730, rev. 1746) (151n.33). Grainger cites Cyder, The Chace, and Hop-Garden.  
484 James Grainger, Preface to The Sugar-Cane (1764) in John Gilmore, Poetics of Empire: A Study of 
James Grainger’s The Sugar-Cane (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2000). Grainger had reviewed Dyer’s The 
Fleece for the Monthly Review in 1757 and cites others in the opening lines of the poem, scholarly labor 
joined to poetic labor. 
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Spirit of Inspiration, that did’st lead        
Th’ Ascrean Poet to the sacred Mount,        
And taught’st him all the precepts of the swain;        
Descend from Heaven, and guide my trembling steps        
To Fame's eternal Dome, where Maro reigns;  
Where pastoral Dyer, where Pomona's Bard,        
And Smart and Sommerville in varying strains,        
Their sylvan lore convey: O may I join        
This choral band, and from their precepts learn        
To deck my theme, which though to song unknown,  
Is most momentous to my Country's weal! (7-17)      
 
Such labor-poetry wordplay occurred to many readers of this West-Indian-Virgilian 
georgic. Percy excitedly described the poem to the gardener Shenstone as a marvel in 
reworking the land of the georgic: “He has taken Possession of a Field for Poetry, which 
is both large, and fertile, and yet un-occupied; And the Cultivation of which must be a 
popular measure to Many Amongst us.”485  
Thus like the dream vision and the conjectural history, the georgic is a recursive 
genre that plays on the labor that is being described and the poetic labor involved in 
translating and transposing it. The georgic’s self-reflexivity in conceptualizing poetic 
labor may be useful, then, for conceptualizing critical labor at remediating so many 
different, discrete packets of evidence in narratives about the past. The Sugar-Cane is not 
very good poetry, but its hyper-mediations gesture toward Grainger’s ideas for georgics 
as scholarship. In the preface, he duly cites Joseph Addison’s “On the Art of Virgil’s 
Georgics,”486 which defines the features of the genre as educative in laying out a 
prospect: “It raises in our Minds a pleasing variety of Scenes and Landskips, whilst it 
                                                
485 Percy to Shenstone, August 10, 1762, Percy Letters, VII:159. Johnson made a similar joke in his review 
of the poem in the Critical Review in 1764: “The poet had an untrodden country to clear; and though he 
may not have entirely subdued the native rudeness of the soil, yet he certainly has opened a delightful tract 
for future cultivation.” “Review of The Sugar-Cane,” Critical Review XII, 270-77, 276. 
486 James Grainger. “Review of Dyer’s The Fleece.” Monthly Review XVI (1757), 328-40. “Virgil’s 
Georgics have done him more honour than all his other poems put together…For the lower or more 




teaches us: and makes the driest of its Precepts look like a Description. A Georgic 
therefore is some part of the Science of Husbandry put into a pleasing Dress, and set off 
with all the Beauties and Embellishments of Poetry.”487 When Grainger transplants the 
form to the West Indies, he highlights this specific feature of local detail as a far-away 
curiosity. At the same time, he self-consciously improves the genre into a practical 
primer in medicine and colonial agriculture by introducing and emphasizing the feature 
of scholarly annotation.  
The Sugar-Cane is a cultural history that tries to address time and place in its 
critical features and tries to be educative as a document of cultural history. It exhaustively 
tries to render the fullest context it possibly can. It does so incompletely and incoherently, 
thus registering its historicity in a less assimilable, generalizable way than could make it 
a useful cultural-historical document. David S. Shields criticizes the hyper-mediation: the 
“pages are freighted with lengthy explanatory footnotes.” He plays up the distinction 
between cultivation and taste in his criticism of the explanatory apparatus: “For a reader 
interested in botany, material culture, or history of the West Indies, these footnotes can be 
fascinating reading. A lover of belles lettres sees the profusion and length as indices of 
verses inadequate to the task at hand.”488 Shaun Irlam calls it “second-degree 
aestheticization of agrarian-capitalist relations by dressing the slave-economy of the 
colonies in the antique weeds of pastoral feudalism.”489 Irlam’s strong language indicates 
the ways the poem can reveal the political context of the past through contemporary 
                                                
487 Joseph Addison. “An Essay on Virgil’s Georgics.” Miscellaneous Works, in Verse and Prose of the late 
Right Honourable Joseph Addison, Esq. (London, 1726), I:257-8.  
488 David S. Shields. Oracles of Empire: Poetry, Politics, and Commerce in British America. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988). 73. 
489 Shaun Irlam, “‘Wish You Were Here’: Exporting England in James Grainger’s The Sugar-Cane.” ELH 
68 (2001) 377-396, 380. 
 
 275 
theoretical language—this is an apt description of the poem but it also indicates the 
problems of situating it fully in the past without structuring devices. Like Hau Kiou 
Choaan, it is as document that oscillates so much as to be glitchy. Grainger’s 
contemporary editor John Gilmore describes this oscillation in approving terms: “While 
Grainger is imposing a European model on Caribbean reality, he is also to some extent 
doing the reverse: the Caribbean reality is being imposed on the European model, on a 
scale to which there is nothing earlier which is comparable in English.”490   
That sugar formed a significant part of the colonial economy for the English 
raised its subject matter to a level beyond curiosity. Reviewing the poem for the Critical 
Review in 1764, Samuel Johnson said he was surprised but interested in the unlikely topic 
of the sugar-cane, for it “demands by its commercial value the attention of a mercantile, 
and by its physical curiosity, that of a philosophical nation.”491 The stakes of the 
expanding colonial project were not lost on Percy and Johnson as they reviewed the poem 
in the London Chronicle: “the poet concludes the whole with an address to the mother 
country; and with a premonition of the dangerous consequences likely to arise from that 
independency to which the northern countries are gradually advancing.”492 Irlam reads 
Grainger’s remediation as an attempt at a political remediation that has questionable 
chances to succeed. He reads the poem as an attempt to render the natural history of the 
colony in familiar terms and thus “stabilize colonial social relations and domesticate the 
foreign, Caribbean terrain in terms of familiar social, literary, and agricultural codes 
produced within the already constructed georgic discourse of the English landscape.”493 
                                                
490 Gilmore, 64-65.  
491 “Review of The Sugar-Cane.” Critical Review XII, 271 
492 continuation of “Review of The Sugar-Cane.” London Chronicle (July 7-10, 1764), 28. 
493 Irlam, 379. 
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Like Jago, Grainger memorializes his friends’ remediating labors and projects in 
his own georgic: 
Yet ‘mid this blest ebriety, some tears,  
For friends I left in Albion’s distant isle, 
For Johnson, Percy, White, escape mine eyes: 
For her, fair Auth’ress!… 
….O were y e all here, 
… 
How would your converse charm the lonely hour?  
Your converse, where mild wisdom tempers mirth; 
And charity, the petulance of wit; 
How would your converse polish my rude lays, 
With what new, noble images adorn? (III.507-520) 
 
Grainger memorializes his “Social Family” of collaborative editors in the poem; they are 
agents of improvement, they are very much within the thematic realm of the georgic.494 
The work of remediation is explicitly discussed in the poem, adding another layer of 
mediating priority to the georgic’s generic conventions. Yet in Latour’s terms, the social 
element of their presence is also more complicated than mere citation can suggest. They 
are English interlopers in the Caribbean text, yet they are also objects of culture. Percy 
had corrected the poem that he appears in—what kind of mediation can capture that 
strange agency? 
Kurt Heinzelman argues that the georgic genre is “subversively archaeological in 
seeing history as embedded, repetitive, and inescapable; it postulates a scene of 
nationalism that is global and imperialistic but honors, above all things, a rhetoric of local 
detail.”495 Reframing of the georgic’s generic features as archaeology, another field of 
study that has its roots in antiquarianism that is remediated through systematizatizing, 
                                                
494 Gilmore explains that James White translated Aristophanes’ The Clouds (1759) and wrote a grammar, 
The English Verb (1761). Charlotte Lennox is the “fair Auth’ress.” 
495 Kurt Heinzelman. “Roman Georgic in the Georgian Age: A Theory of Romantic Genre,” Texas Studies 
in Literature and Language, 33 (1991) 182-214, 184. 
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disciplinary projects in the eighteenth century, indicates the ways in which the genre 
could also be a space for Foucault’s emergence to occur in a genealogy.496 Grainger 
zooms in to focus on an ethnographic or technological detail of cultural difference, then 
zooms out wildly, then back again. Groom’s description of the Reliques is a useful frame 
for The Sugar-Cane: “an imminent disaster: texts existed in countless variations, 
flourishing rhizomatically rather than arboreally, and … miscellaneous, minor”497 That is, 
The Sugar-Cane is a cultural object that extends, attenuatedly and experimentally, the 
kind of labor that one can do with remediating texts. Grainger does not carve out a space 
for his poem in the canon of English poetry, as Thomas Gray would do in Elegy Written 
in a Country Church-Yard498—rather, he overloads the concept of culture with too many 
conflicting meanings, too many notes, too much conflicted labor. 
Grainger’s transposed, translated georgic is a kind of limit case to the problem of 
situated knowledge, for what it preserves and guides in its interpretations is both hyper-
local and gesturing toward a classical history of poetic labor.499 Is the knowledge it 
produces, in poetry and in Grainger’s hyper-mediated annotations, specific or universal, 
                                                
496 Foucault: “The isolation of different points of emergence does not conform to the successive 
configurations of an identical meaning; rather, they result from substitutions, displacements, disguised 
conquests, and systematic reversals. If interpretation were the slow exposure of the meaning hidden in an 
origin, then only metaphysics could interpret the development of humanity. But if interpretation is the 
violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning, in order 
to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game, and to subject it 
to secondary rules, then the development of humanity is a series of interpretations. The role of genealogy is 
to record its history: the history of morals, ideals, and metaphysical concepts, the history of the concept of 
liberty or of the ascetic life; as they stand for the emergence of different interpretations, they must be made 
to appear as events on the stage of historical process” (“Nietzsche, History, Genealogy,” 151-52). 
497 Groom, 12. 
498 See Guillory, Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993). 
499 The first note to the poem is Grainger’s three-page footnote about the cultural history of sugar: the 
Arabic and Hebrew etymology of he word, conjectural history of the transport of the sugar cane to the New 
World, Spanish and Portuguese methods of cultivating the plant on St. Christopher and the surrounding 
islands, the two references to sugar in Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales. His priorities as an editor had not 
changed from his days of editing Tibullus. 
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artifactualized as documentary evidence or artifactualized as cultural taste? Its 
problematic status is one that McLane sees in the Reliques as well: “Whether the dating 
of cultures can ever push us to imagine futures as well as pasts—this is still our question 
inasmuch as we are willing to reflect on our own historicization and prospects.”500  
The flexibility of “culture” as a term produces hyper-proliferable, flimsy 
reflexivity—so might emphasizing these situated qualities as mediations generate, 
recursively, some more substantial self-reflexive alternatives? Gitelman sees the potential 
in studying “media [as] reflexive historical subjects,” in which the very problems of 
novelty, historicity, and recursiveness in artifacts such as historical sound recordings and 
new media objects make them interesting to study because it is impossible to get 
“outside” them to describe them. She argues that “[i]nquiring into the history of a 
medium that helped construct that inquiring itself is sort of like attempting to stand in the 
same river twice: impossible, but it is important to try, at least so the (historicity of the) 
grounds of inquiry become clear.”501 In The Myth of Print Culture, Dane, too, reveals 
some self-reflexive tendencies as he looks back at the myth-busting—and –making—he 
has engaged in his disciplinary critique:  
I began thinking of this work as a polemic I have been conducting for 
several years [in which] I would critique … the notion of the 
bibliographical grand recit, that large general abstraction within which all 
material evidence is placed, and which defines out of existence the very 
possibility of counter-evidence. … But I have discovered, of course, my 
own version of the narrative I have critiqued…502 
 
That is, the very act of narrating the past is a form of abstraction, whether or not one 
believes in abstractions as a valuable part of producing knowledge. 
                                                
500 McLane, Balladeering, 42. 
501 Gitelman, 20-21. 




Conclusion: Errant Paths and the Future of the Book 
 
Where has this errant path led? 
In this conclusion, I want to put the editorial societies of mind that Pope, Bentley, 
Theobald, Percy, and their many collaborators and antagonists have generated to the test 
of preservation by considering it with Douglas Davis’s conceptual digital artwork The 
World’s First Collaborative Sentence, which was “open” to the public for generative 
contributions between 1994 and 2000. The Whitney Museum acquired the poem in 1995, 
socialized it, institutionalized it, creating a feedback loop of worldwide popularity 
proliferating more interactions and acclaim for the project: “From its inception, the 
Sentence has received a torrent of words, sounds, and images, contributors having learned 
about the site by word-of-mouth, web-based references, or press attention. The appeal of 
the Sentence is that it gives the world a space in which to speak its collective and its 
individual mind.”503 Designed by Davis as a tribute to multimedia artist Nam June Paik, it 
traveled digitally to other museums, notably the Kwangzu Biennale in South Korea in 
1995 and then to the Zentrum für Kunst und Medientechnologie in Germany in 1999, 
producing huge influxes of multi-lingual contributions to the project. As it grew, 
contributors tested the bounds of the project by adding not only new languages but also 
new media and new forms of meta-commentary inside the constraints of the prompt.504 
                                                
503 Donald B. Davis, The World’s First Collaborative Sentence (1994-2000) Description from: 
http://whitney.org/www/artport/collection/index.shtml 
504 From Davis’s explanation on the Whitney’s website: “The only ‘rule’ of the Sentence is that no one is 
allowed to type a period at the end of their contributions. Though ingenious users have occasionally found 
ways to break this rule, the vast majority have abided by it with great passion, criticizing those who 
discover ways to type a period at the end of a grammatically completed thought.” This play resembles 
Housman’s labor to explain thinking in terms of grammatical structures, only to find himself limited by his 
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They further tested the bounds of how to mediate a society of the mind. Their 
associations and links in a Latourian Actor-Network theory are various and plentiful. 
By 2005, however, the server that stored the project and its worldwide 
contributions was no longer in service: “When Whitney curators decided to resurrect the 
piece last year, the art didn’t work. Once innovative, ‘The World’s First Collaborative 
Sentence’ now mostly just crashed browsers. The rudimentary code and links were out of 
date. There was endlessly scrolling and seemingly indecipherable text in a format that 
had long ago ceased being cutting edge.”505 What had been the exciting, generative part 
of the project—the collaborative, experimental, meta-play with mediations in images, 
languages (and codes to render non-Western characters and alphabets), and grammar—
became illegible because of its multifarious digital “moving parts” that rendered the 
metaphor of mosaics into something that seemed irrevocably broken. And what happened 
to their sociality, or their status as social interactions mediated by the poem, technology, 
and institution? What social function does a broken server (or servers) serve? 
What happened when Elizabeth Eisenstein announced that historiographies of 
print technology were broken and were producing only a glut of undifferentiable 
monographs? What happened when Robert Darnton surveyed the fields of book history, 
bibliography, textual criticism, and other related disciplines to find an unweeded garden 
of promiscuous approaches? Even when they produced and reproduced errors of scale, 
                                                                                                                                            
metaphors. Davis continues: “The Sentence may well go on forever, or at least until a superior force or the 
limitations of web technology calls a halt to it. As the skills of users have increased, the Sentence has 
grown to incorporate far more than words. In addition to texts, there are now photographs, video, sounds, 
graphics, and links to thousands of other websites, contributed by people of all ages and cultures. Among 
the contributions are musings, rants, lyrical poems, political and spiritual tracts, fragments of thought, and 
philosophical speculation, as well as occasional vulgarities. They address such concerns as art, literature, 
sexuality, religion, the nature of play, the meaning of the ‘sentence’ itself, and the vaster subjects of life 
and death.” 




generosity, and fact, these assessments of broken multitudes had self-organizing 
properties. At the historical moment when The Textual Condition and “The Rationale of 
the Hypertext” looked like a theoretical and practical tool for bibliographers and textual 
scholars, speculation about the future of the book was very much in vogue. It could be 
utopian, as in McGann’s and Marcus’s horizons of editing, or it could be a dystopian 
wasteland of moribund links—and minds. Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, 
critics such as Sven Birkerts and Nicholas Carr wrote elegies for print technology that 
dramatized fears about hyper-mediation.506 Tellingly, like the Ancients-Moderns debate 
that occurred centuries before in proliferating pamphlet technology, both visions of the 
future of reading and knowledge production seized on correcting errors as markers of 
possibility. The errors could be preserved and studied as historical artifacts in McGann’s 
rubric, or they could be proliferated in the nightmare version of hyper-mediation of 
rampant illegible errors that lay waste to humanism.  
Birkerts’ elegiac language calls backward to these concerns about hyper-
mediation from the Ancients-Moderns debate about how to understand the past: 
All that has been said, known, and done will yield to the dance of the 
fingertips on the terminal keys. Space becomes hyperspace, and time, 
hypertime (‘hyper-’ being the fashionable new prefix that invokes the 
nonlinear and nonsequential ‘space’ made possible by computer 
technologies). One gathers the data of otherness, but through a medium 
which seems to level the feel—the truth—of that otherness. The field of 
knowledge is rendered as a lateral and synchronic enterprise susceptible to 
collage, not as a depth phenomenon. And if our media restructure our 
perceptions, as McLuhan and others have argued, then we may start 
producing generations who know a great deal of ‘information’ about the 
past but who have no purchase on pastness itself.507 
 
                                                
506 Sven Birkerts, The Gutenberg Elegies: The Fate of Reading in an Electronic Age (1994) (New York: 
Faber and Faber, 2006). 
507 Birkerts, 137. 
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Birkerts and Milton are both writing stories of belatedness in heightened literary forms of 
elegy and epic: so where does Bentley fit into Birkerts’ dark vision? Bentley’s hyper-
mediated work reflects historical versions of some of those claims, and his overbearing  
emendation of Adam and Eve’s final steps as “social” rather than “solitary” suggests his 
desire for Paradise Lost to be forward-looking rather than backward-facing. Bentley’s 
sense of the past was both particular and eccentric. His marginal notes are distracting and 
de-center Milton’s authority, at the same time that they also make over-determined 
claims about authorial intention. As the librarian at Christ Church during the Ancients-
Moderns controversy, he was the gatekeeper to the texts that any scholar would want to 
study for promoting their cause. He boasted of his position of access and control, only to 
be satirized as petty and officious as trying to control something so large and amorphous 
as the entire classical past.508  
 “Pastness,” like “historicity,” is a form of mediating one’s experience in time, 
space, and technology. In this way, it is a generative critical error to imagine that 
experience as a concept to be “lost” as Milton or Birkerts would have it, for it is always 
reconstituting itself in self-critical genres like the epic, elegy, and editorial apparatus—
each of which is explicitly concerned with a sense of belatedness to past authors’ 
achievements. They are also each explicitly concerned with theories of mind: how do you 
explain the ways of God to man? How do you imagine the future, given the probability 
                                                
508 See Levine: “…Bentley had challenged a more formidable society than he allowed. The Christ Church 
men… were no mere scholars but in every sense men of the world; and like gentlemen and men of taste in 
their time, they were accomplished Latinists and convinced disciples of antiquity. …To the men of Christ 
Church, real scholarship appeared mere pedantry. Unfortuately, the quarrel over Phalaris seemed to require 
a range of classical, especially Greek, learning that was quite beyond them. Nevertheless, they had in their 
favor style and wit enough, a strong sense of cohesion, and sufficient Latin and Greek among them to 
respond vigorously. And they were sure they had a cause that was worth defending” (54). 
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that dream visions may mediate something other than the metaphors of painting and 
cinema in the future.  
Where does Percy fit when he makes incoherent assemblages of older texts and 
plagiarized, reprinted, incomplete editorial apparatuses? Or what about forward-looking 
Theobald, who saw his work as socializing a method for future editors? Their error 
corrections generated these concepts of historicity as a form of interpretation for 
preservation. Douglas Davis’s work challenges Birkerts’ elegy—first by confirming the 
immateriality of a work of art and then by showing new forms of collaboration, 
preservation, canonization, and networked thinking that such a concept engenders, even 
and especially when it breaks. The work of editing and “unediting” all of those 
contributions from their coded state into a more stable digital preservation is an act of 
cultural “gatekeeping” that Birkerts worries is disappearing. While the digital humanities 
boom has occasioned many new instaurations of knowledge, it also has a vested interest 
in consolidation, even in conservatism, as a bulwark against deprofessionalization and 
planned obsolescence of academic structures from the twentieth century. With these very 
legitimate fears of larger budgetary and institutional crises—which are much larger than 
crises in editing—Birkerts’ work also puts Dane’s work in The Myth of Print Culture into 
some historical perspective. Dane’s claims about the need to examine particular book 
objects, polemical and insistently narrow as they may be, are his defense against de-
institutionalization of libraries and archives. He worries about what happens to print 
when it is subsumed in the abstraction of a “culture” or the remediation of digital 
technology. Marcus’s term “unediting”—with her attention on both specific variants and 
on the aura of historicity generated by iteration—poses a methodological challenge to 
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Dane’s hyper-focus by proposing a mediated prospect that can zoom in and out—from a 
wide survey of historical change through media to particular instantiations out of which 
emerge theories about the nature of those changes.  
I can imagine that Davis’s work could inspire a similar kind of crisis to the one 
McLeod/Cloud argued for in “FIAT fLUX,” as the broken links challenge tools for 
studying images, character sets, and other artifacts of previous mediation. In my own 
experiments, I have proposed glitch poetics as one inheritor of Cloud’s work—indeed, 
those glitches seem to come from, or are stored in, clouds of overloaded data. Yet the 
glitch wants to remain glitchy, promiscuous, and unassimilable in the institutional 
demands to consolidate protocols for preservation, reading, publishing and scholarship. I 
would rather the glitch revel in obsolescence than to be assimilated into familiar 
historical narratives, for “…Instead of an immense extension of aesthetics, as media 
optimists envisioned, computing technologies soon turned out to have an anaesthetic 
effect, threatening to turn the user of a tool into a mere consumer of anachronisms.”509 
The anachronism reveals the intellectual labor of making claims about how we might 
study the past in the future—it erases discontinuities in favor of speculative conflations. 
Krapp argues that hyperlink enthusiasts devoted an enormous amount of attention to 
finding past analog precursors like the eighteenth-century commonplace book, the index 
file, Vannevar Bush’s Memex, and other forms of displaying distributed information. Yet 
they did not consider “how to explain the anachronism of claiming precursors and 
forefathers while presenting a radical departure. It is a curious side effect of positing such 
a paradigm shift that the logic of the break is applied to itself, and suddenly, with 
                                                
509 Krapp, 6, 3.  
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hindsight, it appears as if everyone knew it all along: as hypertext is hyped, much of what 
it supposedly superseded turns into hypertext avant la lettre.”  
Many of the scholars under study in this dissertation, have used this strategy of 
digitally enabled retrospection as a thought experiment to study knowledge production in 
the Enlightenment. McGann’s Textual Condition and Radiant Textuality, Alan Galey’s 
strategic anachronisms for studying Milton and Shakespeare as mediating figures in the 
history of information, Peter Stallybrass’s work on the database, Neil Rhodes and 
Jonathan Sawday’s The Renaissance Computer, among others, all use this gambit in a 
non-superficial way, beyond simply tagging print technology as “avant la lettre.” That 
backwards look to analog forms may also be a way of asserting the newness of the media 
objects, in Manovich, Kirschenbaum, Bolter and Grusin.510 Some of those authors take a 
page from McLuhan’s mosaic model; others use transmedia strategies of conflation and 
subsumption. Manovich’s Language of New Media has also suffered a sense of 
datedness, as its sweeping perspective. Galloway argues that the book’s datedness comes 
from its sweep and its inattention to distinctions—what had been a provocative gambit, 
even just for attracting others to the argument, was now obsolete. The project was not 
worthless for its diachronic orientation: “…the simple premise of the book—that new 
media may be defined via reference to a foundational language or set of formal and 
poetic qualities identified across all sorts of new media objects, and indeed across 
historical and social context,” but “we are required to think critically and historically 
because of the very fact that the digital is so structural, so abstract, so synchronic.”511 For 
Galloway, Bolter and Grusin’s work falls under the same rubric of emphasizing novelty 
                                                
510 Krapp, 7. 
511 Galloway, 2. 
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and juxtaposition over discrete observations. Galloway is right about the need for 
distinctions—he recalls Grafton’s and Dane’s arguments about not subsuming media 
history into a theory in favor of discrete, deep historicist study. Yet they are not 
irremediable: from Eisenstein’s argument about technological change that provoked 
disciplinary change, and from Bolter’s prior experience with revising Writing Space 
through reflections on futurism that did not come to pass, we can see these promiscuous 
theories as strategies of interfacing with contingent forms and fears of planned 
obsolescence. They are artifacts, but not irremediable ones. “Avant la lettre” is a kind of 
interpolation of the past into the present: interpolation in the form of an argument. With 
Bentley’s keen eye and ambitions, we can see that correcting those interpolations surely 
proliferates more errors—but it also may engender more new strategies of criticism.   
I am conscious of how frequently I have used that phrase, sometimes ironically 
and sometimes provocatively, in this dissertation; as I am looking at its frequency, I 
realize that, like “cliché” the term comes from media inscription history as a notice that a 
proof has been struck before an engraver’s name has been entered. So “hypertext avant la 
lettre” can be seen as a recursive puzzle about negotiating between print and digital 
modes of inscription. We confront obsolescence not with certainty but with strategic 
uncertainty: Lisa Gitelman describes how inscription media technologies evince “the 
discomforts that the varied and questionable textuality of new inscribed forms seemed to 
inspire, and the largely uncalculated negotiations that helped those inscriptions make 
sense in a changing world.”512 “Avant la lettre” is an anachronism, commonplace, an easy 
shorthand that masks historical distinctions—but because it is a cliché, it also carries with 
it some self-awareness of its limitations. It is a strategy for dealing with what Gitelman  
                                                
512 Gitelman, Scripts, Grooves, and Writing Machines, 14. 
 
 287 
“uncalculated negotiations,” the contingencies of fast-changing modes of digital 
inscription. 
As we cyclically rehearse these contentious debates about what to do with the 
past, there’s a kind of critical glitch which super-charges debates about the death of the 
author, the future of the book, the sins and pleasures of adaptations into new media. 
Those debates are swarms of self-reflexive questions about what errors—and 
possibilities—lie in remediating the past. Remediation as a concept is founded on a kind 
of ahistoricist play with recontextualization and perspectival leaps that expose what we 
had not seen before. Those errors cannot be corrected and erased, for in correcting them 
with new claims of historicism, objectivity, or eternal truths, we engender new 
possibilities for critical errancy. As Benjamin Franklin puts it: , “... error is endlessly 
diversified; it has no reality, but is the pure and simple creation of the mind that invents 
it. In this field, the soul has room enough to expand herself, to display all her boundless 
faculties, and all their beautiful and interesting extravagancies and absurdities.”513 
                                                
513 Quoted in Kathryn Schulz, Being Wrong: Adventures on the Margin of Error (New York: Harper 
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